Chokepoints : internet intermediaries and the private regulation of counterfeit goods on the internet by Tusikov, Natasha Marie
  
 
Chokepoints: Internet Intermediaries and the 
Private Regulation of 










A thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of 
 












I hereby state that the following thesis is entirely my own original work and has not 
been submitted for any other degree at any other university or education institution. 
All sources of information used in the thesis have been indicated and due 





Natasha Marie Tusikov 
 








I would like to thank the people who helped me with this project. Thanks first to my 
supervisor Peter Drahos and my advisors Peter Grabosky and Kathryn Henne for 
providing good advice, asking critical questions and encouraging me to look at the 
big picture. It was a great privilege to write this dissertation at the Regulatory 
Institutions Network and I benefited immensely from the collegial intellectual 
environment.  
 
I want to express my gratitude to the interviewees who agreed to participate in this 
research and generously shared their knowledge and experience with me.  
 
To my uncles—Vit and Valdi Tusikov—for providing a beachside retreat in 
Mollymook with wine and oysters, my sincere gratitude. Thanks also my parents, 
Peter and Barbara Tusikov, and my sister Katrina for patiently listening to years of 
discussions of transnational private regulation and counterfeit goods. I also want to 
thank Charles Murray, a lifelong friend. Finally, and most importantly, my deep 









This dissertation examines non-state regulation on the Internet, specifically the 
capacity of corporate actors to create private regulatory arrangements and the 
degree to which those efforts may rely upon the state. It critically traces the 
interactions and inter-dependencies between corporate actors and the state 
through the lens of corporate online anti-counterfeiting enforcement efforts. 
Between 2010 and 2013, small groups of multinational corporations and 
government officials from the United States, United Kingdom and the European 
Commission created a global private regulatory regime to control websites selling 
counterfeit goods. In this regime, for the first time, major U.S.-based Internet firms, 
like Google and PayPal, adopted so-called “voluntary best practices” agreements 
that guide their regulation of these websites on behalf of rights holders of 
intellectual property. This project examines eight of these agreements that pertain 
to five Internet sectors: advertising, domain name, marketplace, payment, and 
search services.  
In this particular case of private regulation, the state plays a strong, even central 
role. “Voluntary agreements” are a deliberate misnomer as government actors, 
acting in concert with rights holders, employed varying degrees of coercion to 
pressure major Internet firms and payment providers to adopt industry-derived best 
practices. Despite these coercive elements, however, there are common financial 
and reputational interests between rights holders and Internet firms. More 
importantly, these agreements serve strategic economic and national security 
interests, particularly those of the United States. The U.S. government, the 
principal architect of the regime, has interests in the protection of intellectual 
property because of its large stable of successful rights holders. In addition, it has 
national security interests in tapping into the vast troves of personal and 
commercial data that firms, such as Google and Yahoo, collect from their users.  
Corporate agreements to regulate the online distribution of counterfeit goods speak 
to private regulation on the Internet more generally. This dissertation contends that 
  
v 
large corporate actors—both rights holders and Internet firms—can act as arbiters 
on the legality of technologies, services and applications on the Internet. In doing 
so, they can have significant influence in determining what types of new 
technologies and services prosper and which fail. Corporate anti-counterfeiting 
efforts demonstrate not only the considerable regulatory capacity of these Internet 
firms but also state and corporate interests in working with these firms to set rules 
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Chapter 1: Non-State Regulation on the Internet 
The famous Internet Blackout on January 18, 2012, represented the culmination 
of months of protests against two intellectual property bills in the United States. 
These bills were the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and its sister bill from the U.S. Senate, the Protect Intellectual 
Property Act (PIPA). Before that day, intellectual property had generally been 
regarded, at least in public discourse, as a relatively arcane, commercial matter. 
SOPA and PIPA would have targeted websites (hereafter “sites”) globally that 
sold counterfeit goods. Counterfeit goods are unauthorised reproductions of 
trademarked products and a form of trademark infringement. Trademarks are 
the symbols or logos that represent a particular company or product, like the 
famous Nike ‘swoosh.’ These bills also would have targeted sites that offer 
unauthorized downloads of copyrighted content, particularly movies, music or 
software, that are protected in intellectual property law as creative or artistic 
works.1 
 
Internet “intermediaries” were a key target of the bill. These intermediaries play 
an increasingly large and complex role in addressing various types of online 
wrongdoing, including the infringement of intellectual property rights. Internet 
intermediaries facilitate access to or the hosting of information on the Internet, 
like search engines. They also enable transactions or interactions among 
Internet users. This includes social media platforms, like Facebook and Twitter, 
and payment providers, like PayPal. PIPA and SOPA would have required 
intermediaries to play a greater role regulating sites that infringe intellectual 
property rights. Regulation in this dissertation refers to the process of setting, 
implementing and enforcing rules or standards, whether by state or non-state 
actors.  
 
PIPA and SOPA focused on the problem of so-called “infringing sites.”2 This 
broadly conceived term referred to all manner of websites that may distribute 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Another type of intellectual property, which was not included in SOPA or PIPA is patents, 
which relate to industrial methods or processes, like pharmaceutical formulas. 
2 SOPA defined “foreign infringing sites” as sites or a “portion thereof” that were directed toward 
and used by individuals in the United States, in which the site operator “is committing or 
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counterfeit or copyright-infringing goods. SOPA and PIPA would have required 
action against infringing sites from the following intermediaries: 
• payment providers (e.g., Visa and PayPal);  
• search engines (e.g., Google, Yahoo and Microsoft’s Bing);  
• advertising platforms (e.g., Google and Yahoo); and 
• domain name registrars (e.g., GoDaddy).3 
 
Under the proposed legislation, rights holders of intellectual property, such as 
Apple or Pfizer, could seek court orders to require these intermediaries to 
withdraw their services from sites distributing copyright-infringing or counterfeit 
goods. Under certain circumstances, the bills also would have granted rights 
holders a private right of action to work directly with intermediaries to target 
sites identified by rights holders as infringing sites.4 In some cases the bills also 
would have permitted certain intermediaries to act voluntarily against particular 
types of infringing sites that unlawfully distributed pharmaceuticals.5  
 
Critics of the bills said they would endanger free expression on the Internet, 
extend punitive U.S.-style enforcement strategies globally and, because of the 
types of technical enforcement measures proposed, potentially damage Internet 
infrastructure (see Lemley, Levin, and Post 2011).6 These bills were explicitly 
designed to favour rights holders, particularly large institutional copyright 
owners in the movie and music industries, at the expense of Internet firms that 
provide essential Internet services. Entirely absent from the bills was any 
consideration of Internet users or the general public that rely upon the Internet 
to participate fully in economic, social and cultural life. Public anger against the 
bills brought together a transnational coalition of academics, technologists, civil-
society activists, Internet users and Internet giants (Sell 2013).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
facilitating the commission of criminal violations,” including trafficking in counterfeit goods or 
services (SOPA Sec. 102).  
3 Domain registrars, likely the least familiar of this group, help manage the global domain name 
system and enable individuals and companies to register and operate domain names (e.g., 
nytimes.com).   
4 SOPA Sec. 103. 
5 SOPA Sec. 105. 
6 SOPA proposed to use the domain name system, which enables users to access the same 
sites from anywhere in the world to block access to infringing sites. Critics argued it would 
destabilise the system (Lemley, Levin, and Post 2011).!
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The scale of the protest startled U.S. legislators, who had never before 
encountered such heated public opposition in relation to intellectual property. At 
the zenith of the protest, on January 18, more than 15,000 websites blacked out 
part or all of their webpages to protest the bills, including web giants Google, 
Wikipedia and Reddit (Sell 2013). On that day, over four million people signed 
Google’s online petition against the bills (Netburn 2012). In fact, so many 
people attempted to contact their elected representatives that the surge in traffic 
temporarily took down some webpages of members of the U.S. Senate 
(McCullagh 2012). It was the largest Internet protest in history, described by 
U.S. Representative Darrell Issa, a Republican from California and a staunch 
opponent of the bills, as an “Internet mutiny” (Franzen 2012).  
 
Two days after the Internet Blackout, politicians sponsoring the bills in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and Senate withdrew them, effectively killing the 
legislation. Activists protested against SOPA and PIPA so vehemently because 
the bills aimed to change fundamentally online enforcement efforts against 
copyright and trademark infringement. The protest was the first major political 
defeat for U.S. intellectual property proponents in over thirty years, a 
monumental achievement of Internet activism (Sell 2013).   
 
i) From Failed Legislation to Backroom Deals 
 
Once the U.S. Congress withdrew the bills, many opponents assumed the bills 
were dead, at least until the next attempt at legislation. Protestors were 
unaware that proponents of SOPA had successfully transformed the reviled 
bills, which were soundly defeated by a groundswell of public opposition, into a 
series of secret, handshake agreements among powerful corporations. While 
protestors were campaigning against these bills, U.S. policymakers and rights 
holders supportive of SOPA and PIPA were active behind the scenes. They 
quietly negotiated agreements with firms providing essential Internet services, 
including Google, PayPal, Visa, and Microsoft. These agreements were not 
based on legislation but rather on what U.S. policymakers described as 
“voluntary, industry-led initiatives” (Espinel 2013). These initiatives were 
voluntary in the sense that they were non-legislative, non-legally binding 
general principles or “best practices” that would guide the firms’ enforcement 
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efforts against infringing sites.7 Through these non-binding (i.e., informal) 
agreements, proponents of SOPA bypassed public opposition to the bill and 
incorporated into the agreements many of SOPA’s toughest provisions (see 
Table 1.1). The negotiation over and creation of these agreements took place 
outside democratic, legislative processes.  
 
The same firms targeted by SOPA and PIPA, some of whom opposed the 
proposed legislation, adopted the agreements. Signatories include large, well-
known firms, from Google, Yahoo and PayPal to Visa, MasterCard and 
Microsoft (and its search engine Bing). SOPA’s shift from an unpopular bill into 
a series of informal industry agreements was dramatic, and reached beyond the 
United States. Between 2010 and 2013 rights holders, backed by government 
support, negotiated multiple similar agreements in the European Union, 
particularly the United Kingdom, and Canada. These agreements comprise a 
little-known private regulatory effort undertaken by prominent U.S. and 
European rights holders and their trade associations to crack down on the 
online distribution of counterfeit goods. 
Table 1.1: Internet Intermediaries 
Intermediary type Example In SOPA In private agreements 
Payment PayPal, Visa, MasterCard Yes Yes 
Advertising Google, Yahoo, Bing Yes Yes 
Search Google, Yahoo, Bing Yes Yes 
Domain GoDaddy Yes Yes 
E-commerce eBay No Yes 
 
Examining these agreements and the circumstances in which they emerged 
provides a valuable opportunity to study how corporate actors set and enforce 
rules globally in the online environment. More broadly, these agreements also 
offer an opportunity to trace interactions and inter-dependencies between 
corporate actors and the state in the construction of these agreements and 
explore the extent to which non-state (in this case, corporate) regulation relies 
upon the state. This dissertation explores this kind of corporate online regulation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 These “best practices” are identified and determined by industry and therefore do not 
represent objectively evaluated measures.  
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through an empirically grounded analysis of eight private enforcement 
agreements covering five Internet service sectors: advertising, domain name, 
marketplace, payment and search.8  
 
There are strong commonalities among these eight agreements. They are the 
product of closed-door meetings among small groups of industry stakeholders 
and government officials without participation from consumer or civil-society 
groups. They contain non-legally binding measures agreed to by industry 
stakeholders that establish minimum standards or general principles to guide 
intermediaries’ enforcement efforts. There are common enforcement strategies: 
the removal of content that infringes intellectual property rights (hereafter 
“infringing content”) and the withdrawal of services from infringing sites. In terms 
of the removal of infringing content, eBay, for example, removes sales listings 
from its marketplace that advertise counterfeit goods (termed “infringing 
listings”). Search engines like Google remove search results that are hyperlinks 
to infringing webpages (termed “infringing search results”). Other service 
providers agree to withdraw their services from infringing sites. Payment 
providers like Visa or PayPal, for example, withdraw their payment services 
from targeted sites, which leaves sites unable to process payments. 
 
The Internet intermediaries involved in these agreements are not typical Internet 
firms. Given their vast platforms and tremendous surveillance and enforcement 
capacities, these firms should be understood as “macro-intermediaries.”9 This 
dissertation focuses on the following macro-intermediaries: Google, Yahoo, 
Bing (Microsoft’s search engine), PayPal, Visa, MasterCard, American Express, 
eBay and GoDaddy. These firms have a significant regulatory capacity as they 
can reach globally and strip websites’ payment processing abilities, deprive 
them of advertising revenue and withdraw their domain name services (see 
Table 1.2). By withdrawing services from targeted sites, macro-intermediaries 
can render sites commercially non-viable. This enforcement strategy is intended 
to enact regulatory “chokepoints” to impede the functioning of infringing sites by 
throttling their access to essential services like the provision of payment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 There is some overlap amongst these categories as search engines, like Google, also operate 
digital advertising services. 
9 This term is drawn from ideas of “macro-gatekeepers” used to describe companies that 
facilitate the flow of information on the Internet (see Barzilai-Nahon 2008; Laidlaw 2010).!!
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processing. As the agreements are non-binding and struck between private 
actors, there is no judicial or state oversight of the regulatory activities. 
Enforcement can therefore be rapid, global, and largely secret. 
Table 1.2: Internet Macro-intermediaries’ Enforcement Capabilities 
Macro-intermediary Enforcement action  
PayPal, Visa, MasterCard, American Express Withdraw payment processing 
Google, Yahoo, Bing Withdraw advertising services 
Google, Yahoo, Bing Remove search results 
GoDaddy Withdraw domain name services 
eBay Remove sales listings 
 
At first glance, macro-intermediaries’ adoption of these private agreements 
appears to be contrary to their interests as the agreements increase their 
regulatory responsibilities to police their platforms for third-party wrongdoing on 
behalf of rights holders. This is because the term “voluntary initiatives” is a 
misnomer: the agreements are the product of coercive state activity. The state 
is central to the agreements. Government agencies in the United States and 
United Kingdom, and the European Commission employed varying degrees of 
coercion to compel the Internet firms to adopt these informal enforcement 
agreements. In addition to furthering the protection of intellectual property, there 
are other strategic interests at play in these agreements. For the U.S. 
government, the principal architect of agreements, the regulation of online 
infringement is inextricably linked with its interests in shaping broader regulatory 
and standard-setting efforts on the Internet as a whole.  
 
In the United States, policymakers’ circumvention of legislative processes is 
particularly provocative as it came in the wake of SOPA’s resounding defeat. 
Similar evasive manoeuvres around public interest are also evident in state-
facilitated enforcement agreements created in the United Kingdom and in the 
European Union by the European Commission. These agreements are 
backroom deals drafted among small groups of powerful, U.S.-based Internet 
firms and payment providers in concert with large, multinational rights holders 
from the United States and Europe. Consumer organisations are entirely absent 
from the process, as is any representation of the public’s interests in relation to 
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the use and regulation of Internet services. The secretive way in which industry 
and government actors created these agreements is antithetical to legislative 
and democratic processes. It also violates broadly accepted principles of 
Internet policymaking that emphasise multi-stakeholder dialogue, such as those 
adopted in 2011 by the Organisation for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (OECD 2011).  
 
The private informal agreements among rights holders, macro-intermediaries 
and key governmental bodies also speak to broader issues of regulation on the 
Internet. This industry-state anti-counterfeiting coalition raises critical questions 
about the nature of ostensibly non-state regulation and the degree to which 
private actors involved in this type of regulation rely upon the state. It also elicits 
questions about the conditions under which the state prefers private regulation, 
its interests in facilitating this particular regulatory arrangement, and the inter-
play between corporate and state online surveillance practices. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised into seven parts. The first part lays out the 
research problems and questions while the next part defines key terms and 
explains why the research focuses on the private online regulation of trademark 
infringement. The third part gives a brief overview of the context of corporate 
anti-counterfeiting efforts. Next, the chapter situates the research in the relevant 
literatures while the fifth sets out the dissertation’s methodology and theoretic 
framework. The sixth part sets out the dissertation’s argument and the final part 
outlines the chapters to follow.  
 
I) Research Problem and Questions  
 
Nation-states (hereafter “states”) and, increasingly, private actors have 
recognised Internet firms’ regulatory potential and the advantages of 
intermediary-facilitated enforcement, such as the mass surveillance and policing 
of hundreds of millions of transactions and users. Through a focus on regulatory 
efforts against sites selling counterfeit goods, this dissertation investigates the 
creation and operation of a private regulatory regime through an examination of 
eight informal enforcement agreements (see Table 1.3). The dissertation’s main 
research questions are:  
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1. How do macro-intermediaries regulate sites selling counterfeit 
goods using informal enforcement agreements on behalf of rights 
holders?  
2. Why did these macro-intermediaries adopt informal agreements 
that increased their regulatory responsibilities for third-party infringement 
on their platforms?  
3. What explains government intervention among private parties to 
compel Internet firms and payment providers to adopt informal 
agreements that primarily benefit rights holders? 
Table: 1.3: Key Private Enforcement Agreements  
Participants  Site / Initiative 
American Express, Visa, 
MasterCard, PayPal, Google, 
GoDaddy, Yahoo, Bing 
U.S. –Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies to 
address illegal online pharmacies 
MasterCard, Visa, PayPal, 
American Express,  
U.S. – International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
(payment-account termination program) 
Visa Canada – Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (payment-
account termination program) 
eBay E.U. – Memorandum of Understanding for the 
sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet 
(marketplaces) 
Taobao U.S./China  – Memorandum of Understanding 
(marketplace) 
Google, Yahoo U.K., Bing U.K. – Digital Standards Trading Group 
(advertising) 
Google, Yahoo, AOL, Bing  U.S. – Ad Networks’ Statement of Best Practices 
Google, Yahoo, Bing  U.K. – Search Engine Code of Conduct 
 
To answer these questions, this dissertation examines the eight private 
agreements listed in Table 1.3. Analysis focuses on these agreements because 
they comprise states at the forefront of informal regulatory efforts to protect 
intellectual property (the United Kingdom, the United States, as well as the 
European Commission, which is the executive arm of the European Union). I 
include the Canadian agreement to examine variances in the degree of state 
coercion in the creation of non-binding enforcement agreements. In addition, 
Page 9 of 307 
!
!
the dissertation examines the agreement with the China-based Taobao 
marketplace because China is the primary target of rights holders’ enforcement 
efforts. China is both a major manufacturer of counterfeit goods and a country 
with a rapidly growing e-commerce sector in which U.S. and European rights 
holders want to expand their market share. By examining eight agreements that 
cover a range of Internet services, this dissertation can analyse how state and 
corporate actors created and operate a global private regulatory regime.  
 
The macro-intermediaries examined in this project have considerable regulatory 
capacity given the global scale of their platforms and the technological 
sophistication of their surveillance and enforcement programs. Moreover, they 
have significant latitude to make and enforce rules governing the use of their 
platforms and services by Internet users, as well as to issue sanctions to those 
who violate their rules. These macro-intermediaries, by virtue of their provision 
of essential Internet amenities, like search and payment services, have the 
capacity to shape how individuals access and use certain Internet services and 
technologies. As a result, states or corporate actors can exert control over 
considerable portions of the Internet by controlling Internet macro-
intermediaries. State influence over macro-intermediaries, particularly by 
authoritarian governments, raises concerns of censorship and repression of 
human rights (see Deibert et al. 2011). Corporate actors, working through 
macro-intermediaries, can also wield tremendous control over the types of 
content Internet users can access and the services they can use, without any 
sort of judicial or democratic oversight. Corporate regulatory efforts, like that of 
authoritarian regimes, can be largely invisible to many Internet users who may 
not realise how intermediaries have changed their rules until they are unable to 
access certain information or use a particular service. This amounts to state-
sanctioned control by (largely) U.S. rights holders over the Internet. !
 
Despite the growing prominence of corporate regulatory efforts of the Internet, 
particularly in terms of intellectual property, this type of private regulation is 
critically under-studied. This dissertation endeavours to remedy that gap in its 
contribution to the scholarly understanding of online private regulation, 
particularly by and via macro-intermediaries. It also contributes to our 
understanding of corporate actors’ regulatory capacity and limitations, as well 
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as how and under what conditions their efforts rely upon the state. Before it 
describes how macro-intermediaries operate and outlines their evolution as 
regulators on behalf of rights holders, this chapter first explains the choice of 
intellectual property as a way to explore non-state regulation and then defines 
trademarks and counterfeit goods.  
 
II) Why Trademark Infringement? 
 
i) Importance of Intellectual Property 
 
Intellectual property is a valuable and, I argue, intriguing lens through which to 
examine non-state regulation on the Internet. Intellectual property is an issue of 
significant economic and political importance to the United States, the foremost 
global proponent of stronger protection for intellectual property rights (Drahos 
and Braithwaite 2002). Individuals and corporations in industrialised countries, 
particularly the United States but also countries in Europe, own the greatest 
proportion of intellectual property rights.10 Economic benefits from intellectual 
property primarily flow to those who own the rights. In the case of trademarks, 
this means that rights holders in the United States and Europe receive 
considerable revenue from the manufacture of products, even though the 
production of those goods increasingly takes place in lower-cost countries, 
particularly China (Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2009).  
 
In the modern, globalised economy, ownership of intellectual property rights is 
central to economic dominance. This is why the United States, on behalf of its 
industries, continues to pursue ever-stronger intellectual property rights 
protection. The United States uses bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements 
to export its preferred policies on intellectual property globally (Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2002). Historically, U.S.-based rights holders and their trade 
associations have exerted considerable influence over public policymaking 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 2003). U.S. 
intellectual property actors (rights holders and trade associations) successfully 
created a narrative in the late 1970s that linked the protection of intellectual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This is demonstrated in recent studies that examine the concentration of ownership of these 
rights (see U.S. Commerce 2012; OHIM 2012). 
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property to continued U.S. economic dominance (Drahos and Braithwaite 
2002). As chapter 3 will discuss, at that time, U.S. industry faced rising 
competition from emerging economies in Asia, and foreign debt and trade 
deficits (Halbert 1997). The protection of U.S. intellectual property offered a 
nationalistic and protectionist solution to U.S. economic problems and, 
importantly for this dissertation, conceptually linked intellectual property with 
trade (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 2003). This socially constructed idea 
of intellectual property explains the importance that the United States, as well 
as the European Union, accord to the protection of intellectual property (Drahos 
and Braithwaite 2002).   
 
Since the 1970s, U.S. rights holders and their trade associations have been 
central to the U.S. government’s campaign to push for new international rules 
and standards that would establish a global baseline for the protection of 
intellectual property rights. These corporate actors played important roles in 
persuading and pressuring foreign governments and corporations to adopt rules 
that would disproportionately favour U.S. industries, as well as those in a 
handful of other industrialised countries (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 
2003). During this period, the U.S. government formalised a role for these 
industry actors as trade advisors to the government and, in doing so, 
entrenched the inter-dependent relationship between the U.S. government and 
its intellectual property actors.11 
 
The influence of U.S.-based rights holders and their trade associations 
continues today. They lobby states worldwide to toughen laws protecting 
intellectual property and increase enforcement against the infringement of 
intellectual property rights. They also pressure companies that they contend are 
involved in or facilitate infringement to adopt suitably tough (i.e., U.S.-style) 
enforcement policies and processes. This process is never complete as rights 
holders pursue ever-increasing standards of protection. Each successful effort 
that ‘ratchets up’ rules and standards results in an ever-rising ‘floor’ that 
becomes the new baseline for subsequent efforts (Sell 2010).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 In 1981, the United States created the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (ACTN) to 
advise the U.S. government on trade policy. This committee, which is discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 3, is run by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) (Drahos 
and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 2003).  




The private regulation of trademark infringement on the Internet is a compelling 
issue to study because rights holders and their trade associations consider the 
online distribution of counterfeit goods to be a growing and serious problem. As 
a result, rights holders are innovative, aggressive and highly motivated in their 
efforts to protect their rights. The online environment presents particular 
enforcement challenges, from difficulties in locating and identifying offenders to 
problems with uncooperative foreign jurisdictions, as will be explored in chapter 
3. However, it also offers certain advantages. Macro-intermediaries, like Google 
and Visa, possess a considerable regulatory capacity by virtue of their dominant 
market share, vast networks and sophisticated surveillance and enforcement 
apparatuses. By persuading and coercing macro-intermediaries to work with 
them to address infringement, rights holders can dramatically expand their 
capacity to regulate infringing sites. Regulatory efforts on this scale are new as 
they previously would have been prohibitively expensive or technologically 
unfeasible. Before exploring how macro-intermediaries became private 
enforcers for rights holders, the chapter first explains how trademarks function 
and their vital importance as revenue generators for rights holders.  
ii) Trademarks and Counterfeiting 
 
As consumers, we see and likely recognise hundreds of trademarks daily in 
locales as diverse as media to the grocery store and even our workplaces. A 
trademark is a type of intellectual property that is classified as industrial 
property along with patents, industrial designs and trade secrets.12 Like all 
forms of intellectual property, trademark law is a complex and fast-evolving field 
but it is important to highlight a few basic points about trademarks. Trademarks 
can consist of words, letters, numerals, drawings, symbols, colours, audible 
sounds, fragrances, three-dimensional shapes, logos, pictures, or a 
combination of these or other characteristics (Ricketson 1994). Well-known 
trademarks are McDonald’s “golden arches,” Nike’s “swoosh” and Toblerone’s 
distinctive triangle-shaped chocolate bars. Originally, trademarks were intended 
to indicate a product’s origin, such as from a particular guild or artisan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The other category of intellectual property refers to copyright and related rights granted to the 
authors of literary and artistic works, and the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organizations. 
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(Ricketson 1994). However, as systems of production and distribution became 
more complex and globalised, contemporary trademarks identify the ‘proprietor’ 
of the trademark (e.g., Apple) rather than its place of manufacture (Ricketson 
1994).  
 
Trademarks are distinctive signs intended to enable consumers to identify the 
commercial origin of goods (e.g., Nike) and to distinguish specific goods from 
other similar offerings in the marketplace (Ricketson 1994). They enable 
consumers, for example, to distinguish Apple’s iPhones from Samsung’s Galaxy 
phones. Trademarks convey information to consumers about the character, 
quality and reputation of a particular good (Ricketson 1994). They promise but 
do not legally guarantee reliability or the maintenance of certain standards, 
which is the function of certification marks (Ricketson 1994). Laws require 
certification stickers from the Underwriters’ Laboratories, for example, on certain 
products, such as electrical goods. Trademarks need not be registered. Parties 
can acquire rights in relation to trademarks merely by using them, though 
registering trademarks offers protection (Ricketson 1994). Trademarks are 
registered in a process that verifies that no other individuals or companies have 
registered the same sign in the same industry sector (Ricketson 1994). Once 
registered in one country, the trademark can be registered internationally in all 
countries that are signatories to the 1891 Madrid Agreement.13  
 
The owner of a registered trademark has the exclusive right to use that mark 
and prevent all others from using “identical or similar signs for goods or services 
which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is 
registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.”14 There are 
limited exceptions, such as the use of a competitor’s trademark for comparison 
in advertising. Counterfeit goods, meanwhile, are unauthorised reproductions of 
products or packaging that infringe a rights holder’s registered trademark. 
Specifically, they are defined as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 This refers to the 1891 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks 
and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement, which was adopted in 1989 and came into 
operation on 1 April 1996. The International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation administers the system.  
14 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), Art 16.1. This 
multilateral agreement, which established standards internationally for the protection of 
intellectual property rights is discussed in chapter 3. 




any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a 
trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect 
of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects 
from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the 
owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country of 
importation.15 
 
Many people have likely encountered or even purchased counterfeit goods at 
some point in their lives, perhaps at local flea markets or along Canal Street in 
New York City. Counterfeiting affects a broad range of goods from luxury 
clothing and accessories, cosmetics and perfume, and food and alcohol to 
personal care items like toothpaste and condoms. Industrial products, such as 
commercial circuit-breaks, vehicle brake pads and pumps for mining operations 
may also be counterfeited.16  
 
A counterfeit product may have value or utility apart from its identical 
resemblance to a legitimately trademarked version of the same good. For 
example, an individual could wear counterfeit apparel and not recognise or care 
about the goods’ unauthorised trademark. However, for those who produce and 
sell counterfeit goods, their value is the trademark. Individuals desire products 
with certain trademarks because of what that mark represents (Gentry 2001). 
Someone who desires a Gucci purse may knowingly purchase a counterfeit 
version and find satisfaction with it because of the qualities they associate with 
the Gucci brand. Consumers desire counterfeit goods because they are 
“counterfeits of some brand” (Gentry 2001:264).  
 
iii) Trademarks are Forever 
 
Trademarks are often considered synonymous with “brands.” A brand can be 
understood as “the soul of a product” (Rothacher 2004:2). It can represent 
reliable qualities and consistent pricing and even evoke emotional attachment in 
consumers (Rothacher 2004:2). Marketers strategically shape brands to have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 TRIPS Art. 51(a). 
16 This is according to interviews conducted for this research as well as reports published by 
bodies like the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, see http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/reports-and-publications. !
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certain attributes and consumers may imbue those brands with certain 
personality characteristics, whether real or perceived (de Chernatony, 
MacDonald, and Wallace 2011). These characteristics can extend beyond the 
functional qualities of the product (de Chernatony and Riley 1998). For 
example, consumers may identify one model of vehicle with rugged 
independence in the backcountry, while another, similar model evokes ideas of 
downtown, urbane elegance. Brands can also be understood as symbolic 
devices or signifiers that consumers use to act “as an informational cue, 
personal identity signal or cultural symbol” (Schmitt 2012:12). Consumers use 
brands to convey aspects of their personal identities to others, such as 
creativity, refinement, independence or rebellion. They may signal their status 
through, for example, the consumption of luxury goods (de Chernatony, 
MacDonald, and Wallace 2011; Schmitt 2012) or the selection of locally sourced 
goods over imported ones.   
 
Developing and protecting brands is a serious, multi-billion-dollar business 
because trademarks can last forever. Trademarks have no expiry date and can 
be renewed indefinitely, as long as they are in use. This means that unlike 
copyrights and patents, which have expiry dates, trademarks can provide a 
potentially unending source of revenue. Successful brands are valuable 
because they “guarantee future income streams” (de Chernatony, MacDonald, 
and Wallace 2011:29). Rights holders want to attract and maintain lifelong 
customers. Much of the massive marketing literature on brands is in areas 
devoted to studying how consumers perceive brands, which brands they identify 
with and how they form associations with brands (Schmitt 2012). Brand 
perception and attachment are intensely subjective processes. Consumers can 
develop strong preferences for one brand over another, even when there are 
few differences between the products. As brands can be made or broken on 
consumer loyalty, which can be intensely fickle, there are enormous amounts of 
money at stake in the construction and marketing of brands to consumers that 
will inspire and maintain loyalty. 
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iv) Protecting Multi-Billion-Dollar Brands 
 
Multinational rights holders with well-known brands are thus aggressive in their 
efforts to protect their products from trademark infringement because billions of 
dollars are at stake. Companies that are most publicly prominent in their anti-
counterfeiting efforts are typically those with sought-after brands in the apparel 
and accessories sector. These firms include Louis Vuitton, Chanel, Gucci, 
Coach, the Gap, Nike, and Adidas. Many multinational rights holders in other 
industry sectors, such as pharmaceuticals or industrial goods, also have anti-
counterfeiting programs but these are often conducted within the company or 
quietly undertaken by a trade association.17 Further, in contrast with some 
apparel firms, companies with a problem with counterfeit pharmaceuticals or 
circuit breakers may be reluctant to publicise their anti-counterfeiting efforts 
because of concerns of driving away customers. Apparel and accessory firms 
are particularly energetic in their enforcement efforts because surveys indicate 
that individuals who knowingly purchase counterfeit goods choose to purchase 
counterfeit apparel and accessories because they do not perceive these 
products as potentially harmful.18 They may purchase some counterfeit goods 
as trial versions or substitutes for genuine branded goods (Bryce, Horton, and 
Limmer 2010; Penz and Stöttinger 2008; Rutter and Bryce 2008). These 
surveys also find that some consumers also conceptually separate the brand 
from the product, which means they choose to consume a brand (counterfeit 
Gucci purse) but not a specific product (Gucci purse) (Gentry 2001:264).19 This 
de-coupling of brands from products is particularly worrying for producers of 
luxury goods where the brand is the product. 
 
Rights holders involved in the private enforcement agreements examined in this 
dissertation typically operate through their trade associations. This makes it 
difficult at times to determine which rights holders are participating in these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 For example, the U.K.-based British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers’ Association regularly 
conducts enforcement operations in China and the Middle East against factories manufacturing 
counterfeit goods on behalf of its members.  
18 For example, a consumer survey of counterfeit purchase habits by the Business Action to 
Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) found that consumers believe counterfeit apparel to 
be less harmful than pharmaceuticals (BASCAP 2009). 
19 This research demonstrates that in contrast to rights holders’ claims of damage to their 
brands because of counterfeit goods, some consumers purchase counterfeit goods while 
ascribing value to the brand (Gentry 2001). 
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agreements, as these agreements are negotiated in closed-door meetings and 
not widely publicised. Despite these challenges, I identified parties involved in 
these programs through interviews with rights holders and their trade 
associations, particularly the influential Washington, D.C.-based International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC). The IACC, which has decades of 
experience lobbying for increased protection for intellectual property rights, 
counts some of the largest global brands among its membership.20 The IACC’s 
members include Louis Vuitton, Nike, Calvin Klein, Chanel and Apple, as well 
as the pharmaceutical companies Pfizer and Merck. The agreement negotiated 
by the European Commission in relation to counterfeit goods in online 
marketplaces publicly lists its participants (European Commission 2013). 
Participants include Adidas, Burberry, Louis Vuitton, Nike, and Proctor & 
Gamble.  
 
These brands generate massive revenue. Forbes’ annual Fortune 500 list21 
calculates, for example, that Apple generated $156.5 billion in revenue in 2013, 
while Proctor & Gamble generated $85.1 billion and Nike $24 billion (Forbes 
2013). These companies all have highly valuable brands (see Table 1.4). For 
U.S.-based apparel companies, the brand-valuation firm Interbrand estimates 
Nike’s brand at $17 billion, whereas it values the brands Ralph Lauren and the 
Gap at $4.5 billion and $3.9 billion respectively (Interbrand 2013). Non-U.S. 
brands involved in anti-counterfeiting efforts also command considerable value. 
The France-based Louis Vuitton’s brand, for example, is valued at $24.8 billion, 
according to Interbrand, while the Germany-based Adidas’ brand is estimated to 
be worth $7.5 billion.  
 
As brands are intangible assets, these figures are only estimates and there are 
variances among brand-valuation companies in the values they place on 
brands. The value of brands shifts over the years and also rises and falls with 
firms’ fortunes and scandals. Nonetheless, these staggeringly large figures offer 
an idea of the importance of corporate brands and the considerable economic 
interests that firms have in protecting their trademarks. Further, they show that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 The IACC’s membership also includes prominent copyright owners, including The Walt 
Disney Company, Sony Music Entertainment and Warner Brothers Entertainment. For a full list 
of the IACC membership, see: http://www.iacc.org/member-companies.html.  
21 Throughout the dissertation, all figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.  
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these rights holders are wealthy corporate actors that can persuasively lobby 
governments to protect their intellectual property rights.    
 
Table 1.4: Billion-Dollar Brands22 
Macro-Intermediaries Estimated Revenue 
2013 
Brand Valuation 2013 
Google $52.2 billion $93.2 billion 
Yahoo $5 billion $5.2 billion 
Microsoft $73.7 billion $59.4 billion 
PayPal $6.6 billion $7.1 billion 
Visa $10.4 billion $5.4 billion 
MasterCard $7.4 billion $4.2 billion 
American Express $33 billion $17.6 billion 
GoDaddy $1.43 billion Unavailable (privately held) 





Brand Valuation 2013 
Apple $156.5 billion $98.3 billion 
Proctor & Gamble $85.1 billion $3.1 billion 
Louis Vuitton $9.4 billion $24.8 billion 
Nike $24 billion $17 billion 
Adidas $14.5 billion $7.5 billion 
 
The largest Internet firms and payment providers similarly command multi-
billion-dollar revenues and brand valuations. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, these firms are macro-intermediaries because of their global 
operations and significant market share in the provision of key Internet services. 
This dissertation focuses on Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, PayPal, Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express, GoDaddy and eBay. Some of these firms 
provide services across multiple sectors. Google, Yahoo and Microsoft, for 
example, all operate search engines and digital advertising platforms that 
generate, in the case of Google, most of its revenue. GoDaddy is the world’s 
largest domain name registrar, which means it provides and registers domain 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Figures for estimated revenue are drawn from the Forbes 500 listing (Forbes 2013a) and 
figures for the brand estimates are from Interbrand (Interbrand 2013). The exception is 
GoDaddy, which is from (Kharif 2013) as the company is privately held. Bloomberg estimated in 
July 2013 that GoDaddy was on track for an annual corporate revenue of $1.43 billion and could 
be worth $6 billion at an initial public offering that is forecast for 2014 (Kharif 2013) 
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names.23 It also provides web-hosting services that enable sites to be 
accessible via the World Wide Web. eBay, which is one of the top global 
marketplaces, owns and operates PayPal, one of the top online payment 
services.  
 
These companies are all headquartered in the United States, suggesting the 
considerable commercial influence of U.S. companies on the Internet. Although 
these companies operate globally, they do not dominate markets equally in all 
jurisdictions. For example, Google is the world’s largest search engine but in 
China nearly 80% of the market belongs to the China-based Baidu search 
engine (Su 2014). Similarly, eBay is eclipsed in China by the China-based 
Taobao marketplace, which is operated by the massive Alibaba Group that 
provides a range of e-commerce services. Chapter 6 examines the Alibaba 
Group’s Taobao marketplace because U.S. and European rights holders 
complain that it facilitates the trade in counterfeit versions of their products.  
 
As these companies are some of the largest Internet firms globally, it is 
unsurprising that they generate billions in revenue (see Table 1.4). Forbes’ 
Fortune 500 list calculated that Google generated $52.2 billion in revenue in 
2013, eBay $14.1 billion and Yahoo $5 billion (Forbes 2013a). For payment 
providers, Visa and MasterCard generated $10.4 and $7.4 billion respectively 
(Forbes 2013a). These firms also have extremely valuable brands. According to 
Interbrand, Google’s brand, for example, is valued at $98.2 billion, which is in 
second place on the list of top one hundred brands just behind Apple, and 
eBay’s is worth an estimated $13.1 billion (Interbrand 2013).  
 
Colloquially, these macro-intermediaries can be thought of as part of “Big Tech” 
alongside the more traditional corporate powerhouses of Big Banking, Big Oil, 
Big Pharma, and Big Tobacco. This term reflects the massive revenue 
generated by and the global operations of these companies. Given the 
tremendous wealth and growing corporate influence of these macro-
intermediaries, how were they persuaded to act as enforcers for rights holders? 
Why would they agree voluntarily to increase their regulatory responsibilities to 
police third-party infringement on their platforms and networks? The primary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Domain names are the easy-to-remember names for websites, e.g., nytimes.com.  
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reason is that each of the states involved in these agreements (the United 
States, United Kingdom and European Union) used coercion to threaten macro-
intermediaries to adopt the private enforcement agreements. In addition to state 
coercion, rights holders’ also pressured the macro-intermediaries with threats of 
legal action. As well, macro-intermediaries have some common financial 
interests with rights holders, and, more broadly, with the United States and 
European Union, in the protection of intellectual property. 
 
To explore these common interests, the chapter now examines the massive 
revenue generated for certain multinational rights holders through their 
ownership of valuable intellectual property.  
!
v) Rights Holders Controlling Value Chains 
 
Value-chain analysis allows researchers to track how rights holders generate 
revenue through their control of intellectual property rights. The term “value 
chain” refers to all the activities in delivering a product to market, from design 
and manufacture to distribution and marketing (Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 
2009). Multiple companies in different countries may perform separate functions 
in this chain. The globalization of manufacturing and distribution processes 
means that corporations may find it economically advantageous to outsource 
some or all of their production activities to lower-cost countries, particularly 
China. Apple, for example, outsources more than 90% of its manufacturing 
functions to the Taiwanese-owned company Foxconn in China (Guglielmo 
2014). Analysis of value chains can determine the relative proportion of value 
that is captured at different stages of the process and by different companies.  
 
Multinational firms that own valuable trademarks, like Apple and Nike, tend to 
receive the largest share of value in the production of their products (Dedrick, 
Kraemer, and Linden 2009; Gereffi and Memedovic 2003; Kraemer, Linden, and 
Dedrick 2011). These corporations keep within their internal operations the 
most profitable activities, which are typically the design, branding, and 
marketing of products, not their manufacture (Gereffi and Frederick 2010:12). 
Thus, control over the intangible aspects of production, such as design and 
marketing of trademarks, is more important to corporations’ power and 
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profitability than tangible aspects like manufacturing (Gereffi and Frederick 
2010:12). Corporations that own valuable intellectual property can locate their 
manufacturing and distribution facilities in lower-cost countries and shift their 
activities according to changing conditions in cost, supply or demand.    
 
Analyses of Apple’s value chains demonstrate that the company captures the 
greatest share of value from its products. A study in 2011 of Apple’s production 
of iPads and iPhones reveals that manufacturers in China receive 
approximately $10 per iPad or $8 per iPhone in direct labour wages (Kraemer, 
Linden and Dedrick 2011:4).24 This amounts to 1.8% and 1.6% of the value of 
the iPhone and iPad respectively, which is in stark contrast to the 58% and 30% 
of the value that Apple captures from the same products (Kraemer, Linden, and 
Dedrick 2011:11).25 Apple captures the greatest proportion of value because it 
owns the trademarks and patents involved in the manufacture and keeps 
product design, software development, and product management in the United 
States (Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick 2011:2). Apparel manufacturing is 
similarly structured, with multinational apparel corporations like Nike capturing 
the greatest amount in the value chain (Gereffi and Frederick 2010). Companies 
that control the intellectual property can exert considerable power over their 
manufacturers in highly competitive environments. Apple, for example, shifts 
among multiple manufacturers and is willing “to switch key suppliers from one 
model to the next” (Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2010:102). 
 
These value-chain analyses show that not only does revenue disproportionately 
flow to the rights holders, but it also, by extension, flows to the rights holders’ 
home country. As the research on Apple’s value chain aptly reveals, the United 
States benefits from tax revenue and through Apple’s retention of its high-value 
services in the United States.26 China, in contrast, receives only a sliver of the 
value for the role of its citizens in manufacturing. The value captured by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 This study focuses 2010 figures associated with manufacturing the $549 iPhone 4 and the 
$499 16GB iPad. Researchers calculated the value added breakdown for the wholesale price in 
two components: 1) gross profits earned by companies, which they describe as value capture 
and 2) the cost of direct labour (Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick 2011:10). 
25 Researchers examining value-chain analysis of technology firms acknowledge that product-
level costs are difficult to obtain, as these firms “often require the silence of their suppliers and 
contractors through non-disclosure agreements” (Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2009:87). 
26 The amounts of tax revenue a country does and should receive from multinational firms are 
always difficult and sometimes controversial issues.  
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industrialised countries, particularly the United States, shows, in part, why the 
United States pursues ever-increasing protections for intellectual property.  
 
vi) Reaping Rewards from Intellectual Property 
 
The “entire U.S. economy relies on some form of intellectual property,” remarks 
Victoria Espinel, head of the Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator (IPEC), “because virtually every industry either produces 
intellectual property or uses it” (Espinel 2012b). While advocates of intellectual 
property regularly make claims like this, it was not until 2012 that the U.S. 
government first attempted to quantify the number of U.S. jobs reliant upon 
intellectual property.27 In March 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
published a report that measured and ranked the country’s most intellectual 
property-intensive industries. Over a year later and based on the U.S. report, a 
similar report was published in the European Union by the Office of 
Harmonisation for the Internal Market (OHIM), the agency responsible for 
promoting and managing intellectual property.  
 
The studies measure the contributions of intellectual property to their respective 
economies as the number of registered trademarks, patents or copyrights 
owned by a company per 1,000 employees (OHIM 2013:68). The reports find 
that the U.S. and E.U. economies are heavily reliant upon intellectual property-
intensive industries (see Table 1.5). The U.S. report calculates that these 
industries directly contributed 27.1 million jobs in the U.S. economy in 2010 
(U.S. Commerce 2012:vi). Indirect activities provided an additional 12.9 million 
jobs in the same year, for a total of 40 million jobs or 27.7% of all jobs in the 
economy (U.S. Commerce 2012:vi). These industries accounted for $5.06 
trillion (or 34.8%) of value added to the U.S. gross domestic product in 2010 
(U.S. Commerce 2012:vi). The European Union study concludes that 
intellectual property-intensive industries generated 56.5 million jobs directly with 
another 20 million indirect jobs for a total of 77 million jobs or 35.1% of all jobs 
(OHIM 2013:6). These industries account for almost 39% of total economic 
activity in the European Union, worth ! 4.7 trillion (OHIM 2013:6).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 The impetus for the study of IP-intensive industries was a request from Victoria Espinel, U.S. 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (U.S. Commerce 2012:iii).  




Table 1.5: Findings From Intellectual Property Industry Studies28 
Findings United States European Union 
Total related employment 40 million (27.7% all jobs) 77 million (35.1% all jobs) 
Value to GDP $5.06 trillion (34.8%) ! 4.7 trillion (39%) 
Number of trademark-
intensive industries 
55 industries 277 industries 








The reports also rank trademark-intensive industries and identify the top-
performing industry sectors. The U.S. report identifies 55 trademark-intensive 
industries and its top sectors include pharmaceuticals, toiletry products, motion 
pictures, and newspaper and book publishing (U.S. Commerce 2012:17). The 
E.U. identifies 277 intensive industries and its top sectors includes “leasing of 
intellectual property,” pharmaceuticals, wine, biotechnology, toiletries, and 
games and sporting goods (OHIM 2013:52).29 Among the top-ranked 
trademark-intensive sectors are a few odd cases with no obvious direct 
connection to trademarks. The manufacture of wallpaper, for example, ranks 
fifteenth in the EU report while grocery stores rank eleventh in the U.S. report.  
 
Both studies acknowledge significant methodological limitations. They admit 
that trademark usage is difficult and complex to measure in comparison with 
patent usage and as a field of study trademark measurement is critically under-
developed (U.S. Commerce 2012). These findings, moreover, are not 
uncontroversial. Critics of ever-increasing protection of intellectual property 
rights argue that intellectual property amounts to rent-seeking that stifles 
innovation and the creation of future products, inventions and artistic works (see 
Mazzone 2011; Raustiala and Sprigman 2012). Despite this, these reports are 
useful because they indicate how important the U.S. government and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Figures for the United States are from the 2012 study produced by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (U.S. Commerce 2012) and those for the European Union are from the 2013 study 
by the Office for the Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM 2013). !
29 For the European Union, Germany ranks highest in terms of trademark-intensive industries, 
followed, respectively by the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and France (OHIM 2012:85). 
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governments in the European Union perceive intellectual property to be to the 
integrity of their economies.  
 
IV) From Flea Markets to eBay 
 
The problem of counterfeit goods is, of course, not new. For centuries 
unscrupulous individuals fraudulently applied artisans’ “marks” to products to 
misrepresent their origin or creator.30 Contemporary anti-counterfeiting efforts 
began in the late 1970s. At that time, U.S.-based multinational corporations 
were growing concerned about a rise in counterfeit goods coming from 
expanding economies in Asia (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Halbert 1997). 
These companies, particularly those from the pharmaceutical, computer and 
entertainment industries, convinced the U.S. government that the protection of 
intellectual property was central to the health of the U.S. economy (Sell 2003).  
 
i) Evolution of Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts 
 
In the late 1970s, rights holders solidified their lobbying power by creating trade 
associations to focus on the protection on intellectual property. In 1979, they 
created the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC) to deal with what 
rights holders perceived was “a big counterfeiting problem on the horizon.”31 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the IACC was a key player in efforts by 
U.S. rights holders, trade associations and government officials to establish 
international rules and standards protecting intellectual property, as will be 
explored in chapter 3. Since that time, rights holders and their trade 
associations, like the IACC and the U.K.-based Alliance for Intellectual Property 
and the Anti-Counterfeiting Group, have developed a broad range of anti-
counterfeiting policies and initiatives. Among other efforts, they provide training 
to law enforcement agencies, policy advice to governments, and coordinate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The misrepresentation or imitation of marks was recognised as a crime as early as the 
thirteenth century (Paster 1969). However, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that 
trademarks were recognised in legislation with provisions protecting against their unauthorised 
use.  
31 Interview with Bob Barchiesi, President, International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, 24 April 
2012, Washington. 
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enforcement strategies.32 In terms of enforcement, one of their top priorities is to 
assist their members to address the online distribution of counterfeit goods.   
 
The evolution of e-commerce significantly changed the advertisement and 
distribution of counterfeit goods. Most people, for instance, have probably 
received spam perhaps announcing the sale of Viagra to treat erectile 
dysfunction. These drugs generally come from unlicensed and unlawfully 
operating online pharmacies that sell counterfeit or diverted medication (McCoy 
et al. 2012a).33 Internet users have also likely encountered websites selling 
suspiciously cheap brand-name goods, like Coach purses or Acushnet golf 
clubs that are euphemistically described as “replicas.” Although e-commerce 
has made it easier for counterfeiters to advertise their wares and reach 
customers, counterfeit goods must still be physically manufactured and shipped 
from production sites to consumers. This is in contrast to copyright-infringing 
digital copies of the latest movies or albums that can be downloaded from 
sources like The Pirate Bay or IsoHunt. Thus, depending on the nature and 
degree of their problem with counterfeit products, rights holders may have both 
online enforcement strategies and initiatives directed toward targeting the 
physical manufacture, importation and distribution of counterfeit goods. 
 
ii) Corporate Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts 
 
Rights holders employ various anti-counterfeiting measures depending upon the 
perceived importance of the problem and the resources they allocate to address 
it. I interviewed individuals involved in anti-counterfeiting enforcement activities 
across a range of industries, including pharmaceuticals, sporting goods, 
apparel, and consumer electronics. Corporate anti-counterfeiting efforts vary 
widely in their size, structure and manner of operation. One well-known, U.S.-
based multinational firm that I spoke with operated what the firm called its 
“Global Brand Protection Units,” which had a staff of two individuals.34 Other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, for example, offers training for law 
enforcement agencies worldwide.  
33 In this case, diverted medication (also called parallel trade products) refers to legitimate 
products intended for legal sale in one geographical jurisdiction but diverted to another in 
violation of commercial licensing agreements.!!!
34 I spoke with these individuals during my attendance at the IACC Annual Conference in May 
2012 in Washington, D.C. One of the individuals was in charge of anti-counterfeiting efforts in 
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companies operate large, sophisticated anti-counterfeiting programs with 
enforcement units in multiple geographic regions. Those involved in what is 
termed “brand-protection” efforts commonly work with in-house or external 
attorneys to undertake their enforcement activities.  
 
Many rights holders also work with third-party firms that provide what the 
industry refers to as brand-protection services. Firms in this industry vary widely 
in terms of size, scope and the services offered. Some large, well-known 
multinational firms like Kroll and Pinkerton offer brand-protection services, along 
with other security-related functions, such as fraud investigations. Apart from 
these security giants, most other brand-protection firms are much smaller with a 
handful to a few dozen employees each.35 They employ contractors when they 
need a specific skill, like surveillance or a foreign language, or an operative in 
another country.  
 
The brand-protection industry, which is part of the private security industry, 
emerged in the 1980s with the outsourcing of manufacturing from industrialised 
countries to those in Asia, particularly China. According to industry insiders, the 
industry expanded rapidly with the growth of the Internet and rights holders’ 
fears of online infringement in the early 2000s. A particular area of growth is in 
online brand monitoring, in which firms police marketplaces or commercial sites 
believed to be selling counterfeit goods and send cease-and-desist notices or 
complaints for the removal of suspicious content. These firms are part of the 
“high policing” component of the private security industry that specialises in 
corporate security and investigative work (Brodeur 2007; Bowling and Sheptycki 
2012; Sheptycki 2000).36 Similar to other high policing actors, they operate 
globally on behalf of state or corporate clients and mostly serve clients from the 
global north (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; O’Reilly 2011; Sheptycki 1997). This 
dissertation does not examine the brand-protection industry directly, as it 
focuses instead on macro-intermediaries’ enforcement efforts on behalf of rights 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
North and South America and the other was in charge of efforts in Europe, the Middle East and 
Asia.  
35 This brief portrait of the brand-protection industry was established through interviews with 
individuals working in the brand-protection industry in Australia, the United States and the 
United Kingdom.!!
36 “Low policing,” in contrast, involves the protection of physical spaces, commonly airports, 
parking lots, malls or other high-traffic areas (Brodeur 2007; Sheptycki 2000).  
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holders. It is beyond the scope of this project to consider both the brand-
protection industry and macro-intermediaries. However, I draw upon interviews 
with those in the brand-protection sector to explain online anti-counterfeiting 
strategies and examine the development of the private enforcement 
agreements.37 
 
Rights holders face particular challenges in undertaking anti-counterfeiting 
efforts in both the real world and online. Enforcement efforts aimed at physical 
locations, particularly manufacturing facilities, can be legally complex, time 
consuming, costly and challenging. Government and local officials can be 
unwilling or incapable of providing assistance.38 Foreign production facilities, 
often based in China, can be difficult to locate and surprisingly resilient to raids. 
“There simply isn’t this western conception that there are factories churning out 
counterfeit goods day by day,” explained a Hong Kong-based lawyer in relation 
to China. Instead, there “are lots of small on-the-ground facilities.”39 Those 
involved in the production and large-scale distribution can be difficult to locate 
and prosecute. “The Mr. Big, they’re never locked up in jail for IP violations,” 
says the Hong Kong-based lawyer.40  In developing countries, the protection of 
foreign rights holders’ trademark rights is often not a priority for law enforcement 
agencies that understandably must focus on more serious offences like 
weapons trafficking. Even within industrialised countries anti-counterfeiting 
efforts can pose challenges. Enforcement efforts aimed at flea markets or 
discount outlets, for example, can be resource-intensive and ineffective as 
sellers shift locations or rapidly replenish their stocks if counterfeits are seized.  
 
iii) Infringing Sites and the Problem of “Whack a Mole”  
 
In the online environment, rights holders face some of those same challenges. It 
is relatively easy for those offering counterfeit goods to set up a website, name 
it something catchy like www.Nikeoutletsale.com, and spam advertisements to 
consumers. They may also open multiple seller accounts in online marketplaces 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 The brand-protection industry, its history, evolution and roles, merits a dissertation in itself.  
38 In some areas corruption of local and state officials is a significant problem and counterfeiting 
may provide benefits to the local economy through employment (Mertha 2005). 
39 Interview with lawyer at Hong Kong law firm, 7 May 2012, Washington. 
40 Ibid. 
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like eBay or iOffer and sell their wares to unsuspecting customers or those 
looking for a good deal. Rights holders must monitor the sale of their products 
across multiple online marketplaces and try to identify and shut down sites 
selling counterfeits. For some popular brands, the scale of the problem is 
significant as there may be tens of thousands of sales listings for counterfeit 
goods on online marketplaces and hundreds of sites selling counterfeit 
products. Individuals operating these sites can be difficult to identify and tough 
to prosecute, particularly if they are based in jurisdictions that are unwilling or 
unable to cooperate.  
 
The principal challenge, however, is the resilience of counterfeiters’ operations 
to enforcement efforts. Rights holders may complain to the offending site’s web 
host, which can terminate its service to the targeted site. However, the site 
owners can simply seek another web hosting company, payment provider, or 
domain name registrar. “The expression is whack a mole,” explains Damian 
Croker, the head of BrandStrike, a brand-protection firm in the United Kingdom. 
“The fact is even after you get that site down it comes back up again.”41 Those 
in the brand-protection community refer to sites selling counterfeit goods as 
“infringing sites” or, more colourfully, “rogue sites.” There is no commonly 
accepted definition for infringing sites. It includes sites that sell counterfeit 
goods, as well as those that distribute copyright-infringing music, films, software 
or books, like the infamous site, The Pirate Bay.42 In its breadth, this term is 
similar to the one proposed by the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). 
 
SOPA defined “foreign infringing sites” as sites or a “portion thereof” that were 
directed toward and used by individuals in the United States in which the site 
operator “is committing or facilitating the commission of criminal violations,” 
including trafficking in counterfeit goods or services.43  SOPA’s definition would 
have applied to sites selling counterfeit goods and those offering copyright-
infringing content. The breadth of SOPA’s definition alarmed critics who argued 
that a “portion thereof” could be interpreted to include sites that had only a small 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Interview with Damian Croker, CEO, BrandStrike Limited, 25 September 2012, London.  
42 The definition also incorporates sites that distribute circumvention devices, which are 
prohibited in many countries. These devices are software programs that enable users to ‘break’ 
the digital ‘locks’ set by copyright owners.  
43 SOPA Sec. 102.!!
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problem with infringement. This could include a site that allegedly offered for 
sale one counterfeit good amongst all its other legitimate products. It could also 
include legitimate sites that had hyperlinks to sites that sell counterfeit or 
copyright-infringing goods.  
 
Legal definitions proposed in legislation like the ill-fated SOPA are subject to 
judicial interpretation and scrutiny. This gives critics and defendants chances to 
raise objections. Legal rulings shape how definitions can be used and to what 
types of situations they apply. In contrast, private agreements among corporate 
actors provide no similar opportunity for scrutiny. For advocates of these 
agreements, the looser nature of the agreements is highly useful. It means, for 
example, that there is no defined threshold of criminality. Rights holders and 
macro-intermediaries thus have the flexibility to target sites that are selling only 
one counterfeit item if they choose. For critics of these agreements, however, 
the looseness is extremely problematic. It means that sites that sell a mixture of 
legitimate and infringing goods, whether deliberately or unintentionally, could be 
crippled commercially instead of given a chance to address the infringing items. 
Despite these challenges, this dissertation adopts the term infringing site 
because it is commonly used. It does so, however, with the proviso that such 
sites are designated as infringing based on allegations, not proof, of 
infringement by rights holders. Macro-intermediaries generally require only a 
statement of good faith from the rights holders, not any definitive proof of 
infringement like a test purchase of a suspected counterfeit good.44 
 
Rights holders argue that the online distribution of counterfeit goods is too large, 
complex and difficult for rights holders to address alone. In concert with their 
trade associations, they have increasingly pressured macro-intermediaries like 
eBay to crack down on the online distribution of counterfeit goods. Advocates 
for this shift in regulatory responsibility to Internet intermediaries often 
emphasise that these intermediaries facilitate criminal activities, whether 
knowingly or inadvertently. They also say that, in some cases, these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 A test purchase refers to the practice of rights holders (or their investigators) buying a 
counterfeit good, examining it and documenting the features that prove it is a counterfeit. The 
European Commission’s agreement, for example, does not require that rights holders make test 
purchases to prove that the targeted goods are indeed counterfeit and not second-hand goods 
or legitimate goods diverted from another market (see European Commission 2013). !
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intermediaries benefit financially from providing services those selling 
counterfeit goods. “eBay is making money out of this,” argues Ruth Orchard, the 
director of the Anti-Counterfeiting Group, a trade association in the United 
Kingdom. “They take a commission on each sale whether it's a counterfeit or a 
real item.”45 Similar arguments have been leveled against Google, PayPal, Visa 
and MasterCard.  
 
Proponents of increased protection tend to want all types of intermediaries to 
strengthen their enforcement policies, from marketplaces, web hosts and 
payment providers to advertising platforms, search engines, and domain service 
providers. However, they particularly wanted to convince macro-
intermediaries—Google, PayPal, Visa, GoDaddy and the handful of others—to 
adopt tougher policies. Rights holders, particularly those with popular, often-
counterfeited brands, sought to enlist macro-intermediaries as their 
gatekeepers, effectively acting as transnational brand police. Gatekeepers are 
parties that can facilitate and/or control the flow of particular phenomena, such 
as individuals, information, behaviour or funds and are not the primary authors 
or beneficiaries of the wrongdoing (Kraakman 1986; Mazerolle and Ransley 
2004).46 Rights holders were able to persuade the states involved in the private 
enforcement agreements to secure macro-intermediaries’ cooperation because 
of shared interests between rights holders and the governments involved.  
 
iv) State and Corporate Inter-dependencies 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the rights holders pushing for private 
enforcement agreements with macro-intermediaries are billion-dollar brands. 
They operate persuasive, well-funded lobbying campaigns through prominent 
trade associations like the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition. In concert 
with these associations, they use the threat of legal action to convince macro-
intermediaries to strengthen their enforcement practices, as will be discussed in 
chapters 4 to 6. They work with government agencies to set tough rules and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Interview with Ruth Orchard, Director, Anti-Counterfeiting Group, England, 17 September 
2012, by Skype. 
"#! Gatekeeping is traditionally understood as a state-steered process for delivering a public 
good, such as creating safer neighbourhoods. States take an active role in identifying relevant 
third parties and securing their cooperation. In return, states may compensate or reward 
gatekeepers (Kraakman 1986; Mazerolle and Ransley 2004).  
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standards to protect intellectual property, including the privately drafted, non-
binding enforcement agreements. They go to these lengths because the stakes 
are enormous. Multinational rights holders, like Nike and Apple, owe their 
massive revenue and highly lucrative brands to the careful preservation of their 
intellectual property rights. They are keen to maintain their advantage by 
advocating for the ever-increasing protection of these rights. Private 
enforcement agreements with macro-intermediaries offer rights holders a useful 
opportunity to shift some of their enforcement burden to Internet firms and 
payment providers. But more importantly, these agreements allow rights holders 
to undertake global enforcement campaigns in a manner that previously would 
have been unattainable or prohibitively expensive. With their vast, global 
platforms and technologically sophisticated surveillance and enforcement 
capabilities, macro-intermediaries can conduct mass policing of Internet 
networks, platforms and services. They can also enact technological 
chokepoints to throttle suspicious transaction or activities. By partnering with 
macro-intermediaries, rights holders can police their brands globally, rapidly and 
in relative secrecy.  
 
Rights holders’ interests are clear but what about those of macro-intermediaries 
and the governments involved? In contrast to rights holders’ decades of 
experience in influencing intellectual property policymaking, Internet firms like 
Google and GoDaddy are political neophytes and are relatively new to the 
political-lobbying game (Sell 2013).47 Threats of legislation from governments in 
the United States and United Kingdom and legal action from rights holders are a 
factor in macro-intermediaries’ decision to enhance their enforcement practices.  
However, this is not purely a story of state coercion. There are important inter-
dependencies between the state and these macro-intermediaries. 
Governments, particularly the United States, are increasingly reliant upon 
macro-intermediaries’ vast troves of personal and commercial data to facilitate 
law enforcement, national security and economic policies. This is clearly evident 
from Edward Snowden’s leaked files that show the U.S. National Security 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 The protests over the Stop Online Piracy Act revealed the gulf in political lobbying capacity 
between Internet firms like Google, Yahoo and Facebook and the entrenched, institutional 
power of trade associations like the Motion Picture Association of America (Sell 2013). Since 
that time, however, Google has been developing its political lobbying capacity.  
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Agency’s dependence on Google and Yahoo.48 Macro-intermediaries, in turn, 
receive a degree of legitimation and protection for their often-controversial 
corporate surveillance programs and can lobby the U.S. government on issues 
of concern to their industry, such as privacy and the storage of personal data. 
This interplay of state-corporate interests, which is explored throughout the 
dissertation, indicates that Internet firms’ adoption of private agreements has 
broader ramifications than merely the regulation of online infringement.  
 
V) Review of Literature: Where Transnational Policing and 
Corporate Regulation Meet 
 
The logical literature in which to base this research is that of the private security 
industry. Corporate anti-counterfeiting activities are part of the brand-protection 
sector, which itself is a component of the private security industry. In general, 
however, research on high policing by private actors, which includes 
investigative and security consultancy work, is critically under-examined (see 
Brodeur 2007; Bowling and Sheptycki 2012).49 This problem is especially acute 
in relation to corporate actors conducting enforcement activities transnationally 
(exceptions include Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; O’Reilly 2011; O’Reilly and 
Ellison 2006). Despite the under-developed nature of this area, a small but 
useful literature provides helpful insights into mutually beneficial corporate-state 
interactions that shed light on macro-intermediaries’ actions (e.g., Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012; Johnston 2000; O’Reilly 2010). Overall, the private security 
literature is significantly under-developed in relation to transnational corporate 
investigative work, particularly in regards to the Internet.  
 
Given these gaps, this dissertation draws extensively from the socio-legal 
literature to explore ideas of corporate regulation through Internet intermediaries 
and shifting notions of regulatory responsibility among corporate actors (e.g., 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 The leaked Snowden files revealed that the U.S. NSA collected intelligence to help the U.S. 
position in trade talks. In one case, the NSA obtained information from the Australian security 
services on a U.S. law firm that was retained by the government of Indonesia (Jabour and 
Pengelly 2014). !
49 This is in contrast to the booming literature in front-line private security duties, which includes 
guarding specific spaces, like malls or airports, or certain populations, like prisoners or tourists 
(see Brodeur 2007).   
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Benkler 2011; Weatherall 2012; Zittrain 2006). A rapidly growing literature on 
intermediaries provides relevant insights into their regulatory capabilities and 
responsibilities, as well as the procedural and normative concerns raised by 
their regulatory efforts (e.g., Elkin-Koren 2001; Laidlaw 2009; McIntyre and 
Scott 2008). Of particular use to this dissertation are analyses of intermediaries’ 
enforcement abilities and limitations particularly those that assess the 
implications of intermediary-facilitated regulation (Barzilai-Nahon 2006; Kohl 
2012; Laidlaw 2012). Much of the research in this area examines the role of 
Internet service providers, web hosts and search engines in controlling 
copyright infringement (e.g., McIntyre and Scott 2008). There is, however, a 
small but growing body of literature that considers the roles of payment, social 
networking, and domain name intermediaries as gatekeepers (i.e., enforcers) in 
other types of wrongdoing (e.g., Kohl 2013; Lindenbaum and Ewan 2012; 
Mellyn 2010). 
 
In relation to corporate anti-counterfeiting efforts, there is a paucity of scholarly 
research relating to the online or physical world (notable exceptions include 
Mackenzie 2010 and 2010a). There is a small but highly relevant body of 
research that critically questions how counterfeiting can (and should) be policed 
and the public interest in doing so (e.g., Mackenzie 2010; Mertha 2007; Urbas 
2005; Wall and Large 2010). Scholarship that argues that counterfeiting can, in 
some cases, stimulate innovation (e.g., Raustiala and Sprigman 2012) and that 
heavy-handed corporate enforcement practices can unfairly constrain legitimate 
behaviour (see Mazzone 2011) provide a useful corrective to industry and 
government narratives of unmitigated harm. Much of the academic literature on 
counterfeiting, however, can be rather crudely divided into two broad areas: 
supply and demand. This literature provides useful detailed analyses of 
consumer demand for, trends in and challenges of policing counterfeit products. 
The demand-side literature examines consumer attitudes toward counterfeits of 
different brands and products, and predictor variables for the purchase of 
counterfeits (e.g., Arghavan and Zaichkowsky 2000; Rutter and Bryce 2008; 
Swami et al. 2009). The supply-side literature generally analyses trends in the 
manufacturing and distribution of counterfeits (e.g., Chaudhry et al. 2009), 
focuses on specific countries (e.g., for China, see Chow 2003) or products (e.g., 
for cigarettes see Shen et al. 2010).  
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VI) Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
i) Theoretical Framework 
To explain the creation of non-binding enforcement agreements and macro-
intermediaries’ adoption of them, in chapter 2 this dissertation’s theoretical 
framework brings together concepts from two distinct, yet inter-related areas of 
scholarship. The first is the non-state governance literature within international 
relations, which accounts for regulatory authority existing outside the state. The 
second is the law and technology literature, which explores the complexities of 
regulating through technology, along with attendant procedural and normative 
concerns. From the non-state governance literature, the dissertation draws 
upon the concept of “private authority” to explain how and under what 
conditions corporate actors can set and enforce rules. It also adopts the 
concept of “regulatory regime” to capture the array of actors involved in 
regulatory efforts against online infringement. Through the law and technology 
literature, the dissertation considers ideas of corporate actors regulating through 
technological intermediaries and the use of technology as a regulatory 
instrument. The three-part theoretical framework weaves together concepts of 
regimes, private authority and technologically facilitated regulation to explain the 
creation and rapid adoption of informal private enforcement agreements. 
 
The concept of a regulatory regime provides a useful analytical framework to 
explain the emergence of a particular regulatory arrangement, identify all 
stakeholders and account for complementary and divergent interests. Regimes 
are understood here as “the full set of actors, institutions, norms and rules” 
(Eberlein and Grande 2005:91) that comprise a particular regulatory 
arrangement. The advantage of using the term is that it explicitly recognises 
corporate actors’ capacity to make and enforce rules, particularly through “soft 
law” measures, such as non-binding industry codes of conduct or best 
practices. Further, it is sensitive to inter-dependencies between state and non-
state actors and importantly recognises that the state plays a key role in 
directing, shaping or endorsing private regulation.  
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Private authority, meanwhile, usefully explains how corporate actors can 
acquire the capacity to set and enforce rules governing the conduct of others 
and the constraints upon that capacity. This dissertation understands private 
authority as the capacity of non-state actors “to create rules or standards that 
other actors adopt” (Green 2013:29).50 Rights holders must have the capacity to 
persuade others, specifically macro-intermediaries, to adopt their rules. 
Corporate actors’ authority to convince them to do so is limited and, faced with 
reluctant macro-intermediaries rights holders must solicit assistance from the 
state. Analysis of corporate actors’ private authority enables the researcher to 
determine the extent to which the private regulation is dependent upon the 
state. Private authority is partially derived from the state, as the state arbitrates 
among competing private interests and makes decisions that favour some 
actors over others (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Peters et al. 2009). 
 
Finally, the law and technology literature offers ways to consider how rights 
holders and macro-intermediaries use technology to facilitate regulation. 
“Techno-regulation” refers to deliberate efforts to shape individuals’ behaviour 
through technology (Leenes 2011). This literature draws on principles from 
science and technology studies to emphasise that technology is socially 
constructed, and that technology and politics shape one another (Brey 2005; 
Franklin 1995; Latour 2005). Rights holders and macro-intermediaries use 
technology, such as automated surveillance programs, to detect anomalies and 
possible violations of firms’ policies. Techno-regulation enables analysis of how 
technology facilitates users’ compliance and shapes the nature of regulation 
and policing in this space. 
ii) Methodology 
There is virtually no scholarly research on corporate anti-counterfeiting efforts, 
particularly through private enforcement agreements. Thus, I undertook an 
exploratory approach (Blaikie 2000) to gain a deep, detailed understanding of 
the phenomenon and to trace the actors involved in regulating sites selling 
counterfeit goods. I first conducted a series of preliminary interviews in several 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Green (2013) employs this definition to examine non-state actors’ involvement in global 
efforts to set rules in relation to climate change but the definition can usefully be applied to other 
types of non-state regulation.  
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Australian cities, as I was based in Australia. These interviews enabled me to 
gain a thorough understanding of corporate anti-counterfeiting strategies and 
initiatives and a good knowledge of the brand-protection industry. The 
Australian interviews and subsequent interviews in the United States and United 
Kingdom led me to private enforcement agreements in Canada and in China 
that involved, respectively, payment providers and marketplaces. I sought to 
examine the core of online anti-counterfeiting efforts undertaken by actors who 
were directly involved in working with intermediaries and creating the private 
agreements. The dissertation focuses on eight non-binding private enforcement 
agreements adopted between 2010 and 2013 by payment, advertising, search, 
marketplace and domain name macro-intermediaries. 
 
The United States is the epicentre of these efforts. In particular, the Office of the 
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) shaped many of 
the agreements. Alongside the United States, the European Union has a strong 
history of encouraging self-regulation on the Internet. The European 
Commission took a lead role in facilitating the creation of an informal agreement 
among marketplaces and rights holders covering the European Economic Area. 
In the United Kingdom, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, like IPEC, 
shaped and facilitated informal enforcement agreements. The European Union 
and the United States are home to rights holders and trade associations with a 
long, successful history of lobbying for greater protection for intellectual property 
rights. Their enforcement activities are at the vanguard of online anti-
counterfeiting efforts and their private agreements are the first that pertain to the 
online distribution of counterfeit goods. By examining informal regulatory efforts 
in the United States and European Union, I was able to analyse agreements 
across the payment, advertising, search, marketplace, and domain name 
sectors. I selected the Canadian merchant-account termination case to provide 
a counterpoint to that in the United States. Both programs target sites selling 
counterfeit goods.  
 
iii) Research Methods 
 
I conducted 91 semi-structured interviews with rights holders, trade 
associations, Internet firms and payment providers, government officials, 
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attorneys, investigative firms and civil-society groups in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. The majority of the interviews were 
conducted in Washington, DC, New York City and London, United Kingdom. 
Initial interviews were undertaken in my home base of Australia to gain a 
detailed understanding of anti-counterfeiting enforcement and to identify the 
main players, trends and issues in the field. As most of the individuals 
interviewed were in managerial positions as directors of investigative firms or 
rights holders’ brand-enforcement units, elite interviews were the most 
appropriate method (Bygnes 2008). 
 
Wanting to speak with individuals with direct experience in creating the informal 
agreements and in conducting anti-counterfeiting enforcement efforts, I 
interviewed individuals from a wide range of industries: pharmaceuticals, 
apparel and accessories, sporting goods, commercial electrical components 
and consumer electronics. This diversity enabled me to examine the online 
regulation of counterfeit goods across industry sectors. To consider 
perspectives critical of corporate anti-counterfeiting enforcement, I interviewed 
representatives from Public Knowledge, the Centre for Democracy and 
Technology, the Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property at 
American University, and The American Assembly at Colombia University. I 
modified the interview questions according to the participant’s expertise and 
roles. The interviews were a mixture of in-person, telephone, email and Skype 
interviews depending on the participant’s availability and preferences.   
 
The majority of interviewees agreed to digitally recorded for-attribution 
interviews and these individuals are named in the research when they are 
quoted (see Appendix A).51 Some asked that their comments not be attributed 
to them. Their names and organizations have been removed in citations 
accompanying their quotations. Despite repeated requests for interviews, some 
Internet firms declined to participate in this project. In particular, I was unable to 
speak with any search, marketplace or domain name intermediaries. However, I 
remedied this by interviewing attorneys, rights holders and investigative firms 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Many of the brand-monitoring and investigative firms interviewed for this dissertation provided 
detailed background information on the brand-protection industry and corporate anti-
counterfeiting efforts but are not cited directly in the text (see Appendix A).   
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who interact with these firms’ for their perspectives on the macro-intermediaries’ 
anti-counterfeiting activities. I also consulted macro-intermediaries’ corporate 
annual reports, press releases, corporate blogs, media interviews, court 
documents and testimony before government committees in the United States 
and United Kingdom.  
 
I used judgment-purposive sampling to identify individuals with direct 
experience in conducting or facilitating online anti-counterfeiting efforts (Teddlie 
and Yu 2007). I identified individuals with relevant experience through trade 
association websites, such as the U.S.-based International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition and the U.K.-based Anti-Counterfeiting Group. Based on these 
interviews, I used snowball sampling to reach other interviewees (Atkinson and 
Flint 2001).  
 
In addition to interviews, in May 2012, I attended a three-day industry 
conference hosted by the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition in 
Washington, D.C. that focused on anti-counterfeiting enforcement strategies, 
which proved invaluable as a window into the state’s role in private agreements. 
I consulted a range of media sources, including specialised 
technology/intellectual property sites and blogs, particularly, TechDirt, Wired, 
Ars Technica, TorrentFreak and The Register. I also regularly reviewed sites 
and blogs for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the U.K. Open Rights Group 
and the European Digital Rights Initiative. 
 
VII) Argument 
Despite participants’ rhetoric of “voluntary” agreements among macro-
intermediaries, the state played a key role in constructing and legitimising the 
informal private regulatory regime. Government agencies in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, along with the European Commission, employed 
various coercive methods to compel macro-intermediaries to adopt the 
agreements, including threats of legal action and legislation. This coercion 
stimulated cooperation from macro-intermediaries but these actors also have 
some common interests with rights holders and the government agencies 
involved. Both rights holders and macro-intermediaries have strong financial 
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and reputational interests in protecting their brands from association with 
criminality and in ensuring safe e-commerce and online environments.  
 
Rights holders’ private authority is limited as they were unable to persuade 
macro-intermediaries to adopt wholesale changes to their rules. Coercive 
pressure by states, along with rights holders’ threats of legal action, convinced 
macro-intermediaries to adopt the private enforcement agreements. These 
agreements are a novel development in the online regulation of intellectual 
property. They accord multinational corporations access to a powerful 
regulatory capacity—some of the largest Internet firms and payment 
providers—that was previously only available to the U.S. government to control 
problems like commercial child pornography sites and the illegal gambling sites 
(MacCarthy 2010). Macro-intermediaries’ adoption of private agreements has 
fundamentally altered the online regulation of infringement. Their enforcement 
efforts under the agreements are more coordinated, streamlined, rapid and 
proactive than their previous efforts. 
 
The United States and European Union intervened on behalf of rights holders 
because these states have strong economic interests in seeking strengthened 
protection for intellectual property. In comparison with macro-intermediaries, 
rights holders’ have a long-standing, entrenched position of influencing 
policymaking in the United States and Europe. The states involved in the private 
enforcement agreements also have more strategic motives for facilitating 
macro-intermediaries’ global regulatory efforts on the Internet. The United 
Kingdom and European Union, for example, have interests in exerting greater 
control on the Internet in terms of illegal content by tapping into macro-
intermediaries’ considerable surveillance and enforcement capabilities to shut 
down child pornography sites and extremism sites (Fae 2014; Laidlaw 2012). In 
terms of national security, state security agencies in the United States and 
United Kingdom reply upon macro-intermediaries’ mass accumulation of users’ 
personal and commercial data, as demonstrated by Edward Snowden’s leaked 
files. More broadly, the U.S. government has economic and national security 
interests in expanding its standard-setting capacity on the Internet by working 
with—and through—macro-intermediaries, in areas like encryption and data 
storage practices. 




The private regulatory regime created by the enforcement agreements has 
distinctive U.S. origins, which underscores the U.S. role as the strongest 
proponent globally for the protection of intellectual property rights. The regime, 
based in the United States and Europe with branches in Canada and China, 
stretches worldwide and enables proponents of stronger enforcement practices 
to export globally a U.S.-style approach to intellectual property enforcement. 
This regulatory regime was born in and is conducted from the shadows. Its rules 
come from closed-door meetings among small groups of powerful corporations 
and its actors operate without any democratic oversight.  
 
Advocates for intellectual property justify the enforcement campaigns to protect 
consumers from being deceived or defraud by counterfeit goods. Consumers, 
however, do not have a voice in the regime and there is no representation from 
consumer organisations. Government agencies involved in the regime do not 
represent consumers’ interests or, more broadly, those of the public in relation 
to core digital rights, particularly privacy. Given these problems and 
governmental interest in facilitating secretive private regulation on the Internet, it 
is an open question whether these government bodies can represent 
consumers and the general public. This dissertation argues for the public to 
become politically engaged over the issue of state-corporate regulation on the 
Internet. A promising avenue is Brazil’s Marco Civil da Internet, which is a digital 
bill of rights introduced in March 2014 and drafted in an open consultative 
process. The law, which in part is a response to the NSA spying scandal, 
enshrines protection for digital privacy, among other provisions.52  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 An English-language version of the Marco Civil law is available from the Geneva Internet 
Platform, operated by Diplo, a civil-advocacy group promoting diplomacy and democracy 
among small and developing countries, see: http://giplatform.org/resources/text-brazils-new-
marco-civil.  
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VIII) Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter 2 situates this dissertation within the non-state governance and 
regulatory studies literatures and sets out its theoretical framework by drawing 
upon the concepts of regulatory regimes and private authority from non-state 
governance literature and techno-regulation from the law and technology 
literature. Chapter 3 establishes the political, legal and technological context for 
the emergence of informal enforcement agreements. It examines how Internet 
firms and payment became gatekeepers for rights holders and traces legislation 
that has shaped online enforcement efforts, particularly the U.S. Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, the European Union E-Commerce Directive, and the 
U.S. Stop Online Piracy Act.  
 
Chapters 4 to 6 present the dissertation’s empirical findings. Chapter 4 
analyses private agreements involving payment and advertising macro-
intermediaries. Chapter 5 considers how search engines and domain registrars 
are increasing their regulatory efforts against online infringement. Chapter 6 
focuses on online marketplaces’ enforcement efforts against the distribution of 
counterfeit goods. Each of these chapters examines the pressure on macro-
intermediaries to become gatekeepers for rights holder, explains their regulatory 
policies and practices, and explores the involvement of government actors in 
shaping the agreements. Chapter 7 draws upon the empirical findings to 
discuss the inter-dependencies and varying interests among actors in the 
regulation of online infringement and, more generally, corporate regulation on 
the Internet. It underlines the absence of consumers and suggests ways that 
the interests of consumers and the public more generally can be represented. 
Chapter 8 summarises the dissertation’s findings, reflects upon the 
characteristics of corporate online regulation and considers ways to strengthen 
the private enforcement agreements. The dissertation concludes by proposing 
ways to raise public awareness of the troubling aspects of the private regulatory 
regime and calls for greater political engagement by the public in this area. 
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Chapter 2: Regulating Through the State 
 
The analytical puzzle at the heart of this dissertation is why macro-
intermediaries agreed to adopt non-legally binding private enforcement 
agreements to regulate online infringement on behalf of rights holders. More 
broadly, the dissertation explores how private regulatory regimes function and 
the degree to which they rely upon the state. To explore these questions, this 
dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach. It brings together two distinct, 
yet inter-related areas of scholarship: the non-state governance literature within 
international relations and the law and technology literature. By drawing 
together these literatures, the dissertation constructs a theoretical framework 
that explains the role of the state in private regulation and is attentive to 
corporate-state dynamics in the creation and operation of private anti-
counterfeiting efforts on the Internet.   
 
From the non-state governance and the law and technology literatures, the 
chapter weaves together three concepts: regulatory regimes, private authority, 
and techno-regulation. Regimes refer to all the actors and rules involved in a 
particular regulatory arrangement. The concept provides a useful analytical 
framework to trace the key state and corporate actors involved in constructing 
the private agreements and examine their overlapping and competing interests. 
Alongside the concept of regimes, private authority explains how corporate 
actors can acquire and wield authority, as well as and the nature and limitations 
of that authority. This dissertation understands private authority as the capacity 
of corporate actors to make rules that other private parties adopt (Green 2013). 
By pulling together regimes and private authority, the dissertation is attentive to 
the inter-dependencies between corporate and state actors, and to the 
relationship between private authority and the state. From the law and 
technology literature, the chapter uses techno-regulation, which refers to the 
use of technology as a regulatory instrument to shape human behaviour 
(Leenes 2011:14). Technology underlies this regulatory regime and techno-
regulation helps explain how both rights holders and states shape macro-
intermediaries’ enforcement practices.  
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The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it explains how this dissertation 
understands the authority of the state in relation to private regulation and then 
situates the dissertation within the non-state governance literature and 
regulatory studies (a subfield of socio-legal studies). Then the chapter explains 
how corporations can act as regulators and explores corporate and state 
interests in private regulation. Third, the chapter discusses the concept of 
private regulatory regimes and then examines the concept of private authority. 
Fifth, the chapter turns to explore how technology can be used as a regulatory 
instrument. The final part draws together the concepts of regimes, private 
authority and regulation through technology to explain how this dissertation 
understands the private online anti-counterfeiting regime.  
 
I) Conceptualising the State’s Role in Regulation 
In considering corporate actors’ interactions with the state, it is first important to 
consider critically the role of the state in these regulatory relationships. A useful 
way to understand the state is through the theoretical framework of regulatory 
capitalism, as expounded by John Braithwaite (2005 and 2008) and David Levi-
Faur (2005). Regulatory capitalism is premised upon neoliberal principles of 
privatisation, competition and a decentred state that directs rather than 
performs regulation (Braithwaite 2000:222).53 Neoliberalism, in this specific 
context, is understood as referring to ideas of privatisation and deregulation, 
including a diminished public sphere (Braithwaite 2005:3). However, in many 
cases, as state functions were privatised, the demand for oversight bodies to 
monitor those out-sourced functions created an impetus for more not fewer 
regulatory agencies (see Braithwaite 2005; Levi-Faur 2005).54 The proliferation 
of oversight and regulatory bodies accompanying neoliberalism created what 
some call the “audit society” (Power 1997) and others refer to as the “regulatory 
state” (Braithwaite 2000; Majone 1994). In this landscape, the state takes on a 
meta-regulatory role, while corporate actors interact directly and indirectly with it 
in the provision and enforcement of rules.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 For an analysis of the transition from the Keynesian welfare state to the new regulatory state 
with its neoliberal underpinnings, see Braithwaite (2000) and Majone (1994).  
54 Braithwaite (2005) describes the creation in Britain of new regulatory agencies following the 
privatisation of telecommunications, gas, water and electricity sectors in the 1980s. Levi-Faur 
(2005) tracks the privatisation of the telecommunications and electricity sectors globally and the 
rise of new regulatory institutions.  
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i) Governing through Regulation 
States, markets and society are not distinct entities in regulatory capitalism; 
instead, the state is embedded in the economic and social order (Levi-Faur 
2005:14). States and markets are part of a condominium, an ensemble that 
shares the same dynamics of governance (Underhill 2003:757).55 States must 
be understood as embedded in “wider, increasingly transnational social 
structures” and non-state, typically corporate, actors are “integrated into the 
institutional processes of states and government” (Underhill 2003:765). 
Conceptualising state-market relations as a condominium entails recognition 
that political processes help constitute the market, and that market actors 
partially construct the state’s policy preferences (Underhill 2003). The degree to 
which market actors can influence state policymaking depends on their 
organisational capacities and their power (Underhill 2003:765). While the state 
shapes and is shaped by the market, it retains interests and goals distinct from 
those of prominent corporate lobbyists. The state, then, is both a quasi-
autonomous actor and a battlefield for social interests in which actors advocate 
for certain agendas and attempt to influence state policymaking (Haggart 2014).  
The regulatory state deploys power “through a regulatory framework rather than 
through the monopolisation of violence or the provision of welfare” (Walby 
1999:123 in Braithwaite 2005:11). Since the 1980s, states have shifted from 
providing regulation through the production and enforcement of rules to shaping 
the provision of regulation by non-state actors (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). 
The nature of this shift is captured in the oft-quoted metaphor of “steering” and 
“rowing.” In this nautical image, the state strategically “steers” or directs 
regulatory efforts from a position of meta-governance, while non-state actors 
(e.g., business and civil-society actors) take on the state’s traditional task of 
“rowing” by creating and operating various regulatory arrangements (Osborne 
and Gaebler 1992).  
The state in regulatory capitalism retains authority by governing through 
regulation (Levi-Faur 2013:39; Rhodes 2012). Its capacity enables it to direct, 
empower, endorse, shape or deny regulatory efforts (Büthe 2010; Cutler 2002). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Here Underhill draws upon ideas from Karl Polanyi and his argument that the state created 
and enforced the market system (Underhill 2003:765).  
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The state may direct regulatory efforts by mandating or facilitating a particular 
regulatory approach. It may also govern indirectly by empowering regulators to 
enact rules, shaping discourse and distributing resources (Levi-Faur 2013:39; 
Rhodes 2012). The regulators empowered by the state are an array of state, 
civil-society and corporate actors who are involved in producing, implementing 
and/or enforcing rules. The state may also provide incentives to corporate and 
civil-society actors to create or enforce certain rules and standards.56 
 
II) Corporations as Regulators 
 
Building upon the above discussion, the state arbitrates among competing non-
state interests and, in doing so, reflects the relative power of specific actors. In 
addition to recognising the variety of non-state actors, regulatory capitalism also 
usefully acknowledges the clout of large corporate actors that Braithwaite 
(2005) terms “mega-corporate.” Such actors have the capacity to lobby for 
policies that benefit their interests, such as stronger protection of intellectual 
property rights, that may impose costs on smaller businesses or new entrants to 
the sector (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). They also have the capacity to create 
their own rules and standards, both domestically and transnationally to regulate 
their individual corporations, their global supply chains, or even industry sectors 
(Cafaggi 2012). Not all corporate actors, however, have equal resources to 
persuade states to support their regulatory preferences or command the same 
degree of influence in shaping state policymaking processes. Similarly, states 
do not have an equal capacity to influence, stimulate or control corporate 
regulation in the same degree as powerful, industrialised actors like the U.S. 
and U.K. governments and the European Commission.  
 
i) Corporations Setting and Enforcing Rules 
 
The non-state governance literature within international relations and the 
regulatory studies literature are valuable to this dissertation because they 
usefully account or how corporate actors can set, implement and enforce rules 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$# Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) and Grabosky (2005) outline the various ways that the 
state can persuade non-state actors to participate in regulatory activities, such as by providing 
tax incentives.  
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transnationally. Of particular use are studies that explain the legal source of 
corporate actors’ authority to set and enforce rules and the degree to which they 
can impose those rules on other actors. Corporate actors may derive their 
authority from a public statute to perform a service delegated by the state (Scott 
2002). Private security companies that transport and guard prisoners, for 
example, fall into this category. Another form of authority comes from contracts 
(Cafaggi 2012; Scott 2002). Corporations can set rules or standards within their 
supply chains through contracts with their manufacturers and suppliers, for 
instance, in relation to food standards (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010) or 
environmental standards (Vandenbergh 2007). Finally, corporate actors may 
have no formal legal authority to regulate but instead set rules through litigation, 
persuasion, or the control and dissemination of information (Scott 2002). 
Corporate social responsibility codes that are based on non-legally binding 
agreements fall into this category (Dashwood 2012; Prakash and Potoski 
2014).57  
 
Analyses of the sources of corporate actors’ authority can help explain the types 
of rules they have the capacity to enforce and the degree to which they can 
impose those rules on other parties. Companies with supply-chain contractual 
agreements, for example, can set quality-control standards and terminate their 
relationship with non-compliant suppliers (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010). Rights 
holders, in contrast, have no such contractual relationship with macro-
intermediaries. They can, however, use litigation to try to force the Internet 
actors to accept their rules. This literature helpfully accounts for how corporate 
actors use different types of authority to set and enforce rules, which provides a 
useful context to consider the capacity and limitations of corporate actors to set 
and enforce rules (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 These codes are often joint agreements between civil-society organizations and corporations 
to address certain problems resulting from poor industry practices, such as pollution, or to 
improve industry practices in particular areas, such as human rights or labour standards (e.g., 
Bartley 2007). 
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ii) Corporate and State Interest in Private Regulation  
 
The non-state governance and regulatory studies literatures have generated a 
significant body of research that usefully explains why corporate actors may 
prefer private regulation to other forms of governance, under what conditions, 
and for what issues. One of the principal reasons that corporations may form 
transnational private arrangements is because states are incapable or unwilling 
to provide transnational governance on certain issues (Cafaggi 2012; Scott 
2012), or in a manner that corporations consider appropriate. By creating 
private standards, corporate actors can attempt to address gaps in regulation or 
harmonise competing or uneven rules internationally in order to make 
governance efforts more effective (Büthe 2010; Cafaggi 2012). Multinational 
corporations working alongside civil-society groups, for example, have created 
international standards in relation to the commercial use and preservation of 
forests (Meidinger 2002). Corporate actors may also be strategic in their 
creation of rules in order to pre-empt possible government regulation (Büthe 
2010) or to water down existing rules (Black 2008; Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 
1999). Finally, there may be normative reasons for corporate actors’ adoption of 
private rules, such as to repair or safeguard their reputations. For example, 
following criticism of Apple’s supply-chain practices, the company began 
disclosing lists of its suppliers of valuable metals used in its products to prove 
that they are obtained in conflict-free countries.58 
 
There are many pragmatic reasons for states to push corporate actors to create 
private standards or support private governance efforts, although individual 
states’ specific interests may vary by issue. It is important to recognise that 
states may have diverse and sometimes competing goals and interests, as they 
are not unitary actors. Private regulation may offer states a regulatory approach 
that is more responsive and adaptive to changes in technology or 
circumstances than legislation, international law or agreements (Büthe 2010; 
Cafaggi 2012). States can also draw upon corporate actors’ actual or perceived 
specialised technical or industry knowledge, and greater access to markets 
(Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 1999). In 2012, for example, the U.S. government 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Apple uses third-party auditors to ensure that all of the tantalum smelters in its supply chain 
are designated conflict free. Tantalum is a hard metal used in making electronics (Apple 2014).!
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determined that its technology firms were best placed to address the problem of 
botnets59 and requested top companies to form a voluntary working group. 
States may also perceive corporate actors as more responsive, cost-effective 
and efficient regulators than government agencies in certain areas (Büthe 2010; 
Cafaggi 2011; Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 1999; Eberlein et al. 2013). States 
can also strategically use private actors to reach beyond their traditional 
jurisdictional boundaries or to regulate at a scale unfeasible for government 
agencies (Büthe 2010). The U.S. government, for example, works with U.S. 
payment providers, including Visa and PayPal, to crack down on illegal 
gambling websites targeting the United States (MacCarthy 2010).   
 
III)  Regulatory Regimes 
 
There is a diverse array of corporate actors involved in online anti-counterfeiting 
efforts, as they comprise rights holders from a broad range of industries and 
firms providing a wide range of Internet services. The concept of a regulatory 
regime, drawn from the non-state governance literature in international 
relations, provides a useful analytical framework to explain how and why a 
particular form of regulation emerged, interactions amongst actors, and the 
interests it serves. 
 
i) Employing the Concept of Private Regimes 
 
Private regulatory programs, particularly those that extend transnationally, can 
be complex in their structure and comprise a diverse array of state, civil-society 
and corporate actors. The concept of a regime from international relations 
provides a useful analytical framework to examine the array of actors involved 
in corporate online anti-counterfeiting efforts. Stephen Krasner and Robert 
Keohane, along with other international relations scholars, developed the 
concept of regimes to explain the role of non-state actors in global governance 
and, in doing so, provided a corrective to state-centric analyses (Cutler 
2002:26). Krasner’s classic definition of regimes refers to “sets of implicit or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Botnets are networks of Internet-connected computers that are controlled through software 
and harnessed to conduct activities, such as the distribution of spam. Participants in the 
Industry Botnet Group include Microsoft. See: http://www.industrybotnetgroup.org/.  
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explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner 1982:185). This dissertation adopts a 
definition more focused on regulation and understands regimes as “the full set 
of actors, institutions, norms and rules” (Eberlein and Grande 2005:91) 
comprising a particular regulatory arrangement. Scholars of non-state 
governance within international relations, particularly A. Claire Cutler, Deborah 
Avant, Virginia Haufler, Thomas Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall, further 
expanded the concept of regimes to explain non-state actors’ capacity to set 
and enforce rules transnationally (see particularly Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 
1999).  
 
Eberlein and Grande’s (2005) definition of regimes recognises corporate rule- 
and norm-making efforts using informal governance practices, such as those 
involving industry codes of conduct or best practices agreements. It also 
appreciates that privately set rules or standards may operate independently or 
may rely upon or complement state laws. The concept of regimes is agnostic as 
to the level of actors: regimes may encompass actors that operate across states 
as well as those that work within states. A regime may be defined as 
transnational according to the scope of the rule-setting actors, the level of the 
rule-setting institutions, the scope of the rules themselves, or a combination of 
these factors (Mügge 2006:179). Regardless of a regime’s scope, however, it 
may also have roots within a specific territorial base or embody distinctly local 
features (Graz and Nölke 2008:10). These local roots may infuse a regime with 
characteristics that shape its character or operation. Prominent rule-making 
actors, for example, may all be based within the global north creating rules that 
govern how transnational mining companies operate in the global south (see 
Dashwood 2012).  
 
Using regimes provides another advantage. Regimes are also useful to account 
for similarities and differences among actors’ material and ideational interests in 
relation to the governance of a particular issue. Actors may have conflicting, 
sometimes irreconcilable differences that shape the composition and function of 
governance arrangements. Regulatory efforts that materially benefit one party 
can impose costs on the other. Using regimes can help trace the particular 
historical and socio-cultural context from which actors emerged to form 
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particular regulatory arrangements. They can help trace, for example, the long 
history of U.S. rights holders and trade associations in shaping intellectual 
property policymaking in the United States and internationally (Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2002; Sell 2003). The concept is also particularly attentive to the 
dynamics and inter-dependencies between state and non-state actors. As a 
result, one can analyse the relative power of actors and account for the growing 
influence of corporate actors in transnational governance (Hall and Biersteker 
2002; Peters et al. 2009).  
 
By focusing attention on state-corporate inter-dependencies, the researcher can 
investigate the conditions under which corporate actors seek state involvement 
in private regulatory regimes and the degree to which private regulation relies 
upon the state (Graz and Nölke 2008). In doing so, analysis can also reveal the 
governmental interests in facilitating private regulation. Determining the nature 
of state involvement in private regulation is crucial but can be difficult as not all 
actors may be publicly visible in their regulatory activities. In the case of private 
anti-counterfeiting efforts, the state is omnipresent in constructing and 
endorsing private enforcement agreements on behalf of rights holders but is 
largely obscured from public view.  
 
The concept of regimes has useful explanatory power to account for 
interactions and inter-dependencies among actors, their spatial scale, and their 
ideational and material interests in forming regulatory arrangements. However, 
the concept does not contain an explanation of power. Used alone, regimes 
cannot explain how private actors are able to acquire and wield authority over 
others, which actors can acquire regulatory authority, or the ways in which that 
authority is limited or constrained.  
 
IV) Private Authority 
 
U.S.-based rights holders and their trade associations have a history of 
successfully influencing state policymaking in relation to intellectual property 
stretching back to the 1970s, as was discussed in chapter 1. More difficult, 
however, has been their task of convincing macro-intermediaries to adopt rules 
voluntarily that would strengthen their enforcement practices. The principal 
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challenge rights holders face is that they have a relatively limited capacity to 
persuade macro-intermediaries because private actors do not possess the 
coercive capacity of the state. How then can rights holders convince macro-
intermediaries to adopt and enforce their rules?  
 
i) Claiming Private Authority 
 
Private actors’ capacity to regulate is based on two inter-related concepts: 
authority and legitimacy. The concept of authority, as noted by Max Weber, is 
inextricably linked to legitimacy and tied to the idea that states have a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force (Whimster 2004, see also Cutler 2002). By 
adapting this concept to non-state actors, the idea of private authority can 
explain how corporate actors can create, implement and enforce rules, why 
other actors may abide by those rules, and the different types of legitimacy they 
may draw upon (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Black 2008; Büthe 2010; 
Cutler 2010; Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 1999; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010; Hall 
and Biersteker 2002; Graz and Hartmann 2010; Peters et al. 2009).   
 
This dissertation understands private authority as the capacity of corporate 
actors “to create rules and standards that other actors adopt” (Green 2013:29). 
Intellectual property actors are not producing rules to govern their own conduct. 
Instead, they are seeking to impose their privately drafted rules and standards 
to govern how macro-intermediaries regulate third-party infringement. Authority 
is a fluid, rather slippery concept, which can “denote both the power and right to 
rule” (Peters, Förster, and Koechlin 2009:502). Scholars describe authority in 
relation to private actors in various ways. It can be understood as inducing 
“deference” among the governed (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010:9-10), 
motivating behavioural change (Black 2008:148) or involving “decision-making 
power” (Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 1999). It can also refer to “authorship” of 
policies, practices, rules and norms (Hall and Biersteker 2002:4), or “a 
presumptive right to speak and act” (Abrahamsen and William 2007:240). 
Common among these definitions is the capacity to persuade others to accept 
and follow certain ideas.   
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Underlying authority is some form of legitimacy, which gives actors the “right” to 
exert authority (Hall and Biersteker 2002:4; see also Black 2008:144). Actors 
who lack legitimacy, such as mercenaries or warlords, may have the capacity to 
enforce obedience through threats or use of force but not the right to do so. 
Legitimacy involves the perception by those subject to authority that “the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman 
1995:574). Authority and legitimacy are complex, inter-dependent and socially 
constructed concepts. There are also highly malleable constructs (Fuchs and 
Kalfagianni 2010; Suchman 1995). This means that private actors that seek to 
govern others can seek authority and legitimacy from diverse sources and can 
work to construct (or manipulate) narratives that will convince others to accept 
their claims as legitimate.  
 
Private actors commonly draw authority from two sources: their material 
resources (structural authority) and their capacity to shape meanings 
(discursive authority) (Fuchs 2007; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010; Koch 2011; 
Peters et al. 2009; Wilks 2013). Structural authority, which is based upon Susan 
Strange’s (1997) notions of structural power, traditionally refers to the capacity 
of transnational corporations to “punish and reward” countries’ policy choices by 
threatening to or actually relocating investment and jobs (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 
2010:13; see Fuchs 2005). It also encompasses corporations’ capacity to make 
and implement rules to govern their own operations or impose their rules on 
others, particularly through control over supply chains (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 
2010). Structural power represents the capacity of certain transnational 
corporate actors to control access to or the use of certain markets or services.  
 
Private actors often use discursive authority to enhance or amplify their 
structural authority (Fuchs 2005). Discursive authority, which understands the 
importance of norms and ideas to power, here refers to corporate actors’ ability 
to frame and shape the meaning of ideas, issues or policies in a way that 
affects public policy setting or decision-making (Fuchs 2007; Fuchs and Clapp 
2009). Discursive authority can incorporate other types of authority in which 
actors shape meanings, such as moral authority and technical authority (Avant, 
Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Biersteker and Hall 2002; Cutler 2010; Drahos 2010; 
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Suchman 1995). Actors may invoke moral authority by drawing upon widely 
accepted principles or values (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010:13) or claiming 
“normative superiority” on particular issues (Biersteker and Hall 2002:215). 
They may also claim technical authority by arguing that they have specialised 
knowledge, technical skills, experience or information that qualifies them to 
provide expert, scientific, or objective advice (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; 
Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 1999; Cutler 2010; Drahos 2010; Koch 2011).  
 
ii) Seeking Legitimacy for Private Authority 
 
Laying claim to authority is only part of the equation: actors must also seek 
some sort of legitimacy for their claim by drawing upon certain values, norms 
and ideas. For instance, actors may claim moral superiority on an issue to 
justify their right to govern (Suchman 1995).60 They may contend that certain 
individuals or institutions have particular values that would make them 
appropriate candidates for regulators (Suchman 1995). Environmental groups, 
for instance, often claim moral legitimacy by arguing that they are serving the 
public interest when they report corporations for pollution. Those who would be 
governed may take a pragmatic approach and accept regulators because it is 
their interests to do so (Suchman 1995). Companies that wish to become 
suppliers to Apple must abide by its environmental and labour conditions or risk 
losing contracts (Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2009).  
 
Actors do not simply “extract” legitimacy from the social milieu in a “feat of 
cultural strip mining” (Suchman 1995:576). There must be some interaction 
among the would-be governors and governed that includes an element of public 
recognition or acknowledgement. Actors may make different claims to various 
“legitimacy communities” because a narrative that resonates in one community 
may ring hollow in another (Black 2009:21). They may also construct, shape 
and even manipulate legitimacy claims to serve certain goals (Fuchs and 
Kalfagianni 2010; Suchman 1995). While social interaction is important, how the 
recognition of legitimacy occurs and by whom are matters of debate (e.g., 
Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 1999; Hall and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Claims of moral legitimacy do not mean that those seeking to govern are lacking in self-
interest (Suchman 1995). 
Page 54 of 307 
!
!
Biersteker 2002; Peters et al. 2009). Some scholars contend that this 
recognition must involve a “larger public” that often includes states (Hall and 
Biersteker 2002:4-5). Others argue that private actors may only require “passive 
acquiescence” (Suchman 1995:575), “tacit and informal” approval (Avant, 
Finnemore, and Sell 2010:10), or, more calculatingly, apathy (Hall and 
Biersteker 2002:5). The general public may be largely unaware of the authority, 
as governments may grant “silent permission” (Cutler 2002: 35) or the authority 
may even manifest “below the radar of government regulators” (Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson 2006:390 cited in Büthe 2010:21). 
 
iii) Limitations of Private Authority 
 
The notion of private authority is conceptually useful as it provides a language 
and framework to think about how private actors may seek to exert control 
through regulation and the ways in which these actors interact with and rely 
upon the state. Corporate actors can attempt to persuade other private actors to 
conform to their rules by employing campaigns of pressure, shaming, litigating, 
and granting and withholding business deals. If those actors resist, appeals to 
the state for assistance are the last possible avenue. Rights holders 
successfully solicited assistance from governments in the United States and 
United Kingdom, and from the European Commission, which intervened and 
employed varying degrees of coercion to compel macro-intermediaries to act as 
enforcers on behalf of rights holders. In granting rights holders’ requests, these 
governments legitimised rights holders’ demands that macro-intermediaries 
work as gatekeepers to regulate online infringement on behalf of rights holders. 
More broadly, by supporting rights holders’ requests, the governments also 
legitimised rights holders’ vigourous online enforcement strategies described in 
chapter 1.   
 
Private actors’ capacity for authority is also constrained because those who are 
governed may protest or resist any attempts to expand or amend the mandate 
to govern (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010:11). Private authority, like that of 
governments, can be fragile. Non-state actors seeking authority can lose 
credibility or have rivals contest their legitimacy, and the state may weaken or 
revoke its recognition of the regulatory arrangement (Avant, Finnemore, and 
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Sell 2010; Hall and Biersteker 2002). Private regimes can fall apart and be 
replaced by another private regime, or the state can step in and take over 
governance. Compliance with private authority does not necessarily indicate 
that the governed acknowledge the legitimacy of the authority. The “reluctant 
governed,” for example, may fear sanctions for non-compliance or lack the 
resources or spirit to resist (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010:360).  
 
iv) Role of the State in the Private Anti-Counterfeiting Regime 
 
Drawing upon the preceding discussions of private authority, corporate actors 
have varying degrees of reliance upon the state for their regulatory regimes, 
depending upon the regime’s participants, rules and overall goals. Where there 
is relative agreement among participants in relation to the regime or suitable 
incentives offered (or penalties credibly threatened), there may be little, if any, 
state involvement. This is the case, for example, when powerful multinational 
companies, such as Wal-Mart or Apple, require all their suppliers to adhere to 
certain environmental, labour or quality-assurance standards (Vandenbergh 
2007). Wal-Mart and Apple have considerable authority to offer inducements for 
companies to follow or impose penalties for the violation of their policies. 
Companies found in violation of these rules can be terminated as preferred 
suppliers, essentially losing their license “to participate in the global market” 
(Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010:3). These regimes require little direct involvement 
or interaction with the state, as corporations set and enforce rules through their 
supply chains.61 Rights holders, in contrast, lack the capacity to offer sufficient 
incentives or penalties to persuade macro-intermediaries to adopt wholesale 
changes to their regulatory practices. As a result, the private anti-counterfeiting 
regime is reliant upon the state. 
  
What explains the state interest in facilitating some private regulatory 
arrangements and not others? Corporate actors must craft a compelling 
narrative to the state to solicit its assistance in creating or facilitating private 
regulation. These corporate actors have varying degrees of structural and 
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61 Although these corporations may not interact with the state, they are indirectly reliant upon 
the state as they use legal contracts to enforce rules and standards that they impose upon their 
suppliers.   
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discursive authority that they draw upon to add gravitas to their appeals. Some 
requests for state assistance resonant more with the state or align more closely 
with its interests than others. Interactions among private actors and the state 
that shape non-state governance efforts are “reflexive” (Picciotto 2011:11) and 
“synergetic” (Peters, Förster, and Koechlin 2009:504). This means that the state 
and corporate actors have mutually constituted interests (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000; Peters et al. 2009). The state shapes market interests and 
corporate actors inform the state’s policy preferences, depending, of course, on 
corporate actors’ authority and the persuasiveness of their claims (Underhill 
2003). Private authority should therefore be understood as partially derived from 
the state (Büthe 2010; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Sassen 2002).  
 
Corporate actors that can successfully lobby the state to shape particular 
policies or regulatory arrangements demonstrate their relative influence over 
other actors competing for attention on the same topic. Intellectual property is 
an issue of significant economic importance to the United States and the 
European Union, as discussed in chapter 1. Rights holders and trade 
associations, particularly from the United States, have crafted a narrative that 
links continued U.S. economic hegemony to strong protection for intellectual 
property rights and also emphasises the problem of counterfeiting as a threat to 
public safety and economic integrity (Halbert 1997; Sell 2003). In contrast, 
macro-intermediaries, which are also powerful, multi-billion-dollar corporations, 
could not effectively challenge intellectual property actors’ simple but 
persuasive message that intellectual property requires ever-increasing 
protection. As these governments and intellectual property actors become 
partners, their alliance legitimises corporate anti-counterfeiting efforts. The 
rules, standards and norms set by rights holders in the private enforcement 
agreements become more authoritative with the power of the state in the 
background.     
 
Not all private actors have the same capacity to shape states’ policies. Equally, 
states have varying capabilities to create transnational regulatory arrangements 
and compel the involvement of wealthy, multinational corporations. Government 
agencies from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European 
Commission compelled macro-intermediaries to adopt private enforcement 
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agreements by threatening, to varying degrees, legislation or legal action. 
These threats were credible as the governments had the resources and, more 
importantly, the will and economic interest to make good on their promises. 
These countries collectively comprise a massive, highly lucrative market, which 
gives macro-intermediaries a strong incentive to comply with state demands. If 
rights holders headquartered in Cambodia or Mexico, for example, were to 
make similar demands of their governments, it would be difficult to imagine how 




The concept of private authority usefully explains the conditions in which 
corporate actors can persuade others to accept their rules and when they fail. It 
also accounts for state intervention into private regulatory regimes. Ideas about 
regimes and private authority, however, do not address regulation using 
technology or some of the distinctive regulatory dynamics in the online 
environment. To consider these ideas, this chapter employs techno-regulation, 
which refers to the employment of technology to shape human behaviour 
(Leenes 2011:149). Paired with the concept of private authority, techno-
regulation enables researchers to unpack corporate-state dynamics in relation 
to the construction of enforcement strategies against online infringement, 
specifically intermediary-facilitated regulation. Used in this manner, techno-
regulation nicely complements private authority as the former explains how 
actors employ technology as a regulatory instrument in ways that are influenced 
by corporate-state interactions. 
 
i) From Cyber-libertarianism to Techno-Regulation 
 
Techno-regulation provides useful insights into the mutual shaping of 
technology and politics in relation to the regulation of online behaviour and ways 
in which state and corporate actors use technology to control certain types of 
behaviour. To understand technology-facilitated regulation on the Internet, it is 
important to sketch a brief overview of the conceptual shift from cyber-
libertarianism to regulation through technology. Cyber-libertarianism, which 
characterised much of the early period of the Internet from the 1970s to the 
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1990s, argues that the Internet is a novel, ungovernable space that operates 
beyond the reach of nation states (Johnston and Post 1996).62 During this early 
period of the Internet, governance was largely left to the group of academics, 
engineers and dedicated users that created its various applications and 
networks (Brown and Ziewitz 2013; Hofmann 2010). The U.S. government, 
particularly its Department of Defense but also its academic institutions, played 
a key role in the development of the Internet but was not involved in its 
regulation, at least in the early years.63 Scholars of Internet governance 
describe the U.S. government during this period as “passive” (Goldsmith and 
Wu 2006:32) and an “absentee custodian” (McConnell 1997:72 in Hofmann 
2010:10). In the absence of state pressure and reflecting the “overall 
messiness” of the Internet’s development, governance arrangements “emerged 
in the shadow or the absence of law” (Brown and Ziewitz 2011:28-29). 
Regulatory efforts during this time emerged tended to be self-regulatory, 
created by early users and Internet engineers, and undertaken in loose, 
informal networks (Hofmann 2010; Zittrain 2008). 
 
In contrast to the cyber-libertarians, cyber-paternalists argue that, far from being 
ungovernable, the Internet is highly amenable to regulation (Lessig 1999; 
Reidenberg 1998; Wu and Goldsmith 2006). Lawrence Lessig, an influential 
scholar on Internet governance, argues, “cyberspace will be the most regulable 
space humans have ever known” (2006:32). Cyber law scholars focus on the 
regulatory potential of the technical environment of the Internet: the architecture 
of computer hardware and software (Brown and Marsden 2013). Rules can be 
set outside laws and instead be encoded within the Internet’s technical 
architecture.64 Thus, state or non-state actors could introduce rules or standards 
into the code of software applications that would shape—or even prevent—
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 John Perry Barlow, a former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, penned a stirring founding 
document for cyberspace inhabitants in 1996. It begins with the oft-quoted lines: “Governments 
of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new 
home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not 
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather” (Barlow 1996).  
63 For a detailed history of the development of the Internet from the early 1960s and the roles 
played by U.S. and European researchers, see Brown and Ziewitz (2013).   
64 Lessig terms this idea “Code is law” (Lessig 1999) and his ideas have been critiqued, often 
harshly. For example, Mayer-Schönberger (2008) contends that Lessig misunderstands the 
dynamism of the relationship of technology and society, as emphasised by science and 
technology studies, and instead adopts a one-dimensional relationship.!
Page 59 of 307 
!
!
certain types of online activities or behaviour.65 The growing area of cyber law 
explains how online behaviour is controlled in ways other than publicly set laws 
and explores ways in which technology shapes human behaviour and, in turn, 
society shapes technology (Brown and Marsden 2013; Zittrain 2008).  
 
ii) Regulation in the Online Environment 
 
Following the laissez-faire approach to Internet regulation in the 1990s, in the 
early 2000s many countries increased their online regulatory presence 
considerably following the dot-com bust between 2000 and 2001 and the 
terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 (Brown and Marsden 2013). 
Governments were concerned about various types of old and new crimes 
ranging from fraud, child pornography and viruses to terrorism. The online 
environment brings both distinct challenges and advantages to states and 
private actors wanting to address unwanted activity. Its disadvantages are well 
known. Wrongdoers can attempt to remain anonymous and locate themselves 
in jurisdictions infamous for their governments’ reluctance or inability to address 
online offences (Murray 2011). They can also strategically choose Internet 
service providers, like web hosts or payment providers, which may turn a blind 
eye to illicit activities.  
 
The advantages of online regulation, however, are likely less widely known, 
particularly when they involve powerful intermediaries. The U.S. government 
has partnered with macro-intermediaries since the early 2000s to crack down 
on child pornography sites (Laidlaw 2012) or sites that illicitly sell tobacco or 
allow gambling (MacCarthy 2010). When rights holders struck private 
enforcement agreements with Internet firms and payment providers, it marked 
the first time that corporate actors were able to direct macro-intermediaries and 
take advantage of their global regulatory capacity that was previously only 
available to powerful global actors like the United States. By working with these 
macro-intermediaries, rights holders are able to dramatically expand their online 
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65 For example, following a consumer backlash against Microsoft, in June 2013 the company 
removed restrictions that required gamers, even those of offline games, to connect to the 
Internet daily to authenticate their systems (Stuart 2013). 
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regulatory strategies and engage novel forms of technologically facilitated 
enforcement.  
 
iii) Regulation Through Technology 
 
Technology, particularly information and communications, and Internet 
technologies, enables private actors to expand their rule making and 
enforcement activities transnationally, particularly with the development of new 
technologies related to information and communications technologies and the 
Internet (Brown and Marsden 2013; Marsden 2011). As neither the non-state 
governance nor regulatory studies literatures focus on explaining regulation 
through technology, this dissertation looks to the law and technology literature.  
 
Techno-regulation explains how corporate actors use technology to set and 
enforce rules. The concept has its roots in science and technology studies, a 
field of research prominently associated with Bruno Latour (2005). This 
dissertation recognises important insights from science and technology studies, 
particularly that science, technology, and society are mutually dependent upon 
and shape each other.66 Technology, in this perspective, is never neutral but, at 
least partly, is socially constructed (Brey 2005; Franklin 1995; Leenes 2011). 
This means that technology neither solely determines human behaviour, nor is it 
a passive social construct (Brey 2005; Bendrath and Meuller 2011). Technology 
is both real and constructed: it shapes and influences behaviour, beliefs and 
practices and is imbued with norms, concepts and cultural values (Brey 2005; 
Disco 2005; Franklin 1995). Technology also constrains behaviour in certain 
ways. Some constraints are physical, while others are socially constructed or 
combine physical and social factors (Brey 2005:80). Those who design the 
multitude of technologies that we use in our daily lives intend them to facilitate 
certain types of use, and, inadvertently or deliberately, discourage or prevent 
others (Hildebrandt 2008; Murray 2011).  
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66 The ways in which these elements affect one another and with what results are matters of 
keen debate within science and technology studies. For an analysis of varying deterministic and 
constructivist perspectives, see Brey (2005).   
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The recognition that products are designed in ways to shape and constrain how 
individuals use them is not new.67 Fast-food restaurants, like Subway and 
McDonalds, intentionally choose hard, uncomfortable chairs to encourage 
diners to scarf down their meals and depart, thereby ensuring a rapid turnover 
of customers (Robson 1999). Digital architecture can also shape and 
manipulate how individuals access and use technologies online (Bendrath and 
Mueller 2011; Katyal 2003). Studies examining how technology facilitates and 
inhibits behaviour take on greater importance as individuals increasingly rely 
upon the Internet in their work, social and cultural spheres of life. Techno-
regulation explicitly recognises that technologies, like Google’s search 
processes, embody certain norms and ideas, often in ways hidden to users 
(Hildebrandt 2008; Murray 2011). For example, Google, with its dominant 
market share, can shape what information individuals access and thereby 
“shape positions, concepts and ideas” (Elkin-Koren 2001:186).  
Technologies can shape behaviour in ways that force compliance and facilitate 
compliance (Hildebrandt 2008; Koop 2008). Individuals may have no option but 
to comply with certain rules or norms if the technology prohibits certain 
behaviour. For example, many ATMs require users to withdraw their card before 
their cash is issued (Brey 2005:70). Another example is the encoding of digital 
locks onto the electronic files of books, music and movies to prevent users from 
copying or modifying the protected content.68 This constraint is weaker as tech-
savvy individuals can bypass it but others are forced comply with the rules set 
by the locks. Other constraints promote compliance or discourage non-
compliance by using monitoring technologies (Brownsword 2008). These can 
include policies that require users to register with their name and email address 
(like Facebook, Twitter or eBay). Monitoring technologies also refer to 
surveillance mechanisms to track and control transactions across Visa’s 
network or identify breaches of Google’s advertisement policies.69  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Design-based regulation is not confined to cyberspace but includes efforts to design the 
physical environment to reduce crime through better lighting or altered population traffic flows 
(e.g., Clarke 1997; Katyal 2002).  
68 These digital locks, termed digital rights management (DRM), can be broken by individuals 
knowledgeable enough to create or use software to remove the codes prohibiting copying. 
Breaking DRMs, however, is prohibited in many jurisdictions as individuals may do so to violate 
copyright (Haggart 2014).  
#% As will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, Visa and Google have sophisticated surveillance 
and enforcement programs to detect, monitor and remove users that violate their policies on 
intellectual property rights.  
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iv) The Rise of Macro-intermediaries 
 
The concept of techno-regulation enables one to explore how technology 
shapes actors’ regulatory strategies and techniques. As Bendrath and Mueller 
(2011:1156) note in their study of the regulation of digital-copyright 
infringement, by employing such a framework “one can see technology 
structuring the politics, and politics constraining and channeling the 
technology.”70 The use of new technologies is shaped by existing laws and 
regulations, as well as by state and non-state actors promoting certain policy 
goals (Mueller, Kuehn, and Santoso 2012:350). The roles Internet 
intermediaries can (and should) assume are the subject of lively debate among 
scholars, policymakers and industry actors (Kohl 2013; McIntyre and Scott). 
Those favouring intermediary-based regulation contend that intermediaries are 
often best suited to identify and control wrongdoers (e.g., Lichtman and Posner 
2004; Mann and Belzley 2005). Some scholars argue intermediaries should not 
only be encouraged to assume a greater regulatory role to prevent “harmful 
transactions” but should also be threatened with formal sanctions if necessary 
to encourage their gatekeeping duties (Lichtman and Posner 2004). 
 
Despite the breadth of different types of intermediaries, much of the literature in 
this area focuses on the role of Internet service providers, web hosts, and 
search engines (see Barzilai-Nahon 2006; Bracha and Pasquale 2008; Elkin-
Koren 2001; Laidlaw 2010). As payment providers and domain registrars are 
relatively new to the world of gatekeeping, it is unsurprising that they have 
generated less scholarly attention (though exceptions include MacCarthy 2010; 
Lindenbaum and Ewan 2012; Mellyn 2010). Further, macro-intermediaries’ 
gatekeeping activities on behalf of non-state actors are critically under-explored 
(see Laidlaw 2012). As the use of macro-intermediaries by non-state actors is 
growing, particularly with rights holders’ private agreements, it is critical to fill 
this gap in scholarship. This area of study is particularly important as macro-
intermediaries can control the flow of information and shape online behaviour in 
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70 Bendrath and Mueller (2011) examined how Internet intermediaries undertake deep-packet 
inspections, which refers to their scanning and examining aspects of Internet traffic and 
determining whether any will be blocked or redirected. This practice is employed against a 
variety of problems, including child pornography and unauthorised downloading.    
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a manner that than their physical-world counterparts cannot match. Further, 
they can do so outside judicial processes and in relative secrecy. 
 
Macro-intermediaries can be valuable gatekeepers because their vast, 
technologically sophisticated surveillance and enforcement programs. By 
policing problems globally on behalf of states and corporate actors, macro-
intermediaries challenge concepts of jurisdiction and territorially based rules, 
and illustrate the transformed “architecture” of security, particularly in the online 
environment (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; Sheptycki 2007). Within this 
architecture, corporate actors can capitalise upon new technologies, such as 
automated tools, to serve growing demands for global online enforcement 
(Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; O’Reilly 2011; Sheptycki 2000).  
 
Automated enforcement processes are often portrayed as objective, accurate 
and highly targeted. However, by recognizing that the software underlying these 
enforcement measures is based on certain ideas and norms, researchers can 
critically interrogate these claims. Automated processes are neither neutral nor 
are the macro-intermediaries impartial (for an analysis of Google’s claims of 
impartiality, see Kohl 2013). Examining technology entails not only studying its 
“manifest and desired properties” but also its “intended and unintended side-
effects, dangers, and risks” (Disco 2005:38). Given the size and critical 
importance of macro-intermediaries’ operations, these side effects can be 
significant and wide ranging.71 For example, macro-intermediaries routinely 
inaccurately identify and target legitimate content and transactions, as will be 
examined in chapters 4 to 6.  
 
Pat O’Malley observes in his article on automated regulation in relation to traffic 
tickets that individuals can be “policed, judged and sanctioned” through their 
“electronic trace” without any human interaction (2010:795). Automated traffic 
enforcement, however, relates to a breach in public laws and offers the 
possibility of challenge or appeal before a human, although the system is 
designed to minimise such interactions (O’Malley 2010). Macro-intermediaries, 
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71 McIntyre and Scott (2008) examine the considerable procedural and normative challenges, 
including censorship of legitimate content, resulting from Internet service providers’ filtering of 
webpages to block access to child pornography sites.  
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in contrast, institute automated regulatory processes globally and offer limited 
channels for appeal. Their regulatory activities demonstrate that privately set 
rules, standards and norms can be as powerful as laws in the online 
environment but often much less transparent. 
 
VI) The Private Anti-Counterfeiting Regime 
 
Drawing together concepts of regimes, private authority and macro-
intermediaries enables this dissertation to understand how corporate actors 
form private regulatory arrangements and examine the circumstances under 
which these actors turn to the state for assistance. The private enforcement 
agreements examined in this research are popularly referred to as “voluntary 
initiatives.” They are, however, fundamentally coercive as the state employed 
various means to compel macro-intermediaries to join them. The terms 
“informal” and “non-binding,” rather than “voluntary” better captures the regime’s 
use of non-binding enforcement agreements as these terms can include 
coercive pressure. Private regulation in this case does not mean that the state 
is absent from the regulatory process, but that corporate actors play important 
roles in creating and enforcing rules, and in persuading the state to support the 
regulatory regime. Despite the state’s key role in this regime, it largely acts from 
the shadows as it quietly shapes regulatory activities.    
 
i) Corporate Online Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts 
 
The private anti-counterfeiting regime is relatively young, having emerged in the 
mid-2000s to target the online distribution of counterfeit goods. Some of its 
rights holders, trade associations and macro-intermediaries, particularly Google, 
have been active in online enforcement efforts since the late 1990s in efforts 
targeting digital-copyright infringement (Weatherall 2012; Zittrain 2006). The 
actors comprising the regime—a broad coalition of trade associations, macro-
intermediaries, government agencies, and rights holders from a wide array of 
industry sectors—are loosely inter-connected. Government agencies from the 
United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Commission 
play key roles in constructing and endorsing the regime. Some corporate actors 
share common membership in trade associations, like the International Anti-
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Counterfeiting Coalition. In comparison with the tightly knit, highly coordinated 
copyright industries, those representing the interests of trademark owners in 
anti-counterfeiting efforts describe themselves as “a bit of a hodgepodge.”72 
This is because the copyright industries, which comprise the music, movie, 
book, and software sectors, are dominated by a handful of large firms and 
prominent trade associations like the Motion Picture Association of America. 
Counterfeiting affects a broad range of industries and makes it difficult for rights 
holders to adopt a coordinated or standardised approach. Corporate online anti-
counterfeiting efforts involve rights holders from industry sectors ranging from 
pharmaceuticals, sporting goods, and alcohol to apparel, consumer electronics 
and industrial electrical products.  
 
The regime’s scope is global, both in terms of the reach of its macro-
intermediaries and the scope of their rules through internal terms-of-use 
agreements. The regime is rooted in the United States, as all of the macro-
intermediaries and many intellectual property actors are headquartered there, 
and Europe, where state and corporate actors have been active in creating 
private enforcement agreements. The regime’s regulatory practices are 
diffusing outward as other countries, particularly China, are adopting similar 
private governance mechanisms to regulate online infringement. The spatial 
pattern of this regime aligns with ideas from regulatory capitalism, which 
describes regulatory arrangements that are “shaped in North America and 
Europe [and] are increasingly internationalized and projected globally” (Levi-
Faur 2005:13). The regime’s distribution also accords with non-state 
governance scholars who argue that cases of transnational private regulation 
often illustrate a “clear differentiation in North-South relations and centre-
periphery dynamics” (Graz and Nölke 2008:10).  
 
By drawing together the concepts of regimes, private authority, and techno-
regulation, this dissertation employs a theoretical framework that is sensitive to 
the role of the state in private regulation. The dissertation uses regimes to trace 
and critically examine the principal corporate and state actors responsible for 
creating eight private enforcement agreements that cover a wide range of 
Internet services. Paired with the concept of regimes, private authority enables 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Interview with Siân Croxon, Partner, DLA Piper, 14 September 2012, London.  
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the researcher to explore how corporate actors acquire and wield private 
authority over other private parties and, importantly, the limitations to that 
authority. Where private authority is constrained, the dissertation’s analytical 
focus examines corporate-state dynamics and the varying ways certain 
corporate interests align with those of the state. The state in this research 
retains its capacity to direct, shape and compel regulatory efforts that overlap 
with its interests. Finally, the dissertation employs techno-regulation to explain 
how corporations use technology as a regulatory instrument that is shaped by 
particular corporate-state interactions. 
 
The next chapter establishes the specific historical and legal context in which 
the private enforcement agreements emerged, and then introduces the main 
state and corporate actors involve in the creating these agreements. Chapters 4 
to 6 apply this theoretical framework to examine these private agreements in 





Chapter 3: Macro-Intermediaries and Informal Private 
Regulation on the Internet 
 
Macro-intermediaries’ transformation into gatekeepers for large U.S. and 
European rights holders is a monumental achievement. The eight private 
enforcement agreements studied in this dissertation, established between 2010 
and 2013, mark the first time that rights holders secured macro-intermediaries’ 
voluntary cooperation to address online infringement. With these agreements, 
intellectual property actors are able to tap into a global regulatory capacity, 
which was previously only available to powerful countries like the United States. 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, for example, state and federal authorities in the 
United States established voluntary enforcement agreements with payment 
macro-intermediaries, including Visa and MasterCard, to stop payments to 
websites selling child pornography (MacCarthy 2010).73 
 
This chapter establishes the context in which the private anti-counterfeiting 
regulatory regime emerged. It traces the policymaking influence of U.S. rights 
holders and their trade associations back to the early 1970s when the United 
States first began to lead the charge to strengthen intellectual property rights 
globally against what rights holders claimed was a tidal wave of counterfeit 
goods and copyright-infringing content (see Sell 2003). In a span of two 
decades—from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s—rights holders and their trade 
associations convinced the United States to prioritise the protection of 
intellectual property domestically and in its international trade agreements 
(Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). As evidence of their significant private authority, 
these actors also played a key role in establishing tough global standards for 
the protection of intellectual property in 1995 (Sell 2003).74 Many of the 
intellectual property actors who were involved in these early standard-setting 
efforts are also involved in the private anti-counterfeiting regime.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&' These so-called voluntary agreements between U.S. payment providers and federal and state 
authorities in the United States also stopped payments sites unlawfully distributing tobacco, as 
is briefly discussed in chapter 4 (MacCarthy 2010). These agreements are a forerunner to the 
non-legally binding agreements with macro-intermediaries in relation to online infringement.  
&" As will be discussed later in this chapter, this refers to the 1995 TRIPS agreement (Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).  
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While rights holders and trade associations made significant headway in setting 
standards internationally, they found enforcement more difficult, particularly with 
the development of e-commerce in the early 2000s. Rights holders argued that 
online infringement is too complex and prevalent for rights holders to address 
alone and that Internet intermediaries should assume greater responsibility for 
infringement on their systems. In response to lobbying from rights holders, the 
U.S. Congress introduced four intellectual property bills between 2010 and 
2012, including the ill-fated Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA).75 These bills adopt 
a techno-regulatory approach: they propose varying types of Internet 
intermediaries should become regulators because they provide essential 
Internet services and have technologically sophisticated systems to detect and 
police infringement.  During the period that the U.S. Congress was considering 
these bills, the U.S. government was meeting quietly with macro-intermediaries 
to establish the private enforcement agreements examined in this dissertation 
and create a global private regulatory regime to address online infringement.   
 
To cover this history and highlight the specific legal and technological 
developments that shaped the private anti-counterfeiting regulatory regime, this 
chapter proceeds as follows. First, it describes the period from the mid-1970s to 
mid-1990s in which rights holders and trade associations successfully 
established intellectual property as a priority within the United States and 
helped set standards internationally governing its protection. In the next part, it 
explores early online enforcement efforts against infringement from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s. The third part, which focuses on events from 2009 
until 2012, describes the four U.S. intellectual property bills and the protests 
against the SOPA and Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA). Then, in the 
fourth part, the chapter explores how intellectual property actors and macro-
intermediaries frame the issue of the regulation of online infringement in their 
competing efforts to influence the U.S. government’s policymaking in this area. 
The fifth part describes the creation of the private enforcement agreements in 
the United States and the European Union and then offers a brief conclusion.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&$ The other three bills are the Combating Online Counterfeits and Infringement Act (COICA), 
the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), and the Online Protection and Enforcement of 
Digital Trade Act (OPEN Act).!!
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I) Setting Standards Globally to Protect Intellectual Property 
Rights 
 
While the United States is now the global champion for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, it was not always so. It has benefited economically 
from centuries of disregarding intellectual property laws, as have other 
industrialised economies (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Halbert 1997).&# By the 
1970s, however, there were growing concerns in the United States that other 
countries would make economic gains that would undermine its position as an 
economic powerhouse. At that time, U.S. policymakers were preoccupied with 
the possible loss of U.S. competitiveness, growing trade deficits, foreign debt, 
and the rise of manufacturing in Asia, particularly in Japan (Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2002; Halbert 1997). Fears that these factors were endangering 
U.S. economic hegemony grew. Key U.S. corporations like IBM, Pfizer and 
Microsoft loudly complained that infringement of their intellectual property rights 
by Asian countries threatened their businesses (Drahos 1995). These 
corporations petitioned the U.S. government for assistance with a nationalistic 
narrative that compellingly linked strengthened intellectual property with a 
strong U.S. economy (Drahos 1995). In this narrative, concerns over unfair 
trading practices gave the United States a clear Asian “villain” and improbably 
transformed wealthy U.S. industries into “victims” (Halbert 1997).  
 
The U.S. government seized upon this convenient and reassuringly simple 
explanation for its complex fiscal woes. Thus, the U.S. government, based upon 
rights holders’ convincing narrative, conceptually coupled intellectual property 
with international trade (Halbert 1997). The link between intellectual property 
and economic growth, therefore, is socially constructed and reflects the 
perceptions and interests of the U.S. government and certain prominent 
corporate interests, particularly those in the pharmaceutical, software, and 
movie industries, as will be discussed later in this chapter (Sell 2003). By 
establishing this link, the United States exploited its crucial advantage in 
international trade – leverage (Drahos 1995). The U.S. government uses its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&# The United States has long copied ideas and practices from European countries “who copied 
from each other and—something they rarely acknowledge—from the Middle and Far East” 
(Dutfield 2006:2). 
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massive economic market as leverage to pressure other countries: it grants 
countries access to that market or withdraws privileges from countries in 
relation to its market (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite 
2002).  
 
i) Trade Associations Shaping Public Policy 
 
The United States, urged on by key industry actors, sought to use its economic 
leverage to strengthen intellectual property rights globally in two nearly 
concurrent efforts between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s. One avenue was to 
introduce intellectual property into a multilateral agreement governing 
international trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
second was to amend the protection of intellectual property through the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the international body that governs 
agreements on trademarks, copyright and patents. The road to strengthen 
intellectual property rights globally would prove complex and arduous but would 
ultimately lead to victory two decades later with the 1994 Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).77 
 
TRIPS, a multilateral agreement, fundamentally reshaped intellectual property 
rights in favour of industrialised countries that benefit most from strengthened 
intellectual property, particularly the United States, as well as Japan and some 
countries within the European Union (Sell 2003). The agreement required 
member states to criminalise trademark and copyright infringement and to adopt 
both civil and criminal penalties and, in doing so, became the first multilateral 
agreement to incorporate enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property 
(Sell 2003). TRIPS was part of the Marrakesh Agreement that created the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), which means that any country wanting to 
become a member of the WTO had to implement TRIPS (Matthews 2002).  
 
The intellectual property actors involved in efforts to revise the GATT and WIPO 
represented the biggest corporations that own copyright, patents and 
trademarks. In terms of copyright, companies like IBM were concerned about 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&&TRIPS, opened for signature 15 April 1994 (entered into force 1 January 1995).  
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infringement of their software programs, as was their industry association, the 
Business Software Alliance (BSA). The music and movie industries were 
likewise troubled by the mass production of unauthorised versions of their 
products. The high-profile Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and 
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) represented copyright 
owners. Global pharmaceutical companies, particularly Pfizer, argued that 
insufficient protection of their valuable patents from India and Brazil threatened 
their innovations. Former-president of Pfizer Bruce MacTaggart referred to this 
practice as “Stealing from the Mind” in his highly influential 1982 New York 
Times opinion article (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Alongside these groups, 
the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC) advocated on behalf of a 
broad array of industries concerned about protecting their trademarks, copyright 
and patents. Its corporate members include some of the world’s biggest 
multinational corporations, ranging from Calvin Klein, Nike and Pfizer to Phillip 
Morris, Sony and Walt Disney.78 Several of these actors, particularly Nike and 
the IACC, are active in the private anti-counterfeiting regime examined in this 
dissertation, which shows that the online regulatory effort is a continuation of 
standard-setting that began in the early 1980s. 
 
The trade associations focused on revising the GATT and WIPO collectively 
represented a powerful constituency of global corporations with the means and 
intent of shaping public policymaking to protect their intellectual property. Two 
of the associations had decades of experience advocating on behalf of their 
members: the MPAA and RIAA were formed in 1922 and 1952 respectively. 
The others were born out of rights holders’ modern anxiety to protect their 
intellectual property in the face of rising economies in Asia. The IACC was 
formed in 1979 with apparel firm Levi Strauss as one of the founding members.  
 
In 1981, the United States created the Advisory Committee for Trade 
Negotiations (ACTN) to advise the U.S. government on trade policy (Drahos 
and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 2003). The ACTN is one of multiple advisory 
committees organised by the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&( For a full list of the IACC’s member organizations, see http://www.iacc.org/member-
companies.html.  
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(USTR) with the purpose of providing it with policy advice.79 The ACTN 
illustrates the mutually inter-dependent relationships possible between state 
and non-state actors when their interests align, as explained by regime theory 
(see Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). The ACTN formed a powerful 
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC). Members of the IPC were a small group 
of executives from major U.S. industries, which included Pfizer, IBM, General 
Electric, DuPont, Warner Communications, General Motors, and Johnson and 
Johnson (Matthews 2002). Through the IPC, these actors had the authority, 
legitimised by the U.S. government, to propose standards and rules at the 
transnational level to govern the protection of intellectual property. 
 
ii) Shaping Policymaking Through Trade Agreements  
 
As rights holders’ lobbying power, which was formalised in the ACTN, shaped 
U.S. trade policy, industrialised countries, led by the United States, worked to 
introduce intellectual property into the GATT. The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, created in 1947, was both a trade agreement and a process for 
securing international trade agreements.80 The GATT took place through a 
series of negotiations in distinct iterations or “rounds,” each of which took 
months or years to complete. It focused on removing tariffs from industries 
ranging from textiles and chemicals to steel and agricultural products.81 The 
goal of trade associations and industrialised countries was to push for the 
inclusion of intellectual property into the GATT at the Tokyo Round, which was 
held from 1973 to 1979.82 Negotiations over intellectual property, however, were 
complex and contentious. Industry actors, particularly the International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition pushed for continued efforts, which resulted, in 1979, in 
a draft code offered by the United States and the European Union entitled, the 
Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&% This committee, which is also referred to as the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
Negotiations (ACTPN), is organised and administered by the USTR, along with committees on 
agriculture, trade and the environment and labour. Key functions of the USTR are to develop 
and coordinate all international trade negotiations for the United States and advise the White 
House on trade matters.  
() The GATT existed until 1994, and then was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 1995. 
(* For detailed analyses of GATT negotiations through the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds, see 
Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), Matthews (2002) and Sell (2003).  
(+ For detailed accounts of efforts to amend the GATT to include intellectual property rights, see 
Drahos (1995), chapter 6 of Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), and chapter 1 of Matthew (2002). 
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(Matthews 2002:9). The issue of counterfeit goods gained some traction but 
countries that opposed its inclusion into the GATT argued that there was a lack 
of evidence that it was a significant problem (see Matthews 2002). Ultimately, 
there was a stalemate between industrialised and developing countries.  
 
Rights holders and their trade associations responded to opponents’ criticism of 
a lack of evidence of infringement and by rapidly generating multi-billion-dollar 
estimates of losses from counterfeiting and copyright infringement (Blakeney 
1995). They delivered these estimates to the U.S. Congress, which held 
hearings on the topic, as well as in informal meetings with government officials 
(Matthews 2002). In 1984, for example, the Automotive Parts and Accessories 
Association informed the U.S. House Subcommittee that it lost approximately 
$12 billion annually from the counterfeiting of spare parts (Blakeney 1995:4). 
These estimates, based on industry data and analysis, were difficult to verify but 
served to convince politicians of the seriousness of the infringement problem 
(Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Intellectual property actors also emphasised the 
narrative of “theft” of American hard work and innovation by “pirates,” thus 
effectively reframing the issue as a moral and economic problem (Halbert 
1997). As a result of these efforts, government officials, particularly those in the 
United States, increasingly considered infringement a serious economic 
problem. U.S. rights holders’ capacity to frame infringement in a way that 
shaped government policymaking is a demonstration of their considerable 
private authority, which, as will be discussed later in this chapter, is also evident 
in the framing of the Stop Online Piracy Act. 
 
Alongside efforts to incorporate intellectual property into the GATT, trade 
associations were also focusing their efforts on the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation. The organisation, established in 1967 in Geneva, Switzerland, is 
an agency of the United Nations and coordinates intellectual property policies 
and information. WIPO is responsible for administering the 1883 Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which is concerned with the 
protection of trademarks and patents.(' In the late 1970s, industrialised 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(' WIPO also administers the 1891 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration 
of Marks (Madrid Agreement) and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement, which came 
into operation on April 1, 1996. These agreements govern the registration of trademarks 
internationally. WIPO is also responsible for administering the 1886 Berne Convention for the 
Page 74 of 307 
!
!
countries raised alarms of WIPO’s “toothlessness” (Blakeney 1995:2) and its 
apparent inability to counter a growing international trade in copyright-infringing 
goods and counterfeit products. Trade associations and industrialised countries, 
again led by the United States, sought to revise the Paris Convention that 
governs the protection of trademarks and patents.84 Signatories to the Paris 
Convention agree to protect foreign works under domestic laws for intellectual 
property in the practice termed national treatment. However, critics complained 
that the Convention lacked strong enforcement provisions and did not have a 
binding dispute-settlement mechanism for states (Matthews 2002:10). Meetings 
among signatories between 1980 and 1984 to amend the Paris Convention 
became polarised because of irreconcilable differences between industrialised 
and developing countries, much like that of the Tokyo Round at the GATT 
(Blakeney 1995).85 Acknowledging their failure to revise the WIPO conventions, 
industrialised countries began to move away from the consensus-led style of 
WIPO, which contributed to diplomatic paralysis, and shift toward bilateral and 
multilateral trade talks (Drahos 1995).86  
 
With the failure of efforts at WIPO, the United States redoubled its efforts 
targeting the next round of GATT discussions. The Uruguay Round (1986 to 
1994) would prove ultimately successful for proponents of intellectual property 
rights. Industry efforts were key. The Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) 
developed the U.S. position on protecting intellectual property and then sought 
to establish consensus with trade associations in Japan and Europe, which 
became staunch proponents (Sell 2003). These allies then formally supported 
the IPC’s proposals on intellectual property protection87 that became the 1994 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
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Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which governs the protection of copyrighted works.   
(" At the same time, there were also efforts to revise the Berne Convention, also administered 
by WIPO that governs copyright. 
($ Developing countries argued that few benefits would flow to them from stronger intellectual 
property laws. Their views were bolstered by a report by the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development in 1974 that nationals of five countries owned 84% of patents issued in developing 
countries (the United States, Germany, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) 
(Matthews 2002:11). The study of trademarks showed that developing countries paid a 
massively inflated price for pharmaceuticals (Blakeney 1995). 
(# For example, the United States began negotiations in 1983 with Taiwan over patent protection 
for chemical compounds and copyright protection (Matthew 2002:16).  
(& Their proposal in June 1988, the Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual 
Property, which became the basis for TRIPS, advocated minimum standards, national 
enforcement measures, and a dispute-settlement mechanism (Sell 2003:107). 
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The Uruguay Round created in 1994 the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which administers TRIPS. All countries that wished to become members of the 
WTO had to sign onto TRIPS, providing a powerful economic motivation for 
countries to agree to the agreement.88 For the Intellectual Property Committee, 
this was an incredible effort by twelve executives from U.S.-based corporations 
who created a law that fundamentally changed the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights worldwide (Sell 2003).89  
 
In two decades, U.S. rights holders and trade associations persuaded the U.S. 
government to consider intellectual property as an issue integral to its economic 
dominance and prioritise the protection of intellectual property in its trade deals. 
This feat alone demonstrates the significant private authority of rights holders 
and their ability to construct a compelling narrative about the economic 
importance of intellectual property. It also shows the intertwined economic 
interests between the U.S. government and its rights holders and trade 
associations. Further, these intellectual property actors, along with their 
European counterparts, were key players in establishing global standards to 
protect intellectual property rights through TRIPS. Intellectual property actors 
also had powerful new tools of coercion with the Section 301 and Special 301 
Processes that are undertaken through the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR). These processes enable U.S. rights holders, backed 
by the U.S. government, to push for economic sanctions against countries and 
non-U.S. companies that rights holders argue do not sufficiently protect 
intellectual property.  
 
iii) Shaping Policies through Economic Sanctions 
 
One of the principal reasons that the United States was successful at the 
Uruguay Round was its reform of its domestic trade legislation. In 1984, in 
response to stalemates in international fora and the “increasing cacophony of 
agitation” (Blakeney 1995:5) from industry, the United States introduced 
important amendments to Section 301 of its Trade Act of 1974 (Drahos and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(( The incentives for countries to join the WTO include trade liberalization and reduced tariffs in 
trade with WTO member states (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).  
(% For a detailed analysis of the influence of the Intellectual Property Committee in shaping the 
GATT, see Chapter 5 of Sell (2003) and Chapters 7 and 8 of Drahos and Braithwaite (2002).  
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Braithwaite 2002). These amendments, drafted in part by industry, allowed the 
USTR to withdraw trade benefits from or impose duties on a country’s goods.90 
In 1988, again in response to industry pressure, the U.S. further amended the 
legislation and created the Special 301 process.91  
 
In the Special 301 process, the USTR evaluates countries as to whether they 
provide adequate protection of intellectual property or market access for U.S. 
firms. The USTR’s decisions are based on industry complaints and industry-
provided data. The Special 301 has three categories of sanctions, which, in 
order of seriousness, are priority foreign country, priority watch list and watch 
list.92 The United States can then impose varying degrees of pressure on 
countries with unsatisfactory practices and direct those countries to make 
specific changes in order to be removed from these lists. As part of the Special 
301 process, the USTR publishes an annual survey, called the Special 301 
Report that identifies U.S. rights holders’ concerns with particular countries. As 
of 2006, the USTR also publishes a “Notorious Markets List.” Entities on this list 
are both physical marketplaces, like the Silk Market in Beijing, and online 
businesses, such as the China-based Taobao trading platform. Similar to the 
process for countries, U.S. rights holders and trade associations submit 
complaints to the USTR about markets that they contend are have insufficient 
policies and practices to protect their intellectual property rights.  
 
The Special 301 process is driven by industry.93 Rights holders and trade 
associations provide resources for the “global surveillance network” required by 
the initiative, as well as data for estimates on losses (Drahos and Braithwaite 
2002:107). The U.S. government legitimises industry efforts and provides the 
bureaucratic infrastructure that negotiates with, threatens and sanctions 
targeted countries (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). For example, when the 
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%) Section 301 does not require that the alleged activity actually violate a trade agreement with 
the United States in order to be censured (Flynn 2010:5).  
%* The Special 301 process was created in 1988 through an amendment made to Trade Act of 
1974 by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act in 1988.  
%+ A priority foreign country, the most serious category, is one that “has the most onerous and 
egregious acts” and is not “engaged in good faith negotiations.” Countries designated priority 
watch list are those that do not provide an adequate level of protection or enforcement. 
Countries on the watch list merited attention to address its intellectual property problems, see 
the USTR’s Special 301 Reports.  
%' The USTR also regularly accepts submissions from the public.  
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USTR placed the Taobao marketplace on its Notorious Markets List in 2008, it 
directed the Alibaba Group, the owner of Taobao, to work with U.S. rights 
holders and trade associations to address their concerns (Spelich 2012).94 
Taobao significantly altered its enforcement policies and practices based on 
rights holders’ complaints (see Spelich 2012), as will be discussed in chapter 6. 
The Notorious Markets List, and more broadly, the Special 301 process, are 
backed by the weight of the U.S. government that can credibly threaten trade 
sanctions against countries like China whose companies U.S. rights holders 
contend violate their intellectual property rights. The USTR’s Special 301 
process, in which the state applies coercive pressure on behalf of rights 
holders, demonstrates the history (since 1988) of state-facilitated regulation in 
relation to the global protection of intellectual property.  
  
The United States found the Special 301 process useful in stimulating 
discussions internationally among countries reluctant to adopt new rules to 
protect intellectual property. When the GATT Uruguay Round discussions 
stalled between 1986 and 1989, frustrated industry actors used the “new 
weapons in its arsenal – swift retaliation and a more credible threat” (Sell 
2003:108) to target countries, like Brazil, that failed to protection intellectual 
property in a manner considered adequate by U.S. industry. After an aggressive 
barrage of 301 complaints, leading developing countries grudgingly admitted in 
1989 that they would participate in negotiations on all trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights, which became the TRIPS agreement (Sell 2003).   
 
iv) Rights Holders’ Authority to Set Rules 
 
To draw together the ideas discussed so far, U.S.-based rights holders and 
trade associations played a central role in crafting and establishing consensus 
around the agreement that became TRIPS, along with their industry allies in 
Europe and Japan (Sell 2003). The most influential corporate actors, who sat on 
the Intellectual Property Committee, represented the interests of the largest and 
most powerful pharmaceutical, software, automotive, entertainment and 
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%" The Alibaba marketplace, a business-to-business trading platform also owned by the Alibaba 
Group, was on the Notorious Markets List from 2008 to 2011.  
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chemical companies (see Drahos and Braithwaite 2002).%$ Alongside these 
actors were the leading trade associations representing the music, movie and 
software industries, as well as the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, 
which represents well-known brands like Nike and Levi Strauss.  
 
In addition to their standing as powerful, multi-national corporations, these 
actors achieved their objectives of stronger trademark laws and enforcement 
because of several, inter-related factors. They had expertise on the legal and 
technical aspects of intellectual property at the time when most others around 
the negotiating table lacked this knowledge, and they provided valuable 
information on infringement and countries’ inadequate intellectual property laws 
(Sell 2003).96 Importantly, they also had a remarkable aptitude to frame 
intellectual property as an issue integral to trade and a serious, compelling 
problem at the global level. These actors cannily employed forum shifting by 
moving among negotiations at WIPO, various GATT meetings and informal 
meetings with government officials and industry actors to create strategic 
alliances and pressure reluctant states and actors to embrace intellectual 
property reform (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Matthews 2002). These skills—
specialised technical and legal knowledge, the capacity to constructive 
persuasive frames, and the ability (and resources) to shift among fora—are also 
evident in the private anti-counterfeiting regime.  
 
Underlying corporate actors’ success in crafting agreements at the global level 
are close, inter-dependent ties between U.S. industry and the U.S. government. 
In relation to intellectual property, the U.S. government is a non-neutral 
arbitrator: its interests are aligned toward the ever-increasing protection 
intellectual property (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 2003). The role of major 
U.S. corporations as trade policy advisors to the United States was 
institutionalised in the USTR 301 processes and the USTR Advisory Committee 
for Trade Negotiations. The 301 processes gave industry actors a valuable, 
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%$ In 1986, the members of the Intellectual Property Committee, an offshoot of the Advisory 
Committee for Trade Negotiations were Bristol-Myers, Pfizer, Merck, Monsanto, CBS, Du Pont, 
General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM and Johnson and Johnson (Sell 
2003:12). 
%# Drahos (1995:15) notes that many developing countries had no tradition of intellectual 
property as understood and practiced by industrialised countries and therefore lacked 
“consciousness” and “doctrinal knowledge” that accompanied industrialised countries’ 
understanding of intellectual property.  
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state-sanctioned coercive tool to persuade other countries of the importance of 
intellectual property and its rightful place at the heart of trade policies. As 
explained in chapter 2, this is an example of the state legitimising corporate 
authority and empowering corporate actors (Büthe 2010; Levi-Faur 2013).  
 
The U.S. government was sympathetic to corporate actors’ framing of 
intellectual property as a trade issue because it offered a nationalistic solution to 
U.S. economic woes (foreign theft) that emphasised a continuation of U.S. 
economic dominance (see Drahos 1995). The U.S. government and its 
prominent industries in these trade negotiations represented a state-market 
condominium (Underhill 2003) as corporate interests shaped the government’s 
policies on intellectual property and the government influenced the development 
of the market by setting standards through TRIPS. However, TRIPS, is not 
simply a narrative of U.S. corporate and government interests. Key business 
interests in Europe and Japan also pushed for strengthened measures for 
intellectual property. While U.S. corporate actors play an important role, the 
international effort to increase the protection of intellectual property rights can 
be understood as one of global corporate actors representing a diverse array of 
multinational corporations and trade associations (Matthews 2002).   
 
II) From TRIPS to Regulation of Online Infringement 
 
Intellectual property actors’ campaign against online infringement is a 
continuation of their battle to create TRIPS. Even though TRIPS advocates 
claimed “we got 95% of what we wanted” in the agreement (Sell 2011:448), it 
was never intended as an end goal but rather a beginning point for tough new 
global standards. In this battle for intellectual property protection, each new 
agreement or standard merely establishes a global baseline or “floor,” which 
proponents of intellectual property seek to “raise” in subsequent efforts to 
strengthen enforcement mechanisms (Sell 2003). The corporations and trade 
associations that successfully created and achieved consensus over TRIPS 
began in the late 1990s and early 2000s to apply their considerable lobbying 
and policymaking acumen to the online realm.  
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i) Challenges and Advantages of Online Enforcement  
 
Following the implementation of TRIPS in 1995, U.S. intellectual property actors 
increased their push for legislation to deal with online infringement. TRIPS was 
created at a time when counterfeit goods were smuggled in container loads into 
ports from foreign manufacturing sites and then distributed through flea markets 
and low-end retail outlets. That world, in part, still exists. Counterfeit goods must 
still be manufactured and physically shipped to consumers, unlike music, 
movies, books and software which can be created and disseminated in an 
electronic format. E-commerce enables businesses, whether licit or illicit, to 
communicate with customers, advertise their wares, and establish markets 
globally for their products. Sellers of counterfeit goods can offer their wares 
through platforms like eBay or the China-based Taobao marketplace. They can 
also set up their own website to sell counterfeits openly to willing consumers or 
try to deceive individuals who want to buy genuine products.  
 
At the same time, the Internet brings distinct enforcement challenges as a 
space for transnational policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; Sheptycki 2007). 
The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition argues that its members face 
difficulties in protecting their intellectual property online because of the “relative 
anonymity, minimal cost of entry, and decreased overhead of the online retail 
market, compared to traditional brick-and-mortar” stores (Johnson 2013:2). 
Addressing wrongdoing on the Internet also commonly involves jurisdictional 
challenges, as countries may not have the capacity or interest in addressing 
online infringement (Mann and Belzley 2005). Further, targeting infringing sites 
can be challenging as site operators may shift from one jurisdiction or service 
provider to another in response to enforcement pressure. Internet law scholar 
Peter Swire refers to this type of illicitly operating sites as “mice” (Swire 2005). 
Such mice are small, nimble and breed annoyingly quickly, which makes 
traditional enforcement operations difficult (Swire 2005:1979). Those in the 
intellectual property protection sphere refer to this challenge as “whack a mole,” 
in a reference to the popular arcade and carnival game. Bob Barchiesi, 
president of the IACC explains that rights holders  
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Would take websites down and they’d pop right back up. Within twenty 
seconds, they’d knock a site down and it would pop back up with a 
number one or a dot, just something a little bit different [in the domain 
name]. It just wasn’t doing anything. It didn’t have any effect at all.97  
 
Intellectual property actors argue that because of the pervasiveness of online 
infringement and the difficulties in policing it, the problem is too large and 
complex for rights holders to address alone. Further, they claim that Internet 
intermediaries bear a certain degree of responsibility for policing infringement 
and ensuring that they do not facilitate infringing activities. Internet 
intermediaries, as defined in chapter 1, are firms that facilitate a wide range of 
technical and commercial interactions, transactions and services on the 
Internet, such as search, payment or advertising (OECD 2011). When states or 
private actors persuade intermediaries to monitor or control certain activities, 
intermediaries became gatekeepers or enforcers. Any Internet intermediary can 
be persuaded to act as a gatekeeper, given the right motivation.  
 
Intermediaries are generally perceived to be more cost-effective and efficient 
regulators than if government (or corporations) were to undertake the regulation 
alone.98 Not all intermediaries have an equal regulatory capacity. Their 
capability in controlling different types of wrongdoing depends on how they 
operate, their scope, and the services they offer. Internet intermediaries range 
from micro-intermediaries, which have relatively small operations in terms of 
their market share, users and transactions and scope, to macro-
intermediaries.99 The term macro-intermediary refers to a small group of 
Internet firms and payment providers that operate vast, global platforms and 
command significant market share in their industry sectors.  
 
While the Internet brings enforcement challenges, it also offers considerable 
advantages. A London-based investigator with a firm specialising in intellectual 
property protection explains:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
%& Interview with Bob Barchiesi, President, International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, 24 April 
2012, Washington. 
98 For discussions on the perceived cost-effectiveness of Internet intermediaries, particularly 
payment providers, see MacCarthy (2010). 
99 For a discussion of macro- and micro-gatekeepers in the online environment, see Laidlaw 
(2010). 
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Actually, being online, to some extent, makes it easier because you do 
have cutting points. Online people have a trail. They do have these 
merchant accounts. [….] It leads directly to their bank account. It will lead 
to details of where these individuals are and who they are.*)) 
 
Macro-intermediaries can enable rights holders to detect and exploit “cutting 
points” (or chokepoints, for example, bank accounts) and track down 
wrongdoers. Intellectual property actors recognised the role that macro-
intermediaries could play in controlling infringement and mounted high-pressure 
campaigns to convince the Internet actors to assist them. Macro-intermediaries 
use technology as a regulatory instrument—a characteristic of techno-
regulation. These Internet actors operate massive surveillance and enforcement 
programs and have the capacity to monitor and control hundreds of millions of 
transactions across and users of their systems. Macro-intermediaries regulate 
their users’ behaviour through their internal terms-of-service agreements, which 
enables them to institute rules swiftly and easily and govern their platforms and 
services globally. These firms are industry leaders, meaning that once they 
adopt certain rules, others in their industry tend to follow, particularly if they 
have contractual relationships with the macro-intermediaries. Further, by virtue 
of their size, these macro-intermediaries can enact chokepoints that, to varying 
degrees, control the flow of transactions, users or information across their vast 
systems. These macro-intermediaries, then, can exert considerable regulatory 
authority and shape the use of essential Internet services, like payment, search 
and domain name services.    
 
Before examining efforts by states and rights holders to enlist these macro-
intermediaries, this chapter briefly outlines how the 1998 U.S. Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) and similar legislation in the European Union set the 
standard for anti-counterfeiting efforts.   
 
ii) The DMCA: Setting the Standard for Online Enforcement 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was the first major piece of 
legislation to address the online infringement of intellectual property rights. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Interview with Gavin Hyde-Blake, Director of Research and Investigation, Eccora, 19 
September 2012, London.  
Page 83 of 307 
!
!
DMCA was born out of rights holders’ growing concerns in the United States 
about digital-copyright infringement in the early 1990s (see Zittrain 2006). This 
legislation focuses exclusively on copyright infringement. However, two 
elements are important because the DMCA influenced the regulation of 
trademark infringement in the United States and internationally. First, the DMCA 
struck a balance between the interests of rights holders and intermediaries. In 
particular, it granted specific intermediaries conditional immunity from liability for 
the infringement if, among other criteria, they removed the allegedly infringing 
content.101 Second, the DMCA instituted a response to infringement that was 
echoed internationally and adopted in relation to trademark infringement—the 
notice-and-takedown regime.102 This refers to intermediaries’ practice of 
removing content (i.e., takedown) upon receiving a complaint from the relevant 
rights holders (i.e., notice). 
 
Once the United States passed the DMCA, it pushed other countries to adopt 
similar notice-and-takedown legislation to establish a new, global baseline for 
the protection of copyright. In the following years, other countries slowly 
implemented their own legislation (de Beer and Clemmer 2009). Like the 
DMCA, these laws established some sort of compromise between 
intermediaries and rights holders and provided limited immunity for certain 
intermediaries in exchange for their prompt action upon receipt of a notice of 
infringement (Weatherall 2012). In 2000, the European Parliament introduced 
the Electronic Commerce Directive (E-Commerce Directive),103 which 
harmonised the conditions under which intermediaries could be held liable for 
third-party infringement throughout the Europe Union.104 It employs a notice-
and-takedown scheme for infringing content similar to that of the DMCA.105  
 
While the DMCA focuses solely on copyright infringement, the E-Commerce 
Directive takes a broader approach. It applies to a range of activities, including 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 DMCA Sec. 512 (b)(1). 
102 DMCA Sec. 512 (b)(1)(E). 
103 The United Kingdom implemented the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulation 2002, 
SI 2002/2013, a mirror of the ECD, as all member states of the European Union must do with 
EC Directives. 
104 This is not a harmonization of liability but rather of “limitations of liability” (see Sparas 
(2013:10).  
105 For example, ECD Article 14 (b): “the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.”  
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copyright and trademark infringement, as well as defamation. The Directive 
does not provide a legal definition of “intermediaries,” although it describes the 
intermediaries that it considers “information society service providers,” which 
includes those that sell goods online, like eBay and Amazon.106 The E-
Commerce Directive is echoed, to varying degrees, in legislation of the 
European Union member states and thus governs how those countries address 
infringing sites.  
 
The DMCA and E-Commerce Directive establish a baseline for rights holders to 
address the online distribution of counterfeit goods, albeit unintentionally in the 
case of the DMCA. They provide a framework for Internet firms not designated 
as intermediaries within these acts to deal with online infringement. For 
example, in 1998 eBay created a notice-and-takedown program called VeRO 
(Verified Rights Owner Program) modelled on the DMCA as part of its efforts to 
respond to rights holders’ complaints of the sale of counterfeit goods, threats of 
legal action and lawsuits (see Dougherty 2011). Further, the DMCA and the E-
Commerce Directive illustrate how states arbitrate among competing (in these 
cases, corporate) interests and, in doing so, align themselves more closely with 
certain interests, specifically rights holders, rather than others. In the DMCA, the 
U.S. government continued its long-held tradition of seeking ever-increasing 
protection for intellectual property (see Haggart 2014), a practice it maintained 
with the introduction of the Stop Online Piracy Act in 2011. With the DMCA and 
SOPA, the U.S. government further demonstrates that it is non-neutral arbitrator 
on the issue of intellectual property as its interests are closely inter-twined with 
prominent rights holders and trade associations.  
 
III) Expansion of Online Enforcement Efforts Against 
Infringement 
 
With the maturation of e-commerce, intellectual property actors in the United 
States argued that legislation dealing with online infringement needed to be 
updated. Notice-and-takedown schemes, spurred into being by the 1998 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 In Article 18, the Directive describes intermediaries that provide mere conduit services (e.g., 
that provide access to the Internet, like Virgin Media), caching services (e.g., as undertaken by 
web browsers), and hosting services (e.g., like Facebook or eBay).  
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DMCA, had not evolved alongside Internet technologies and Internet 
intermediaries. Since the late 1990s, there has been a dramatic expansion in 
Internet services with the creation of entities like PayPal (created in 1999), 
Facebook (2004), YouTube (2005) and Twitter (2006). Given this range of new 
types of intermediaries, proponents of tougher intellectual property protection 
began arguing in the mid-2000s that new legislation was needed in the United 
States to update the DMCA (Castro, Bennett, and Andes 2009). They 
contended that more types of Internet intermediaries should be obliged to 
assume gatekeeping duties, particularly payment and advertising 
intermediaries, in addition to those proscribed in the DMCA (Castro, Bennett, 
and Andes 2009). 
 
i) Emergence of “Voluntary” Enforcement Initiatives 
 
Voluntary (non-legally binding) enforcement efforts against online infringement 
emerged in the European Union and United States in 2009. In the European 
Union, there is a history of official support for non-binding enforcement 
agreements among private actors. The 2000 E-Commerce Directive, which also 
sets out enforcement provisions against online trademark infringement that 
were discussed earlier, grants Internet service providers permission to form 
non-binding agreements to develop “rapid and reliable procedures for removing 
and disabling access to illegal information.”107 In 2004, the European 
Commission called upon industry to take an active role in anti-infringement 
efforts and promoted the development of codes of conduct as “a supplementary 
means of bolstering the regulatory framework” (European Commission 2004:4).  
 
It was in 2009, however, when negotiations began on the first non-binding 
agreement for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. In that year, the 
European Commission announced it had “organised a structured dialogue 
between stakeholders to facilitate mutual understanding” in relation to the sale 
of counterfeit goods through online marketplaces (European Commission 
2009:10). The resulting agreement, which will be examined in greater detail 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 E-Commerce Directive Art. 40 also states that provisions in this Directive “should not 
preclude the development and effective operation, by the different interested parties, of 
technical systems protection and identification and of technical surveillance made possible by 
digital technology.”  
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later in chapter 6, established a set of non-binding general principles among 
marketplaces, rights holders and their trade associations to guide enforcement 
efforts against counterfeit goods.  
 
In the United States, the idea of voluntary industry initiatives also began to gain 
traction in 2009. The International Trademark Association (INTA), an influential 
New York City-based trade body, recommended that more intermediaries 
needed to assume greater enforcement responsibility for the online sale of 
counterfeit goods. INTA released recommendations that online marketplaces, 
search engines, and payment providers should adopt voluntary measures to 
address the online sale of counterfeit goods (INTA 2009). Prominent firms 
agreed to the measures, including Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and 
Paypal, as well as eBay, Yahoo and Google. The recommendations largely 
focus on educating consumers and encouraging intermediaries to work with 
rights holders and establishing clear processes to deal with infringement.  
 
Also in 2009, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a 
Washington, D.C.-based think tank, released a white paper. In the paper, ITIF 
analysts recommended that the U.S. government should “encourage 
stakeholders to develop best practices and collaborative self-regulation 
regimes” (Castro, Bennett, and Andes 2009:23). Daniel Castro, lead author on 
the paper, acknowledged that there is no “silver bullet” or “single technical or 
legislative proposal will completely solve such a complex issue” as online 
infringement but “there are many “lead bullets’” (Castro, Bennett, and Andes 
2009:1). In this bullet metaphor, many intermediaries have important roles to 
play in the regulation of online infringement, particularly search engines, 
payment providers and advertising platforms. ITIF analysts recommended that 
the U.S. government work with rights holders and intermediaries to identify 
infringing sites. Once infringing sites are identified, “ad networks and other 
companies can refuse to place ads with them, and banks and credit card 
companies can refuse to process payments to them” (Castro, Bennett, and 
Andes 2009:23).*)( 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*)( ITIF’s white paper also recommends search engines and Internet service providers block 
infringing sites in a manner similar to that used against sites distributing child pornography (see 
Bennett, and Andes 2009).!
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The proposals by the International Trademark Association and the Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation recommended a significant departure 
from the traditional conception of Internet intermediaries. First, these groups 
argued that more types of Internet intermediaries should be enlisted as 
gatekeepers to address online infringement on behalf of rights holders, like 
payment providers and advertising platforms. Second, INTA and ITIF advocated 
an expansion of intermediaries’ traditional notice-and-takedown roles (as 
described in relation to the E-Commerce Directive) to include notice-and-
termination programs. In notice-and-termination programs, Internet 
intermediaries withdraw or terminate services to sites upon receiving a 
complaint (i.e., notice) from rights holders of infringing activity. Intermediaries 
can withdraw payment processing services, for example, that disable a 
website’s capacity to process payments. Third, these programs would be 
voluntary.  
 
In their recommendations, INTA and the ITIF advocated a shift from the removal 
of infringing content, in which sites remain functional, to the disabling of sites 
through the termination of their essential technical and commercial services. 
Proponents of this strategy view Internet intermediaries as the most appropriate 
regulators and argue that they have technological capacities to detect and 
address online infringement (Castro, Bennett, and Andes 2009). In this strategy 
of regulation through technology, advocates argued that the focus of 
enforcement should move from the removal of specific infringing content to the 
termination of entire sites. Rights holders and intermediaries would work 
together with minimal government involvement to determine what constitutes 
infringement and how best to address it (Castro, Bennett, and Andes 2009). 
The state, however, would remain in the background to provide coercive 
pressure to stimulate or direct regulatory activities, a situation that is clearly 
evident in the private regulatory arrangements examined in chapters 4 to 6.  
 
Neither the INTA proposal nor the ITIF proposal considered the involvement of 
consumers or civil-advocacy groups in relation to the voluntary initiatives. 
Moreover, ITIF’s report acknowledged that encouraging Internet firms and 
payment providers to act voluntarily against infringing sites could raise the 
possibility of anti-competitive behaviour. Macro-intermediaries hold 
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considerable market share in their industry sectors, such as Google for search 
engines and Visa, PayPal and MasterCard for payment providers. To address 
problems of potential anti-competitive behaviour, ITIF suggests, “the 
government should also consider providing anti-trust exemptions for 
collaborative industry action” (Castro, Bennett, and Andes 2009:23). Such 
collaborative industry action against infringement, ITIF argues, is more 
important than deterring potential anti-competitive behaviour among Internet 
giants. It is evident in ITIF’s strategy, and argued throughout the dissertation, 
that the interests of consumers and the public are secondary to the protection of 
intellectual property on behalf of rights holders.  
 
ii) Four Doomed Intellectual Property Bills in the United States 
 
While intellectual property actors were pushing macro-intermediaries in 2009 to 
adopt non-binding enforcement measures, they were also forcefully lobbying 
U.S. legislators and policymakers for legislation to update the DMCA. As 
discussed in chapter 2, there are advantages and disadvantages of voluntary 
regulation by industry actors. Non-binding measures can be created and altered 
rapidly, according to the situation and participants’ needs (Büthe 2010; Cafaggi 
2011). Legislation, meanwhile, has judicial safeguards, punitive sanctions and a 
binding force that, in the case of intermediaries, would require them to police 
infringing sites. Proponents of legislation framed online infringement as a 
problem best solved by Internet intermediaries, as is evident in the proposals 
from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Regulation by 
intermediaries gained public prominence when they became the centrepiece of 
four U.S. federal bills on intellectual property enforcement introduced in 2010 
and 2012.  
 
a) Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act 
 
When Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democratic senator from Vermont, introduced 
an intellectual property bill in September 2010, there was no indication that 
intellectual property would captivate millions of people less than two years later 
and spark a massive online protest. At that time, intellectual property was a 
largely considered an arcane subject of interest only to large corporations and 
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attorneys. The bill, Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act 
(COICA)109 would have allowed the Attorney General to seek court orders 
against domestic and foreign infringing domain names (see Table 3.1).110 
Internet intermediaries, specifically domain name registrars, payment providers 
and advertising platforms, would be required to withdraw their services from 
targeted sites.111 The bill also would have granted these intermediaries the right 
to act voluntarily against domain names they reasonably believed was 
“dedicated to infringing activities.”112  
 
Civil-society groups like Electronic Frontier Foundation contended the bill would 
result in inadvertent takedowns of legitimate sites and would censor the Internet 
(Timm 2012). More surprising, however, was fierce opposition from Senator 
Ron Wyden, a Democrat from Oregon. Intellectual property is a long-standing, 
non-partisan issue in the United States (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Wyden 
broke ranks with his Senate colleagues and announced he would vote against 
the bill in a full Senate vote because he said, as written, it was “almost like 
using a bunker-busting cluster bomb when what you really need is a precision-
guided missile” (Anderson 2010). 
 
b) Protect Intellectual Property Act 
 
Given Wyden’s opposition, Senator Leahy withdrew the bill and in May 2011 
introduced a revised version of the bill into the Senate Judiciary Committee. The 
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act (PIPA) had several similarities with its predecessor (see Table 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*)% Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act of 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd. Sess., 
September 20, 2010, S. 3804. 
**) COICA would have targeted domain names, which are the names given to Internet Protocol 
addresses, such as ThePirateBay.se. One domain name may have multiple websites. For 
example, in 2011 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement seized a domain—mooo.com—that was a domain name service provider. As a 
result, 84,000 subdomains were wrongfully seized as well and associated with the child 
pornography charges that resulted in the seizure of mooo.com (Kopel 2013). In contrast, the 
Stop Online Piracy Act would have targeted particular infringing websites, which are sets of 
related webpages.  
*** COICA, Sec. 2(e)(2) (non-domestic names) and COICA Sec. 2(e)(1) for domestic domain 
names.  
**+ COICA, Sec. 2(e)(B).  
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3.1).113 PIPA allowed the Attorney General to seek court orders to be served on 
intermediaries requiring them to withdraw their services from infringing sites.114 
It also granted intermediaries a voluntary right of action against sites selling or 
dispensing pharmaceuticals without a valid prescription and for “medication that 
is adulterated or misbranded”.115 However, PIPA went a step further than 
COICA when it proposed to grant rights holders a private right of action (see 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3). This provision would have enabled rights holders to seek a 
court order to compel payment providers and Internet advertising networks to 
suspend their services to infringing sites.116  
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of Intermediaries – Private Right of Action 
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c) Stop Online Piracy Act 
 
While PIPA was under discussion in the Senate Judiciary Committee and critics 
were raising mounting concerns about its provisions, another intellectual 
property bill was introduced in October 2011. Representative Lamar Smith, a 
Republican from Texas, introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) into the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
**' Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act 
of 2011. 112th Cong., 1st. sess., May 12, 2011, S. 968. 
**" PIPA Sec. 3(2). 
**$ The provision defined ‘misbranded’ as that within Section 502 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 352. This section refers to false or misleading labels, packages, or 
contents on labels. See PIPA, Sec. 5(b) in relation to voluntary action against infringing sites 
threatening public health.  
**# PIPA Sec. 4.    
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House Judiciary Committee. Like PIPA, SOPA allowed the Attorney General to 
seek court orders to require a range of intermediaries to disable their services to 
infringing sites. SOPA also granted a private right of action to rights holders.117 
It granted voluntary right of action to intermediaries to withdraw their services 
from sites they reasonably contend are infringing sites and to sites endangering 
the public health by distributing counterfeit pharmaceuticals (see Tables 3.1 and 
3.2).118 SOPA took a tougher line against Internet intermediaries than PIPA: it 
introduced a timeframe of five days for intermediaries to take action or face 
penalties.119  
 
Table 3.2: Comparison of Intermediaries – Voluntary Actions 
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**& SOPA Sec. 103. 
**( SOPA Sec. 104 granted immunity for voluntary action against non-U.S.-based infringing sites 
and SOPA Sec. 105. granted voluntary right of action against sites endangering public health. 
**% SOPA Sec. 102 and 103. 
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d) Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act 
 
As protests grew over SOPA and PIPA, two politicians who were critical of the 
bills introduced an alternative, the Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital 
Trade Act (OPEN Act) in December 2011.*+) Senator Wyden introduced it into 
the Senate Finance Committee and Representative Darryll Issa, a Republican 
from California, introduced the Act into the House Judiciary Committee. OPEN 
differed substantially from the previous bills. It did not offer a private right of 
action nor did it propose that the Attorney General could seek court orders 
against infringing sites. Instead, it proposed to situate the regulatory authority 
for foreign infringing sites in the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).*+* 
The ITC could grant rights holders orders to compel payment service providers 
and advertising intermediaries to withdraw their services from infringing sites.*++ 
Like SOPA and PIPA, however, even OPEN would granted voluntary right of 
action to payment providers and Internet advertising networks against infringing 
sites endangering the public health through the unauthorised distribution of 
pharmaceuticals (see Table 3.3).*+'  
 
e) Protests over PIPA and SOPA 
 
Soon after the introduction of COICA, civil-advocacy groups like Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and Public Citizen criticised the bill, along with cyber law 
scholars and technologists who track regulation on and of the Internet (Benkler 
2011). With the introduction of PIPA and SOPA, the protest gathered 
momentum as critics wrote about it in blogs, spread the word through social 
media, circulated petitions, and on November 16, 2011, declared “America 
censorship day” to protest the bills, which gathered four million signatures on its 
first day (Moon, Ruffini, Segal 2013; Sell 2013). The campaign accelerated in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*+) Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act. H.R. 3782 (112th Congress, 2011–
2013). Introduced Jan 18, 2012; Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act. 
S.2029 (112th Congress, 2011-2012). Introduced 17 December 2011.   
*+* In contrast to COICA, PIPA, and SOPA, which would have operated through the Attorney 
General at the Department of Justice, OPEN proposed to work through the ITC, an 
independent, quasi-judicial federal agency with an investigative mandate for trade-related 
issues. The OPEN Act would have only considered foreign infringing sites and referred 
domestic infringing sites to the Attorney General for investigation.  
*++ SOPA Sec. (8)(13)(g). 
*+' OPEN 337A(8)(13)(k). 
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late 2011 as anti-SOPA activists planned an Internet blackout for January 18, 
2012 in which thousands of websites agreed to block their home webpages 
partially or completely in solidarity with the protest (Sell 2013). These sites, like 
Google and Wikipedia, urged concerned individuals to contact their elected 
representatives in the United States. Following an unprecedented outpouring of 
anger against PIPA and SOPA, the U.S. Congress withdrew them on January 
20, 2012. The OPEN Act languished after the SOPA protests and has not 
progressed since then.  
 
f)  Legitimising Intermediaries as Gatekeepers 
 
Although these bills failed to become law—and, in the case of PIPA and SOPA, 
spectacularly so—they served an important purpose for intellectual property 
actors. There are commonalities across the four bills, even though the OPEN 
Act was introduced as an alternative to PIPA and SOPA. All the bills focused on 
disabling infringing sites by using intermediaries to withdraw commercial and 
business services instead of removing infringing content. They all proposed to 
grant intermediaries a voluntary right of action against sites that unlawfully 
distribute pharmaceuticals. Finally, they all expanded the concept of Internet 
intermediaries that should bear responsibility for policing online infringement 
from the 1998 DMCA and 2000 European E-Commerce Directive. Each bill 
references payment providers and advertising platforms.   
 
Although there are differences among these bills, their similarities indicate a 
degree of consensus among U.S. policymakers and legislators in terms of 
enforcement strategies that are considered suitable. The bills legitimised ideas 
of disabling sites, at least in the eyes of the bills’ proponents. They also 
legitimised the concept of voluntary right of action for intermediaries against 
certain types of infringing sites. Even the OPEN Act incorporated ideas of 
voluntary rights of action and targeting entire sites instead of proposing policies 
to address specific problematic content or activities. The differences between 
OPEN and the other bills are therefore not absolute but a matter of degrees.  
 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation referred to the bills’ voluntary measures as 
the “vigilante provision” because intermediaries could act without any judicial 
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oversight, “the standard for immunity is incredibly low and the potential for 
abuse is off the charts” (Timm 2012). To qualify for immunity, these 
intermediaries need only act “in good faith” and “on credible evidence,”124 which 
raises significant concerns given the number of complaints of inaccurate or 
abusive enforcement by intermediaries in the area of digital-copyright 
enforcement (see Urban and Quilter 2006).125 The recasting of Internet 
intermediaries as gatekeepers fundamentally shifts intermediaries’ burden of 
responsibility for policing third-party infringement on their platforms. While these 
bills clearly recognise that these intermediaries have specialised, technical 
knowledge and their capacity to regulate certain activities, their determination of 
why Internet intermediaries should bear responsibility for infringement is less 
compelling. The reasoning appears to be that intermediaries have a technical 
capacity to monitor and block certain transactions and a global reach. 
Therefore, intermediary-facilitated regulation would enable rights holders—and, 
by extension, the U.S. government—to expand their regulatory efforts globally. 
Despite the death of these bills, their ideas live on in non-binding agreements 
adopted by an elite group of macro-intermediaries, as the next section explores.   
 
IV) Framing the Debate over Online Enforcement 
 
The acrimonious debate over the Stop Online Piracy Act provides a valuable 
opportunity to examine how intellectual property actors and macro-
intermediaries frame ideas around the online regulation of intellectual property 
rights. By examining actors’ competing narratives regarding online infringement, 
the researcher can focus upon how they try to legitimise their positions and, in 
turn, influence policymaking in the United States. As discussed in chapter 2, 
actors may draw upon different sources of legitimacy consecutively or 
simultaneously. They can also construct, shape, meld or manipulate legitimacy 
claims depending on the community to whom they are speaking. Actors may 
look to various sources for authority but corporate actors commonly draw upon 
their power in the market (often termed structural authority) (see Avant, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*+" SOPA Sec. 105. 
*+$ For example, in a study of takedown notice in relation to copyright infringement, Urban and 
Quilter (2006) found a large proportion (55% of notices they examined related to Google’s 
search results) were from businesses trying to remove search results of their competitors (see 
Urban and Quilter 2006).!
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Finnemore, and, Sell 2010). Corporate actors also draw upon discursive 
authority, which refers to their capacity to construct and communicate 
persuasive narratives about particular problems and appropriate solutions 
(Fuchs 2007).  
 
i) Framing the Concept of Intellectual Property 
 
Underlying the concept of framing is the understanding that ideas are influenced 
by the social milieu in which actors operate and are thus subject to shift and 
change (Odell and Sell 2006). Perceptions of the material world are “mediated 
through ideational processes” (Béland 2010:148), which means that actors give 
meaning to and make sense of the world in which they live. Actors can use 
ideas and metaphors as discursive frames to present events or behaviour in 
certain ways and suggest alternatives (see Odell and Sell 2006). In relation to 
policymaking, actors employ frames to persuade others of the seriousness of 
particular problems and the necessity of reform. Effective framing is vitally 
important. “One must convince people that one’s arguments are good, one’s 
institutional innovations necessary, and one’s horror stories disturbing” (Boyle 
2007:18 in Sell 2003:3).  
 
Just as actors construct and interpret particular policy responses as 
appropriate, they also define and shape the perceived problems. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, rights holders strategically constructed an association 
between intellectual property and international trade. Similarly, they have 
proven remarkably apt at framing infringement as a serious criminal offence. 
This strategic construction of crime (Lacey and Zedner 2012) enables rights 
holders to shift attention away from any role that their corporate processes may 
play in creating opportunities for counterfeiters, like out-sourcing production to 
China (Mackenzie 2010). There is a common misconception “that there’s some 
kind of boogeyman counterfeiter or evil empire,” explains a Hong Kong-based 
attorney, “Nine times out of ten it’s their own suppliers.”126 Thus, instead of 
interpreting the problem as one of parallel trade or contractual dispute between 
rights holders and manufacturers, counterfeiting is framed as a criminal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*+# Interview with lawyer at Hong Kong law firm, 7 May 2012, Washington. 
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offense.127 Intellectual property actors’ framing of infringement as a harmful 
crime has remarkable staying power. It is a frame that simplifies complex 
issues. What is often defined as a problem of “counterfeit pharmaceuticals,” for 
example, can be much more complicated. Intellectual property actors 
sometimes conflate issues of generic medication, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, 
parallel trade medication, and substandard medication.128 Such slippage among 
different issues can enable actors to portray a problem as larger or more 
serious than it is in reality. 
 
Before protests over the bill made supporting it politically unpalatable, SOPA 
(and its sister bill the Protect IP Act) commanded wide, though not universal 
support in the U.S. Congress. Industry supporters were largely multinational 
rights holders and their affiliated trade associations like the Motion Picture 
Association of America, the Recording Industry Association of America, and the 
Entertainment Software Association. Opponents of the bills were an eclectic 
group ranging from non-governmental organizations, librarians, civil-society 
groups and technologists to Internet giants. These latter actors included 
Google, Yahoo, Amazon, eBay, Facebook, and Twitter, as well as the industry 
associations like the Consumer Electronics Association (Sell 2013).   
 
ii) Advocates for SOPA 
 
Proponents of tougher enforcement against online infringement draw upon 
arguments they have successfully employed since the 1980s: counterfeit goods 
cost jobs, threaten innovation and endanger public health (Halbert 1997). For 
the online realm, they also emphasise what they see as the inherently deceptive 
nature of infringing sites that lure unsuspecting consumers because they accept 
popular credit cards. Such sites threaten “our collective confidence in the 
Internet ecosystem,” argued Representative Bob Goodlatte, a Republican from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Parallel trade refers to the distribution of legitimate, non-counterfeited goods from one 
country or region to another without the authorization of the intellectual property rights owner. 
Rights holders generally object to this practice because they may practice differential pricing in 
which an identical product is assigned higher prices in certain country or regions.  
128 Generic pharmaceuticals refers to genuine drugs that are no longer covered by a patent and 
that are identical in terms of active medicinal ingredients but typically cheaper than brand-name 
versions of the same drug. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals refer to medication that is deliberately 
and fraudulently mislabelled and may have the wrong or incorrect quantities of active 
ingredients. Substandard medication, which describes problems with or flaws in the medication, 
can refer to genuine or counterfeit medication.!
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Virginia, in his remarks to the House Judiciary Committee on SOPA in 2011 
(Goodlatte 2011:38). Elements of the SOPA debate echoed concerns from the 
late 1970s about a flood of counterfeit goods from Asia. Advocates directed 
heated accusations at China, demonstrating that the rhetoric of the ‘foreign 
counterfeiter’ has remarkable staying power.129 Metaphors of lawlessness and 
ungoverned spaces are used in relation to infringement to lend urgency to 
enforcement efforts and justify action from both the state and the private sector 
(Loughlan 2006).  
 
SOPA advocates worked to recast opposition by Google, Yahoo and others to 
the bill as being fundamentally concerned with furthering their business 
interests rather than protecting American businesses and consumers. By 
arguing that Internet intermediaries were part of the problem, intellectual 
property actors sought to shift the burden of regulatory responsibility onto those 
intermediaries. Representative Lamar Smith, a Texas Republican, underlined 
this point when he argued that if Google made “the right decision” (i.e., 
strengthened its enforcement efforts) then it would have to give up revenue 
from “ads that are actually on the infringing websites” (Smith 2011:129).  
 
iii) Opponents of SOPA 
 
Opponents of the proposed legislation argued that they supported the bill’s 
intention to address copyright infringement and the online distribution of 
counterfeit goods but criticised the proposed measures as flawed and 
problematic. “Believing that a free and open Internet is worth fighting to protect,” 
Senator Wyden argued, “does not mean that we aren’t concerned about 
copyright infringement” (Wyden 2011). To underline their legitimacy as 
guardians of the Internet, Internet firms emphasised the important roles they 
played in facilitating a healthy and vibrant Internet, social and cultural 
interactions, and fertile environment for e-commerce. These firms pointed to 
their considerable economic contribution to the U.S. economy. Google, for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*+% The narrative that constructs counterfeiting as a serious, transnational crime also 
conceptualises the ‘counterfeiter’ as the foreign ‘other,’ a process that is common to many other 
narratives explaining crime (e.g., see Woodiwiss (2001) for a critique of ‘foreign’ organised 
crime). 
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example, stressed that the firm generated $64 billion in economic activity in 
2010 for American businesses (Oyama 2011).  
 
These firms also grounded their objections in appeals to protect basic rights and 
freedoms, particularly freedom of speech (Sell 2013). Randall Rothenberg, 
president of the Interactive Advertising Bureau, the trade association for digital 
advertisers, emphasised that his industry was “greatly concerned about the 
broad, potentially unconstitutional, constraints on the freedom to advertise,” 
which is protected by the First Amendment in the United States (Rothenberg 
2011). Kent Walker, vice president and general counsel at Google, said that any 
measures must not undermine the principle of “Internet freedom [as] a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy” (Walker 2011:7-8). Nor, he argued, should 
they endanger “legitimate technologies, innovative businesses, and lawful 
speech” (Walker 2011:7-8).  
 
In testimony to Congress, Google, MasterCard and GoDaddy all expressed 
support for some form of voluntary regulation that would give them the flexibility 
to address infringement in their own way (for MasterCard, see Kirkpatrick 2011). 
These firms warned, however, that the burden for enforcement could not fall on 
intermediaries alone. In a statement that all intermediaries echoed, to varying 
degrees, Google argued, “no intermediary will be able to prevent all abuse of its 
systems” (Oyama 2011:7). 
 
iv) Inter-Play of Interests 
 
By examining the competing frames employed by advocates and opponents of 
SOPA, one can also study the varying interests and power dynamics at play in 
relation to the regulation of online infringement. Both camps drew upon 
considerable resources of structural and discursive authority. Each created a 
compelling narrative that spoke to their respective constituencies. Proponents of 
the bill represented the Goliath in this battle because of their decades of 
successful intellectual property policymaking in the United States and on the 
global stage (Sell 2003). The anti-SOPA coalition expertly roused public 
opposition and achieved a surprise upset over the powerful, institutionalised 
interests of intellectual property actors. This clash of multi-national corporations 
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over intellectual property enforcement is unusual. More unusual was the 
legislative defeat of rights holders, which was the first such occasion in 30 years 
in the United States (Sell 2013).  
 
Despite the remarkable achievement of the SOPA protest, it is important to 
recognise that it was a temporary alliance among a broad coalition of interests. 
Internet firms flexed their growing lobbying power but their interests may not 
necessarily align again with others in the anti-SOPA movement (Sell 2013). The 
coalition successfully created a narrative to defeat the bill—Stop Censorship 
and Don’t Break the Internet—but even with the death of the bill the dominant 
frame—Copying is Theft—remains intact. Activists won the skirmish against the 
bill but lost the larger battle as intellectual property actors merely instituted 
SOPA-like measures into private non-binding agreements.  
 
V) Creation of Private Enforcement Agreements 
 
Given their opposition to SOPA’s provisions, what explains macro-
intermediaries’ decisions to adopt private enforcement agreements that institute 
SOPA-like practices? There are several reasons, which will be explored further 
in the following chapters. First, macro-intermediaries face an uneven playing 
field, as explored earlier in this chapter. There is strong bipartisan support for 
greater protection for intellectual property rights in the United States. This 
sentiment is also evident in the European Union, as demonstrated by the 
actions of the European Commission and U.K. government in compelling 
macro-intermediaries to enter private enforcement agreements by threatening 
legislation or legal action. In addition, rights holders have an institutional 
advantage in terms of influencing states from their decades of shaping 
intellectual property policymaking in the United States and internationally. 
These states, this dissertation argues, are non-neutral actors that have strong 
preferences for macro-intermediary-facilitated regulation of intellectual property 
on the Internet.  
 
There are two other important reasons that macro-intermediaries adopted the 
private enforcement agreements examined in this dissertation, as will be 
Page 100 of 307 
!
!
examined further below. There are inter-dependent interests among macro-
intermediaries, intellectual property actors, and states. Macro-intermediaries 
share common financial and reputational concerns with rights holders. More 
importantly, macro-intermediaries and the U.S. government, in particular, share 
overlapping interests in online surveillance.  
 
i) Inter-dependent Interests 
 
Macro-intermediaries, like rights holders, have financial interests in in protecting 
intellectual property (trademarks, copyright and patents) related to their 
products and services. Internet firms and payment providers also have 
reputational interests in ensuring that they maintain the confidence of their 
users and preserve the reputation of their brands. As discussed in chapter 1, 
the European Union, and particularly, the United States perceive intellectual 
property as integral to their economies (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 
2003). Rights holders and trade associations constructed a conceptual linkage 
between intellectual property and international trade and, as a result, prioritise 
highly the protection of intellectual property rights (Sell 2003). Critics of this 
linkage argue that, in many cases, intellectual property does not boost 
economic growth but instead stifles innovation and rewards rent-seeking 
behaviour by large corporate interests (e.g., Drahos and Braithwate 2002; 
Mazzone 2011; Raustiala and Sprigman 2012). This dissertation does not 
engage that debate but notes that the United States, United Kingdom and 
European Union accord intellectual property importance based, in part, on rights 
holders’ persuasive narrative of its significance to their economies (Sell 2003).  
 
In addition to common interests in intellectual property, states involved in the 
private regulatory regime (the United States, United Kingdom and the European 
Union) can capitalise upon macro-intermediaries’ regulatory capacity to exert 
influence online in their areas of interest. The United Kingdom and the 
European Union, for example, are interested in working with Internet 
intermediaries, often in voluntary regulatory arrangements, to take down child 
pornography sites and extremism sites (Fae 2014; Laidlaw 2012). There are 
also complex, inter-dependent relationships between the macro-intermediaries 
and the U.S. government in relation to online surveillance. The U.S. 
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government, through its National Security Agency (NSA) and along with its 
allies, particularly the United Kingdom, is reliant upon macro-intermediaries’ big-
data-oriented business models.130 These firms are ideally suited to facilitate 
mass surveillance as many of their applications and services are premised upon 
collecting, storing and mining vast amounts of personal and commercial data 
from their users.  
 
Information from Edward Snowden’s leaked files demonstrates the degree to 
which the NSA relies upon data from Google, Yahoo and Microsoft, which 
enables the United States and its allies to protect their national security and 
economic interests.131 These firms are economically motivated to work with the 
U.S. government to ensure that lucrative government contracts flow unimpeded. 
An executive for a top technology firm in the U.S. explained the difficulty of 
resisting the U.S. government in relation to the NSA’s surveillance while 
courting its business. “We’re fighting you on this,” the unnamed executive 
exclaims, “oh, and can I have that $400 million contract” (Levy 2014). State 
reliance upon information from macro-intermediaries provides a degree of 
legitimation of and protection for their corporate surveillance programs, which 
have regularly attracted criticism and charges of breach of privacy.  
 
By agreeing to work with rights holders on intellectual property, an issue of 
significant importance to the United States and European Union, macro-
intermediaries are in a valuable position to influence government policymaking 
and standard setting in areas of importance to them. This includes shaping 
regulations on digital privacy, intellectual property and anti-trust measures.132 
Governments are also interested in shaping standards on the Internet to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*') Big data can be understood as massive volumes of information that companies must process 
in order to identify patterns, infer probabilities and make connections. Firms like Twitter, Google 
and Facebook provide “free” services, such as search, email and social networking, in 
exchange for amassing and tracking users’ data, which they sell to advertisers to generate the 
bulk of their revenue (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). 
*'* The Snowden files reveal accounts of the NSA spying on allies of the United States to 
strengthen its economic bargaining position in trade talks. For example, the NSA monitored 
communications among European Union officials in New York and Brussels and also conducted 
surveillance of U.S. law firms representing foreign governments in U.S. trade disputes (Glanz 
and Lehren 2013).  
*'+ Google, for example, is now one of the top five lobbying corporations in the United States 
along with companies like General Electric and AT&T. Its two main areas of lobbying are the 
topics of intellectual property (trademarks, copyright and patents) and labour and anti-trust 
issues, according to the Center for Responsive Politics’ project OpenSecrets.org that tracks 
corporate lobbying amounts.  
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facilitate state influence over Internet infrastructure and services. The Snowden 
files, for example, reveal how the U.S. government strategically weakens 
encryption standard-setting processes to ensure it has a back door into 
companies using that encryption.133 In doing so, the U.S. government signals its 
intention to remain a principal actor within the digital economy and the evolution 
of the Internet.  
 
ii) Uncertain Regulatory Landscape 
 
Macro-intermediaries face an uncertain legal climate in relation to the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights for several reasons. States 
threatened each of the macro-intermediaries examined in this dissertation with 
legislation or legal action. Rights holders and their trade associations have also 
sued or threated legal action against macro-intermediaries. In relation to these 
lawsuits, U.S. and European courts have delivered starkly divergent rulings in 
relation to intermediaries’ enforcement responsibilities, particularly in relation to 
online marketplaces (Mac Síthigh 2013; Rimmer 2011). More broadly, Internet-
related intellectual property law is evolving with the maturation of e-commerce, 
shifts in business models, and with the growing industry awareness of online 
infringement (Mac Síthigh 2013). As a result, there is a lack of clarity on the 
nature of an appropriate notification of infringement from rights holders, which 
makes it difficult for intermediaries to determine what constitutes compliance 
and how to implement appropriate enforcement measures (McNamee 2011).  
 
Intermediaries that face varying degrees of legal uncertainty about their 
enforcement responsibilities, have a greater motivation to adopt additional or 
informal regulatory measures (McNamee 2011). The threat of future legal 
proceedings against intermediaries for contributory liability is “the pressure that 
gets everyone to agree to the arrangements,” explains Robert Guthrie, an 
associate at SJ Berwin LLP in London.134  Thus, intermediaries’ adoption of 
voluntary measures is partly “defensive” (Lindenbaum and Ewen 2012) as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*'' Snowden’s files revealed that the NSA was deliberately weakening and introducing flaws into 
international encryption standards developed by industry, something long suspected by 
cryptographers (see Perlroth, Larson, and Shane 2013).!
*'" Interview with Robert Guthrie, Associate, SJ Berwin, 5 October 2012, London. 
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compliant intermediaries presumably have a lower risk of being sued by rights 
holders or targeted by states for legal action.  
 
iii) Limitations of Private Authority 
 
As will be explored throughout this dissertation, rights holders have some 
capacity to shape macro-intermediaries’ enforcement practices by pressuring 
the firms and employing threats of legal action. However, they did not have the 
authority to force macro-intermediaries to adopt enforcement practices that 
were as coordinated, streamlined and comprehensive as rights holders desired. 
Rights holders, for example, were unable to persuade Visa and MasterCard to 
amend their enforcement practices to facilitate the rapid, mass termination of 
payment services to infringing sites. 
 
Rights holders’ private authority is limited: they do not have the ability to 
persuade other actors to adopt their rules in all circumstances. Intellectual 
property actors faced several critical impediments in their efforts to persuade 
macro-intermediaries to adopt strengthened enforcement measures voluntarily. 
Private actors’ rule production and enforcement works best among “small 
exclusive clubs of participants” who lack important conflicts of interest (Peters, 
Förster, and Koechlin 2009:500). This is not the case in relation to the private 
regulation of online infringement. In this private regulatory regime, there are a 
range of industries, including apparel, sporting goods, electronics and 
pharmaceuticals. The macro-intermediaries involved represent multiple industry 
sectors, from advertising, search and domain name services to payment and 
marketplaces. In addition, these macro-intermediaries have considerable 
resources to defend themselves against threats of legal action and material 
interests in resisting greater responsibility for policing their platforms. 
 
More importantly, rights holders and their trade associations have little leverage 
over these firms outside pressuring them and threatening legal action. Rights 
holders do not have a financial or contractual relationship with the macro-
intermediaries, as is the case in some types of private regulation. Moreover, 
rights holders wanted the macro-intermediaries to adopt rules that would 
substantially alter their enforcement practices and generally exceed what the 
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firms are obliged to do under law or most court rulings. Give the impasse 
between rights holders and the macro-intermediaries, rights holders petitioned 
the state to intervene and to compel the firms to accept private non-binding 
enforcement agreements.  
 
iv) Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property “Czar” 
 
Against the backdrop of increasingly heated debates over COICA, PIPA and 
SOPA, Internet firms and payment providers were quietly meeting with U.S. 
government officials to negotiate “voluntary, best practices” agreements. The 
office behind these efforts—the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC)—is small and almost entirely unknown to the 
general public. IPEC was created in the Prioritising Resources and Organization 
for Intellectual Property Act (PRO-IP Act) of 2008 and is located within the 
Office of Management and Budget. Its mission is singular: coordinate and 
enhance federal enforcement efforts solely in relation to intellectual property 
rights.135  
 
Victoria Espinel served as the first head of IPEC, after the Senate confirmed her 
nomination in December 2009 until August 2013.136 (Note: In an indication of 
the tight ties between this office and rights holders, in August 2013, Espinel left 
IPEC to work for Business Software Alliance, a trade association that 
represents the interests of software companies (BSA 2013).) During her tenure, 
Espinel was popularly referred to as the “IP czar.” This is a fitting title for Espinel 
who announced that her goal was to “change the enforcement paradigm” (IPEC 
2012:44) in relation to online infringement by working “to encourage practical 
and effective voluntary actions to address repeated acts of infringement” 
(Espinel 2012). The term, “IP czar,” again reveals the priority that the U.S. 
government accords the protection of intellectual property. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*'$ IPEC, for example, coordinates the Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Report, prepares legislative recommendations on intellectual property enforcement, and 
develops strategies on certain topics, like counterfeit pharmaceuticals.  
*'# Espinel had extensive experience working on intellectual property policy as senior counsel at 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and as the Assistant U.S. Trade 
Representative for Intellectual Property and Innovation at the USTR and the chief U.S. trade 
negotiator for intellectual property and innovation.  
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For such a small department, IPEC has had an out-sized influence on shaping 
U.S. enforcement strategies against online infringement. In 2010, one year after 
her appointment to lead IPEC, Espinel coordinated a series of meetings among 
Internet firms and payment providers to create sets of industry-generated best 
practices to address online infringement. Between 2010 and 2013, she 
announced a series of informal agreements covering a wide range of Internet 
services, involving search, payment, advertising, and domain name services 
(see Table 3.4). Signatories included Google, Microsoft, Visa, PayPal, 
MasterCard, GoDaddy, Yahoo and American Express.  
 
v) Agreements in the United Kingdom and European Union  
 
Around the same time, government officials in the United Kingdom and at the 
European Commission were also quietly coordinating non-binding agreements. 
The United Kingdom and the European Commission, along with the United 
States, are the key state actors in the private anti-counterfeiting regime. They 
are all strong proponents of intellectual property protection and advocates of 
informal regulation by industry. The eight private enforcement agreements 
examined in this dissertation all (except one) emerge from the United States, 
United Kingdom or by the European Commission.137 
 
In the United Kingdom, responsibility for intellectual property is divided between 
two departments. The first is the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
in which Viscount Younger of Leckie, House of Lords, is the Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for Intellectual Property. The other, which is primarily 
involved in coordinating the agreements, is the Department of Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS).138 Ed Vaizey, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Culture, Communications and Creative Industries, within DCMS has 
responsibility for Internet and creative industries, culture, and broadband 
spectrum and telecommunications, among other duties. Vaizey began 
organizing a series of closed-door roundtables with rights holders, trade 
associations and technology firms in late February 2011.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 The exception is the private enforcement agreement established between the Canadian Anti-
Fraud Centre and Visa, which is examined in Chapter. 4.  
138 The Department for Culture, Media and Sport is known colloquially as the Ministry of Fun. 
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Chaired by Vaizey, the roundtables discuss a range of issues, including non-
binding agreements for payment, advertising and search intermediaries to 
control infringing sites. Participants include major trade associations: the 
Federation Against Copyright Theft, British Recorded Music Industry, Motion 
Picture Association of America, and the Internet Advertising Bureau, which 
represents the digital-advertising industry in the United Kingdom. Major Internet 
and telecom firms also participate in the roundtables, including Google, Yahoo, 
Microsoft, Facebook, Virgin Media and British Telecom. Between 2011 and 
2013, Vaizey helped coordinate a code of conduct for search engines and 
pushed forward a new self-regulatory program for the U.K. digital advertising 
industry (see Table 3.3). 
 
Table: 3.3: Private Enforcement Agreements  
Initiative  Government  Macro-intermediaries 
Ad Networks’ Statement 
of Best Practices 
U.S. Office of Intellectual 
Property Enforcement 
Coordinator  





U.K. Dept. for Culture, Media 
& Sport 
Google, Yahoo, Bing  
Centre for Safe Internet 
Pharmacies  
U.S. Office of Intellectual 
Property Enforcement 
Coordinator  
American Express, Visa, 
MasterCard, PayPal, Google, 
GoDaddy, Yahoo, Microsoft 
Payment Account 
Termination Program 
U.S. Office of Intellectual 
Property Enforcement 
Coordinator  




Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Visa 
Search Engine Code of 
Conduct 
U.K. Dept. for Culture, Media 
& Sport 
Google, Yahoo, Bing  
Memorandum of 
Understanding  
European Commission eBay  
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
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In 2009, the European Commission began holding a series of closed-door, 
industry-only meetings to discuss the online sale of counterfeit goods (see 
Table 3.3). The Commission argued that voluntary arrangements aimed at 
counterfeiting and piracy can give industry stakeholders “the flexibility to adapt 
quickly to new technological developments” (European Commission 2009:10). 
The Commission offered to act as a facilitator for these meetings, which 
involved providing administrative and logistical support and “safeguarding, 
where necessary, a fair balance between all the different interests at stake, 
including the legitimate rights and expectations of EU citizens” (European 
Commission 2009:10). By May 2011, signatories had hammered out a deal that 
was quietly posted online. The agreement sets out general principles for 
marketplaces and rights holders to work together in cracking down on the sale 
of counterfeit goods in the European Economic Area (European Commission 
2011).  
 
There are commonalities among the eight private enforcement agreements 
examined in this dissertation. Government officials from the European 
Commission and in United States and United Kingdom shaped all the private 
agreements, except one.139 Industry stakeholders and government officials 
created the agreements in closed-door meetings. Consumers were neither 
consulted nor were their interests fully represented. Government officials used 
varying degrees of coercion to compel cooperation from the macro-
intermediaries. In general, the agreements focus on making enforcement 
practices more streamlined, more rapid, and more proactive.  
 
vi) Global Private Regulatory Regime 
 
To summarise, this chapter demonstrates that multinational rights holders and 
their trade associations, particularly from the United States, have considerable 
private authority to shape policymaking in the United States and internationally 
in relation to the protection of intellectual property rights. These corporate actors 
also created a compelling narrative of infringement as a serious and 
economically harmful problem that remains ingrained despite the SOPA 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 Note: The Canadian agreement was created by a government agency, the Canadian Anti-
Fraud Centre. 
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protests. Rights holders have an institutional advantage over macro-
intermediaries in convincing governments in the United States or European 
Union to intervene on their behalf and compel cooperation from macro-
intermediaries. The states involved in this private regulatory regime play a 
central role in employing coercive means—threats of legislation and legal 
action—to secure macro-intermediaries’ participation as gatekeepers on behalf 
of rights holders. These states do so because they have longstanding, socially 
constructed interests in protecting intellectual property (Drahos and Braithwaite 
2002), as well as the economic interests discussed in chapter 1. Further, these 
states also have strategic security interests in tapping into macro-
intermediaries’ global regulatory capacity.  
 
As will be explored in the next three chapters, the private anti-counterfeiting 
regime also demonstrates the complex dynamics of corporate regulation on the 
Internet. There is a distinct spatial patterning in this regulatory regime with its 
small group of U.S.-based multinational corporations that dominate the 
provision of key Internet services. In this environment, it is corporations not 
governments that have the global reach, technological capabilities and vast 
data-mining capacity necessary to police infringement in the manner desired by 
rights holders.  
 
The following chapters examine the eight private enforcement agreements. 
Chapter 4 analyses private agreements involving payment and advertising 
macro-intermediaries, while chapter 5 concentrates on search and domain 
name macro-intermediaries. The Stop Online Piracy Act targeted these actors 
and the private agreements in these chapters incorporate SOPA-like provisions. 
Chapter 6 examines private agreements among online marketplaces, 
specifically eBay and Taobao. These actors were not targeted in SOPA but their 
agreements, which set out informal measures for strengthened, streamlined, 
and proactive enforcement practices that go beyond what is required by law or 
judicial rulings, are in the spirit of SOPA. 
!
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Chapter 4: Revenue Chokepoints using Payment and 
Advertising Intermediaries 
 
Payment processing and digital advertising are the lifeblood of commercial 
websites. By impairing access to these essential services, intellectual property 
actors have the capacity to “starve” infringing sites of revenue. In the anti-
counterfeiting strategies, payment providers endeavour to prevent these sites 
from receiving illicit revenue from the sale of counterfeit goods. Similarly, 
advertising platforms work to deter infringing sites from receiving legitimate 
revenue from advertisements. Proponents of this enforcement strategy 
approvingly refer to it as establishing revenue “chokepoints” in the online 
environment that “throttle” unwanted behaviour.140 This regulatory approach will 
be familiar to anyone who has examined the U.S. Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA) and Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA). These bills would have 
allowed rights holders to obtain court orders requiring payment and advertising 
intermediaries to withdraw their services from infringing sites and for these 
intermediaries to take action voluntarily against sites that endangered public 
health.141 Although the U.S. public soundly rejected SOPA and PIPA, 
supporters of the bills have quietly introduced similar provisions into private 
enforcement agreements with payment and advertising macro-intermediaries. 
These macro-intermediaries, such as PayPal and Google, agreed to withdraw 
their services voluntarily from infringing sites upon the request of rights holders. 
The private agreements pertaining to payment and advertising macro-
intermediaries, based on non-binding “best practices,”142 lack the legislative and 
judicial oversight mechanisms contained within SOPA and PIPA.143  
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140 Interview with David Wood, Director of Anti-Piracy, British Recorded Music Industry (BPI) 
Ltd., 12 September 2012, London.  
141 PIPA and SOPA, along with the other two failed U.S. intellectual property bills, COICA and 
OPEN, all proposed that payment providers and advertising platforms should be used to target 
infringing sites. The bills all proposed voluntary rights of action against sites endangering public 
health, such as those that sold pharmaceuticals without a valid prescription or pharmaceuticals 
that are adulterated or misbranded.  
142 These “best practices” are identified and designated as such by industry and do not 
represent objectively evaluated measures.!!
143 For example, SOPA would have required qualifying plaintiffs to inform the Intellectual 
Property Enforcement Coordinator of any court orders in which payment or advertising 
intermediaries fail to comply with a court order requiring them to withdraw services from 
infringing sites, see: SOPA Sec. 103 (c).  
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Payment and advertising macro-intermediaries are, as Siân Croxon, a London-
based attorney with DLA Piper, observes, “an important part of the armoury in 
the fight against counterfeits.”144 Visa, MasterCard, American Express and 
PayPal dominate the online payment industry. This chapter focuses on Google 
because it is the most popular search engine globally (with the exception of a 
few regions) and is also the largest digital advertising platform.145 Other smaller 
digital advertising actors that have signed onto these agreements are Yahoo 
and Bing, Microsoft’s search engine. From the perspective of techno-regulation, 
these macro-intermediaries control their platforms and services by deploying 
monitoring technologies to protect their services from violations of their internal 
policies, including the infringement of intellectual property rights. They have 
massive, sophisticated programs to detect and remove content (advertising 
platforms) or sanction users (payment providers). Given their global scope and 
significant market share, these macro-intermediaries have a tremendous 
regulatory capacity that state and industry actors can endeavour to tap into.  
 
Rights holders and trade associations working on their own lacked the authority 
to persuade or compel macro-intermediaries to strengthen their enforcement 
policies and successfully appealed to government to intervene. Payment and 
advertising actors have faced various pressures to adopt informal private 
agreements to regulate online infringement. Chief among these were threats of 
legislation and legal action from the U.S. and U.K governments. The U.S. Office 
of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) and the U.K. 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), two prominent state actors 
within the private regulatory regime, directly facilitated the creation of the private 
agreements. In addition to government coercion, payment and advertising 
actors faced pressure from rights holders to strengthen their enforcement 
practices. These macro-intermediaries also have financial and reputational 
interests in protecting their corporate brands and ensuring that their customers 
retain confidence in their services.  
 
To explore why and under what conditions payment and advertising macro-
intermediaries adopted private enforcement agreements, this chapter examines 
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144 Interview with Siân Croxon, Partner, DLA Piper, 14 September 2012, London. 
145 Baidu, for example, is the largest search engine in China.  
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programs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The United 
States, which is the headquarters of all the macro-intermediaries, hosts the 
largest number of private anti-infringement agreements because of the work of 
Victoria Espinel, the former head of IPEC.146 The U.S. payment-termination 
program is the largest in the world. Similarly, the United Kingdom’s digital 
advertising industry operates the largest and most comprehensive program 
worldwide to prevent the placement of advertisements on infringing sites. 
Finally, the Canadian payment-termination program offers a useful counterpoint 
to the U.S. program because the former differs markedly in its origins and 
structure from the U.S. program.    
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it briefly introduces the payment and 
digital advertising industries before explaining how online payment processing 
and digital advertising work. Then the chapter explores how these macro-
intermediaries became gatekeepers targeting online infringement and describes 
the creation of the non-binding enforcement agreements that underpin the 
private regulatory regime. Third, it examines four programs to regulate the 
online distribution of counterfeit goods. The first two—one in Canada and one in 
the United States—involve payment providers terminating their services to 
infringing sites. The others—one in the United States and one in the United 
Kingdom—are designed to deter the placement of advertisements onto 
infringing sites. Fourth, the chapter then analyses these programs and, in the 
fifth section, examines the role of the state and actors’ interests. It then offers a 
brief conclusion.  
 
I) Online Payment and Advertising Industries 
 
Payment providers and advertising intermediaries provide services essential to 
the functioning and growth of the digital economy. Websites can generate 
revenue by selling goods and services or selling advertising space on their 
webpages. Any site interested in generating revenue or donations must have a 
functional payment processing capacity and offer trusted, well-known payment 
options. Visa, MasterCard, American Express and PayPal are dominant players 
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146 As discussed in Chapter 1, Espinel facilitated five informal agreements between 2010 and 
2013 that involve advertising, domain name, payment, and search macro-intermediaries. 
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within the global online payment industry. While other online payment options 
exist, most commercial websites depend on at least one of the big four 
providers to enable their customers to purchase their goods and services. 
 
Visa is the globally dominant payment provider. It controls 72.7% of the debit 
market and 49.6% of the credit market globally, and processed 92.7 billion 
transactions in 2012 (Suchman 2013). It is also the most commonly accepted 
payment method for infringing sites, according to a U.S. law firm’s examination 
of 3,000 websites that U.S. federal courts ordered closed for selling counterfeit 
goods (RogueFinder 2012). MasterCard and PayPal are also commonly 
accepted forms of payment on infringing sites, according to the law firm’s report. 
Behind Visa, MasterCard and American Express are large players in the online 
payment industry, generating 40.1 billion transactions and 5.8 billion 
transactions respectively in 2012, compared with 9 billion transactions through 
China’s UnionPay, which is another major payment provider (Suchman 
2013).147 PayPal is a major online payment processor with 137 million accounts 
in 2012 (eBay 2013).  
 
The digital advertising industry is growing rapidly. Online or digital advertising 
refers to a wide range of ads on social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter 
and LinkedIn), mobile devices (e.g., smart phones and tablets), through email 
and search engine results, and on websites. Rights holders are keenly 
interested in digital advertising because it is an increasingly important forum in 
which to advertise their brands. In 2012, spending in the industry reached (in 
U.S. dollars) $99 billion globally and the industry predicts that 2013 global 
spending will reach just over $113 billion (WPP 2013). Online advertising made 
up nearly 20% of all advertising globally in 2012 and is experiencing double-
digit annual growth (WPP 2013).   
 
The United States and the United Kingdom are both large and fast-growing 
markets for online advertising. In 2012, spending in the United States 
accounted for just over $36.8 billion, with the market in the United Kingdom 
reaching £5.4 billion (eMarketer 2013). While people think of Google primarily 
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147 UnionPay is a network of China-based banks and its credit cards, which are affiliated with 
Visa, MasterCard or America Express, can be used in most countries worldwide. 
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as a search engine, it is also the giant of online advertising. It controls about 
33% of digital ads globally (eMarketer 2013). Google is also highly dependent 
on advertising for its revenue and, in 2012, received 95% of its $50 billion 
revenue from advertising (Google 2012:12). Far behind Google are other 
familiar Internet firms: Facebook, with 5% of digital ad revenue; Yahoo with 3%; 
Microsoft at 1.7%; AOL at 0.9%; and Twitter at 0.5% (Efrati 2013). Facebook 
and Twitter, which are recent entrants into digital advertising, are rapidly 
expanding their market share.  
 
The payment and advertising industries are dominated by a handful of U.S.-
based firms: Visa, MasterCard, PayPal, American Express and Google. These 
macro-intermediaries have a considerable capacity to institute and enforce rules 
governing their networks and platforms. Equally importantly, they also have a 
significant ability to set rules and standards, which, by virtue of their market 
share, can influence regulatory practices throughout their industry sectors. 
When the largest payment providers enact rules prohibiting certain activities, 
they shape e-commerce activities globally and affect what Internet users can 
purchase and how they can use payment systems, even with respect to 
situations where the goods or services in question are legal. PayPal, for 
example, withdrew its services in 2012 from online publishers that offered what 
PayPal argued was unacceptable types of erotic content (Charman-Anderson 
2012).148 In situations where payment macro-intermediaries collectively remove 
their services from sites they contend are engaging in unacceptable activities, 
the affected sites have few commercial alternatives. Payment macro-
intermediaries can essentially cut off actors deemed “bad” from the global 
online payment system, crippling, possibly fatally, their means of conducting 
business.149 This is the essence of governing through revenue chokepoints.  
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148 In this case, PayPal withdrew its services from self-publishing and small publishing outlets 
that offered erotic content including incest, under-age sex, and bestiality. Following an outcry 
over censorship, in which protesters pointed out that famous works of literature would have 
been banned under these rules (including Vladimir Nabakov’s Lolita and Sophocles’ Oedipus), 
PayPal relented and restored the services (see Charman-Anderson 2012). Unlike the online 
publishers that regained PayPal’s services after a public protest, other sites may not have the 
resources or public-interest angle to mount a successful challenge. 
149 There are alternatives to these big payment providers, such as MoneyGram and Western 
Union. However, both MoneyGram and Western Union have joined the global private regulatory 
regime targeting infringing sites. These companies are part of the payment-termination program 
operated by the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, which is discussed later in the 
chapter (see Montanaro 2012).   
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Google—as the world’s most popular search engine and the global giant of 
digital advertising—has a tremendous capacity to shape how individuals access 
information. As will be discussed in chapter 5, like all search engines Google 
indexes information from webpages and ranks it according to proprietary 
algorithms. This means Google selects and prioritises some types and sources 
of information over others based on a set of closely guarded criteria (Singhal 
2012). As a search engine, Google has significant power to filter and control 
access to information, thus constructing meaning and shaping choices (Elkin-
Koren 2001:185; see also, Introna and Nissenbaum 2000; Kohl 2013). As a 
digital advertiser, Google sells specific terms to advertising intermediaries, 
which result in relevant advertisements being listed alongside search results. 
For example, a search on hotels in Bangkok may be accompanied by ads for 
flights to Thailand. Google can therefore play a key role in structuring the online 
market of goods and services (see Elkin-Koren 2001:185) as it determines the 
content and advertisements that users see. Further, critics of Google argue that 
it prioritises its own services over those of competitors, thus using its power to 
skew competition in its favour (Kohl 2013:233). Given the sheer scope and 
commercial power of Google’s services—unprecedented in the Internet age—
those who can regulate Google can regulate the Internet (Kohl 2013:233). 
 
i) How Online Payment Processing Works 
 
Given the complexity of the online payment and advertising industries, it is 
necessary to give a brief outline of how sites process payments and how 
intermediaries deliver ads to sites. For the consumer, Visa, MasterCard and 
American Express all function in a similar manner. However, there is an 
important difference that affects how payment providers terminate merchant 
accounts. Visa and MasterCard operate what is termed an “open-loop” payment 
system, while American Express operates a “closed-loop” payment system, at 
least in the United States. An open-loop payment system means that Visa and 
MasterCard do not issue cards to users or grant merchant accounts to 
individuals wishing to process commercial payments. “We allow the cardholder 
sitting in Turkey to do business with a merchant in Germany within a nano-
second,” explains Martin Elliott, director of corporate risk management at Visa 
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International. “What we don’t do is we don’t issue the cards. We don’t sign the 
merchants. We don’t lend money to folks” (Elliott 2012). 
 
Visa and MasterCard are card associations, which means that they each 
operate through a network of tens of thousands of formally affiliated and 
licensed financial institutions globally. Each financial institution affiliated to Visa 
or MasterCard must adhere to the card association’s rules when offering 
payment services. Institutions that issue branded payment cards (i.e., a 
credit/debit card with a Visa or MasterCard logo) are called issuing institutions. 
Financial institutions that grant merchant accounts that can accept payment by 
Visa or MasterCard are known as acquiring institutions. Transactions through 
open-loop payment systems involve multiple intermediaries to process 
transactions among the cardholder, issuers and acquirers, the card association 
and the merchant. Visa and MasterCard do not have direct contractual 
relationships with merchants (i.e., individuals selling goods online). Instead, 
merchants have contractual relationships with the issuing and acquiring 
institutions, which, in turn, have direct contractual relationships with Visa and 
MasterCard.  
 
The closed-loop system, in contrast, is much simpler. These systems are 
popular among department stores where payment cards are limited to use 
within a particular store. American Express operates a closed-loop system in 
which it directly issues payment cards to users and has a contractual 
relationship with merchants. It processes payments made between cardholders 
and merchants without a network of financial institutions. To make matters more 
complex, however, American Express primarily operates its closed-loop system 
in the United States but outside the United States, it establishes agreements 
with third-party financial institutions in the American Express network in a 
manner similar to that of Visa and MasterCard (Forbes 2013).  
 
PayPal, meanwhile, operates quite differently from Visa, MasterCard or 
American Express. It is an online payment system that allows users to transfer 
funds from various sources, such as bank accounts, credit cards or PayPal 
accounts to recipients. Users must sign up for a PayPal account. They can then 
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use PayPal by transferring money into that account or by linking their PayPal 
account to their bank account or credit card.  
 
Anyone who has purchased goods from a legitimate online retailer has an idea 
of how online payments work at the consumer’s end but there are complex and 
highly technical transactions behind the checkout page. Imagine purchasing 
something from your favourite online retailer. You click to the checkout page 
and enter your payment and shipping information. The site then lists various 
payment options, Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and American Express. Each of 
these is called a financial or payment channel. On legitimate sites, each of 
these payment channels is functional. On infringing sites not all channels may 
function but may be used to give the appearance of legitimacy.  
 
Table 4.1: Processing Payments Online 
Open-loop Process Closed-loop Process 
Cardholder submits card to merchant’s system 
1. Merchant’s bank asks card association 
(Visa or MasterCard) to determine issuing 
bank. 
2. Card association’s authorization system 
validates card’s security features and 
forwards to issuing bank for purchase 
approval. 
3. Issuing bank approves purchase. 
Card association sends approval to 
acquiring bank. 
4. Acquiring bank sends approval to 
merchant. 
1. The merchant’s system sends the 
transaction to American Express. 
2. American Express verifies the card 
and authorises the transaction. 
3. American Express sends approval to 
merchant. 
 
Cardholder completes purchase and receives receipt 
 
The transaction process varies according to the type of payment you choose 
(see Table 4.1). If you decide to pay with an American Express card (assuming 
a closed-loop process), then you enter your payment details and the merchant’s 
system sends the transaction directly to American Express. American Express 
verifies the card, authorises the transaction and sends approval to merchant. If 
you pay with Visa or MasterCard, the transaction goes between the 
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cardholder’s issuing bank and the merchant’s acquiring bank for approvals 
before it is processed.  
 
ii) How Online Advertising Works 
 
Even casual Internet users will have encountered multiple types of digital 
advertising. Ads can be static (simple images or text), animated, or interactive in 
which the user is invited to play a game or watch a video. Some ads “pop-up” 
above the webpage that you are viewing, while banner ads that sit within a 
webpage may be static, or may incorporate video, audio and other interactive 
elements. Understanding digital advertising can be difficult as the purchase and 
placement of ads involves transactions through multiple intermediaries. There 
can be as many as nine different intermediaries depending on the nature of the 
firms involved in creating, selling and placing advertisements. The industry also 
increasingly relies upon automated and real-time bidding to purchase and 
deliver ads to sites in microseconds, similar to the operation of stock 
exchanges. The complexity of the industry means that it can be difficult to track 
the distribution of ads and determine how some end up in the wrong place, like 
a site selling counterfeit goods.150 Amit Kotecha, a senior mobile and networks 
manager for the U.K. branch of the Internet Advertising Bureau, the digital 
advertising trade association, has spent many hours explaining the complexity 
of digital advertising to rights holders. Most thought “it was a one-to-one 
relationship between the advertiser and the publisher,” Kotcha says, “when in 
fact most of the time there are over five relationships or five transactions before 
it ends up on the site.”151 
 
The most common advertising intermediaries are the advertiser, ad network, ad 
exchange and publisher.152 The advertiser (referred to here as the rights holder) 
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150 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
151 Ibid. 
152 There are also several other advertising intermediaries, which are less relevant to the 
discussion here: agency, demand-side platform, supply-side platform, and agency trading desk. 
A demand-side platform is a technology platform that facilitates real-time bidding for buyers to 
purchase space on desirable webpages from multiple ad exchanges and ad networks. Demand-
side platforms serve those purchasing ad space, while supply-side platforms help publishers 
(i.e., websites) manage and sell their available ad space and facilitate their interaction with ad 
exchanges that, in turn, interact with a demand-side platform. An agency-trading desk is 
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purchases ads to sell its products. Rights holders generally work with an 
advertising agency that plans and produces advertising campaigns and 
advertisements. Ad networks serve as brokers between rights holders 
producing ads and websites selling space on their platforms. These ad 
networks determine how much advertising they can sell to sites, contract with 
rights holders to buy that space and then deliver the ads. Ad networks may 
represent sites in a particular sector (e.g., health or electronics) or buy access 
to sites meeting certain criteria (e.g., with certain demographics or recreational 
interests). Among the largest ad networks are Google AdSense, Yahoo 
Publisher Network, and AOL Advertising. An ad exchange is a technology 
platform that facilitates automated, auction-based pricing and real-time buying. 
Sellers put ads on the exchange and buyers bid for ads similar to “eBay or the 
stock market.”153 Google, Yahoo and Microsoft operate some of the largest ad 
exchanges in addition to operating large ad networks. Finally, the publisher is 
the individual website that delivers and disseminates the advertisement. One 
publisher may deal with thousands or tens of thousands of webpages that end 
users end up seeing.   
 
II) Pressure on Marketplaces from State and Industry 
 
For proponents of stronger online anti-counterfeiting efforts, the Stop Online 
Piracy Act and its sister bills were essential because the United States does not 
have a statutory measure to address online trademark infringement. As 
discussed in chapter 3, Internet intermediaries have adapted notice-and-
takedown programs required under the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act to 
deal with rights holders’ complaints related to the trade in counterfeit goods. 
SOPA would have required advertising and payment macro-intermediaries to 
act against the online distribution of counterfeit goods and, with the death of 
SOPA, proponents of stronger enforcement redoubled their focus on private, 
informal enforcement efforts. In the United Kingdom, neither payment nor 
advertising intermediaries are required by statute to remove content or disable 
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software that enables ad networks and advertising agencies to connect to ad exchanges and 
manages buying. 
153 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
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services in relation to online trademark infringement.154 Given this absence of 
statutory measures, proponents of strong protection for intellectual property 
emphasied informal, non-legally binding measures and thereby created a 
private regulatory regime.  
 
Payment and advertising intermediaries have internal policies that prohibit 
providing services to sites trading in counterfeit goods, as will be discussed in 
further detail in this and the following sections. Many of these policies predate 
the private enforcement agreements that payment and advertising providers 
implemented in 2011 and 2013 respectively. Similar to other industries, 
companies in the online payment and advertising sectors are subject to an array 
of domestic laws in countries in which they operate, as well as certain industry-
created rules, standards and codes that guide their operations. The ways in 
which macro-intermediaries regulate infringement depends on the type of 
revenue stream they facilitate and their degree of interaction with infringing 
sites. Payment providers facilitate the direct flow of funds to infringing sites by 
enabling sites to process customers’ payments. Payment actors have a direct 
contractual relationship either with the merchant or with the financial institution 
that granted the merchant an account. Advertising intermediaries, in contrast, 
facilitate the indirect flow of revenue through ads placed on sites. Advertising 
actors may not have a direct relationship as the online placement of 
advertisements typically involves multiple transactions and intermediaries.  
 
Before discussing how payment and advertising macro-intermediaries regulate 
infringing sites, the following section explains how they were enlisted as 
gatekeepers to address infringing sites. The chapter then examines four private 
regulatory programs: two that terminate payment services to infringing sites and 




154 In a January 2014 speech during the discussion of an intellectual property bill in the U.K. 
House of Commons, MP Mike Weatherley recommended that payment and advertising 
intermediaries should be included in the bill and required to act as gatekeepers to remove illegal 
content. Prime Minister David Cameron appointed Weatherley as the U.K. intellectual property 
advisor in September 2013 (Weatherley 2014). 
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i) Regulating Payment Providers 
 
Prior to their adoption of private enforcement agreements, payment providers 
governed violations of their policies, including the trade in counterfeit goods, 
through their internal policies. These policies generally incorporate state laws 
and industry rules within their terms-of-use contracts that lay out the conditions 
under which individuals and companies can use their services. These terms-of-
use agreements stipulate that individuals cannot engage in any activities while 
using the services that violate the laws of their country. Visa and MasterCard, 
for example, state that any transactions "must be legal in both the Cardholder's 
jurisdiction and the Merchant Outlet's jurisdiction" (Visa 2013). The terms-of-use 
agreements also outline company- or industry-specific policies regarding the 
use of their services and penalties for violation, which generally include 
restricted access to services or termination of services (Visa 2013).  
 
Payment macro-intermediaries have a history of working for states against a 
range of wrongdoing since at least the early 2000s. In the United States, for 
example, Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and American Express have worked with 
federal and state authorities to track and block online payments in relation to 
commercial child pornography sites, Internet gambling sites, and the distribution 
of illicit drugs (MacCarthy 2010). A 2005 agreement among payment providers 
and U.S. state attorneys general to tackle online sales of tobacco aptly 
illustrates how governments can use non-binding agreements with the private 
sector to further public policy goals. In 2005, state authorities complained of 
online tobacco retailers selling tobacco without verification of the buyer’s age 
and without reporting tax (see Ribisl et al. 2011). Enforcement of these 
violations, however, was difficult and unsuccessful (see MacCarthy 2010; Ribisl 
et al. 2011). To address this problem, federal and state authorities requested 
Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and American Express to prohibit payment 
processing for sites that did not meet state requirements, and the providers 
agreed (MacCarthy 2010). 
 
Public health researchers lauded the resulting non-binding agreement among 
payment providers as “landmark” and an official from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms observed that industry “cooperation” was “completely 
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voluntary” (Green Sheet 2005). By shifting enforcement responsibility to 
intermediaries, federal and state officials effectively extended their regulatory 
reach to undertake the first national effort to address the illicit online distribution 
of tobacco (Ribisl et al. 2011).155 To encourage cooperation from payment 
providers, for example, forty-two state attorneys general warned the providers 
that they believed federal and state laws on tobacco were being violated and 
requested they take measures to address these violations (MacCarthy 
2010:1084). By pointing to the violation of laws and urging specific action, these 
attorneys general emphasised the potential of payment providers being held 
accountable for facilitating criminal activity. Thus, the tobacco agreements 
clearly illustrate the inherently coercive nature of this type of “voluntary” industry 
initiative. This case also demonstrates how states can extend their regulatory 
reach by working through Internet intermediaries, as well as capitalizing upon 
their specialised technological expertise to monitor and control massive 
numbers of financial transactions. 
 
ii) Payment Providers’ Informal Agreements  
 
Payment providers drafted and adopted their informal agreements in closed-
door meetings. As a result, it is difficult to determine with any precision when 
intellectual property actors first proposed that payment macro-intermediaries 
should regulate infringing sites voluntarily. In September 2009, however, the 
International Trademark Association (INTA), an influential New-York-based 
lobbying body for rights holders,156 released what it termed “voluntary best 
practices” for Internet intermediaries to address online infringement (see INTA 
2009).157 INTA’s practices represent “a middle ground as to how to deal with 
this problem that was acceptable to everybody,” recalls Candice Li, external 
relations manager dealing with anti-counterfeiting policies at INTA.158 “We 
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155 Separate non-binding agreements were also struck in 2005 between the federal government 
and private shipping firms, specifically United Parcel Service, FedEx and DHL (Ribisl et al. 
2010). 
156 INTA performs what it calls “policy-advocacy” work, which involves lobbying, awareness 
raising and policy development, and making recommendations on legislation and trade 
agreements, including the the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. Interview with Candice Li, 
External Relations Manager, Anti-counterfeiting, International Trademark Association, 3 April 
2012, New York City. 
157 INTA also proposed best practices for search engines and marketplaces (see INTA 2009).  
158 Interview with Candice Li, External Relations Manager, Anti-counterfeiting, International 
Trademark Association, 3 April 2012, New York.  
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couldn’t just go ahead and say companies like eBay are fully responsible for 
doing everything.” For payment providers, one of INTA’s key recommendations 
was that they consider merchant-account terminations.159 Visa, MasterCard, 
PayPal and American Express all agreed to these practices, which were the first 
to outline how rights holders should work with payment providers to deal with 
online infringement. In contrast to the 2011 private agreement, INTA’s practices 
focused on creating awareness of the problem of counterfeit goods and 
establishing lines of communication between rights holders and intermediaries 
(INTA 2009).    
  
In terms of intellectual property enforcement, payment providers have worked 
with law enforcement agencies and rights holders since the early 2000s in 
relation to sites that provide copyright-infringing versions of music and movies. 
However, rights holders were unable to convince payment providers to adopt 
tougher enforcement measures to deal with infringing sites, as the next section 
explores. Prior to payment providers’ agreements in 2011, their enforcement 
efforts were relatively uncoordinated and unstructured. Linda Kirkpatrick, a 
senior executive with MasterCard, recalls that before the U.S. government-
facilitated enforcement agreement, payment providers had a “different 
fragmented approach to attacking the problem” and “no formal process for 
addressing inquiries” (Kirkpatrick 2012). For payment providers, it took direct 
pressure from the U.S. and U.K. governments for them to implement formalised, 
systematic processes to terminate infringing sites’ merchant accounts on behalf 
of rights holders.  
 
The first instance of an informal private agreement in relation to intellectual 
property was around 2009 with the City of London Police in the United 
Kingdom. The City of London Police, which undertakes law enforcement duties 
within the three-kilometre square area covering London’s financial district, has 
responsibility to addressing financial crime, including intellectual property rights 
crime. At the time, officers with the City of London Police and rights holders 
were working together to stop multiple Ukraine-based sites that allowed users to 
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159 INTA suggested that payment providers may “choose” to terminate services to infringing 
sites or issue other sanctions, which suggests a flexibility in sanctions that is not evident in 
private agreements agreed to by payment providers in 2011 (see INTA 2009). 
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download copyright-infringing music for a small fee.160 The U.K. police had no 
jurisdiction over the sites and so rights holders asked Visa and MasterCard to 
terminate the sites’ merchant accounts voluntarily. The payment providers, 
however, were somewhat reluctant as they can face legal liability for removing 
payment services without cause. Visa, in particular, was understandably 
hesitant as, in 2006, Visa withdrew its services from an allegedly infringing site 
that then successfully sued Visa in a Russian court (Yee 2011).161 In response 
to the providers’ resistance to voluntary action, officers from the City of London 
Police sought legal advice and informed the providers they could lay criminal 
charges against the providers if cooperation were not forthcoming. Det./Supt. 
Bob Wishart, who worked on the case, said he told the payment providers:  
 
Look, you are effectively supporting these sites. We’re telling you that 
they are illegal. [….] We’re telling you that from here on in everything that 
you earn out of these sites is potentially proceeds of crime. We’re putting 
you on notice.162 
 
Given that incentive, “MasterCard stepped up to the plate straight away,” 
Wishart recounts but Visa was “slightly more reluctant.”163  
 
In the United States, the private regulatory regime was created in an 
environment where the threat of legislation hung over meetings between macro-
intermediaries and Victoria Espinel, head of the U.S. Office of the Intellectual 
Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC). Beginning around November 2010, 
Espinel facilitated a series of meetings among Internet firms and payment 
providers. The purpose of these meetings was to create a series of informal 
private agreements to address online infringement. Espinel learned of the City 
of London’s arrangement with payment providers when she was appointed as 
head of IPEC in 2009.164 At the same time that Espinel was in negotiations with 
the payment macro-intermediaries, the U.S. Congress was debating two 
intellectual property bills: the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits 
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160 Interview with Det./Supt. Bob Wishart, Head of National Operational Delivery, Regional 
Fraud Project, City of London Police, 6 September 2012, London.  
161 The Russian court ordered the payment provider to restore the site’s payment services (see 
Yee 2011). 
162 Interview with Det./Supt. Bob Wishart, Head of National Operational Delivery, Regional 
Fraud Project, City of London Police, 6 September 2012, London.  
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid.    
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Act (COICA) and the Protecting Intellectual Property Act (PIPA). The U.S. 
Senate introduced COCIA in September 2010 and then replaced it with PIPA in 
May 2011.  
 
Just one month after the introduction of PIPA, in June 2011, Espinel announced 
that MasterCard, PayPal, Visa and American Express agreed to non-binding 
principles to terminate the merchant accounts of infringing sites (IPEC 2011). 
The agreements, which were not released publicly, outline a series of guidelines 
to make payment providers’ enforcement measures more coordinated and 
streamlined (see Appendices B and C).165 Provisions in the agreements echo 
COICA and PIPA as they encourage payment providers to remove their 
services voluntarily from infringing sites.166 These private enforcement 
agreements form the basis of the private anti-counterfeiting regime. As will be 
discussed later in the chapter, the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
drew upon these best practices when it worked with IPEC to create its payment 
termination program.  
 
iii) Regulating Advertising Platforms 
 
Advertising intermediaries’ adoption of private enforcement agreements to 
regulate infringing sites has similarities with the experiences of payment 
providers. The U.K. government warned the digital advertising industry to 
implement its regulatory program quickly or face legislation.167 In addition to 
government pressure, rights holders pushed the advertising industry to 
strengthen its enforcement practices. In advertising, rights holders play a key 
role in demanding and shaping regulation as they spend considerable sums to 
craft a certain image of their brand. They not only want their brands to end up 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165 The agreements negotiated by IPEC are not widely available. A law professor in the United 
States unsuccessfully filed a freedom of information request to IPEC to obtain information about 
the informal agreements with the payment providers. The Office of Management and Budget, 
which includes IPEC, denied the request citing trade secrets, privileged or confidential 
information. Fortunately the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition provided the information 
to the lawyer who shared the two best practices documents with me.    
166 Although the payment providers’ agreement preceded the introduction of SOPA, which came 
in October 2011, I argue that the agreements are “SOPA-like” because of the agreements’ 
similarity to provisions in PIPA, which strongly resembles SOPA.  
167 This is according to minutes from the Search Roundtable Discussion with Rights Holders and 
Search Engines in November 2011 between trade associations, Internet intermediaries and the 
U.K. Department for Culture, Media and Sport obtained by the U.K. Open Rights Group through 
a freedom of information request (Bradwell 2011). !
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on legitimate, non-infringing sites, but rights holders also want their brands to be 
represented on sites that meet certain criteria. The Interactive Advertising 
Bureau, for example, sets out guidelines for rights holders to avoid placing 
advertisements on sites with content relating to pornography, tobacco, illicit 
drugs or violence (see IAB 2013). Rights holders campaign strongly against 
misplaced advertisements because the public relations from “one bad story 
could ruin a brand for a very long time,” says Amit Kotecha at the Internet 
Advertising Bureau.168  
 
In fact, rights holders’ fear of damage to their brands was the impetus for 
regulation of the digital ad industry in the United Kingdom in 2005. In that year, 
the U.K. television program Panorama ran a documentary that exposed how the 
advertising industry inadvertently placed advertisements on some websites with 
illegal and controversial content.169 “We are talking about some pretty grim 
websites,” recounts David Ellison, marketing services manager for the 
advertising trade association, Incorporated Society of British Advertisers (Ellison 
2012).170 The sites were “at best distasteful and on the wrong end of the 
morality scale, and at worst highly illegal” (Ellison 2012). While the documentary 
outraged rights holders, “it was really good for the industry because all of the 
legitimate ad networks got together,” explains Kotecha. They “said what are we 
going to do about this? Our business is at threat because we don’t want all this 
money to go away.”171 The result was a voluntary code called the Internet 
Advertising Sales House (IASH), which certified ad networks as ‘brand safe’.172 
Ad networks vetted every website they represented and allowed rights holders 
to choose whether or not they would place their ads on sites that have content 
dealing with sexual content, alcohol or violence. 173 Rights holders could select 
the types of sites they approved for their advertisements:  
 
They were given this blue box on their order form and they could tick 
whatever classification – adult, etc. They could also tick whether they 
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safe. Non-vetted would mean that it would not be on a porn site where 
there is a list of stuff but the content hasn’t been checked in advance.174 
 
The industry code was popular with rights holders. Those with the biggest 
accounts, like British Airways decided that they “only want[ed] to buy from the 
ad networks that have been certified by the industry.”175 
 
As the digital advertising industry evolved, other types of intermediaries 
emerged, particularly ad exchanges. Ad networks, which serve as brokers 
between rights holders and sites, were covered by the IASH industry code. Ad 
exchanges, which are technology platforms that buy and sell ads in real time, 
were not. The underlying purpose of the regulatory regime—and a key demand 
of rights holders—was to expand the Internet Advertising Sales House to cover 
the whole industry. Rights holders “fund the whole industry and everyone has to 
meet those demands,” Kotecha explains.176 The new non-binding agreement—
the subject of one of this chapter’s advertising case studies—is the Digital 
Trading Standards Group (DTSG). The digital advertising industry, as described 
earlier, began creating the DTSG in 2011 to adjust for evolution in the industry. 
Government pressure forced the industry to rapidly develop and implement the 
DTSG in late 2013. The important difference between the previous IASH 
program and the DTSG is that the latter covers all intermediaries involved in the 
online placement of advertisements. In addition, as will be explored later in the 
chapter, the DTSG uses an industry-generated blacklist that helps advertisers 
avoid placing ads on infringing sites.  
 
The process of creating the Digital Trading Standards Group was complex as it 
involves multiple advertising exchanges, as well as trade associations 
representing the advertising industry and those for rights holders, particularly 
the Federation Against Copyright Theft and the British Recorded Music 
Industry.177 These latter trade associations, along with the Internet Advertising 
Bureau, repeatedly met with Ed Vaizey, the U.K. Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries, at the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport, to update the government on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 Ibid. 
175 Third-party auditors certified participating ad networks. Ibid.  
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
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progress of the DTSG. On behalf of rights holders’ trade associations, Minister 
Vaizey pushed the advertising industry to “fast-track” the agreement while in 
meetings with industry stakeholders.178 This pressure forced the industry to 
develop the agreement “really quickly” because the government wanted a 
process in place in 2013.179 While government pressure was not responsible for 
the creation of the DTSG, direct pressure from government officials hastened its 
implementation and the threat of legislation hung over the industry if it did not 
make sufficient progress. Kotecha explains:  
 
They really believe in self-regulation. [….] The last thing they want to do 
is legislate. We definitely don’t want that. It just leads to this black hole. 
We don’t know when they are going to legislate again. They could just 
push something through. If they do it once, they can do it again.180  
 
iv) Advertising Platforms’ Informal Agreements 
 
In the United States, the digital advertising industry also faced the threat of 
legislation in the form of COICA, PIPA and the Stop Online Piracy Act. In 
addition to these bills, the largest digital advertising actor—Google—faced 
criminal charges from the U.S. Department of Justice for facilitating infringement 
in relation to so-called “illegal” online pharmacies, as will be discussed later in 
this section (DOJ 2011).  Even before the introduction of COICA in 2010, the 
U.S. digital advertising industry had policies in place that prohibited the 
placement of ads on sites with illegal or what the industry determined to be 
“inappropriate” content (see IAB 2013). Despite these measures, advocates of 
tougher enforcement measures argued that legislation was necessary to 
address the problem of legitimate advertisements on infringing sites (Espinel 
2011a).  
 
U.S. legislators and policymakers made their preferences clear for more action 
from the digital advertising industry. Ads “hel[p] these sites obtain legitimacy 
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178 This is according to minutes from the Online Infringement of Copyright Roundtable in 
February 2012 between trade associations, Internet intermediaries and the U.K. Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport obtained by the U.K. Open Rights Group through a freedom of 
information request (Bradwell 2012). 
179 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
180 Ibid.!
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and confuse the public,” argued Victoria Espinel, head of IPEC in testimony to a 
Judiciary Subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2011, and  
also provide sites “a source of revenue” (Espinel 2011a:48). The U.S. 
Congressional International Anti-Piracy Caucus went a step further. In letters to 
the top three U.S. advertising associations in October 2011, members called 
upon the digital advertising industry to choke off revenue to sites involved in 
distributing infringing goods (Sandoval 2011).181 Direct state pressure, similar to 
the situation of the payment providers and U.K. advertising actors, underlies the 
private agreements with the U.S. advertising (see Table 4.2). 
 
Between 2010 and 2013, Espinel held a series of meetings with Google, Yahoo 
and Bing about how they could better regulate their advertising services (IPEC 
2013). In the background to these discussions, the U.S. Congress introduced 
COICA, PIPA and SOPA, which, as discussed in chapter 3, would have 
required advertising intermediaries to withdraw their services from infringing 
sites. The result of Espinel’s negotiations was three best practices-based 
agreements: one that focuses on so-called illegal online pharmacies and two 
that address advertisements on infringing sites in general (see Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: U.S. Informal Agreements with Advertising Actors  
Agreement Actors 
Centre for Safe Internet 
Pharmacies (2010) 
Google, Yahoo, Bing (American Express, MasterCard, 
PayPal, Visa, GoDaddy) 
Advertising associations’ best 
practices (2012) 
American Association of Advertising Agencies, the 
Association of National Advertisers, Interactive Advertising 
Bureau 
Ad networks’ best practices 
(2013) 
Google, Yahoo, Bing 
 
 
The first agreement, announced in December 2010, three months after the 
introduction of COICA, brought together multiple actors to create the Centre for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 Members of the Congressional International Anti-Piracy Caucus called for action from the 
American Association of Advertising Agencies, the Association of National Advertisers, and the 
Interactive Advertising Bureau (Sandoval 2011). 
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Safe Internet Pharmacies.182  In this agreement, advertising actors would 
remove advertisements from and prevent advertising from being placed on sites 
that sold pharmaceuticals in violation of U.S. federal and state laws (IPEC 
2011). For reasons of space, this dissertation does not examine the role of 
advertising macro-intermediaries in relation to the Centre for Safe Internet 
Pharmacies but instead focuses in chapter 5 on the domain registrar 
GoDaddy’s regulatory efforts in regards to this agreement. 
 
The other two informal agreements relate specifically to advertising associations 
and advertising networks. In May 2012, the largest advertising associations in 
the United States announced a shared statement of best practices that would 
guide their members’ policies. The Association of National Advertisers, the 
American Association of Advertising Agencies and the Interactive Advertising 
Bureau set out best practices to urge their members to avoid placing 
advertisements on infringing sites (ANA 2012). This agreement set the tone for 
the U.S. digital advertising industry as these associations represent the majority 
of U.S. firms involved in advertising.  
 
Just over a year later in July 2013, a group of U.S.-based ad networks 
announced a similar set of best practices (Ad Networks 2013). Signatories to 
the agreement were Google, Bing, AOL and Yahoo and prominent advertising 
firms 24/7 Media and Condé Nast. It is this latter agreement—the ad networks’ 
agreement—that is the chapter’s second advertising case study. While the ad 
networks’ agreement introduced guidelines to direct how advertising 
intermediaries addressed infringing sites, Google, Bing and Yahoo already had 
enforcement policies in place. The private agreements formalised but did not 
substantially alter their enforcement practices, as is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
Like the payment macro-intermediaries, the advertising actors—Google, Yahoo 
and Bing—adopted informal agreements with provisions similar to those 
proposed in PIPA and SOPA. In both the United States and the United 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 Discussions between IPEC and these actors began in the autumn of 2010, with a cross-
industry meeting in November 2010 and the agreement in December 2010. The Centre 
achieved non-profit status in 2012 (IPEC 2011; Clifton 2012).!
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Kingdom, advertising macro-intermediaries negotiated private agreements in 
the shadow of legislation. Google, however, faced additional coercive pressure 
in the form of criminal charges from the U.S. Department of Justice. While 
Google was in talks with Victoria Espinel about strengthening its advertising 
policies, Google was under investigation that it accepted ads from so-called 
“illegal” online pharmacies (see DOJ 2011).183 In 2011, Google settled the case 
by forfeiting $500 million, one of the largest forfeitures in the United States (DOJ 
2011). This case indicates the importance of digital advertising and the concern 
with which the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and, more broadly, the U.S. 
government, views the protection of intellectual property relating to 
pharmaceuticals, as is explored in greater detail in chapter 5.  
 
To summarise, the U.S. and U.K. governments exerted direct coercive pressure 
on payment and advertising macro-intermediaries to compel their involvement 
in private enforcement agreements. These agreements are the basis of a global 
private regulatory regime that relies upon state authority. The coercive 
conditions under which these states created the agreements, and therefore the 
regime, demonstrate the mutually aligned interests of rights holders and the 
U.S. and U.K. governments. As the next section explores, the regime’s mode of 
regulation is through technology: macro-intermediaries are responsible for 
monitoring their platforms and removing content and services related to the 
distribution of counterfeit goods. Macro-intermediaries’ ability to shape 
compliance by withdrawing services or altering how individuals can use their 
platforms makes them valuable gatekeepers.    
 
III) Intermediaries’ Enforcement Programs 
 
Having established how key payment and advertising actors signed onto private 
enforcement agreements, the chapter turns to explain the ways in which they 
police infringing sites. Advertising and payment intermediaries facilitate different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 The issue of online pharmacies is complex and controversial, as will be discussed in chapter 
5. Federal and state authorities in the United States impose strict conditions on the types of 
online pharmacies that can legally serve U.S. consumers and how they can operate. As a 
result, cheaper medication from foreign, often Canadian-based online pharmacies may violate 
these rules but supply genuine branded or generic medication. Thus, not all online pharmacies 
operate in accordance with U.S. laws but they do not all supply counterfeit or misbranded 
pharmaceuticals.  
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types of revenue for their clients: advertisements allow infringing sites to 
generate legitimate revenue, while selling counterfeit goods produces illicit 
funds. These intermediaries also have different relationships with rights holders. 
The advertising industry exists to promote products and services while payment 
providers, in contrast, enable financial transactions among all parties. 
 
i) Payment Intermediaries’ Enforcement Policies 
 
Payment providers operate through a series of contractual agreements 
(different from the non-binding private enforcement agreements). These 
agreements involve cardholders, acquirers, issuers, card associations, and 
merchants. The policies lay out how users and merchants can use the services, 
what activities are unacceptable, the responsibilities of issuing and acquiring 
financial institutions and the penalties for violating policies. Rights holders and 
their trade associations refer to these contractual agreements as a “legal 
lynchpin” (Montanaro 2012a) because they provide the authority for providers to 
terminate the merchant accounts of infringing sites anywhere in the world.  
Violation of these policies can result in a range of sanctions. Payment providers 
may suspend or terminate a user’s account and levy fines on acquiring banks 
that fail to detect or deal adequately with merchants operating infringing sites 
(American Express 2013). These fines are incentives for acquiring banks to 
ensure they do not grant merchant accounts to individuals involved in selling 
illegal goods. Bob Barchiesi, president of the International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition, comments that fines are “the hammer that the credit cards have over” 
their network of licensed financial institutions (Barchiesi 2012). 
 
Payment providers have notice-and-termination policies that predate their 
participation in private enforcement agreements. The process for terminating 
merchant accounts is relatively straightforward. Visa, MasterCard and American 
Express have similar procedures (American Express 2011; MasterCard N.d.): 
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1) Rights holders (or their authorised agents) provide contact 
information and evidence of ownership of the trademark/s in question.184 
2) Rights holders describe the alleged infringement and capture a 
screenshot of the site showing the product/s for sale. 
3) They note the web address of the site selling infringing products. 
4) They provide evidence of payment methods by capturing a 
screenshot of the site’s checkout page. 
5) They attest that the merchant is not authorized to sell the products 
in question (e.g., the merchant is not an authorized re-seller). 
6) They provide evidence that they have notified the website 
operator of the infringement, for example cease-and-desist letters.  
7) They attest that the information is accurate and complete with 
statements made in good faith. 
Once the payment providers receive the complaint, they identify the acquiring 
bank that granted the merchant account. Visa and MasterCard require the 
acquiring bank to respond within two business days if law enforcement has 
initiated the complaint and within five business days for rights holder-generated 
complaints (MasterCard N.d.). Acquiring banks must conduct an investigation 
and terminate the merchant agreement and account if warranted. If the bank 
decides termination is not necessary, Visa and MasterCard demand, in the 
words of MasterCard, that acquirers provide “provide compelling, written 
evidence disproving the violation” (MasterCard N.d.).  
 
PayPal’s process for account termination is simpler as it does not operate 
through a network of acquiring financial institutions. PayPal’s internal security 
unit and third-party online monitoring firms “crawl the Internet looking for key 
words, indicators and PayPal brands and references.”185 If violations of 
PayPal’s policies are identified, PayPal conducts an investigation. “[I]f we detect 
behaviour in violation of our terms the PayPal account is restricted,” says Julie 
Bainbridge, senior brand protection manager with PayPal.186 PayPal then sends 
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184 Authorised agents include trade associations that undertake enforcement efforts, attorneys 
or private investigative or brand-monitoring firms. 
185 Personal interview Julie Bainbridge, Senior Brand Protection Manager, PayPal, 1 July 2012, 
by Skype. 
186 Ibid 
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an email to the user saying the account is restricted because of a violation and 
that the merchant can no longer accept payment by PayPal. 
 
ii) Payment Providers’ Private Enforcement Agreements 
 
Payment providers’ enforcement agreements set out broadly worded principles 
for working with rights holders and terminating merchant accounts. Although 
these agreements have not been publicly released, I obtained copies (see 
Appendices B and C).187 The agreements require rights holders to coordinate 
their complaints of infringement by working through associations like the 
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (see Appendix C). According to the 
agreements, rights holders should also develop, in cooperation with payment 
providers, “a common form or system” and standardized coding to categorize 
types of infringement (see Appendix C). The agreements also contain 
references to safeguards. The guidelines recommend that payment providers 
have a clearly identified complaint mechanism and point of contact for 
complainants. Importantly, they should also have a process to allow a “prompt 
review” if merchants dispute the allegations and allows providers flexibility in 
issuing sanctions (see Appendix B).  
 
Overall, these enforcement agreements are intended to transform payment 
providers into gatekeepers with the technological capacity to process mass 
numbers of complaints in a rapid, streamlined manner for rights holders. These 
agreements form the basis of how Visa, MasterCard and PayPal work with the 
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, which is explored in greater detail 
below.  
 
iii) Account Termination Programs 
 
Beginning in 2011, rights holders, trade associations and government actors in 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, working in cooperation 
with payment providers separately created several merchant-account 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187 As discussed earlier, the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition shared these two 
agreements (one four-page agreement, dated May 2011, and one two-page agreement, dated 
July 2011) with a U.S. lawyer who shared them with me (see Appendices B and C).  
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termination programs. These programs vary in scope, degree of law 
enforcement involvement, and payment actors but have broadly similar 
operations. In the United Kingdom, several music trade associations work with 
the City of London Police in a partnership that began with a threat of criminal 
charges, as discussed earlier.188 There are also several other smaller programs 
run by brand-monitoring firms and trade associations as merchant-account 
termination is a growing area of interest for brand-protection firms.189 
 
In addition to these programs, there are also two, well established programs 
operating in North America, one in the United States and the other in Canada, 
which form this chapter’s payment case studies. The U.S. program targets sites 
distributing counterfeit and copyright-infringing goods. The Canadian program 
concentrates solely on counterfeit goods. The principal difference between the 
programs is the U.S. program has no direct participation from law enforcement 
or government agencies while the other is operated by a law enforcement 
agency on behalf of Canadian rights holders. Studying these programs provides 
an ideal opportunity to examine the role of government in the creation of each. 
 
a) International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition Program  
 
The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC), based in Washington 
D.C., launched its program in January 2012. The program directly emerged 
from the best practices agreement that Victoria Espinel, the head of IPEC, 
coordinated among payment providers (IPEC 2012). Building upon this 
agreement, the IACC signed memoranda of understanding with multiple 
payment providers, including Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and American Express. 
Rights holders participating in the program can make complaints in three 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 In mid-2011, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the British 
Recorded Music Industry (BPI) and the City of London Police joined forces with MasterCard, 
Visa and PayPal (IFPI 2013). Investigators from IFPI and BPI identify sites they allege are 
offering copyright-infringing content and forward the information to the police, which request that 
the payment providers withdraw their services (IFPI 2013). 
189 In my interviews, I identified a similar merchant-account termination program operated by a 
U.K. trade association and one operated by a U.K. brand monitoring firm. 
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categories: 1) counterfeit goods; 2) digital-copyright infringement; and 3) 
circumvention devices (Montanaro 2012).190  
 
Bob Barchiesi, IACC president, explains the program’s goal is to "create a 
streamlined, simplified procedure” for rights holders to submit complaints “to 
credit card networks across multiple platforms" (Barchiesi 2011). The IACC’s 
program, called “RogueBlock,” allows IACC members to submit complaints 
electronically to the IACC. The IACC reviews all complaints, employs analysts 
to conduct trace messaging191 to determine the relevant acquiring bank, and 
then sends complaints directly to the relevant payment providers for account 
termination (Montanaro 2012). The program is available to any member of the 
IACC or its affiliated members who pay the program’s annual fee. Participants 
can submit a maximum of 25 URLs per calendar month, which “limits the brand 
owner to really pick the cream of the crop cases,” explains Kristina Montanaro, 
director of special programs for the IACC and manager of the program.192 
 
b) Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Program  
 
The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC) is a law enforcement agency in North 
Bay, Ontario that works with the public, law enforcement agencies, and the 
private sector to address and deter fraud.193 Its merchant-account termination 
program is the creation of Barry Elliott, who is head of the analysis section of 
the CAFC and a retired member of the Ontario Provincial Police’s Anti-Rackets 
Branch. Elliott launched the program in 2011—it predates the IACC’s 
program—and says that it is based upon his long-time professional relationship 
with Visa through their partnership in fraud investigations. Elliott explains that 
the program’s strategy is “to go for the throat and to take away the ability of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
190 Circumvention devices refer to hardware or software that breaks rights holder-imposed 
digital locks, such as those that confine an e-book to a particular e-reader or a video game to a 
particular device. 
191 Trace messaging involves tracking a payment transaction to identify the merchant account’s 
acquiring bank so that the payment provider (e.g., Visa) can request that the relevant bank 
investigate the merchant account.  
192 Interview with Kristina Montanaro, Associate Counsel, Director of Special Programs, 
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, 24 April 2012, Washington. 
193 The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre is jointly managed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(federal law enforcement), Ontario Provincial Police, and the Competition Bureau Canada 
(federal regulatory agency). Visa is a key partner. 
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merchants to make money.”194 There are several important differences between 
the CAFC and IACC programs. The CAFC works exclusively with Visa and 
solely targets sites selling counterfeit versions of Canadian rights holders’ 
products.195 “If you target Canada, we’ll take your merchant account,” Elliott 
says.196 The CAFC acts upon complaints received from rights holders and, in 
contrast with the IACC program, the CAFC also receives complaints from 
consumers. Rights holders can also pay to submit a thousand sites annually to 
the CAFC rather than the 300 permitted by the IACC.197 
 
Although the CAFC operates the merchant-account program, it does not verify 
that the sites are selling counterfeit goods but instead relies upon rights holders 
to make that determination. “If the company says that the site is unauthorized, 
we cut the merchant account,” explains Elliott. “Civil liability falls on the 
company.”198 The CAFC’s program is rather unusual as it operates by 
employing undergraduate criminology students from the local university, 
Nipissing University. The CAFC supervises the students and trains them to 
process complaints and conduct trace messaging.199 Nipissing University 
administers rights holders’ fees and pays the students’ wages because the 
CAFC cannot charge or receive money for its services as a non-profit 
association.200 
 
iii) Advertising Intermediaries’ Enforcement Policies 
 
Regulating the placement of ads in the digital advertising industry is even more 
complex than identifying and targeting infringing sites’ merchant accounts. 
Underlying the digital ads we see everyday are technical and highly complex 
systems that classify content. Some topics are highly regulated—or outright 
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194 Interview with Barry Elliott, Criminal Intelligence Analytical Unit, Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, 
North Bay, Ontario, 27 June 2012, by telephone. 
195 In contrast, the IACC program works with multiple payment providers and operates on behalf 
of rights holders anywhere worldwide.  
196 Interview with Barry Elliott, Criminal Intelligence Analytical Unit, Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, 
North Bay, Ontario, 27 June 2012, by telephone. 
197 Interview with Barry Elliott, Criminal Intelligence Analytical Unit, Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, 
North Bay, Ontario, 27 June 2012, by telephone. 
198 Ibid. 
199 The students’ trace-messaging analysis identifies the acquiring bank in a transaction that 
Visa can trace but as the students do not have access to payment providers’ data like the IACC 
program, Visa must identify the acquiring bank. 
200 Interview with representative from Nipissing University, 12 July 2012, by Skype. 
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prohibited—on many advertising platforms, such as pornography, weapons, 
hate speech, tobacco and illicit drugs. Other topics may vary according to a 
particular country’s policy on the subject, such as alcohol, abortion and 
gambling. Some taboo topics are surprising and idiosyncratic to the company. 
Google, for example, forbids ads for ‘secret’ paternity tests.201 Advertising 
intermediaries institute these policies because rights holders have repeatedly 
expressed their concern that their ads could be placed on sites that offer illegal 
or inappropriate content that may negatively affect their brands. For example, 
an industry-run survey of marketing managers in the U.K. found that they are 
most concerned about their ads ending upon on pornographic sites (Digital 
Strategy Consulting 2013).202 After pornography, marketing managers were 
most concerned about sites linked to terrorism and then those offering infringing 
content. 
 
The online advertising industry regulates the content and placement of ads 
through a series of best practices agreements and internal policies. Some of 
these rules echo state regulations that limit advertising, for example, on tobacco 
products or alcohol, while others reflect rights holders’ demands to avoid 
controversial or unwanted content (IAB 2013). The major advertising trade 
associations in the United States and the United Kingdom all have policies that 
recommend advertising intermediaries not place ads on infringing sites (ANA 
2012; IAB 2013). Advertising actors like Google, AOL, Yahoo and Bing explicitly 
prohibit ads for counterfeit goods (Bing N.d).  
 
iv) Advertising Intermediaries’ Enforcement Programs 
 
As introduced earlier, there are two non-legally binding regulatory programs in 
which advertising macro-intermediaries work to control advertising practices in 
relation to infringing sites—one in the United States and the second in the 
United Kingdom. Depending on the services they offer, advertising 
intermediaries are responsible for both preventing the placement of legitimate 
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201 For a list of Google’s AdWords Restricted Products and Services, see: 
http://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/topic.py?hl=en&topic=1308252. 
202 The survey, conducted on behalf of Project Sunblock, a company that offers brand-protection 
services, was of 268 senior marketing decisions makers at mid-sized (50-500 people) UK 
brands (Digital Strategy Consulting 2013). 
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ads on infringing sites and removing ads for counterfeit goods (i.e., ads that 
direct consumers to sites selling counterfeit products). For the latter effort, 
Google, Yahoo and Bing operate notice-and-takedown programs that allow 
rights holders (or their authorized representatives) to complain about specific 
ads. These notice-and-takedown provisions, however, are only for ads. If rights 
holders want to complain about a search result (e.g., from Google or Yahoo) 
that links to an infringing site, they can file a notice of infringement to the 
relevant search engine to have that link de-indexed from the search results, as 
will be discussed in chapter 5. 
a) Ad Networks’ Private Enforcement Agreement 
 
In July 2013, a group of U.S.-based ad networks announced it would follow a 
private enforcement agreement established after several years of negotiation 
with the Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (Ad 
Networks 2013). Google, the largest digital advertising actor, signed the 
agreement. So did AOL, and Yahoo-Bing, which operate a combined 
advertising network. In addition to these actors, the prominent ad networks 24/7 
Media, Adtegrity, and Condé Nast agreed to the agreement. The guidelines that 
comprise the agreement have three components.  
1. Members agree to institute policies prohibiting advertising on 
infringing sites and agree to an “ongoing dialogue” with all interested 
parties including consumer organizations and free speech advocates.  
2. Members agree to be certified, either through the Interactive 
Advertising Bureau, the trade association for online advertising, or an 
independent process.  
3. Members agree to institute a notice-and-takedown process to deal 
with complaints from rights holders.  
 
These private agreements coordinate regulatory practices among the largest 
advertising actors. However, they largely reiterate policies and practices that 
participants already had in place. For example, Google and Yahoo-Bing 
operated notice-and-takedown programs before they joined the agreement. In 
addition, the Interactive Advertising Bureau had already certified Google and 
Yahoo’s ad networks prior to their adoption of the private agreement (see IAB 
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2013). As is argued later in this chapter, the similarity between the ad networks’ 
established policies and the private enforcement agreements is because of the 
ad networks’ economic dependence on rights holders.   
b) Digital Trading Standards Group 
 
In 2011, the digital advertising industry in the United Kingdom began updating 
its voluntary industry certification program, the Internet Advertising Sales House 
(IASH) code of conduct. As discussed earlier, this was because new actors had 
joined the industry, specifically ad exchanges, which buy and sell 
advertisements in real time. In late 2013, the industry introduced the Digital 
Trading Standards Group (DTSG), which is based on a set of non-binding 
guidelines. Signatories to the DTSG include Google, Bing and Yahoo UK. The 
DTSG has two main components:  
1. A process to govern where advertisements can be placed; and  
2. A third-party verification process that certifies firms that have 
adopted processes to “minimize the risk of ad misplacement” (JICWEBS 
2013:4).203 
To comply with the first element, advertising intermediaries can employ 
automated “content-verification tools.” These tools check the contents of any 
webpage where an ad will be delivered using, for example, keyword 
identification to search for common terms used on pornographic sites. If these 
tools detect problematic terms, they block the real-time delivery of 
advertisements to inappropriate sites (IAB 2013). Advertising networks and 
exchanges may also develop lists of pre-verified sites (called “whitelists” or, in 
industry jargon, “appropriate schedules”). They can also compile lists of 
prohibited sites (known as “blacklists” or “inappropriate schedules”). Ad 
networks and exchanges then use these blacklists and whitelists to govern 
where they place advertisements (JICWEBS 2013).204 Buyers and sellers of 
advertising agree on placement restrictions prior to selling ads and incorporate 
those terms into their sales contracts. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
203 JICWEBS, which refers to the Joint Industry Committee for Web Standards in the U.K. and 
Ireland, approved the DTSG and recommends the program as an industry standard.  
204 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
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To comply with the auditing component of the DTSG, signatories agree to allow 
independent, industry-approved firms verify their ad misplacement-minimization 
policies within six months and then thereafter annually (JICWEBS 2013:4).205 
“No other country in the world has got this far,” says Amit Kotecha, whose 
industry group, the Internet Advertising Bureau, facilitated the creation of the 
DTSG. “It’s a massive step forward.”206  
 
The City of London Police plays an unusual role in relation to the Digital Trading 
Standards Group. The Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU), which is 
part of the City of London Police, hosts an “infringing website list” (or blacklist). 
Trade associations like the Federation Against Copyright Theft and the British 
Recorded Music Industry populate the list of infringing sites based on their 
rights holder members’ complaints (Police 2013). Both trade associations had 
strongly pushed the digital advertising industry to crack down harder on 
infringing sites.207 Police say that all sites on the blacklist, which will not be 
publicly available, “are identified and evidenced as infringing by rights holders 
and then verified by PIPCU” (Ernesto 2014). Advertising intermediaries that 
belong to the DTSG will use this blacklist to ensure that the listed sites do not 
receive advertisements. 
 
IV) Analysis of Intermediaries’ Enforcement Measures 
 
The four enforcement programs analysed in this chapter from the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Canada outline a private regulatory regime that, while 
rooted in specific geographical locations, stretches globally by virtue of macro-
intermediaries’ vast operations. By tapping into macro-intermediaries’ 
sophisticated monitoring and enforcement capabilities, the regime has the 
technological capacity to shape the provision of payment and advertising 
services across the Internet.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
205 The industry body JICSWEB, a media industry trade association, must approve independent, 
third-party verification firms and content verification tools. 
206 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
207 Interview with Kieron Sharp, Director General, Federation Against Copyright Theft, 9 October 
2012, by Skype. 
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Payment and advertising macro-intermediaries not only facilitate different types 
of revenue streams but they also have different regulatory capabilities in relation 
to infringing sites. Payment providers supply an essential service. All 
commercial sites and even those that operate through donations require 
payment processing that is reliable, trusted and popular enough to attract 
consumers. When the largest payment providers—PayPal, Visa, MasterCard 
and American Express—terminate their services, finding viable commercial 
replacements can be more difficult than replacing advertising revenue. Payment 
providers can therefore cripple websites that rely upon processing donations or 
payments from customers. This means that the wrongful targeting of legitimate 
sites can render sites commercially non-viable.  
 
Advertising intermediaries, depending on their specific roles, can remove bad 
ads for counterfeit goods and deter infringing sites from accessing legitimate 
sources of advertising revenue. Both strategies have weaknesses. Those 
advertising counterfeit goods can seek alternate fora for their ads, such as 
social networks. Operators of infringing sites can sell space on their webpages 
to less reputable, non-mainstream advertisers. In contrast to payment services, 
commercial sites can exist without ads or can rely upon less-reputable ads 
from, for example, the sex industry.  
 
i)  Payment Macro-Intermediaries 
 
Regulation of the online payment and advertising industries is challenging 
because both industries have complicated, real-time and automated 
enforcement processes, global operations, and an intricate ecosystem of firms 
providing a range of facilitative services. Merchant-account terminations are 
complex because each infringing site may offer multiple payment methods, 
termed “payment channels,” such as PayPal, Visa and Western Union. Not all 
these channels may be functional but the logos may be present to attract 
consumers. Each payment channel may support multiple webpages meaning if 
“you attack the single checkout page, you can make a difference,” says Robert 
Caldwell, founder of G2 Web Services, the company that built and does data 
analysis for the IACC merchant-account program (Caldwell 2012).  
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Detailed information on the merchant-account termination programs is not 
publicly available. However, snapshots released by each program give some 
indication of the scale of enforcement (see Table 4.3). Two years after its 
launch, the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition’s program reported in 
January 2014 that it had referred over 8,400 sites for investigation and 
terminated over 2,800 merchant accounts (IACC 2014). The difference between 
the payment channels identified and merchant accounts terminated refers to 
sites that may still be under investigation, those with inactive payment channels, 
or already-terminated payment channels. The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre 
reported that between April 2011 and March 5, 2012 it terminated 484 Visa 
merchant accounts.208 In a presentation at the IACC’s anti-counterfeiting 
conference in May 2012, a representative from MasterCard said that it and Visa 
have had “hundreds and hundreds, even thousands over the last few years of 
merchants terminated as a result of our collective efforts” (Kirkpatrick 2012).  
Table 4.3: Merchant-Account Termination Programs 
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Payment macro-intermediaries have considerable regulatory authority to control 
infringing sites by withdrawing their payment processing capacities. This finding 
corroborates recent scholarly research, which examines websites selling 
unauthorized pharmaceuticals, that concludes that “reliable merchant banking is 
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+)(!Interview with Barry Elliott, Criminal Intelligence Analytical Unit, Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, 
North Bay, Ontario, 27 June 2012, by telephone.!
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a scarce and critical resource that, when targeted carefully, is highly fragile to 
disruption” (McCoy et al. 2012:1). In fact, the stated goal of the IACC’s program 
is to “shrink the universe” of Internet firms that provide services to infringing 
sites (Johnson 2013). By partnering with macro-intermediaries, intellectual 
property actors shift infringing sites to alternative payment methods or less-
reputable payment providers whose services would not be as popularly 
accepted as the major payment firms.  
 
ii) Advertising Macro-Intermediaries 
 
Enforcement efforts against online infringement within the digital advertising 
industry are more complex than those of the online payment industry. This is 
because of the number of actors involved and the dual role that some 
advertising intermediaries must play in removing bad ads and preventing the 
placement of legitimate ads on infringing site. As the ad networks’ agreement 
and the Digital Trading Standards Group launched in July 2013 and late 2013 
respectively, it is too soon to analyse enforcement results from these programs. 
It is clear, however, that Google, the largest online-advertising actor, is active in 
its removal of ads from its services that violate its policies. In 2013, for example, 
Google reported removing more than 350 million bad ads, not all of which were 
for counterfeit goods, and banning about 14,000 advertisers for trying to sell 
counterfeit goods, a decline of 80% from 2012 (Google 2014). Google also 
reported disabling more than two million ads for “illegal online pharmacies” in 
2013 (Google 2014). Despite Google’s prolific efforts, removing this content 
does not prevent those responsible from shifting to another, less-reputable 
advertising provider.  
 
From all indications, the amount of legitimate advertising mistakenly placed on 
infringing sites is relatively small. Despite rights holders’ concerns, it appears to 
comprise a single-digit percentage of overall digital advertising. Project 
Sunblock, a U.K. firm providing brand-protection services, found in its survey of 
U.K. marketing managers that 1% of all ads were placed on sites with 
inappropriate content (Digital Strategy Consulting 2013). This content included 
phishing scams, malware, illegal drugs, violence and pornography. A senior 
manager for Hewlett Packard, the information technology company, echoed 
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these findings at the May 2012 conference hosted by the IACC. He said less 
than 1% of Hewlett Packard’s digital advertising campaign had gone astray and 
98.6% of its advertising partners were compliant with the company’s rules 
(Linggo 2012).  
 
More importantly, infringing sites do not appear to rely extensively on 
mainstream advertising. Two scholarly analyses of ads on infringing sites 
directed toward Canada and Singapore demonstrate that so-called high-risk 
advertising dominates these sites, particularly ads for the sex industry (see 
Watters 2014; Watters 2013). Two other studies, which focus on copyright-
infringing sites, also conclude that these sites generally do not rely upon 
mainstream advertising to support their services.209 Advertising intermediaries 
candidly admit that a small proportion of ads will continue to be inadvertently 
placed on inappropriate sites. “I know after years of doing this stuff,” explains 
Kotecha at the Internet Advertising Bureau, “everything flies around really fast 
and sometimes it’s impossible to figure out the culprit.”210  
 
There will always be some advertising intermediaries who will facilitate the 
placement of less-reputable ads to less-reputable sites. However, as critics 
pointed out during protests of the Stop Online Piracy Act, ads for “escort 
services and high-interest lenders” do not pay as much as “the Chevys and 
Coca-Colas of the world” (Healy 2013). Infringing sites, if they receive revenue 
from advertisements, are more likely to rely upon advertising that is unwanted 
by more mainstream sites, such as ads for escort services. These ads generate 
far less revenue than mainstream, premium brands, like Apple or Nike.  
 
V) State Pressure and Actors’ Interests 
 
State pressure and coercion were central to the creation of payment and 
advertising macro-intermediaries’ private enforcement agreements. The U.S. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
209 A study jointly commissioned by Google and PRS for Music, a UK association of composers 
and music publishers, concluded the majority of sites analysed used ads from non-mainstream 
advertising firms (BAE Systems Detica 2012). The American Assembly, a non-partisan public 
affairs forum based in Columbia University, surveyed unauthorised downloading sites and found 
they were low-cost operations that rely upon donations in some cases (Karaganis 2012). 
210 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
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and U.K. governments both employed threats of legislation and legal action to 
convince the macro-intermediaries to adopt and implement non-binding 
enforcement practices. Advertising and payment actors, in addition to facing 
coercive measures, have varying financial and reputational interests in adopting 
private agreements. Interests of industry and states, however, largely 
overshadow consumers’ interests and the private enforcement agreements 
raise serious concerns of anti-competitive behaviour.  
 
i) Role of the State 
 
Governments in the United Kingdom and United States played key roles in 
pushing payment and advertising macro-intermediaries into negotiations and 
guiding the creation of non-binding regulatory arrangements. In the United 
Kingdom, senior officers from the City of London Police used the threat of 
criminal charges against Visa and MasterCard to “leverage” their 
cooperation.211 In the United States, the Department of Justice cracked down 
on Google’s acceptance of advertisements for illegal online pharmacies. Google 
not only settled with the government for $500 million but it also agreed to 
institute compliance mechanisms to prevent a reoccurrence of the problem 
(DOJ 2011). The action by the Department of Justice shows the seriousness 
that the U.S. government accords infringing sites, particularly those that are 
involved in the unauthorized distribution of pharmaceuticals. Pressure from the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry, a powerful voice for strong intellectual property 
laws (see Drahos and Braithwaite 2002), likely influenced the U.S. 
government’s crack down on Google.212 
 
In contrast, the Canadian program was created with any apparent threats or 
pressure on Visa as it developed from a longstanding partnership with the 
Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre. However, the CAFC, as a law enforcement 
agency, has authority to pressure Visa to cooperate should that have been 
necessary and, as explored earlier, a U.K. law enforcement agency had already 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
211 Interview with Det./Supt. Bob Wishart, Head of National Operational Delivery, Regional 
Fraud Project, City of London Police, 6 September 2012, London. 
212 The influence of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in shaping online enforcement efforts 
against infringing sites is explored in Chapter 5.!!
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threatened Visa’s European operations with criminal charges to compel the 
payment provider to work voluntarily with rights holders and law enforcement. 
 
Negotiations in both the United States and the United Kingdom took place 
against pending legislation or threats of legislation. In the U.S., discussions with 
Victoria Espinel, Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), took 
place while the U.S. Congress was considering multiple intellectual property 
bills, including the controversial Stop Online Piracy Act. The U.K. digital 
advertising industry feared that that the government could step in with 
legislation and “push something through,” explains Kotecha, a manager at the 
Internet Advertising Bureau, although he contends that the last thing they want 
to do is legislate.213 
 
IPEC directly shaped the private agreements. Fred Humphries, vice-president 
of U.S. government affairs at Microsoft, acknowledges Espinel’s work when he 
comments that the agreement with the U.S. ad networks came after a “multi-
year effort with the White House to develop these best practices” (Humphries 
2013). Similarly, payment providers credit Espinel for pushing them to 
strengthen their enforcement practices. Julie Bainbridge, a senior brand 
protection manager at PayPal, recalls that Espinel said to PayPal, “We know 
you’re at the table being proactive but you need to do more.”214 Linda 
Kirkpatrick, an executive at MasterCard, recognizes Espinel’s role in 
coordinating negotiations that shaped the payment industry’s approach to online 
infringement:  
 
We have, thanks to Ms. Espinel, an established best practices policy that 
all of us have signed up for, a set of minimum standards that many of us 
far exceed but it certainly sets the ground work and framework for what’s 
appropriate (Kirkpatrick 2012).  
 
In the United Kingdom, the government also made clear its preference that the 
digital advertising industry develop and implement the Digital Trading Standards 
Group quickly. In an industry-only roundtable group hosted by Minister Ed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
213 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
214 Interview with Julie Bainbridge, Senior Brand Protection Manager, PayPal, 1 July 2012, by 
Skype. 
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Vaizey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport, he urged the advertising industry to “fast-track” the DTSG.215 The 
digital advertising industry recognizes the role of government in shaping its 
regulatory measures. “[P]olitical imperatives from government have really 
pushed things forward,” says Kotecha.  
 
ii) State and Corporate Interests in Informal Private Regulation  
 
The private enforcement agreements struck among payment and advertising 
macro-intermediaries primarily serve state and corporate interests. These 
agreements, drafted and implemented quietly, enable states to bypass 
problematic legislation and achieve similar regulatory outcomes through non-
binding enforcement measures. 
 
Payment and advertising macro-intermediaries have multiple financial and 
reputational interests in joining private enforcement agreements, as well as the 
motivation of lessening the risk of litigation from rights holders. For example, 
Bob Barchiesi, president of the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, 
explains that several rights holders told him that the only reason payment 
providers were working with the IACC was because “they don’t want to be 
litigated or legislated into it.”216 By strengthening their regulatory efforts against 
online infringement, macro-intermediaries can demonstrate to government that 
they are responsible corporate actors. Payment providers want to be able to go 
to “the White House and say ‘we don’t really have as big an issue as folks 
thought,” explains Barchiesi.217 Advertising actors in the United Kingdom hope 
that a more comprehensive regulatory program will deliver some peace in the 
industry. “It will be great to work with them instead of against them,” Kotecha 
says, as his association, the Internet Advertising Bureau, had been pressured to 
improve industry practices by trade associations. “There was a lot of lobbying 
and fighting before.”218     
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 Minutes from February 2012 roundtable meeting chaired by Ed Vaizey (Bradwell 2012). 
216 Interview with Bob Barchiesi, President, IACC, 24 April 2012, Washington. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
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Macro-intermediaries, like rights holders, have valuable brands that they want to 
protect from negative association with criminal activity. Barchiesi recounts that 
he used this argument when he lobbied payment providers to work with the 
IACC and terminate their services to infringing sites. “[Y]ou have a brand and 
your brand is getting damaged,” he recalls telling the providers, “because your 
brand lends credibility to these sites. Consumers trust your brand.”219 Macro-
intermediaries are also financially motivated to address online infringement on 
behalf of rights holders. Advertising actors have a strong economic self-interest 
in adopting measures that encourage rights holders to continue expanding their 
digital advertising presence. Google, for example, received 95% of its annual 
revenue from advertising in 2012 (Google 2013). Rights holders have 
tremendous power to shape rules and standards in the advertising industry 
because they supply the product—well-known, sought-after brands. “They fund 
the whole industry and everyone has to meet those demands,” says Kotecha.220 
Payment providers also have financial interests in protecting their corporate 
brands and ensuring that the online payment industry is safe and reliable.  
 
iii) Consumers’ Interests 
 
Consumers, meanwhile, were shut out of the negotiations. Consumers’ interests 
are threatened by the potential of anti-competitive behaviour by macro-
intermediaries that can determine the legality of content and websites in ways 
that may unfairly constrain the goods and services available to individuals. For 
proponents of stronger enforcement, private agreements that encourage 
coordinated or standardized regulatory practices within Internet sectors provide 
a useful consistency in anti-counterfeiting activities. However, the practice of 
macro-intermediaries working together raises the problem of anti-competitive 
behaviour. State pressure on payment providers, for example, has resulted 
these macro-intermediaries working together collaboratively for the first time. 
Linda Kirkpatrick at MasterCard, made this point during a presentation at the 
May 2012 IACC conference on counterfeiting:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
219 Interview with Bob Barchiesi, President, IACC, 24 April 2012, Washington. 
220 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
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Some of us are competitors in our space. But on this particular topic, I 
think we’ve unified and rallied against the common goal of follow the 
money. It’s not often that you get MasterCard, PayPal and Visa on the 
same panel. Our lawyers don’t let us. But again, on this topic, there’s no 
question that we need to be unified (Kirkpatrick 2012).  
 
Kirkpatrick’s statement highlights the problem of anti-competitive behaviour that 
can result when companies with dominant market shares in an industry work 
together to set rules and standards. There are real concerns that multinational 
corporations may set rules that benefit their interests and those of other 
powerful companies over consumers’ interests and those of the general public. 
PayPal, for example, has withdrawn its services from technology companies 
that offer virtual private networks and online file storage services, which are 
legal technologies, because of concerns that these companies facilitate 
unauthorized downloads of music, movies and software (Enigmax 2013; 
Ernesto 2012). Payment providers’ withdrawal of services from a company, on 
behalf of rights holders, because of suspected wrongdoing of some users is an 
unfairly broad regulatory approach.  
 
There are similar concerns of anti-competitive behaviour in relation to the Digital 
Trading Standards Group because of its use of an industry-generated blacklist 
of infringing sites. Advertising intermediaries will use this list to avoid placing 
legitimate advertisements on infringing sites. The Police Intellectual Property 
Crime Unit at the City of London Police hosts and reports that it will verify sites 
on the list. However, the list is not publicly available for scrutiny, nor are the 
criteria used to designate sites as infringing. It is unclear how site operators can 
challenge their inclusion on the list and whether inclusion on this blacklist brings 




This chapter’s analysis of four anti-counterfeiting enforcement programs 
involving payment and advertising macro-intermediaries reveals a private 
regulatory regime that is rooted in the United States and the United Kingdom 
and extends outward globally, with a branch in Canada. Except for the 
Canadian case, direct state pressure was essential in compelling these macro-
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intermediaries to adopt and implement regulatory arrangements based on non-
binding enforcement measures. Rights holders were particularly influential in 
pushing advertising intermediaries, both in the United States and United 
Kingdom, to adopt informal regulatory arrangements because of rights holders’ 
capacity to make rules governing the use of their brands in the advertising 
industry. In contrast, state pressure was necessary to stimulate cooperation 
from payment providers, as rights holders’ lacked the authority to force payment 
providers to accede to their rules. State actors thus play a central, though often 
hidden role, within the regulatory regime but macro-intermediaries involved in 
the regime credit state pressure for their participation.  
 
Payment and advertising macro-intermediaries comprise an integral part of the 
private anti-counterfeiting regime because, particularly in regards to payment 
providers, they can enact revenue chokepoints to disable infringing sites. By 
using the provision of payment services as an enforcement tool—a form of 
techno-regulation—payment macro-intermediaries are highly effective 
regulators that can disable sites that rely upon sales or donations. Given the 
market dominance of a handful of U.S.-based payment companies, they have 
the capacity to act as private arbiters of the legality of technologies, services 
and applications on the Internet and shape how individuals may access and use 
them. A similar challenge is evident in relation to the U.K. advertising industry’s 
use of industry-generated blacklists to ensure advertisements are not placed on 
infringing sites. There is a danger that such blacklists, which are drafted in 
secret by powerful trade associations, will further entrench established industry 






221 Industry-generated blacklists of sites have a troubled history. The U.S.-based GroupM, for 
example, which is one of the world’s largest advertising firms created a blacklist that mistakenly 
included many legitimate sites, including a digital library (Archive.org), technology company 
(BitTorrent Inc.) and video and music-sharing sites (SoundCloud and Vimeo) (Ernesto 2011). 
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Chapter 5: Access Chokepoints: Search and Domain 
Intermediaries 
 
Search engines and domain registrars facilitate access to the web222 and both 
provide critical Internet services. Search engines enable Internet users to 
search for and access information from among billions of webpages. Domain 
registrars are part of the domain name system, which is an essential part of the 
Internet infrastructure that translates easy-to-remember domain names 
(bbc.co.uk) into numerical addresses and allows users to access websites 
anywhere in the world. Advocates of using enforcement strategies of “access 
chokepoints” contend that search engines and domain registrars can deter 
users from accessing sites that distribute counterfeit goods or copyright 
infringing content.223 By throttling access to customers, the reasoning goes, 
infringing sites will cease to be profitable and individuals who seek legitimate 
goods will not be deceived by counterfeits.224 
 
Similar to the strategy of revenue chokepoints discussed in chapter 4, using 
search and domain intermediaries to deter access to infringing sites was a key 
part of PIPA and SOPA. These bills would have required search and domain 
intermediaries to withdraw their services from infringing sites.225 Further, they 
would have permitted domain intermediaries to act voluntarily against sites that 
endangered public health.226 Despite the failure of PIPA and SOPA, search and 
domain macro-intermediaries adopted provisions similar to those contained 
within these bills in non-binding enforcement initiatives. GoDaddy, the world’s 
largest domain registrar, signed an agreement to withdraw its services from 
online pharmacies that violate U.S. laws on the distribution of pharmaceuticals. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
222 While the “Internet” and “World Wide Web” (or web) are often used inter-changeably they 
refer to different entities. The Internet is a series of interconnected computers and the web, a 
system of hypertext-linked webpages, is one of the services that operates on the Internet. 
223 Interview with Dave Wood, Director of Anti-Piracy, British Recorded Music Industry (BPI), 
Ltd., 12 September 2012, London. 
224 This dissertation does not address the regulatory role of Internet service providers (ISPs), 
such as Verizon, which enable users to access the Internet. They play a significant role in the 
control of digital-copyright infringement but not the regulation of counterfeit goods. For the role 
of ISPs in regulating copyright infringement, see McIntyre and Scott (2008) and de Beer and 
Clemmer (2009).    
225 SOPA Sec. 103 and PIPA Sec. 4.  
226 Google would have been permitted to act voluntarily against sites endangering public health 
through its role as an advertising intermediary, see: SOPA Sec 104 and PIPA Sec 5(b). 
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Google, the largest global search engine, adopted a U.K.-based code of 
conduct to guide its regulation of search results.  
 
Examining search engines and domain registrars together makes sense 
because both types of intermediaries facilitate access to sites. In addition, 
intellectual property actors argue both should assume greater responsibility for 
blocking or deterring access to infringing sites. Search and domain macro-
intermediaries are key components of the global private regulatory regime, as 
are the payment and advertising macro-intermediaries examined in chapter 4. 
Google and GoDaddy—the focus of this chapter’s case studies—are classic 
examples of gatekeepers that regulate through technology. They each operate 
massive operations with global reach and have highly sophisticated surveillance 
and enforcement programs to protect their platforms from all kinds of threats, 
including infringement by third parties. As they each dominate their respective 
industries, rights holders and states are keen to recruit them as private 
enforcers to crack down voluntarily on infringing sites.  
 
Search and domain macro-intermediaries negotiated their private enforcement 
agreements in the shadow of legislation, similar to the experience of the 
intermediaries discussed in chapter 4. Google and GoDaddy—this chapter’s 
two case studies—have varying interests in agreeing to strengthen their 
enforcement efforts voluntarily against infringing sites. Both Google and 
GoDaddy are motivated to protect their corporate reputations from association 
with wrongdoing and mitigate the risk of legislation or legal action from rights 
holders or states for facilitating infringement. Google, in particular, has been 
subject to intense pressure from governments in the United States and United 
Kingdom, as well as from rights holders and their trade associations.  Google 
also faced the threat of criminal charges from the U.S. Department of Justice for 
accepting ads from unauthorized online pharmacies, a matter it settled by 
forfeiting $500 million (DOJ 2011).     
 
This chapter explores how and why Google and GoDaddy, the leading search 
and domain macro-intermediaries, agreed to adopt a tougher approach against 
infringing sites voluntarily. First, the chapter briefly introduces the search and 
domain name industries before explaining how search engines and domain 
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registrars operate. Third, it explores how these macro-intermediaries became 
gatekeepers and the creation of the private regulatory regime. To illustrate how 
these macro-intermediaries regulate infringing sites, this chapter examines two 
cases of informal private regulation. In the first case, the chapter analyses the 
first-ever search engine-created voluntary code of conduct drafted in the United 
Kingdom by Google, Yahoo and Bing. The chapter then discusses GoDaddy’s 
participation in a White House-negotiated informal agreement to crack down on 
online pharmacies that violate U.S. laws on the distribution of pharmaceuticals 
(commonly termed “illegal online pharmacies). In the fifth section, the chapter 
provides analytical findings on these programs and then examines the role of 
the state and actors’ interests. The chapter then offers a brief conclusion. 
 
I) Search and Domain Names Service Industries 
Search engines and domain registrars provide essential Internet services that 
are integral to the effective functioning of the Internet and the growth of e-
commerce. Search engines provide the vital link between users and the billions 
of webpages comprising the World Wide Web. They enable individuals to 
access knowledge and ideas from around the world and to tap into previously 
difficult-to-access sources of information. They also help consumers locate 
goods and services from vendors ranging from boutique neighbourhood outlets 
to global multinational corporations. Domain registrars, for their part, deliver 
essential Internet infrastructure. The domain name system (DNS), which is 
explained in greater detail in the next section, is commonly described as the 
phone book of the Internet. It enables anyone to connect to websites around the 
world by resolving (i.e., translating) easy-to-remember domain names (e.g., 
www.slate.com) to the corresponding unique numeric Internet Protocol address. 
The DNS enables universality: anyone can reach the same website by entering 
its domain name. Domain registrars are one of several actors that facilitate the 
operation of the domain name system and enable individuals and companies to 
operate their own sites. Two U.S.-based companies—Google and GoDaddy—
dominate the search and domain name markets, although there are many 
smaller search engines and domain registrars that offer services.   
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Google’s dominance on the Internet is difficult to overstate. Created in 1997, 
Google is the most popular search engine globally and the largest digital 
advertising platform. Google is outranked in some markets by local search 
engines, such as by Baidu in China and by Yandex in Russia. Google 
dominates the search markets in the United States (67%) and in the European 
Union (over 80%) (Goodwin 2014). Alongside Google are other, much smaller 
search engines. Yahoo, created in 1994, has around 10% of the U.S. market 
(Goodwin 2014). Bing, which is owned by Microsoft and was created in 2009, 
has about 16% of the U.S. market (Goodwin 2014).  The number of searches 
these companies facilitate is staggering. In December 2013, Google conducted 
18 billion searches, Bing conducted 3.3 billion, and Yahoo 2 billion (Goodwin 
2014).  
 
The collection and organization of information, whether in libraries or through 
search engines, is never neutral but always privileges certain ideas and voices 
over others (Kohl 2013). Search engines effectively construct meaning by 
defining the information that is available for search queries and therefore they 
shape choices (Elkin-Koren 2001:185). Critics have long argued that search 
engines deliberately or inadvertently exclude certain types of sites (Introna and 
Nissenbaum 2000).227  In the online environment where the amount of 
information is overwhelming, search engines play a vital role in amassing and 
sorting information. In doing so, however, they can be understood as powerful 
chokepoints (Kohl 2013) and gatekeepers that filter information in a deliberate 
and strategic manner (Elkin-Koren 2001).  
 
As a search and advertising giant, Google has a tremendous capacity to shape 
the types of information users access and, because of its reliance upon 
advertising revenue, it has strong commercial interests in doing so. Google thus 
generates significant social anxiety. In a January 2014 debate on an intellectual 
property bill before the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, Pete 
Wishart, a Member of Parliament for the Scottish National Party, expressed 
concerns about Google’s influence:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
227 Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) argue that search markets that are slanted toward large, 
commercial, popular sites and risk silencing certain voices and content.  
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It is digital behemoth—there is nothing bigger in the digital world—and the 
gatekeeper for all our content industries. Nothing happens without Google, 
and nothing can go through its prism without satisfying it in some way 
(Wishart 2014:24).  
 
States and corporate actors have successfully tapped into Google’s surveillance 
and enforcement apparatuses to try to exert control over the types of search 
queries that are “acceptable” and to regulate “objectionable” content—the 
definitions of which vary widely and are not always set out in legislation (see 
Elkin-Koren 2001; Kohl 2013). In terms of intellectual property, rights holders 
and their trade associations have for years lobbied Google to take ever-greater 
responsibility to ensure its service does not facilitate access to illegal content. 
As a result, Google has become—at times unwillingly—one of the major online 
regulators of infringing content. 
 
Domain registrars, in contrast, have attracted much less political attention. In 
contrast to Internet services like search engines or marketplaces, users 
generally do not directly encounter domain registrars. Instead they use Internet 
services that themselves rely upon the domain name system. The average 
Internet user likely has little familiarity with the operation of the domain name 
system. This is because the domain name system is technical, complex and 
challenging to comprehend fully. The DNS operates as good infrastructure 
should—unobtrusively, effectively and without requiring its users to comprehend 
its operations. Even those in intellectual property rights enforcement are more 
familiar with traditional regulatory actors, such as search engines or online 
marketplaces. Domain registrars are relatively new regulatory actors in the 
realm of anti-counterfeiting in contrast with search engines.  
 
GoDaddy, created in 1997 and based in Phoenix, Arizona, is the largest domain 
registrar globally with approximately 30% of market share and it claims on its 
website to have over 57 million domains.228 As a registrar, it registers domain 
names on behalf of individuals or companies wanting to create websites. 
GoDaddy registers multiple types of domain names, known as generic top-level 
domains, including .com, .net, .org, info, .biz., .travel and .xxx. Individuals 
wanting to create sites with one of these domain extensions register domain 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
228 For information on GoDaddy’s services, see: http://au.godaddy.com/.  
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names with the company. GoDaddy is also one of the world’s largest web 
hosting companies. This means that it provides content storage or hosting 
services to individuals or companies wanting to establish sites. GoDaddy is a 
privately held company and financial analysts estimated its 2013 revenue at 
$1.43 billion (Kharif 2013).  
 
i) How Search Engines Work 
 
To “exist is to be indexed by a search engine,” argue Professors Lucas Introna 
and Helen Nissenbaum (2000:171) in their analysis of the political importance of 
search engines, in which they argue search engines shape the information 
users can access. This observation aptly captures how users fundamentally rely 
upon search engines to navigate effectively among billions of webpages. 
Google has entered our common vernacular (‘to Google’ something) and the 
term is often used to refer to any kind of online search. One could thus say to 
“exist is to be indexed by Google.” Given the scale of Google’s search platform, 
any exclusion from its search results represents a broader exclusion from 
society and from full participation in commercial, social and cultural life. Despite 
the common usage of the term ‘Google,’ the average Internet user may 
regularly rely upon search engines but have little understanding of how they 
operate.  
 
Other programs can perform search functions but this dissertation focuses 
exclusively on search engines. This is because rights holders and governments 
argue search engines are the main culprits furthering infringement (MPAA 
2013).229 Search engines are complex software programs that use algorithms to 
scan the web, extract billions of items of information and deliver it to users 
organized in a fashion that is relevant to users’ search queries. Retrieved 
information may be in a wide variety of formats, including text, images, maps, 
audio and video, products and geographical locations (Gasser 2006:206). 
Although search engines are highly complex, they are essentially software 
systems that look for information on the web and, sometimes, in databases, in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
229 The Motion Picture Association of America, the main lobbying body for the movie industry, 
released a report in 2013 in which it argued that Google facilitated users’ searches for 
copyright-infringing content and thus facilitated illicit downloads of movies (MPAA 2013). 
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response to users’ inputted keywords. In order to identify and catalogue the 
web’s billions of webpages, search engines use software called ‘web crawling 
bots’ or ‘spiders’ to crawl the web and build indices of what is found on 
hundreds of millions of sites. Search engines must continually crawl the Internet 
because new sites are added and existing sites change.  
 
Once a search engine retrieves information based on a user’s keywords, it must 
present the information in a manner that is useful and relevant to the user, 
although the search results may number in the tens of millions. Search engines 
use complex proprietary algorithms to rank search results and they closely 
guard the details of those algorithms. Google, for example, only discloses that 
its algorithm uses 200 variables to rank webpages, including the frequency and 
location of keywords on that page and the number of other pages linking to the 
page in question (Singhal 2012). Search engines then present those ranked 
results in listings called “search engine results pages.” Each search result 
contains a hyperlink to the webpage where the search terms appear and a brief 
snippet of text. From that text snippet and the hyperlink, the user can choose 
the desired search result. Highly ranked search results receive the most traffic 
and Google’s top search results are the most valuable as it is the dominant 
search engine. As search ranking is proprietary, search results differ among 
search engines and search engines also produce different results in different 
countries (Spink et al. 2006). Search engines generally sell ad space alongside 
search results that correspond to the search terms.  
 
ii) How the Domain Name System Works 
 
In contrast to search engines, the domain name system is more complicated. 
The domain name system refers to the complex process that translates 
(“resolves”) a site’s domain name into its corresponding, unique Internet 
Protocol address and, in doing so, locates the site in question and enables the 
user to access it. Simply put, the domain name system matches names (e.g., a 
website’s address) to numbers (its IP address). Users do not have to remember 
or even know a site’s specific numerical Internet Protocol address.  
 
Although it is easy to take the effective functioning of the DNS for granted, it is 
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important to outline how the system functions in order to explain how registrars 
can disable infringing sites. Imagine that you wish to create a website. To do so 
you have to purchase server space from a web hosting service for a small fee. 
You can choose from one of thousands of companies, including from many 
Internet service providers that enable you to access the Internet, like Virgin 
Media. You also have to register for a domain name from a domain registrar so 
people will be able to find your site easily. Domains are not sold outright: one 
must register them for fixed periods of time and they can be automatically 
renewed. 
 
Domain registrars manage and register domain names. They may, like 
GoDaddy, offer retail-level services to register names on behalf of individuals 
and companies. They may also offer wholesale-level services to companies that 
are re-sellers of domain names, such as the U.S.-based company eNom. Many 
of these companies offer both web hosting and registrar services. Imagine you 
choose GoDaddy, which is the largest registrar globally and also offers web 
hosting. You select a simple and catchy domain name and use the registrars’ 
automated process to register your name. GoDaddy registers domain names “at 
a rate of more than one per second,” which makes it “virtually impossible for a 
human being to verify the legitimate use of every domain name,” explains 
Christine Jones, former executive vice president and general counsel for 
GoDaddy in testimony before the U.S. Congress in 2011 (Jones 2011:4). 
GoDaddy approves your registration and issues the name to you for a specified 
period of time as long as you abide by GoDaddy’s terms and conditions 
regarding your use of the domain name (GoDaddy 2013).  
 
Your new domain name fits neatly into a global, hierarchal domain name 
system. The system is organized into various types of domain names 
extensions. There are 250 unique country-code designations (country-code top-
level domains), such as .us (United States), .ca (Canada), .uk (United Kingdom) 
and .jp (Japan). There are generic designations (generic top-level domains), of 
which .com, .net, and .org are commonly recognized. The .com designation is 
the most popular code for commercial sites. Codes that refer to specific 
agencies or institutions are called sponsored designations (sponsored top-level 
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domains), such as the commonly used .edu (education) and .gov (U.S. 
government).  
 
Once your new site is ready to be viewed, you type its domain name into your 
web browser and, in a fraction of a second that it takes to load, a series of 
transactions occur. This process, which translates a domain name into its 
corresponding numeric IP address and enables the user to view a specific site, 
is called resolution. To resolve the domain name, the individual’s computer (or 
handheld computing device) works to resolve the query by using cached 
information from previous views of the site in question. The process may also 
involve the Internet service provider (e.g., Verizon) sending a series of queries 
to different domain name servers. These are massive databases that map 
domain names to their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The Internet service 
provider sends queries until the address is found. Simplifying somewhat, the 
following process occurs: 
1. Someone types your domain name into a web browser. This generates a 
request by your Internet service provider to match the domain name to its 
IP address known as a DNS query.  
2. The query travels to an authoritative name server, sometimes going 
through other name servers in the process, which translates the domain 
name into its IP address, known as DNS resolution. 
3. The Internet service provider, now with the IP address, contacts the site 
in question and it loads in the user’s browser.  
II) Pressure on Marketplaces from State and Industry 
 
As explained in chapters 3 and 4, the United States does not have a statutory 
measure to address online trademark infringement. As a result, in the United 
States, search and domain intermediaries are not required by statute to remove 
content or disable services in relation to rights holders’ complaints of online 
trademark infringement. They can, however, do so voluntarily. In the European 
Union, in contrast, search engines are required to remove search results linking 
to webpages that offer counterfeit goods under the E-Commerce Directive, 
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which is echoed in member states’ laws.230 For proponents of tougher 
measures to address online infringement, informal private regulatory 
arrangements are useful in situations where there are legislative gaps (e.g., 
domain intermediaries in the United States) or where parties consider the 
statutory requirements insufficient (e.g., search engines’ regulation in the United 
Kingdom).231  
 
Rights holders and their trade associations recognize the regulatory capacity 
that search and domain macro-intermediaries can bring to the policing on online 
infringement. Google, in particular, has been a target of pressure because 
intellectual property owners, particularly the large movie, music and software 
industries, argue that Google facilitates digital-copyright infringement by 
displaying search results that link to infringing webpages.232 Government 
officials in the United States and United Kingdom have likewise harshly 
criticized Google and demanded that the search giant crack down on search 
results that link to webpages with illegal content.233 Domain intermediaries, in 
contrast, have attracted much less political attention. This is largely because the 
domain name system is technical and complex, particularly for those 
accustomed to working with web hosts, Internet service providers or 
marketplaces. As well, domain intermediaries are relatively new to policing 
online infringement.  
 
Search and domain intermediaries both facilitate access to the web, although 
they differ in the ways they function and their degree of interaction with Internet 
users. Individuals have direct contact with search engines as they choose a 
specific search engine, type search terms and receive a list of search results 
from their query. In contrast, domain registrars do not have direct contact with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
230 Domain intermediaries are not included within the E-Commerce Directive. This chapter 
focuses on the operation of the domain registrar GoDaddy in relation to its U.S.-based 
operations.  
231 There were legislative gaps in the United States because, at the time the Office of the 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator was coordinating negotiations that led to the 
Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies, the U.S. Congress was considering COICA. With the 
deaths of COICA, PIPA and SOPA, the private agreement that created CSIP survived.!
232 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in 2013, the Motion Picture Association of America 
released a report that accuses Google of facilitating users’ access to copyright-infringing 
content (MPAA 2013). 
233 For example, the U.K. House of Commons’ Culture Media and Sport Committee criticised 
Google harshly in its 2013 report, entitled “Supporting the creative economy.” In their report, 
members “condemn[ed] the failure of Google” to address illegal content on its platform (2013:3).  
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users. They play a role in operating the domain name system, which ensures 
users can access the webpages they select from their list of search results. 
Domain registrars have a contractual relationship with the site operators for 
which they provide domain names (such as the .com or .net extensions) but not 
individuals visiting those sites. Search engines do not have a contractual 
relationship with either users of their systems or the sites that they index to 
produce their search results.  
 
i) Regulating Search Engines 
 
Domestic laws, judicial rulings, internal policies and informal agreements govern 
the type of information search engines are permitted to display in their search 
results page.234 Search engines argue that they merely deliver information 
relevant to users’ search queries. Google, for example, says that it “is a provider 
of information, not a mediator” and does not “make any claims about the 
content” of the webpages relating to search requests.235 Despite this claim, 
search engines mediate search and shape search results in many ways, as the 
next section will explore in greater detail. In many countries, search engines are 
legally required to remove search results that link to webpages with copyright-
infringing content once appropriately alerted by rights holders or their authorized 
representatives. As discussed in chapter 3, search engines fall under the 1998 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the United States and the European 
Commission’s 2000 E-Commerce Directive in the European Union.236 Both the 
DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive contain provisions that require search 
engines to remove infringing search results in notice-and-takedown programs in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
234 For example, a court in France ordered Yahoo in 2000 to disable access to auctions of Nazi 
memorabilia for individuals in France as indicated by their Internet Protocol addresses 
(Goldsmith and Wu 2006). 
235 Google makes this statement on its webpage describing how content can be removed from 
Google, see: 
https://support.google.com/legal/troubleshooter/1114905?rd=2#ts=1115655,1282899  
236 Search engines are classified under “informational locational tools” in the DMCA, see Sec. 
512 (d). In the E-Commerce Directive, search engines fall under hosting providers, see Article 
18. European Commission Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD), 2000/31/EC, passed 8 June 
2000. The United Kingdom implemented the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulation 
2002, SI 2002/2013, a mirror of the ECD. 
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response to notifications of infringement.237 These rules formalized search 
engines’ role in controlling online infringement. 
 
Search engines also have internal policies that govern the types of search 
terms they display. Google, for instance, removes or blocks images in search 
results that involve pornography, bodily functions or fluids, vulgar words, or 
animal cruelty.238 In addition, search engines will remove certain types of 
results. They generally remove results relating to child sexual abuse and some 
types of personal information, such as social insurance numbers or credit cards 
that could make individuals susceptible to crime. To protect users’ safety, 
Google will also remove search results that link to sites, for example, that install 
or distribute viruses. However, search engines generally refuse to remove 
search results that link to content that individuals may allege is embarrassing, 
inaccurate or offensive, unless ordered to do so by the courts.239  
 
It is important to clarify search engines’ capacity to regulate. Search engines 
index and rank webpages. They can de-index (i.e., remove) specific hyperlinks 
from search results that link to problematic webpages but they cannot remove 
content from those webpages. Complainants who want webpages removed 
must contact site operators or web hosts. Complainants must also distinguish 
between search engines results (i.e., the list of hyperlinks for webpages) and 
search engine-related ads that appear alongside those results. Search 
intermediaries have separate policies and notice-and-takedown systems to deal 
with each (for the removal of ads, see chapter 4).  
 
Nonetheless, search engines’ capacity to access, index and rank hyperlinks to 
vast amounts of information, mark them as powerful regulators. Governments 
around the world and corporate actors are increasingly demanding that search 
engines deliver only “acceptable” search results, although concepts of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
237 See DMCA, see Sec. 512 (d)(3) and E-Commerce Directive Article 14 (1b). The wording is 
similar in both regulations. Intermediaries must act “expeditiously” to “remove or disable access 
to” the targeted information. 
238 See Google’s Removal policies https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324 
239 Ibid. 
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“objectionable” content vary widely among countries and from issue to issue.240 
As part of their efforts to address unacceptable content, Google, Yahoo and 
Bing belong to the U.S.-based Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography, 
which is managed by the U.S.-based National Centre for Missing and Exploited 
Children.241 For this organization and a similar association in the European 
Union called the Internet Watch Foundation, search engines voluntarily agree to 
block access to webpages blacklisted by the organization as containing child 
pornography. They also voluntarily remove search results that link to webpages 
containing child sexual abuse content (see Laidlaw 2012). 
 
ii) Regulating Domain Registrars  
 
Domain registrars are governed by a series of contractual agreements between 
the registrant (i.e., site operator) and registrar (e.g., GoDaddy), as well as 
contracts among ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers), the registrar and its registries. ICANN is a private, non-profit 
institution based in California that oversees and coordinates the Internet’s 
technical infrastructure, including the domain name system. It sets out the 
responsibilities of registrants, registrars and registries that are then echoed in 
each of the contractual agreements (ICANN 2012). Domain registries, which 
comprise a range of public-sector organizations, non-profits and commercial 
firms, each act as specific databases for all the domain names registered within 
a specific top-level domain. The U.S.-based company Verisign, for example, is 
the authoritative registry for the .com designation, which means that all 
registrars that want to issue .com domains must work with it.242 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240 See, for example, Deibert et al. (2011) for a valuable analysis of the varying ways Internet 
intermediaries act on behalf of states to control and censor information and monitor citizens in 
countries throughout Southeast Asia. 
241 FCACP is part of the Centre for Missing and Exploited Children and the National Centre for 
Missing and Exploited Children, a non-profit organization working with the U.S. Department of 
Justice. Other members of FCACP include PayPal, Visa, MasterCard and American Express. 
The Internet Watch Foundation, funded by the European Union, is a non-profit organization that 
has law enforcement and industry partners and operates through voluntary industry regulation. 
+"+! Verisign is also an important part of the domain name system as it operates one of the 
thirteen root name servers. This means that Verisign, along with the twelve other root servers, 
contains the complete database of Internet domain names and the corresponding IP addresses 
for particular top-level domains (e.g., .com for Verisign, along with the other top-level domains it 
manages). These servers are the first to respond to queries for resolving domain names to the 
corresponding IP addresses.  
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ICANN sets out policies that each registry must adopt or institute in the 
registries’ agreements with registrars. ICANN has the authority to suspend or 
terminate registrars that violate its policies by, for example, permitting illegal 
activity or failing to comply with court orders (ICANN 2013). ICANN also 
accredits registrars, although not all choose accreditation. Each domain 
registrar may work with multiple registries, for example, for Verisign with .com 
and the U.S.-based registry Neustar for .biz. GoDaddy, then, is bound by 
agreements with multiple registries and must also abide by ICANN’s policies 
and ICANN’s accreditation agreement. 
 
Registrars’ contracts with website operators also echo state laws. GoDaddy, for 
example, prohibits users of its services from involvement with malware, spam, 
hacking, the promotion of terrorism or the distribution child sexual abuse images 
(GoDaddy 2013). The company also prohibits its users from promoting, selling 
or distributing prescription medication without a valid prescription or infringing 
on any entity’s intellectual property rights (GoDaddy 2013). Like search 
engines, domain registrars are also active in efforts to counter online child 
pornography. GoDaddy, for example, is also a member of the UK-based 
Internet Watch Foundation and voluntarily removes its services from sites that 
the Foundation identifies as distributing child pornography (Jones 2011). 
 
iii) Creation of Private Enforcement Agreements 
 
Search engines and domain registrars have varying degrees of experience 
addressing online infringement. For search engines, the first public reference to 
voluntary industry regulation of infringing sites came in 2009 when the 
International Trademark Association (INTA) released its best practices to 
address the online sale of counterfeit goods (INTA 2009). This is the same 
document that recommends payment providers voluntarily act against infringing 
sites, as was discussed in chapter 4. It proposes that rights holders and search 
engines “work collaboratively” to address the online distribution of counterfeit 
goods and that search engines establish some kind of “clear and effective 
process” to deal with infringing search results (INTA 2009:4). Google and 
Yahoo’s agreement to these best practices commit them, at most, to 
discussions with trademark owners and instituting processes to receive 
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complaints of infringement. This is in stark contrast to rights holders’ demands 
several years later for vastly strengthened enforcement practices, as the next 
sections will explore.  
 
As e-commerce and file-sharing technologies developed throughout the 2000s, 
rights holders increasingly began complaining about the online distribution of 
counterfeit goods and copyright-infringing products. Google, as the largest 
search engine, was the target of the most complaints of infringing search 
results, and the vast majority of these are from the music and movie industries 
(Google 2013). As discussed in chapter 1, search engines and domain 
registrars would have been required under PIPA and SOPA to withdraw their 
services from infringing sites. Under these bills, both search and domain 
intermediaries could have taken voluntary action against sites endangering 
public health.243 Prior to these bills, search and domain intermediaries worked 
voluntarily against child pornography sites and to prevent online fraud. PIPA 
and SOPA, however, expanded the idea of voluntary regulation from state-
driven efforts (child safety) and security-driven measures (fraud) to include 
working with corporate actors to protect intellectual property. 
 
These bills, as discussed in chapter 1, aroused fierce public opposition, 
especially SOPA. Google, in particular, voiced its protest to proposals that 
search engines should increase their enforcement efforts against infringing 
sites. Kent Walker, senior vice president and general counsel at Google, spoke 
before a House Judiciary Subcommittee in 2011. He reminded them “search 
engines are not in a position to censor the entire Internet, deleting every 
mention of the existence of a site” (Walker 2011:7). Walker went on to remark 
that search engines cannot make problematic sites “unfindable” (Walker 
2011:7). In addition to critics’ concerns of censorship, SOPA’s opponents 
warned about possible damage to the domain name system. Technologists, 
including engineers who built the Internet, protested that SOPA’s provisions to 
block the domain name system could irreparably harm the systems’ stability, 
security and universality. In a provision alternately referred to as “blocking” and 
“filtering,” SOPA proposed to use Internet service providers (e.g., Verizon) to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
243 PIPA Sec. 5(b) and SOPA Sect. 105. 
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prevent resolution to the corresponding Internet Protocol address.244 This 
provision would mean that certain sites targeted by the U.S. government or 
rights holders would be “unreachable by, and invisible to, Internet users in the 
United States and abroad” (Lemley, Levine, and Post 2011:36). This provision 
did not directly affect domain intermediaries. However, a representative from 
GoDaddy, a strong supporter of SOPA, proposed in testimony before the U.S. 
Congress that domain registrars, not Internet service providers, were better 
equipped to block undesirable sites (see Jones 2011). Google and GoDaddy 
were, therefore, on opposite sides of SOPA and had different approaches to the 
regulation of online infringement.  
 
In 2010, as critics of COICA were sounding the alarm about significant 
problems with the bill, Victoria Espinel, head of the Office of the Intellectual 
Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) was meeting with macro-
intermediaries in relation to creating an industry-based, informal regulatory 
regime that would operate outside of the proposed intellectual property bills.  As 
introduced in chapter 4, the goal was to agree upon non-binding initiatives to 
address what Espinel referred to as “illegal fake online ‘pharmacies’—criminals 
masquerading as legitimate pharmacies” (Espinel 2012a). In December 2010, 
two months after the introduction of COICA, Espinel announced the creation of 
the Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies (IPEC 2012). Signatories to the 
agreement are payment providers (MasterCard, Visa, American Express, 
PayPal), search engines (Google, Bing, Yahoo) and domain registrars (eNom 
and GoDaddy) (IPEC 2012). In creating the Centre for Safe Internet 
Pharmacies, Espinel brought together companies with vast regulatory 
capacitates in a regulatory regime with global reach across multiple Internet 
industry sectors.  
 
The purpose of the Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies (CSIP) is to raise public 
awareness about unauthorized online pharmacies and to encourage consumers 
to purchase medication from licensed, accredited pharmacies.245 CSIP also has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
244 SOPA, for example, proposed to block infringing sites using the domain name system. 
Domain registrars would prevent queries from accessing the proper sites and would instead 
return error messages. SOPA Sec. 102(c)(2)(A) and PIPA Sec. 3(2).  
245 As will be explored later in the chapter, one method of accrediting pharmacies is through the 
private-sector firm LegitScript, which analyses and verifies the operations of online pharmacies. 
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a more unusual focus: enforcement. Advertising intermediaries like Google that 
are members of CSIP remove advertisements for unauthorized pharmacies, 
while GoDaddy cancels or seizes domain names.246 These measures are 
similar to those proposed in COICA.247 This chapter examines CSIP as one of 
its case studies because it offers a useful opportunity to examine how domain 
registrars, specifically GoDaddy, became gatekeepers to control online 
infringement. In addition, CSIP differs from the other informal private 
agreements because it involves a coalition of macro-intermediaries that work in 
a coordinated fashion to disable sites that CSIP designates as illegal online 
pharmacies. As will be discussed later in the chapter, GoDaddy was largely a 
willing participant in these discussions, in stark contrast to Google, which was 
under considerable pressure from intellectual property and government actors 
to participate.  
 
While macro-intermediaries’ negotiations with IPEC occurred against the 
shadow of impending legislation, those in the United Kingdom were set against 
stalled legislation. In the United Kingdom, the 2010 Digital Economy Act had 
stalled amid industry infighting over the cost of the system.248 The legislation 
focuses solely on sites offering copyright-infringing content (e.g., unauthorized 
downloads of music, movies or software). It proposes to have Internet service 
providers, like Virgin Media, institute three-strikes programs in which they would 
pass on warnings from rights holders to users and then terminate users’ Internet 
access.249 Copyright-related trade associations, unhappy at the long delay over 
the implementation of this legislation, pressured the government to facilitate 
informal discussions among industry stakeholders. Ed Vaizey, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Culture, Communications and Creative 
Industries at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport convened a series of 
roundtables in 2011 and 2012 with search engines, rights holders and trade 
associations. In a series of closed-door, industry-only meeting in 2011 and 2012 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
LegitScript, which is a member of CSIP, also works for pharmaceutical companies, indicating 
the potential of pharmaceutical industry interests influencing standards for online pharmacies. 
246 Payment providers would also terminate the pharmacies’ payment processing capacities. 
247  The measures also closely resemble provisions that PIPA and SOPA would have when they 
were introduced in May and October 2011. 
248 The Digital Economy Act, introduced in 2010 in the United Kingdom has stalled amid conflict 
between rights holders and Internet service providers over the cost of implementing the system. 
The government hopes to finally institute the program sometime in 2015 (see BBC 2013). 
249  Digital Economy Act 124A. 
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that were chaired by Vaizey, rights holders and search engines discussed 
voluntary enforcement efforts. In February 2012, Google, Yahoo and Bing 
drafted a voluntary code of conduct. It is the first of its kind anywhere for search 
engines (see Appendix D). 250 
 
The search engines’ code is the product of both threats of legislation and direct 
pressure by government officials. At those roundtable meeting, Jeremy Hunt, 
who was then Secretary of State at the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, warned the search intermediaries that the government was “willing” to 
employ legislation but wanted “industry to find a way forward” (Bradwell 2011). 
With this threat of legislation in the background, Hunt then “tasked” search 
engines to draft a voluntary code of conduct to guide their enforcement efforts 
after they rejected the one proposed by rights holders as too stringent (Bradwell 
2011). As will be explored in the following section, rights holders were 
“disappointed” by the search engines’ code (Bradwell 2012). Hunt and Vaizey 
pressured the search engines to work with rights holders to amend their 
enforcement practices in line with rights holders’ demands. Google, which has 
faced unremitting pressure from government officials and rights holders in the 
United States and United Kingdom, made significant alterations to its 
enforcement practices. 
 
To summarize, the U.S. and U.K. governments exerted varying degrees of 
coercive pressure on search and domain macro-intermediaries to secure their 
participation in private regulatory arrangements, which is a similar situation to 
the macro-intermediaries examined in chapter 4. The private enforcement 
agreements adopted by Google and GoDaddy comprise an important 
component of the private anti-counterfeiting regime. As described in chapter 3, 
underlying the regime are inter-dependent interests between rights holders and 
the regime’s state actors that are oriented toward strengthened protection for 
intellectual property rights. The regime relies upon the technological capacity of 
its macro-intermediaries as without their ability to monitor and control 
transactions and behaviour across their platforms, rights holders would be 
unable to control online infringement at a scale that they consider necessary.  
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250 The Open Rights Group obtained this code of conduct through a freedom of information 
request (Bradwell 2012).!
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III) Intermediaries’ Enforcement Programs  
 
As the largest search engine, Google is the target of the most complaints about 
search results linking to infringing webpages and is removing ever-increasing 
numbers of search results from its search index. The search giant faces 
considerable government and industry pressure, as evident in the U.K. 
roundtable discussions, in which industry and government actors encouraged 
Google to modify its enforcement practices (Bradwell 2011). GoDaddy, in 
contrast, is relatively new to working as a gatekeeper in relation to intellectual 
property and, except for the threat of legislation on all macro-intermediaries, did 
not appear to experience direct government pressure.  
 
i) Search Intermediaries’ Enforcement Policies 
 
Search intermediaries operate notice-and-takedown programs to remove 
search results that link to problematic webpages, such as those containing 
copyright-infringing goods. In order to have results removed, search engines 
generally require complainants to provide a name and contact information and 
describe the nature of infringement. Complainants must provide the URL251 of 
the infringement, an electronic signature of the rights holder or the authorized 
agent, and a statement attesting the information is correct.  
 
Google publishes its enforcement efforts in its Transparency Report, which is a 
standalone site dedicated to tracking the complaints Google receives from 
rights holders and requests for data from governments. In relation to rights 
holders, Google tracks who submits the requests, and indicates the requests it 
complies with and those it rejects.252 No other company discloses more 
information on its enforcement efforts than Google, particularly on behalf of 
rights holders. Yahoo and Bing, in contrast, do not publish figures on their 
enforcement activities. Beginning in 2012, the numbers of requests for removal 
to Google began to increase dramatically. According to the Transparency 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
251 The uniform resource locator: this is the string of text that identifies a webpage address. 
Google requires a link to a specific webpage in order to remove the search result that hyperlinks 
to that page.  
252 Google’s Transparency Reports do not include all requests the search giant receives. It does 
not include, for example, any requests relating to its YouTube or Blogger services, see: 
http://www.google.com.au/transparencyreport/  
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Report, in 2012, Google removed 50 million search results, compared with only 
10 million in 2011. In 2013, it removed 214 million search results. For the first 
four months of 2014, Google has received a staggering 100 million requests for 
the removal of infringing search results (Ernesto 2014). Google reports that it 
complies with just over 97% of the requests it receives and does so in an 
average of six hours from the time a request is received (Google Transparency 
Report). The vast majority of these removals relate to complaints of copyright 
infringement and two of the largest reporting organizations are the British 
Phonographic Industry and Recording Industry Association of America (Google 
2013). 
 
As stated earlier, search engines operating in the European Union are required 
by statute to remove trademark-infringing search results, but those operating in 
the United States face no such statutory requirement. Outside the European 
Union, Google directs complainants who wish to remove results to sites selling 
counterfeit goods to contact the site operator of the sites in question.253 Despite 
Google’s policies that it will not remove such results, the search giant is 
removing small numbers of search results linking to sites selling counterfeit 
goods and recording them in its Transparency Report. Among the hundreds of 
millions of copyright-related complaints are a very small number of removal 
requests from well-known trademark owners Chanel, Gucci, Louis Vuitton and 
Deckers Outdoor Corporation. For example, in a three-month period in 2013, 
Deckers Outdoor Corporation, which owns the popular Ugg brand of footwear, 
submitted requests for the removal of 19,520 URLs from Google’s search 
results.254  
 
Google does not remove all URLs submitted by trademark owners and does not 
provide reasons for its decisions. The search giant may be removing the results 
in response to complaints from intellectual property actors under the E-
Commerce Directive for Google’s European operations or as part of its own 
proactive enforcement. Another possible explanation is that rights holders file 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
253 To see Google’s advertising policies regarding the use of trademarks and trademark 
infringement, see: https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/2562124?hl=en-AU  
254 These removals were submitted between 3 July 2011 and 26 September 2013. 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/owners/25106/Deckers-Outdoor-
Corporation/. 
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complaints of copyright infringement to remove these results. If the counterfeit 
goods are advertised using rights holders’ copyrighted stock photos, rights 
holders can submit a complaint of copyright infringement under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act to remove search results linking to sites selling 
counterfeit goods.255 
 
a) Search Engine Code of Conduct 
 
The United Kingdom is home to the first voluntary code of conduct among 
search engines in relation to intellectual property rights infringement. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, U.K. rights holders and trade associations 
wanted progress in regards to online infringement given delays in the 
implementation of the 2010 Digital Economy Act. They petitioned the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to convene private, industry-
only roundtables to discuss intellectual property rights infringement (Bradwell 
2011).  
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of Codes for Search Engines 
Rights holders’ proposed code Search engines’ code of conduct 
Demote repeatedly infringing sites No demotion policy 
Prioritize certified sites No certified sites policy 
Stop indexing sites subject to court 
orders 
No such policy 
‘Improved’ notice-and-takedown  ‘Expeditious’ notice-and-takedown  
Constrained suggested & related 
searches 
No changes to suggested & related 
searches 
 
As discussed earlier, between 2011 and 2012, Ed Vaizey, on behalf of DCMS 
chaired a series of roundtables with search engines, rights holders and trade 
associations (Bradwell 2012). Prominent trade associations attending the 
meetings were the Federation Against Copyright Theft, British Phonographic 
Industry, and the Motion Picture Association of America. Google, Yahoo and 
Bing participated in the roundtables. Information on the roundtables comes from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
255 Some rights holders use this strategy to address the sale of counterfeit goods. Interview with 
Roxanne Elings, Co-Chair, Global Trademarks/Brand Management Practice, Greenberg Traurig 
LLP, 20 March 2012, New York City.  
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U.K. Open Rights Group, a civil-advocacy association, which successfully filed 
freedom of information requests and obtained meeting minutes and lists of 
attendees (Bradwell 2012). 
 
Meeting minutes reveal that intellectual property actors wanted search engines 
to alter their enforcement measures substantially to counter infringing sites (see 
Table 5.1). In November 2011, rights holders proposed a code of conduct that 
they wanted search engines to adopt (see Appendix E; Bradwell 2011). Google, 
Yahoo and Bing balked at this proposal. Jeremy Hunt, who was then the 
Secretary of State at the DCMS, instructed the search engines to create their 
own code in consultation with rights holders (Bradwell 2011). In February 2012, 
the search engines presented their code of conduct (see Appendix D). This 
code is the first of its kind anywhere for search engines. 
 
The differences between the two codes are striking. The two codes indicate that 
intellectual property actors and search engines had starkly divergent ideas, at 
least between late 2011 and early 2012, of how search intermediaries can and 
should be responsible for regulating infringing sites. Rights holders proposed 
five key areas where they wanted search engines to revamp their enforcement 
processes (see Appendix E):  
1. They wanted repeatedly infringing sites to be demoted (i.e., de-
prioritized) in search engines’ rankings of search results. This measure 
was intended to promote legitimate sources of content and encourage 
consumers to choose a top-ranked legitimate source instead of an 
infringing site. 
2. Rights holders wanted sites certified by industry to be prioritized in 
search rankings. This measure was also intended to boost the rankings 
of legitimate sources.  
3. Rights holders wanted any site subject to a court order to be 
removed automatically and rapidly from search results. This would mean 
that sites blocked by court order in the United Kingdom, like The Pirate 
Bay, would be de-indexed from search results. 
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4. They wanted notice-and-takedown programs to have an 
“expeditious process” in which rights holders could take advantage of 
“automated tools” for the “rapid removal and disabling of infringing links.” 
5. Rights holders also wanted to curtail certain types of search 
practices. They wanted to limit “autocomplete” or “suggested” searches 
in which search engines suggest search terms as users are typing.256 
This measure was intended to ensure consumers were not directed 
toward illegal content. 
The search engines largely rejected rights holders’ demands. They did not 
include measures to demote search results, prioritize certified sites, or de-index 
sites subject to court orders. They also ignored requests to make changes to 
suggested-search functions. Instead, the search engines’ code of practice 
largely reiterates their existent notice-and-takedown procedures but stipulates 
that they should undertake “expeditious” processing and “eliminate 
inefficiencies” (Appendix D). Of note, the search engines suggested several 
practices to guide rights holders’ complaints. They instructed rights holders to 
deal with infringing sites directly before complaining to search engines and then 
submit only narrow and specific removal requests. The code suggests that 
rights holders should be “accountable for improper notices” made to search 
engines, make complaints publicly available, and to agree to reasonable 
appeals processes (Appendix D). Unsurprisingly, rights holders and trade 
associations attending the roundtable meeting expressed “disappointment” that 
the code did not include any of their key demands (Bradwell 2012). Given the 
secrecy of the roundtables, it is unclear if the search engines’ code is currently 
in force, been discarded, or amended to reflect rights’ holders and state’s 
preferences for tougher enforcement measures.  
 
b) Changes to Google’s Enforcement Practices 
 
Despite the stark differences between the rights holders’ and search engines’ 
codes of conduct between late 2011 and early 2012, Google’s policies were 
moving closer to those demanded by rights holders (see Table 5.2). Prior to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
256 Google’s Autocomplete works using algorithms to predict and shows search queries as you 
type based on the searches of all Google’s users. Google defends the feature by saying that it 
reflects all search activities (however odd or objectionable) and reflects diversity on the Internet.  
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rights holders’ release of their code in November 2011, Google announced 
several changes to its enforcement policies. These changes included 
amendments in two areas (autocomplete and search demotion) that Google had 
long resisted changing. In December 2010, Google announced on its Policy 
Blog that it planned to prevent “terms that are closely associated with piracy” 
from appearing in Autocomplete (Walker 2010). This was one of rights holders’ 
principal demands in their proposed code of conduct. Google implemented the 
changes to Autocomplete in January 2011. The second change concerned 
search demotion. Google had argued for years that it would not alter its 
algorithms that indexed and ranked its search results. In August 2012 the 
search giant capitulated. Google announced it would amend its search 
algorithms to consider the number of “valid copyright removal notices” against 
sites and then demote search results from sites with a “high” (unspecified) 
number of removal notices (Singhal 2012). 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Proposed and Actual Rules for Search Engines 
Rights holders’ code Search engines’ code  Google’s Policies 
Demote repeatedly 
infringing sites 
No demotion policy Demotion policy introduced 
in August 2012 
Prioritize certified sites No such policy No such policy 
Stop indexing sites subject 
to court orders 







Constrained suggested & 
related searches 
No such policy Changes to Autocomplete 
feature introduced in 
January 2011 
 
Google’s policy changes in this area would appear to indicate that it is giving in 
to long-term sustained pressure and threats of legal action and legislation from 
rights holders and governments. By changing its Autocomplete feature and 
demoting infringing search results, Google addresses critics’ biggest criticism 
that it facilitates infringement by guiding consumers toward unauthorized 
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content instead of emphasizing legitimate content.257 However, Google is also 
increasingly becoming a content owner (e.g., paid YouTube channels) that must 
protect its intellectual property. As Google operates multiple services—search, 
advertising, and content distribution—its interests in addressing infringement 
are becoming more diverse.   
 
ii) Domain Intermediaries’ Enforcement Policies 
 
Given the complexity of registrars’ operations, companies like GoDaddy have 
multiple methods to regulate the domain names they register to individuals or 
companies (see Table 5.3).258 
1. They can change the name of the registrant (i.e., who registered 
domain name) to another party. This can involve changing the name 
from an individual accused of infringement to the rights holder. 
2. They can prevent the transfer of a domain name. This can be 
done while an investigation or court proceeding is undertaken.  
3. They can cancel a domain name. This means that the name goes 
back into pool of available names that anyone may register. 
4. They can transfer the domain name to a different registrar. Courts 
may order the registrar to hold the name in trust pending the outcome of 
a case. 
5. They can suspend DNS resolution (also called ‘seize and 
takedown’). The domain name will not resolve to its proper site and will 
instead show an error message.259 
6. They can redirect domain resolution (also called ‘seize and post 
notice’). The domain name will not properly resolve and will instead be 
directed to another webpage with, for example, a banner warning against 
purchasing counterfeit goods.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
257 This was a complaint by rights holders at the U.K. roundtable and a demand in the code of 
conduct rights holders drafted for the search engines (Bradwell 2011). 
258 ICANN published a helpful how-to guide on how domain name seizures and takedowns can 
be undertaken (Piscitello 2012).  
259 The domain name system may be return a “false No Such Domain signal, simulating network 
loss and let the question ‘time out’” or use the “Administrative Denial response code” (Vixie 
2012). 
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Table 5.3: Domain Intermediaries’ Enforcement Measures 
Technique Result 
Change registrant name Registrant loses domain name 
Prevent transfer of domain name No change or modification of name 
Delete domain name Domain returns to common pool 
Transfer to different registrar Transfer to new registrar 
Suspend DNS resolution (seize & 
takedown) 
No resolution (e.g., site not found) 
Redirect DNS resolution (seize & post 
notice) 
Redirection to warning page 
 
Seize and post-notice measures, which involve redirecting domain names to 
warning banners, are an increasingly common way to deal with infringing sites. 
David Lipkus, an associate with Kestenberg, Siegal, and Lipkus, LLP in 
Toronto, says that some rights holders he works with seek court orders to “point 
the domain name to their authorized website so even if you are looking for 
‘brand fakes.com’ you’ll end up at the authorized site for that product.”260  
 
a) Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies 
 
The Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies (CSIP), as discussed earlier, provides 
a useful case in which to examine how domain registrars undertake 
enforcement against online infringement through non-binding private 
enforcement agreements. In addition, by focusing on CSIP, the researcher can 
examine pressure from the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical industry 
on macro-intermediaries to crack down on unauthorized online pharmacies.  
 
In July 2012, a group of Internet intermediaries—led by Google and GoDaddy—
officially launched CSIP. This followed an agreement macro-intermediaries 
struck with Victoria Espinel, head of IPEC, in 2010. CSIP brings together firms 
representing payment, search, domain name, and advertising sectors. Marjorie 
Clifton, CSIP’s executive director, describes the centre as providing “a first-ever 
private sector solution” to the problem of illegal online pharmacies (Clifton 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 Interview with David Lipkus, Associate, Kestenberg, Siegal, and Lipkus, LLP, Toronto, 
Canada, 10 August 2012. 
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2012).261 CSIP focuses on consumer education, information sharing, and, more 
unusual in a non-profit, non-governmental organization, private enforcement 
efforts against unauthorized online pharmacies (IPEC 2013:36). By creating 
CSIP under the auspices of IPEC, Espinel legitimized private regulatory efforts 
against unauthorized online pharmacies.   
Online pharmacies in the United States must operate according to federal and 
state laws regarding the use of prescriptions and the distribution of 
pharmaceuticals (GAO 2013). Some states in the United States, for example, 
have laws prohibiting prescriptions from being issued online and instead require 
in-person prescriptions (GAO 2013). This means that an online pharmacy 
operating legally outside the U.S. jurisdiction may be in violation of U.S. federal 
or state laws regarding the advertisement, prescription, sale and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals if they target individuals in the United States. As used by 
enforcement actors, the term “illegal online pharmacies” refers to sites that 
distribute over-the-counter and/or prescription pharmaceuticals that may be 
unsafe, poor quality, counterfeit, or unapproved and/or issued in the absence of 
appropriate prescription processes (GAO 2013). This is an incredibly broad 
concept that combines safety concerns (e.g., poor quality and counterfeit 
medication) with procedural concerns (how prescriptions are issued). It 
encompasses sites peddling misbranded, unapproved or adulterated 
medication, as well as pharmacies that offer professional services and 
legitimate, safe medication.  
Christine Jones, GoDaddy’s former general counsel and executive vice 
president, describes the role of members of CSIP as working “to eviscerate the 
online sale of counterfeit and otherwise illegal prescription drugs” (Berkens 
2011). As a member of CSIP, GoDaddy voluntarily withdraws its services from 
sites identified as illegal online pharmacies. GoDaddy receives tips from the 
public about suspected wrongdoing in relation to sites distributing 
pharmaceuticals. It also accepts complaints from LegitScript, which operates 
what it claims is the “world's largest database of Internet pharmacies.”262 
LegitScript sells its monitoring and investigative services to pharmaceutical 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 According to Clifton, CSIP is also involved in creating a ‘white list’ of approved Internet 
pharmacies in cooperation with other private-sector partners (Clifton 2012).  
262 On its website, LegitScript describes how it monitors clients’ platforms for illegal online 
pharmacies, see: http://www.legitscript.com/services/monitoring  
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rights holders. The company is an ex-officio member in CSIP. As part of its role 
with CSIP, LegitScript uses set of publicly available standards that it devised to 
evaluate pharmacies as legitimate, unverified (subject to ongoing review), or 
unapproved according to whether LegitScript determines if they are compliant 
with U.S. law.263 
The Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies releases little data on its members’ 
enforcement activities on its website, but there are indications of its efforts from 
other sources. CSIP’s members are involved in the annual Operation Pangea, a 
weeklong, international project coordinated by Interpol to crack down on 
problematic online pharmacies. GoDaddy and other members of CSIP, like 
Google and PayPal, work with federal and state law enforcement agencies and 
regulatory bodies like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. As part of 
Operation Pangea, CSIPs’ members shut over 18,000 sites in 2012 and over 
13,700 in 2013 (Interpol 2012; Interpol 2013). By drawing together macro-
intermediaries from the payment, search, advertising and domain name sectors, 
CSIP has a considerable regulatory capacity. As its members have committed 
to addressing illegal online pharmacies, they are a valuable resource for law 
enforcement or state regulatory bodies, like Interpol and the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, to draw upon.  
 
IV) Analysis of Intermediaries’ Enforcement Measures 
 
The two private enforcement agreements examined in this chapter reveal the 
roles of search and domain macro-intermediaries in the private regulatory 
regime. Chapter 4 illustrated the payment and advertising components of the 
regime, which can enact revenue chokepoints, while this chapter focuses on 
macro-intermediaries that can thwart access to infringing sites.  Google and 
GoDaddy, the dominant firms in their industry sectors, are technologically 
sophisticated regulators that use complex algorithms to deliver and rank 
searches, register domain names, and to monitor their platforms for violations of 
their policies.  
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263 LegitScript created criteria to determine the legality of online pharmacies, including whether it 
is licensed or registered, complies with regulations pertaining to controlled substances, and 
dispenses medication using a valid prescription process, see: 
http://www.legitscript.com/pharmacies/standards  




Both firms have a capacity for mass policing: Google removes hundreds of 
millions of search results and GoDaddy cancels the domain names of 
thousands of sites. Neither removes content from the targeted sites but only 
impairs access to those sites. Search and domain macro-intermediaries are 
prolific in their regulation but not particularly effective. In relation to search, the 
sites are still accessible to individuals that can find its domain name 
elsewhere.264 Site operators that lose their domain names can shift to another 
domain name registrar. In contrast to the online payment sector, which is 
dominated by a small number of companies, there are many providers of 
domain names, although GoDaddy is the largest. Sites can obtain a domain 
name from a small, relatively unknown domain registrar and function effectively. 
However, these sites cannot rely upon a small, relatively unknown payment firm 
as the sites must provide payment services that consumers will trust and use. 
 
i) Google’s Regulatory Capacity 
 
Google has a tremendous regulatory capacity to respond to complaints from 
rights holders and trade associations about problematic search results. The 
number of requests to Google for the removal of infringing links is skyrocketing, 
with 214 million removals in 2013 and 100 million for the first four months of 
2014 (Ernesto 2014a; Google Transparency Report). This explosion in requests 
occurred after the failure of PIPA and SOPA in 2012, which suggests that rights 
holders are able to use existing legal avenues to address complaints of 
copyright infringement. Currently, Google is only removing a small portion of 
results linking to sites selling counterfeit goods. SOPA would have required 
search engines to remove results linking to sites selling counterfeit goods as 
well as copyright infringing content. With the death of this bill, trademark owners 
do not have the same access as copyright owners to remove infringing links, 
however, the traffic to sites selling counterfeit goods is much less than that to 
sites offering unauthorized downloads.  
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264 For well-known sites like The Pirate Bay, users do not need search engines. For other, 
lesser-known sites, they can use links from other webpages to point to their sites.  
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Despite Google’s regulatory capacity as a macro-intermediary, its enforcement 
efforts against infringing sites are relatively ineffective. Search engines can only 
remove hyperlinks to content but do not impair access to the site itself. Google 
is a prolific regulator but there is little evidence that this regulatory strategy is 
effective at reducing copyright-infringing content. In fact, there is a serious 
problem with complainants’ submission of improper removal notices, which 
results in search engines wrongfully removing legitimate, non-infringing content 
(Quilter and Urban 2006). Google, Yahoo and Bing highlight this problem in 
their code of conduct and propose that rights holders’ narrowly target search 
results and be held accountable for wrongful removals (Appendix D). The scale 
of wrongful removals is unknown because Google does not specify reasons for 
all the requests it denies. In 2013, for example, Google denied 21 million 
requests for various reasons, including that they were duplicates of other 
requests, inaccurate or made claims involving intellectual property owned by 
another party (Google Transparency Report). 
 
Google has adopted policies to streamline and speed up its enforcement 
practices. In 2012, for example, Google created the Trusted Copyright Removal 
Program to fast-track complaints from complainants with “a proven track record 
of submitting accurate notices” and “a consistent need to submit thousands of 
URLs each day” (Google 2013). This program is designed to serve reporting 
agencies that submit 95% of the URLs Google receives (Google 2013). These 
include the British Recorded Music Industry and Recording Industry Association 
of America, as well as private monitoring and investigative firms, like the 
multinational U.S.-based MarkMonitor. Google’s removal of over 97% of search 
results for which it receives complaints indicates that the company errs on the 
side of removing links rather than refusing requests (Google 2013). Google’s 
creation of the trusted members’ program indicates the degree to which large 
trade associations dominate copyright enforcement. It also demonstrates the 
growth of the intellectual property protection industry as companies like 
MarkMonitor collectively file tens of millions of requests for the removal of 
search results from Google annually. These companies and trade associations 
wield significant power as they distinguish ‘legitimate’ from ‘infringing’ search 
results in the absence of any judicial process and issue requests for Google to 
de-index the search results. As Google continues to adopt more enforcement-
Page 181 of 307 
!
!
friendly policies, these actors will be able to submit ever-increasing numbers of 
removal requests and thereby shape the kind of content and technologies that 
users can access.    
 
ii) GoDaddy’s Regulatory Capacity 
 
Like Google, GoDaddy has a significant regulatory capacity as the largest 
domain name registrar. GoDaddy can incapacitate domain names through a 
seize-and-takedown action, which means that the site will not be found or an 
error message will be displayed. It can also perform a seize-and-post-notice 
action, which means that sites will be redirected toward a warning banner. Both 
actions mean that the sites will not resolve properly.265 Unlike Google, GoDaddy 
does not publicly track its enforcement activities but it does release some 
information about the scale of its regulatory efforts. For example, GoDaddy 
worked with U.S. regulators to take down over 36,000 illegal online pharmacies 
in 2010 and 47,000 such sites in 2011 (Clifton 2012). 
 
Efforts by GoDaddy and other domain registrars have been successful in 
pushing operators of infringing sites to less-reputable domain registrars. John 
Horton, president of LegitScript, which monitors the compliance practices of 
online pharmacies, calculates that 80% of registrars have effective policies. He 
claims that unscrupulous site operators “cluster at a handful of domain name 
companies” that are so-called “rogue registrars” for their inadequate regulation 
of their registrants’ activities (PR Newswire 2013). Existing regulatory policies, 
such as ICANN’s accreditation of registrars, and domain registrars’ withdrawal 
of services from non-compliant site operators are effectively shifting bad actors 
to a small number of less-scrupulous registrars. Macro-intermediaries like 
GoDaddy are unable to deal with site operators who do not use their services. 
This is why Victoria Espinel advocated a multi-intermediary regulatory approach 
for the Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies. Domain, search, payment and 
advertising macro-intermediaries working together in a coordinated approach 
are more likely to disable infringing sites more effectively.  
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265 These actions are also respectively referred to as suspending or redirecting DNS resolution.  
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GoDaddy’s regulatory efforts against infringing sites, like those of Google, have 
limited efficacy. The strategy of seizing domain names (either accompanied with 
takedowns or post-notice actions) does not affect the sites’ content. 
Enforcement strategies that only target sites’ domain names are “disruptive” at 
most, a fact acknowledged by U.S. government officials in interviews with the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office in a review of regulatory efforts against 
illegal online pharmacies (GAO 2013). Sites that lose their domain names can 
easily obtain another and resume operations quickly once users are aware of 
the new domain name, as recent scholarly studies have found (e.g., Liu et al. 
2011). This dissertation concludes that payment providers are more effective at 
disabling sites than domain registrars, which corroborates analysis of domain 
intermediaries’ regulatory capabilities against infringing sites (Liu et al. 2011).  
 
Infringing sites’ movement among domain registrars to avoid enforcement 
action brings to mind the whack-a-mole phenomenon discussed earlier. If, 
however, the domain registrar operates web-hosting services for the targeted 
site, it can remove site content along with domain services. GoDaddy, as the 
world’s largest domain registrar and web host, has a considerable advantage to 
withdraw both types of services from infringing sites. As a regulator of both 
domain names and hosted content, GoDaddy has significant regulatory 
capacity. The consequences of enforcement errors, however, are compounded 
as the registrar can essentially cripple a site by incapacitating its domain name 
and seizing its content. Google, in contrast, can only de-index a webpage from 
its search engine.  
 
V) State Pressure and Actors’ Interests 
 
Returning to this dissertation’s main question, why did Google and GoDaddy 
agree to adopt non-binding private enforcement agreements to guide their 
regulatory efforts against infringing sites? Like the payment and advertising 
macro-intermediaries, there were threats of legislation and legal action, and 
search and domain macro-intermediaries have financial and reputational 
interests in strengthening their enforcement practices, similar to those 
discussed in chapter 4. Consumers, meanwhile, are the missing constituency of 
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this regulatory regime, even though the Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies is 
ostensibly dedicated to serving their interests.   
 
i) The Role of the State 
 
State actors played pivotal roles in establishing both the search engines’ code 
of conduct in the United Kingdom and the Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies 
in the United States. The degree of coercive pressure, however, was 
considerably greater on Google than on GoDaddy. The search giant faced the 
possibility of legislation in both countries. In the United Kingdom, the 
government preferred industry-created regulation but was willing to legislate if 
there was no industry consensus. Former Secretary of State Jeremy Hunt 
delivered that warning to Google, Yahoo and Bing and then directed them to 
work with rights holders to draft a code of conduct (Bradwell 2011). In the 
United States, in contrast, the government was trying to pass COICA, a tough 
new intellectual property bill. While the debate over COICA was ongoing, 
Victoria Espinel, of IPEC, brought together domain name, search/advertising, 
and payment macro-intermediaries—all targeted under COICA—and 
“challenged” them to come together to address illegal online pharmacies (IPEC 
2011). 
 
In addition to the threat of legislation in the U.S. and U.K., as described above, 
Google faced a criminal investigation for accepting advertisements from 
unauthorized pharmacies and the search giant forfeited $500 million (DOJ 
2011). Pressure from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which is a powerful 
voice for strong intellectual property laws, likely influenced the U.S. government 
to crack down on Google. The Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies, for 
example, has among its members the Alliance for Safe Online Pharmacies. This 
Alliance represents pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies, as well as 
other health care providers.266 Moreover, U.S. pharmaceutical companies are 
the most vocal critics of online pharmacies, particularly those that do not 
operate according to U.S. state and federal laws (see GAO 2013). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
266 Pharmaceutical companies have aggressively pursued stronger protection for its intellectual 
property since the 1970s, including tougher measures on parallel importation (Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2002). 
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Politicians in the United Kingdom clearly indicated their preference that Google 
take a stronger stance against online infringement. Members of the House of 
Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee pronounced that they were 
“unimpressed by [Google’s] evident reluctance to block infringing websites on 
the flimsy grounds that some operate under the cover of hosting some legal 
content” (House of Commons 2013:3). They further argued that the “continuing 
promotion by search engines of illegal content on the Internet is unacceptable” 
and Google’s attempts to address the problem “have been derisorily ineffective” 
(House of Commons 2013:3-4).  
 
GoDaddy, in contrast, has elicited no similar criticism from policymakers. There 
is no publicly available information indicating that Espinel or other government 
officials pushed GoDaddy to adopt non-binding enforcement measures. Given 
GoDaddy’s strong support of industry and voluntary enforcement efforts as 
evidenced in Christine Jones’ testimony to the U.S. Congress, it is probable that 
the company joined IPEC’s initiatives voluntarily. 
 
ii) State and Corporate Interests in Informal Private Regulation  
 
Search and domain macro-intermediaries’ financial and ideational interests 
affect how they undertake the regulation of infringing sites. In contrast with the 
other macro-intermediaries, there is little publicly available information of how 
GoDaddy came to adopt non-binding enforcement agreements. There are 
several reasons that explain this lacuna. GoDaddy has a much lower public 
profile than the other macro-intermediaries. As a privately held company, it 
publishes few details of how it deals with violations of its policies. GoDaddy is 
also a relatively new entrant into the realm of intellectual property protection, 
although it has experience working against child pornography sites alongside 
PayPal, Google and Visa. Rights holders have not publicly targeted GoDaddy to 
crack down on infringement. GoDaddy has financial interests in protecting its 
services and users from wrongdoing and preserving its brand from being 
associated with counterfeit goods. Like the other macro-intermediaries, 
GoDaddy wants to maintain its dominant market position.  
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Like GoDaddy, Google has an interest in protecting its valuable brand from 
being associated with criminality. Google does not contest that infringement is a 
problem but disagrees with rights holders over the regulatory strategy of relying 
upon search engines to remove linkages to infringing sites. Indeed, Kent 
Walker, senior vice president and general counsel of Google, argues that 
shutting down sources of revenue is a more effective enforcement avenue 
(Walker 2011:7). Google has material interests in shifting the regulatory focus 
away from its search engine practices but, as the digital advertising giant, it 
would continue to address the problem of infringement by policing its 
advertising services.267 Google’s ideational interests affect how it regards the 
regulation of infringement. “It’s not Google’s job to go around the web to declare 
whether sites are legal or illegal,” said Theo Bertram, manager of U.K. public 
policy for Google at an industry-sponsored event to discuss how funding 
sources for online infringement could be throttled (Bertram 2013).268 To “edit the 
web and literally delete sites,” argued Eric Schmidt, Google’s chief executive 
officer, “goes counter to our philosophy” (Ernesto 2013). 
 
Google’s critics, however, argue that the company has the resources and 
technical skill to address the problem of infringement but not the requisite 
commitment. Detective Superintendent Wishart of the City of London Police 
argues that Google’s resistance to modifying its search processes to screen out 
content that infringes intellectual property is hypocritical:  
 
Google has said to us that they are massively reluctant to police the 
Internet, massively reluctant to do anything where they are perceived to be 
influencing peoples’ choices or intrusively looking at what people are 
doing. Our argument is, ‘you do that anyway. You do that from the 
commercial perspective.’269   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
267 Google also offers a payment service—Google Wallet—that it would presumably regulate to 
ensure it does not facilitate payments of infringing goods. Google has only a tiny share of the 
online payment sector, which is a highly competitive market and dominated by Visa, PayPal, 
MasterCard and American Express.  
268 Bertram did not disregard Google’s role as a regulator, particularly in relation to its 
advertising services. He went on to say “but if Coca-Cola comes to us and says ‘here’s a list of 
500 dynamic sites, and we don’t want you to place ads on those…’ that’s a slightly different 
thing” (Bertram 2013).  
269 Interview with Det./Supt. Bob Wishart, Head of National Operational Delivery, Regional 
Fraud Project, City of London Police, 6 September 2012, London. 
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These critiques aptly illustrate the differing interests Google has toward the 
regulation of online infringement. Google claims an ideological position against 
censorship but it has strong economic interests in crawling certain types of sites 
and prioritizing specific types of information in its search index. Its ideational 
position on removing search results; however, is likely tempered by its 
dependence on its advertising services for its revenue. Google’s desire to 
mitigate the risk from legislation and legal action also influences its decisions to 
adopt voluntary measures to strengthen its enforcement efforts. Patrick 
Robinson, former director of public policy at Yahoo in the United Kingdom, 
remarked that search engines’ removal of infringing links does not indicate an 
“admission” that the content is infringing but rather a desire to avoid legal action 
from rights holders (Bradwell 2012). By removing problematic search results for 
rights holders and amending its enforcement policies, Google is mitigating the 
possibility of future legal action from rights holders and states.  
 
 
iii) Consumers’ Interests 
 
Consumers’ interests are ostensibly at the heart of discussions among rights 
holders, macro-intermediaries, and the U.S. and U.K. governments over 
infringing sites. In reality, however, the private enforcement agreements are 
primarily designed to serve large corporations whose interests do not always 
align with those of consumers. Similar to chapter 4, there was no representation 
from consumers in the creation of the agreement that launched the Centre for 
Safe Internet Pharmaceuticals or the search engines’ code of conduct. Little 
information is publicly available of these state-negotiated agreements. Further, 
the U.S. and U.K. governments, along with intellectual property actors, 
strategically used closed-door meetings to draft the enforcement measures in 
secret and side step controversial and stalled legislation. 
 
CSIP is unlike the other informal agreements that Victoria Espinel negotiated as 
head of IPEC because CSIP focuses on a particular type of infringing site, so-
called illegal online pharmacies. Online pharmacies that sell or advertise 
pharmaceuticals in violation of states’ laws can pose health and safety risks to 
consumers (GAO 2013). However, some of these pharmacies may only violate 
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U.S. laws on prescriptions but provide safe, genuine medication. On the 
surface, its mission appears to serve consumers’ interests as CSIP promotes 
safe purchases of medication from approved, accredited online pharmacies.  
 
Consumers’ interests in purchasing medication for the best possible prices do 
not always align with the interests of large, multinational pharmaceutical 
companies intent on protecting their profit margin. The pharmaceutical pricing 
structure set by U.S. pharmaceutical companies means that pharmaceuticals 
are typically more expensive in the United States than other countries, and, in 
consequence, consumers often seek medication from online pharmacies that 
may not be licensed for operation in the United States (GAO 2013). As a result, 
consumers may be unfairly caught in a situation between legally accessible, 
less-affordable medication and (some) unauthorized pharmacies that provide 
safe, affordable medication. State and industry efforts to crack down on all 
types of unauthorized online pharmacies, even those that supply safe 
medication, does not serve consumers’ interests, particularly in the United 
States where many individuals struggle to afford pharmaceuticals (see GAO 
2013).  
 
The principal problem with CSIP is that it relies upon corporate actors 
connected to the pharmaceutical industry to identify “safe” pharmacies. 
LegitScript verifies pharmacies on behalf of government and corporate clients, 
including pharmaceutical companies. CSIP can then encourage its members to 
withdraw their services from targeted sites. State and industry actors benefit 
from CSIP’s global network of macro-intermediaries. Government actors, 
particularly the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, can reach extra-territorially 
to police sites that it contends are distributing pharmaceuticals to individuals in 
the United States in violation of federal and state laws (GAO 2013).270 Rights 
holders (pharmaceutical companies) benefit from CSIP’s considerable 
regulatory capacity and the ability of its macro-intermediary members to 
withdraw services from targeted online pharmacies. Consumers, however, may 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
270 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration uses informal enforcement measures to request 
Internet service providers and domain name intermediaries to withdraw their services from 
pharmacies over which the FDA has no jurisdiction but designates as operating illegally within 
the United States (see GAO 2013).  
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be much worst off if they lose access to pharmacies that prescribe safe, 
affordable medication.  
 
In terms of search engines, the creation of the code of conduct—the first in the 
world—demonstrates the close, inter-dependent relationships between 
intellectual property owners and the U.K. Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport. Minutes and proposed codes of conduct from the roundtable meetings 
demonstrate that rights holders had the full support of Ed Vaizey, Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary, and Jeremy Hunt, then Secretary of State to create private 
enforcement agreements. Non-binding agreements among key industry actors 
enable the government to bypass its unpopular and stalled Digital Economy Act. 
These roundtable discussions, in which rights holders proposed to change 
fundamentally how search engines operate, have the potential to alter how 
individuals access information and can use search engines. Such discussions 
that can affect critical Internet services, like search, payment and domain 
names, should not left to small groups of corporate and government actors in 
closed-door meetings.  
VI) Conclusion 
 
The two private enforcement agreements examined in this chapter—the Centre 
for Safe Internet Pharmacies and the search engines’ code of conduct—
illustrate the complex, loosely coordinated private regulatory regime. Actors 
from the Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator and the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport are central figures in the regime as 
they secured macro-intermediaries’ participation in negotiations with rights 
holders and facilitated the creation of the agreements. The role of state actors is 
paramount to this regime because rights holders alone did not have the 
requisite authority to bring together all the macro-intermediaries involved in 
CSIP or direct Google, Yahoo and Bing to draft a non-binding code of conduct. 
By compelling Google and GoDaddy into talks through threats of legislation and 
legal action, IPEC and the DCMS legitimized rights holders’ demands that 
macro-intermediaries assume greater regulatory responsibility for online 
infringement. As a result, rights holders’ authority to pressure macro-
intermediaries to amend their enforcement practices can be seen as partially 
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derived from the state (see Büthe 2010; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Sassen 
2002).  
 
A principal component of techno-regulation—the shaping of human behaviour 
through technology—is that technology and politics mutually shape one another 
(Brey 2005). This was evident in the U.K., for example, when rights holders and 
politicians pressured search engines to demote repeatedly infringing sites in 
their search indices. Google announced it has adopted this practice, thus 
showing how certain interests can shape intermediaries’ use of technology to 
police wrongdoing on their platforms (Singhal 2012). For search engines, 
however, changes to the ways they detect and control perceived wrongdoing 
among search results affects the results they display to users and how they 
rank those results.  
 
State and corporate pressure on Google to amend its enforcement practices in 
relation to intellectual property can have profound consequences on Google’s 
overall operation of its search engine, which can negatively affect how users 
search for and access information. Certain types and sources of information 
could be rendered inaccessible or relegated far down in the rankings of search 
results. In a similar fashion, GoDaddy, working through the Centre for Safe 
Internet Pharmacies along with other macro-intermediaries, is shaping how 
consumers can purchase pharmaceuticals online and what types of pharmacies 
are designated as “safe.” Google and GoDaddy’s regulatory efforts through 
informal, privately drafted measures demonstrate the ways in which macro-
intermediaries’ regulatory practices can affect the provision and use of key 
Internet services, as well as the types of products individuals can access.      
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Chapter 6: Online Marketplaces and Private 
Enforcement Agreements  
 
Online marketplaces have fundamentally transformed how consumers and 
businesses buy and sell goods and services. With the creation of eBay in 1995, 
individuals have convenient, real-time access to a global marketplace. From 
their homes individuals can buy and sell products from around the world. In 
many ways these marketplaces are fundamentally different from their brick-and-
mortar counterparts. Online marketplaces do not handle or sell the goods 
themselves, nor do they verify products’ quality, legality or authenticity (eBay 
2013a). Instead, they facilitate commercial transactions between parties. The 
U.S.-based eBay and the China-based Taobao marketplace are the two largest 
online marketplaces globally. They are consumer-to-consumer platforms, which 
blur the lines between consumers and merchants as they allow individuals to 
buy and sell goods with other individuals globally.  
 
Since the creation of online marketplaces, unscrupulous individuals have used 
them to sell illegal or controlled goods, such as drugs, weapons, endangered 
species or counterfeit goods (see e.g., Lehrer 2012). With the growing 
popularization of online shopping in the early 2000s, prominent multinational 
rights holders began to complain that the marketplaces contain numerous sales 
listings for counterfeit goods (i.e., “infringing listings”). This chapter focuses on 
eBay and Taobao because rights holders, particularly those with well-known, 
sought-after brands, and their trade associations argue that these marketplaces 
have significant problems with the sale of counterfeit goods on their 
platforms.271 This is because they serve massive populations, have significant 
market share and are therefore an efficient way for individuals to sell counterfeit 
goods. 
 
eBay operates globally and has 128 million active users (eBay 2013). The 
China-based Taobao, meanwhile, boasts 231 million active users, along with its 
sister marketplace Tmall, which operates storefronts that businesses sell to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+&* This is according to my interviews with rights holders, investigative firms, attorneys and trade 
associations in Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.  
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consumers (Alibaba 2014). Taobao, created in 2003, is a Chinese-language 
marketplace that primarily operates in China. Taobao is of particular concern to 
U.S. and European rights holders because, as China’s largest online 
marketplace, it is an ideal entry point into the Chinese e-commerce market and 
rights holders want the marketplace’s hundreds of millions of users to purchase 
authentic products. Further, Taobao is part of the massive, China-based 
Alibaba Group, which, among its many services, operates several online 
marketplaces and a payment provider, and is one of the top three e-commerce 
platforms in China.272  
 
eBay and Taobao represent an important component of the private regulatory 
regime because they facilitate a massive volume of trade, enable consumers to 
sell to one another, and have hundreds of millions of users. Both marketplaces 
use technology as a regulatory instrument as they have sophisticated 
surveillance and enforcement programs to detect wrongdoing on their platforms 
and remove problematic listings or sellers. eBay, with its global scope, massive 
trading volume and dominant market share, is a macro-intermediary. Taobao, in 
contrast, operates primarily within China and does not have the global scope to 
be considered a macro-intermediary. However, given its size and market 
dominance in China, it has a considerable regulatory capacity to control the 
online distribution of counterfeit goods on its marketplace.  
 
In 2011, both eBay and Taobao signed non-binding enforcement agreements 
with rights holders to strengthen their enforcement policies and practices. eBay 
joined a memorandum of understanding to regulate the distribution of 
counterfeit goods through marketplaces in the European Economic Area.273 
Taobao signed a memorandum of understanding with an influential trade 
association, the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition. Similar to the 
agreements adopted by other macro-intermediaries discussed in chapters 4 and 
5, the coercive pressure of the state was at the centre of both agreements. The 
European Commission facilitated the creation of the European agreement and 
warned industry stakeholders that legislation would be considered if a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
272 The other two dominant e-commerce companies in China are Baidu, a search giant, and 
Tencent, an online gaming company (The Economist 2014). 
273 The European Economic Area is comprised of the European Union and member states of 
the European Free Trade Area, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.  
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“voluntary” agreement were not reached (European Commission 2009). Taobao 
signed its agreement because, at the time, it was listed on the Notorious Market 
List operated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).274 
Taobao’s adoption of the agreement was a factor in its release from the list in 
2012. In addition to direct pressure from the European Commission and the 
USTR, both marketplaces have financial and reputational interests in working 
with rights holders, similar to the other macro-intermediaries examined. The 
marketplaces want to mitigate their risk of legal liability, establish a degree of 
regulatory certainty as to their enforcement responsibilities, and protect their 
corporate reputations from association with counterfeit goods. 
 
As will be discussed later in the chapter, the United States does not have 
legislation pertaining to online trademark infringement.275 The European Union, 
in contrast has legislation that governs how online marketplaces deal with 
counterfeit goods and the European Commission’s private agreement builds 
upon that legislation. In contrast with the other macro-intermediaries, 
marketplaces would not have been targeted under the Stop Online Piracy Act or 
its predecessors. However, marketplaces’ informal private agreements are 
similar to those of the other macro-intermediaries. Through their private 
agreements, eBay and, in particular Taobao, significantly altered their regulation 
of the third-party distribution of counterfeit goods on their platforms. Their 
enforcement efforts are more rapid, streamlined, and proactive than their 
previous enforcement measures. Further, marketplaces’ private agreements 
can be understood as embodying the spirit of SOPA as these agreements 
encourage marketplaces to institute what the European Commission calls 
“beyond-compliance” regulatory strategies (European Commission 2013).   
 
This chapter examines how and why eBay and Taobao adopted non-binding 
enforcement agreements. The rest of the chapter proceeds in five parts. First it 
briefly introduces eBay and Taobao and then describes how the marketplaces 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
274 The USTR’s Notorious Market List, published in the Out-of-Cycle Review, is part of the 
Special 301 process described in chapter 3. The USTR listed Taobao as a notorious market in 
2008 and removed it in 2012 after the USTR judged that Taobao had instituted sufficiently 
improved enforcement practices. 
275 Marketplaces in the United States are subject to the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 
relation to copyright infringement but there is no similar statutory measure for online trademark 
infringement. !
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operate. Next, the chapter examines state and industry pressure on the 
marketplaces to adopt the private enforcement agreements. Third, the chapter 
examines two private agreements: the European Commission’s agreement with 
eBay and Taobao’s agreement with the International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition. Fourth, the chapter analyses these programs and then, in the fifth 
section, examines the role of the state and actors’ interests in the regulatory 
regime. The chapter then provides a brief conclusion.  
 
I) Online Marketplaces 
 
Online marketplaces are an integral feature of the digital economy. They use a 
wide variety of business models: some sell goods directly to consumers while 
others provide only the interface and support for third-party users (buyers and 
sellers) to carry out transactions. For example, the U.S.-based Amazon and the 
China-based Tmall marketplace, which is owned by the same company as 
Taobao, the massive Alibaba Group, enable businesses both large and small to 
sell their products directly to consumers through their platforms.276 Goods may 
be sold for fixed fees or through a variety of types of auctions. These 
marketplaces allow businesses to buy and sell goods at a far lower cost than 
their previous distribution models allowed and reach consumers and markets 
that would otherwise be inaccessible or prohibitively expensive. 
 
i) eBay and Taobao Marketplaces 
 
Marketplaces like eBay and Taobao that offer a broad diversity of newly 
manufactured and second-hand goods serve consumers’ desire for multiple 
types of products at a range of prices. They also allow consumers to trade in 
secondary-market goods, such as second-hand clothing or nostalgia items like 
vintage video games, toys and jewellery. With the growth of consumer-to-
consumer marketplaces like eBay and Taobao, individuals began to supplement 
their incomes by selling goods online and small businesses exploited the 
platforms to serve new and existing markets.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+&# Another category of marketplaces is business-to-business platforms like the China-based 
Alibaba marketplace, owned by the Alibaba Group, in which companies can purchase and sell 
goods at wholesale levels.  
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eBay, created in 1995, is one of the earliest online marketplaces, and remains 
the dominant consumer-to-consumer marketplace outside of China. In 2013, 
eBay claimed over 128 million active users and more than 550 million listings 
globally (eBay 2013:4). It generated $14 billion in 2013 and has platforms in 
1,000 cities around the world. eBay is more than a marketplace: it describes 
itself as a “global ecommerce platform” with localized sites around the world, 
such as eBay.se in Sweden and eBay.co.uk in the United Kingdom (eBay 
2013). It also operates marketplaces in a variety of countries, such as Gumtree, 
Kijiji, Marktplaats.nl, and mobile.de (eBay 2013).  
 
To understand Taobao, one must situate it within the context of the Alibaba 
Group. Many outside China probably had little familiarity with the Alibaba Group 
until it filed its much-anticipated initial public offering in the United States in May 
2014. Financial analysts estimate the deal could raise between $15 and $20 
billion on a company with an estimated worth of anywhere between $160 to 
$250 billion (Owles 2014). The Alibaba Group is comprised of multiple 
businesses, including marketplaces, payment services, cloud storage 
businesses, and a search engine. In 2003, the Alibaba Group launched the 
Taobao marketplace (in Chinese the name means ‘hunting for treasures’) as a 
rival to eBay, which entered China in 2002. The eBay-Taobao rivalry was fierce 
but brief. Within three years of its birth, in 2006, Taobao had displaced eBay 
claiming 67% of the consumer-to-consumer market in China (Mitchell 2010). 
Jack Ma, executive chair of the Alibaba Group, remarked of the eBay-Taobao 
rivalry: “eBay may be a shark in the ocean, but I am a crocodile in the Yangtze 
River. If we fight in the ocean, we lose—but if we fight in the river, we win” 
(Wang 2010).  
 
Taobao maintains a dominant presence in China’s e-commerce landscape, with 
90% of China’s consumer-to-consumer market share in 2012 (Erickson 2012). 
As a Chinese-language site, over 98% of Taobao’s sales are made to 
consumers in China with fewer than two percent of users in the United States 
(Spelich 2012). The marketplace has approximately 800 million product listings 
on its marketplace (Erickson 2012). Alongside Taobao, one of the Alibaba 
Group’s other important marketplaces is Tmall, created in 2008. Tmall is 
China’s top business-to-consumer site with approximately 40 to 50% of the 
Page 195 of 307 
!
!
market share in China, compared to Amazon277 at less than five percent 
(Millward 2013). Many U.S. and European rights holders regard Tmall as an 
entry point into the Chinese e-commerce marketplace and a way to access 
hundreds of millions of Chinese shoppers. For example, Tmall sells more than 
70,000 multinational brands and Chinese brands (Spelich 2012). 
 
eBay remains the marketplace leader in terms of generated revenue but 
Taobao and Tmall are rising rapidly. For the first 11 months of 2012, the 
Taobao and Tmall marketplaces surpassed the gross merchandise value of 
Amazon and eBay for 2012 (Alibaba 2013). This refers to the total value of 
merchandise that is sold over a particular period of time. Amazon and eBay 
together generated approximately $155 billion in gross merchandise value in 
2012, while sales from Taobao and Tmall accounted for $161 billion (Alibaba 
2013). Online commerce is growing about 60% a year in China, compared with 
10% in the United States (Tabuchi 2014), making the Chinese e-commerce 
environment highly attractive to multinational rights holders. For example, on 
November 11, 2013, which is the Chinese equivalent of the “Black Friday” 
shopping day in the United States, Taobao and Tmall generated more than 
$5.75 billion in sales in 24 hours (Millward 2013a). In comparison, shoppers 
spent $1.9 billion in the United States for Black Friday and Thanksgiving sales 
(Carlson 2013). 
 
ii) How Online Marketplaces Work 
 
Online marketplaces enable Internet users from around the world to participate 
in different markets and create specialized markets (Casarosa 2009:4). 
Marketplaces are often categorized as to whether they facilitate transactions 
among businesses, provide businesses a platform to sell goods to consumers, 
such as Amazon or Tmall, or enable consumers to sell to one another, such as 
eBay or Taobao. There is, however, some blurring amongst these categories. 
While Taobao is China’s biggest consumer-to-consumer marketplace, it also 
contains storefronts through which merchants sell directly to consumers. Users 
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277 This chapter does not focus on Amazon because it is a business-to-consumer site (unlike 
eBay and Taobao) and rights holders claim that eBay and Taobao present a larger problem 
than Amazon in terms of the online trade in counterfeit goods.   
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can also adopt different roles: a wholesaler in one market and a consumer in 
another. “There are a lot of sites in China which are where people tend to buy in 
bulk,” explains Damian Croker, founder of BrandStrike, a London-based brand-
monitoring firm. Those people then “maybe sell it on eBay or sell it in the 
markets or wherever.”+&( 
 
Online marketplaces provide a venue for rights holders to reach consumers 
globally at a far lower cost than their previous distribution models (and thus 
potentially secure higher profits). These marketplaces are fundamentally 
different from traditional, brick-and-mortar stores as they only provide the 
interface and support for third-party users (buyers and sellers) to carry out 
transactions. Online marketplaces do not handle or sell the goods themselves 
nor do they verify the listings’ accuracy or the goods’ authenticity. eBay 
underlines this distinction in its User Agreement. “You acknowledge that we are 
not a traditional auctioneer. Instead, our sites are venues to allow users to offer, 
sell, and buy just about anything, at any time, from anywhere, in a variety of 
pricing formats and location” (eBay 2013a).  
 
Buyers can generally register for free as marketplaces earn revenue by 
charging sellers various fees. eBay, for example, charges sellers fees for listing 
their products and upon the conclusion of sales.+&% Taobao does not charge 
sellers for transactions, but rather charges them for marketing, shipping and 
advertising services, and export-related services such as customs clearance, 
logistics and cargo insurance (Alibaba 2011:22). Marketplaces also generate 
significant revenue by charging transactional fees for the use of their proprietary 
payment systems.+() The Alibaba Group owns Alipay, a payment processor with 
about 50% of the market share in China (Jackson 2014). eBay owns PayPal, 





+&( Interview with Damian Croker, founder and CEO, BrandStrike Limited, London, 25 
September 2012. 
+&%!For eBay’s fees and services: http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html#if_auction.!
+() Amazon charges transaction fees for the use of Amazon payment services (ranging from 
1.9% to 2.9%). For Amazon’s fee’s and services, see: http://services.amazon.com/amazon-
payments/pricing-plan.html.  
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II) Pressure on Marketplaces from Industry and State 
 
Given the size of eBay and Taobao and the hundreds of millions of people they 
serve and transactions they facilitate, rights holders are keen to ensure that 
they do not trade in counterfeit versions of their products. “The stand-alone 
[infringing] site is a lower priority than taking action on the trading platform,” 
explains Tim Waring, director of the U.K.-based Intelligence Technologies, a 
brand-monitoring firm, “because the trade platform has a much higher visibility 
than a stand-alone site.”281 Rights holders’ strategy in relation to the distribution 
of infringing goods through legitimate marketplaces is to “get them off the bigger 
auction sites,” says Kieron Sharp, director general of the Federation Against 
Copyright Theft, a trade association in the United Kingdom, thereby “reducing 
their opportunity and people looking to find that kind of thing.”+(+ As the two 
largest online markets serving consumers, much of rights holders’ enforcement 
efforts are concentrated on eBay and Taobao. 
 
To pressure eBay and Taobao to strengthen their enforcement efforts, rights 
holders and their trade associations employed tactics similar to those discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5. They used threats of legal action and also worked with 
state actors. In the European Union, prominent rights holders, like Nike and 
Proctor & Gamble, and their trade associations petitioned the European 
Commission to pressure eBay to sign onto a non-binding enforcement 
agreement under a threat of legislation. For Taobao, U.S. rights holders and 
trade bodies worked with the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) to blacklist Taobao on the Notorious Market List to compel it to 
strengthen its enforcement policies. Before discussing these events, the next 
section outlines the legal frameworks within which the marketplaces operate.  
 
i) Legislative frameworks 
 
Prior to the introduction of the private enforcement agreements in 2011, eBay 
and Taobao both had enforcement procedures in place to deal with complaints 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+(* Interview with Tim Waring, Director, Intelligence Technologies, 3 October 2012, by Skype.  
+(+ Interview with Kieron Sharp, Director General, Federation Against Copyright Theft, 9 October 
2012, by Skype.  
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of counterfeit goods. These notice-and-takedown programs remove specific 
infringing content (i.e., takedown) upon receiving rights holders’ complaints of 
specific incidents of infringement (i.e., notice). As outlined in chapter 3, 
marketplaces operating in the United States, like eBay, base their notice-and-
takedown programs on the provisions outlined in the U.S. 1998 Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), even though the DMCA does not cover 
trademark infringement. (Marketplaces are required under the DMCA, as 
hosting providers, to institute notice-and-takedown programs to deal with 
copyright infringing content (DMCA).)283 In the absence of a statutory regime to 
deal with online trademark infringement, marketplaces have adopted DMCA-like 
measures to address complaints of sales listings offering counterfeit goods 
(Goldman 2009). eBay, for example, has operated a notice-and-takedown 
program, called the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) program, since 1998, which 
removes listings pertaining to counterfeit goods (Doughery 2011).  
 
Marketplaces operating in the European Union, meanwhile, like eBay’s 
European operations are subject to the 2000 European Commission Electronic 
Commerce Directive, which is adopted into member states’ laws. This directive 
covers copyright and trademark infringement and considers marketplaces to be 
hosting intermediaries. Marketplaces are required, once they gain “knowledge 
or awareness” about infringement to act “expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the information.”284 Removal of infringing information in the E-
Commerce Directive occurs through a notice-and-takedown regime, highly 
similar to that prescribed by the DMCA.285 For its part, China also has a notice-
and-takedown regime that resembles those in Europe and the United States 
(see Mostert and Schwimmer 2011). In 2010, China revised Article 36 of the 
Tort Law of People’s Republic of China, which sets out measures for Internet 
intermediaries to remove infringing content, including sales listings (see Mostert 
and Schwimmer 2011). 
 
To summarize, both the European Union and China had laws in place to 
address the online sale of counterfeit goods prior to the introduction of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+('!DMCA Sec. 202(512)(b).!
+(" E-Commerce Directive Art. 14 (b). 
+($ E-Commerce Directive Art. 12-15. 
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private enforcement agreements with eBay and Taobao in 2011. In the United 
States, marketplaces generally adapted the DMCA to deal with complaints of 
counterfeit goods. Despite these measures, however, rights holders kept 
pressuring marketplaces to remove infringing listings more quickly and to 
monitor their platforms proactively to remove sales listings for counterfeit goods 
before rights holders made complaints. Prior to the private agreements, eBay 
was reluctant to undertake proactive monitoring and argued that it was not 
required to do so under the E-Commerce Directive (Dougherty 2011).286 Before 
the USTR placed Taobao on its Notorious Market List between 2008 and 2012, 
the marketplace had no real incentive to crack down on the trade in counterfeit 
goods. Overall, marketplaces’ enforcement practices prior to the private 
agreements could be characterized as relatively reactive (particularly Taobao) 
and fragmented with distinct regulatory differences between countries.  
 
As will be explored in the following section, eBay and Taobao adopted the 
private agreements as they faced, to varying degrees, an uncertain legal 
environment because of threats of legislation and litigation, and direct pressure 
from state actors. 
 
ii) Pressure from Rights Holders 
 
For rights holders, litigation and threats of legal action are useful tools to shape 
intermediaries’ regulatory efforts. Intellectual property attorneys argued, for 
example, that legal threats convinced eBay to implement its Verified Rights 
Owner program (VeRO) in 1998. Describing the pressure on eBay, the 
attorneys said, “It took many years to get there, by threatening to sue them 
under the doctrines of contributory and vicarious infringement” (Kolson, 
McDonald, and Pogoda 2004).  
 
Even after eBay introduced its VeRO program, the marketplace has faced 
pressure from rights holders for years that it is not doing enough to address or 
prevent third-party infringement on its platform. In an early private enforcement 
agreement in 2004, eBay and Tiffany Inc., the U.S. luxury jewellery store, 
worked together to detect and remove listings for counterfeit Tiffany products 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
286 E-Commerce Directive, Art. 47. 
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(Rimmer 2011). By 2005, however, the agreement crumbled as Tiffany 
launched one of the first lawsuits against eBay alleging that the marketplace 
facilitated the sale of counterfeit versions of Tiffany products.287 Tiffany 
characterized eBay as “a pirate bazaar, a 'flea-market', and a seller of fakes and 
counterfeits” (Rimmer 2011:134) and alleged that the marketplace facilitated the 
trade in counterfeit Tiffany products by turning a blind eye to bad actors.288 The 
court found in eBay’s favour that it had sufficient enforcement policies and 
practices in place to deal with rights holders’ complaints of infringement.289  
 
eBay argued that the case “broadly endorsed eBay’s anti-counterfeiting efforts” 
(Dougherty 2011:1). Rights holders disagreed and pursued the marketplace 
over similar claims in courts in Europe and won judgments against eBay that 
required the marketplace to undertake proactive monitoring for counterfeit 
goods.290 These cases highlight tensions between marketplaces and rights 
holders and underscore the debate over the nature and limitations of 
marketplaces’ responsibilities for policing their platforms for third-party 
infringement undertaken by their sellers. Moreover, divergent court rulings 
between the United States and Europe also further cloud the nature and scope 
of marketplaces’ responsibilities in relation to third-party infringement on their 
platforms (McNamee 2011; Rimmer 2011). Commentators on the differing court 
rulings against Internet intermediaries’ responsibilities for third-party 
infringement argue that there is “little clarity on what constitutes a proper 
takedown notice and what intermediaries are entitled to limited liability” 
(Goldman 2009; see also McNamee 2011).  
 
eBay is thus operating in an uncertain regulatory climate that affects its 
operations. Furthermore, the lack of legal clarity regarding its enforcement 
responsibilities and exposure to liability complicates the operation of its 
platforms worldwide. eBay acknowledges the challenges working in this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
287 In the case, Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc (2008), Tiffany alleged that eBay was “liable for direct 
and contributory trademark infringement, unfair competition, false advertising, and direct and 
contributory trademark dilution” (Rimmer 2011:134).  
288 For a detailed analysis of the Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay case, see Rimmer (2011). 
289 The ruling in 2008 and appeal in 2010 found that eBay was not liable for facilitating 
trademark infringement and the judge concluded that the “burden of policing the Tiffany mark 
appropriately rests with Tiffany, see: Tiffany (NJ) Inc., v eBay, Inc., (SD NY, 2008), page 57. 
290 For example, courts in France ruled against eBay and found it liable for facilitating the sale of 
counterfeit goods in cases brought by Hermès and Louis Vuitton (Guthrie 2012:3). 
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environment in its 2013 annual report in which eBay states that it “believe[s] that 
the legal climate, especially in Europe, is becoming more adverse to our 
positions” (eBay 2013:22). eBay further claims that this legal climate could 
require the marketplace to “take actions which could lower our revenues, 
increase our costs, or make our websites less convenient to our customers” 
(eBay 2013:22). eBay continues to operate with these legal uncertainties but 
the European Commission’s agreement offered a respite from litigation in 
Europe as all signatories agree to abstain from litigation while participating in 
the agreement (European Commission 2013). As will be explored in the 
following section, the European Commission proffered a carrot-and-stick 
approach: it promised a break from the pressure of litigation but warned of 
legislation if industry could not come up with a voluntary agreement (European 
Commission 2013).  
 
In contrast to eBay, Taobao has faced considerably less legal pressure from 
rights holders. Courts in China have been unwilling to hold online marketplaces 
liable for trademark infringement (Woo 2010:51). U.S. and European rights 
holders appear generally reluctant to pursue litigation in China. A Hong Kong-
based lawyer interviewed said that undertaking intellectual property cases 
through the legal system in China is difficult because the judiciary is 
inadequately trained and the lack of separation between government and the 
judiciary results in politically motivated decision-making.+%*  
 
Litigation offers rights holders a useful avenue to pressure intermediaries to 
strengthen their enforcement practices. As discussed above, eBay instituted its 
VeRO enforcement program after years of pressure from rights holders. “They 
had to be pulled kicking and screaming into doing it,” recalls Siân Croxon, a 
London-based lawyer with the law firm DLA Piper.292 Rights holders’ capacity to 
use the threat of litigation varies widely. There “aren’t many rights holders with 
the interest and the resources and, I suppose, the commercial interest to bring 
significant cases to court,” observes Jeremy Newman, a partner with Rouse 
Legal in London.293 There are also significant drawbacks to litigation. “It’s slow. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+%* Interview with Hong Kong-based lawyer in Washington.  
+%+ Interview with Siân Croxon, partner DLA Piper, 14 September 2012, London. 
+%' Interview with Jeremy Newman, Partner, Rouse Legal, 10 September 2012, London. 
Page 202 of 307 
!
!
It’s expensive,” notes Newman.294 “It returns a variety of answers by jurisdiction, 
which is hopeless for the likes of eBay having numerous laws,” he says.295 This 
latter point is particularly problematic not only for Internet firms with global 
operations but also for multinational rights holders that want equal protection for 
their goods in all the markets in which they operate. 
 
One of rights holders’ main goals for the European agreement was to get eBay 
to increase its infringing or suspicious sales listing before being altered to do so 
by rights holders. Ruth Orchard, director of the U.K.-based Anti-Counterfeiting 
Group, a trade association, explains that intellectual property actors wanted 
eBay “to take a bit of proactive enforcement on their side.”296 Failing in their 
attempts to get eBay to strengthen its proactive efforts across all its 
marketplaces through litigation, rights holders’ other option was to pressure 
eBay to undertake proactive enforcement voluntarily. Intellectual property actors 
admit that outside court proceedings, eBay has “always been very reluctant to 
negotiate” explains Robert Cumming, a solicitor with the firm Walker Morris in 
England.297 As a result, rights holders and their trade associations had to 
petition the European Commission to intervene and compel eBay to enter 
negotiations with rights holders on a non-binding private enforcement 
agreement.  
 
For eBay, its operation in an uncertain legal requirement contributed, in part, to 
its adoption of the European agreement. The marketplace acknowledges that 
the legal climate is “adverse” to its business (eBay 2013:22). The threat of 
legislation is a strong motivation to cooperate, as is a respite from litigation from 
rights holders in Europe. In the case of Taobao, litigation was not an effective 
option. Instead, rights holders employed a powerful state-backed tool of 
economic coercion—the Special 301 process operated by the Office of the U.S. 




+%" Interview with Jeremy Newman, Partner, Rouse Legal, 10 September 2012, London. 
+%$ Ibid. 
+%# Interview with Ruth Orchard, Director, Anti-Counterfeiting Group, England, 17 September 
2012, by Skype.  
+%& Interview with Robert Cumming, Solicitor, Walker Morris, England, 21 September 2012, by 
Skype.  
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iii) Pressure Through the State 
 
Similar to the cases of the other macro-intermediaries, state actors played a 
direct role in exerting pressure to convince eBay and Taobao to adopt non-
binding enforcement agreements. The European Commission warned 
marketplaces operating in the European Economic Area, including eBay and 
Amazon, that “if voluntary arrangements cannot be agreed” it would “need to 
consider legislative solutions” (European Commission 2009). The Commission 
took on a direct and, it acknowledges, “a novel function as facilitator” to 
coordinate the 2011 private agreement among marketplaces, rights holders and 
trade associations (European Commission 2013: 5-6). This non-binding 
agreement is the first of its kind for online marketplaces. One of its principal 
goals is to push marketplaces, in the words of the European Commission, “to 
move beyond mere compliance with legislation” (European Commission 2013:5-
6).298 A related goal of the European Commission’s agreement was to provide a 
forum in which industry could work cooperatively instead of being stuck in an 
endless cycle of legal battles. All signatories to the memorandum agreed “not to 
initiate any new litigation against each other” during the period of the agreement 
(European Commission 2013:4).  
 
For U.S. and European rights holders frustrated with the sale of counterfeit 
goods through Taobao a useful option for rights holders and trade associations 
is to work through the USTR. As chapter 3 explained, the USTR is one of the 
most powerful venues for intellectual property actors to strong-arm countries 
and non-U.S.-based firms to adopt appropriately tough (i.e., U.S.-style) 
intellectual property laws and enforcement practices. In 2006, the USTR started 
publishing the Notorious Market List, which identifies problematic physical and 
virtual marketplaces. In 2010, the USTR began publishing this list separately in 
a report called “Out of Cycle Review of Notorious Markets” to emphasize the 
problem of online infringement. Rights holders submit industry data and 
analysis alleging that specific companies, like Taobao, are failing to protect 
intellectual property in a manner rights holders consider sufficient. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+%( The European Commission’s position on voluntary industry commitment to ‘compliance-plus’ 
enforcement and self-regulatory measures is drawn from its consumer agenda, which 
encourages industry to draft voluntary codes of conduct (European Commission 2012a). 
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When the USTR names companies or websites as “notorious markets,” it 
pressures them to make specific changes to their enforcement policies and 
practices as identified by rights holders. The Notorious Markets List is more 
than a name-and-shame process: it is part of the Special 301 process that is 
backed by the U.S. government. As described in chapter 3, the U.S. 
government provides the bureaucratic reinforcement for rights holders’ 
complaints of inadequate enforcement as the USTR threatens and sanctions 
countries where rights holders have identified problems, using the leverage of 
access to U.S. market (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002).  
  
The USTR listed Taobao as a notorious market in 2008 and released it from the 
list in 2012 after the Alibaba Group made significant changes to the 
marketplaces’ enforcement practices.299 Prior to Taobao’s removal from the list, 
in September 2012, John Spelich, vice president of international corporate 
affairs at the Alibaba Group, wrote to senior USTR officials and outlined 
changes to Taobao’s policies.300 Spelich argued that the Alibaba Group 
instituted “broad-based measures and severe penalties to prevent the sale of 
infringing goods” and to “cleanse” the platform of problems (Spelich 2012:1). He 
said that Taobao had conducted “extensive consultations with U.S. 
stakeholders” to identify ways to strengthen the platforms’ enforcement 
processes and “eliminate bottlenecks” in processing and removing listings 
(Spelich 2012:3). In response to rights holders’ directives, Taobao made several 
significant changes to its policies: 
• “Significantly upgraded” notice-and-take-down program, including adding 
measures for complaints to be made in English; 
• “Substantially reduced” the timeframe to remove infringing listings;  
• Toughened penalties for repeat offenders (Spelich 2012:3-7). 
In addition to these measures, Taobao signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC 2013).301 Rights 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+%% For the USTR Reports, see http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-
publications/2013/2013-special-301-report.  
')) Spelich’s letter and the accompanying 29-page report provide a useful overview of the 
marketplaces’ enforcement practices (Spelich 2012).!
301 Taobao also signed similar memoranda of understanding with the Motion Picture 
Association, which is the international wing of the Motion Picture Association of America, and 
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holders and trade associations judged these significant changes to Taobao’s 
policies sufficient and in 2012 the USTR removed Taobao from the Notorious 
Markets List. When the USTR announced Taobao’s rehabilitation, it 
congratulated the platform but urged Taobao “to further streamline procedures” 
for dealing with infringing sales listings (Erickson 2012). The USTR also called 
upon the marketplace to continue working toward “a satisfactory outcome with 
U.S. rights holders and industry associations” (Erickson 2012). 
 
In sum, the U.S. government and European Commission pressured eBay and 
Taobao into adopting non-binding enforcement agreements in a manner similar 
to the cases examined in chapters 4 and 5. Pressure from the European 
Commission and the USTR provided intellectual property actors with the 
coercive force that they could not achieve themselves through legal action or 
pressuring eBay and Taobao. These marketplaces constitute the final 
dimension of the global private regulatory regime that also features revenue 
chokepoints (payment and advertising actors) and access chokepoints (search 
and domain name actors). The marketplaces’ agreements also illustrate the 
spatial dimensions of the regime: it is based in the United States and Europe 
and stretches globally, including to China, which is a major manufacturing 
location of counterfeit goods. Moreover, the private agreements with eBay and 
Taobao further demonstrate the degree to which interests are aligned between 
rights holders and the states involved (the U.S. government and European 
Union). Before describing the marketplaces’ private enforcement agreements, 
the next section explains how they regulate their platforms to address the online 
trade in counterfeit goods.    
 
III) Intermediaries’ Enforcement Programs 
 
Marketplaces explicitly prohibit the offer, sale or distribution of counterfeit goods 
on their platforms in their policies and terms-of-use agreements (eBay;302 for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
U.S.-based rights holders, including the luxury handbag company Coach, the North Face, an 
outdoor-wear apparel manufacturer, and Samsonite, makers of luggage (Spelich 2012:3). 
')+ eBay’s policy against counterfeits states: “For a safer buying and selling experience on eBay, 
we don't allow listings for counterfeit items, fakes, replicas, or unauthorised copies, 
unauthorised copies include things that are backed-up, bootlegged, duplicated, or pirated—
which are all illegal.” For eBay’s policy on counterfeit goods, see: 
http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/replica-counterfeit.html#policy.  
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Taobao see Spelich (2012)). Their notice-and-takedown programs are relatively 
straightforward. Rights holders (or their authorized third parties, such as 
attorney or investigative firms) submit notices of infringement, proof of 
ownership of the trademark/s in question, references to specific listings, and a 
sworn statement. These statements attest, in the words of eBay, that the 
complainants have “good faith belief” that certain listings “are not authorized by 
the IP Owner, its agent, or the law.”303  
 
In addition to reactive enforcement practices, marketplaces also generally 
employ some preventive measures to enable them to identify and deal with any 
violations of their policies, such as listings with illegal, misleading or 
inappropriate content, fraudulent activity, or manipulating prices. eBay users, for 
example, must supply identifying information and a credit card to eBay upon 
registration, as well as accept PayPal, which is owned by eBay. These steps 
“make it easy to track [offenders] down once their illegal behavior becomes 
apparent,” says Robert Chesnut, eBay’s Senior Vice-President of Rules, Trust 
and Safety (Chesnut 2007:24).  
 
The private enforcement agreements adopted by eBay and Taobao expanded 
upon their existing policies. A principal feature of the private agreements is that 
eBay and Taobao agreed to undertake proactive monitoring and policing of their 
platforms, as is explored in the following sections on the European 
Commission’s agreement and Taobao’s agreement.  
 
i) eBay’s Enforcement Policies 
 
eBay’s notice-and-takedown efforts are undertaken through its Verified Rights 
Owner program, which is the earliest and most well established enforcement 
program (Dougherty 2011). Approximately 40,000 rights holders participate in 
VeRO and each may own one to several hundred brands (eBay 2013). Rights 
holders belonging to the program have “dedicated priority email queues” for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
')' For eBay’s “Notice of Claimed Infringement” form for rights holders to report infringement to 
the marketplace, see: http://pics.ebay.com/aw/pics/pdf/us/help/community/NOCI1.pdf.  
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reporting alleged infringement.304 eBay accepts notifications of infringement 
from rights holders in relation to counterfeit goods, as well as trademark, 
copyright, and patent infringement, including “unlawful comparison to trademark 
owner’s brand name” or “unlawful use of a trademark.”305 
 
eBay, like most marketplaces, allows complainants to submit notifications of 
infringement electronically. The marketplace generally deletes infringing listings 
within hours of receiving a notification of infringement.306 Once the listings are 
removed, eBay notifies the seller and any bidder, cancels the bid or calls for any 
outstanding transactions not to be completed, advises the seller of the reason 
for cancellation and provides educational material on intellectual property 
rights.307 Sellers’ repeatedly found to be in violation of eBay’s policies may be 
suspended from the marketplace without a refund of their fees.  
 
eBay also grants access to online monitoring or investigative firms working on 
behalf of rights holders to use software to communicate with eBay’s system in 
what is known as an application-programming interface (API). Developers may 
design APIs for any type of program or platform.308 Brand-protection firms using 
an API with eBay can automate the process of monitoring sales, extract eBay 
user information, and send takedown notices more quickly and effectively.309 
Using the API, “we can automate a cease-and-desist,” explains James Ramm, 
director of the London-based Commercial Security International, an 
investigative firm. The “system fills out the necessary details on the VeRo and 
squirts it through our API back to eBay and it’s an instant removal request.”310 
By using APIs, brand-protection firms can submit thousands of complaints for 
the removal of sales listings on behalf of their clients, monitor multiple trading 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
304 For information about eBay’s Verified Rights Owner program, see: 
http://pages.ebay.co.uk/vero/about.html. 
305 For eBay’s “Notice of Claimed Infringement” form, see:  
http://pics.ebay.com/aw/pics/pdf/us/help/community/NOCI1.pdf.   
306 In Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc. (2008), the U.S. court found that eBay removed 75% of listings 
within four hours and eBay’s practice was to remove listings within 24 hours of receiving a 
notice of infringement. Tiffany (NJ) Inc., v eBay, Inc., (SD NY, 2008), page 12. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Google API “Places,” for example, converts any address into geographical coordinates that 
transferred onto a map. For Google’s Place API, see: 
https://developers.google.com/places/documentation/?csw=1.  
309 Interview with James Ramm, Director, Commercial Security International, 10 October 2012, 
London.  
310 Ibid.   
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platforms simultaneously and track individuals as they target different 
marketplaces. 
 
a) European Commission’s Memorandum of Understanding  
 
In May 2011, the European Commission quietly published on its website a non-
binding agreement called the “Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of 
Counterfeit Goods via the Internet.”311 This agreement, which was the result of 
two years of negotiations, is one of the most ambitious steps to increase the 
regulation of intellectual property rights and is the first agreement of its kind for 
online marketplaces. Signatories include an array of trade associations and 
rights holders from the pharmaceutical, consumer electronics, sporting goods, 
software, apparel, and toys industries, including Proctor & Gamble, Nokia, Louis 
Vuitton, and Nike. The agreement also covers 39 online marketplaces, including 
multiple country-specific versions of eBay and Amazon (e.g., from France, 
Belgium and Poland) as well as other marketplaces operating throughout 
Europe, like Ricardo, Tuktuk and Allegro.'*+ The agreement covers only 
counterfeit and copyright-infringing goods and excludes any disputes over 
parallel trade.  
 
As discussed earlier, the European Commission, which coordinated the 
agreement, motivated industry actors by warning that legislation would be 
considered if they could not agree upon “voluntary” measures (European 
Commission 2009). The overarching goal of the agreement is to push 
marketplaces to go “beyond mere compliance” in two areas: notice-and-
takedown programs and what the European Commission refers to as 
“preventive and proactive” anti-counterfeiting measures (European Commission 
2011). In relation to notice-and-takedown programs, the agreement sets out 
general principles to streamline the programs and speed up the removal of 
problematic sales listings (see Table 6.1).313 This is where eBay’s enforcement 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
311 When first released, the agreement was titled only “Memorandum of Understanding” and 
curiously, it did not contain European Commission’s logo anywhere on the document (European 
Commission 2011). 
312  For a full list of signatories to the agreements, see European Commission (2013). 
313 The agreement is based upon sets of general principles. The Commission acknowledges 
that participants are reluctant to adopt uniform standards and processes, particularly given the 
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policies changed. First, eBay streamlined and simplified its enforcement 
practices to make its notice-and-takedown process more rapid and, secondly, it 
formalized its proactive monitoring practices to remove problematic listings.314  
 
Table 6.1: Key Provisions in European Commissionʼs Agreement315 
Measures Non-binding Principles 
Notice-and-takedown 
programs 
Marketplaces agreed to institute streamlined, simplified programs 
to remove infringing listings more rapidly and effectively 
Proactive measures Marketplaces and rights holders agreed to monitor sales listings 
to prevent sales of counterfeit goods 
Penalties Marketplaces agreed to increase sanctions against repeat 
offenders 
!
Both marketplaces and rights holders had complained about poor enforcement 
practices. Rights holders argued that the platforms’ notice-and-takedown 
programs were ineffective or too slow at removing infringing listings. In turn, 
marketplaces argued that rights holders submitted notifications that were 
incomplete or too general, sometimes targeting “whole catalogues of products” 
(European Commission 2013:9). Under the agreement, marketplaces agree to 
institute notice-and-takedown programs that are “not excessively burdensome 
and simple to subscribe to, complete and process” and deal with complaints “in 
an efficient and comprehensive manner” (European Commission 2011:4, 5).  
 
Rights holders would look for infringing versions of their products and 
marketplaces would identify and prevent the sale of counterfeit goods (see 
European Commission 2011). Signatories could conduct this monitoring through 
technical (e.g., automated software) measures or analysis by humans. “You 
have to be very quick to be able to do the take down of an auction that is going 
on,” say Ruth Orchard, of the Anti-Counterfeiting Group. “You have to be able to 
do it that same day.”316 In addition to strengthening reactive and proactive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
differences among their business models and existing enforcement measures (European 
Commission 2013). 
314 In its 2008 lawsuit with Tiffany, eBay argued it undertook some proactive monitoring of its 
platform. With the European Commission agreement, however, eBay adopted proactive 
monitoring as an integral part of its enforcement efforts.  
315 Information is from the text of European Commission’s agreement (European Commission 
2011). 
316 Interview with Ruth Orchard, Director, Anti-Counterfeiting Group, England, 17 September 
2012, by Skype.  
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enforcement measures, marketplaces also agreed to sanction repeat infringers 
including “the suspension (temporary or permanent) or restriction of accounts or 
sellers” (European Commission 2011:6-7).317  
 
ii) Taobao’s Enforcement Policies 
 
Taobao’s online complaint system closely resembles that of eBay. There are 
English-language instructions for submitting complaints to Taobao, but the 
system is in Chinese.318 Rights holders must submit proof of identity,319 proof of 
ownership of the intellectual property in question, details of the intellectual 
property right,320 and hyperlinks to the relevant allegedly infringing listings  
(Spelich 2012). Once Taobao receives notifications of infringement, it notifies 
sellers of claims of infringement and discloses details of the complaint to sellers. 
If the sellers fail to contest the complaint, Taobao removes the listing. For 
complainants with “an established track record of submitting accurate and 
complete takedown notices,” Taobao undertakes removals more rapidly, usually 
within hours or a day (Taobao N.d.). The marketplace imposes escalating 
penalties on individual sellers and operators of storefronts on its marketplace 
and it may temporarily or permanently ban those who sell counterfeit goods 
(Spelich 2012).321 Taobao shames repeat infringers through a public blacklist of 
online merchants it penalizes for selling counterfeit or substandard products on 




'*& Marketplaces may consider a number of variables when determining how to discipline repeat 
infringers, including “the severity of the policy violation, the number of alleged infringements, 
repeat infringement, period of time since prior infringement, seller feedback, language that 
indicates clear intent, scale of legitimate business as well as other more suspicious behaviour, 
such as efforts to avoid detection” (European Commission 2013:11). 
'*( For information in English on how to submit a complaint to Taobao, see: 
http://qinquan.taobao.com/report/iprOperation.htm. The online complaint system itself is entirely 
in Chinese.  
'*% Taobao requires complainants provide contact information and proof of identification (e.g., 
identity card, passports and businesses license, see Spelich (2012).    
'+) Rights holders must provide a registration number, type of intellectual property (i.e., 
(trademark, copyright, invention patent, design patent, utility model patent), country of 
registration country, and period of validity. For Alibaba’s “User Guide of AliProtect for a 
Complainant” (for rights holders to submit complaints, see: 
http://service.alibaba.com/ggs//safe_trade_tips/article/User_Guide_of_AliProtect_for_a_Complai
nant_200001301.htm?channel=03#.  
'+* For example, Taobao may remove a storefront from search results in its marketplace for 
seven days, close the shop for 21 days or permanently (see Spelich 2012). 
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b) Taobao’s Memorandum of Understanding 
 
Taobao is a favourite target for rights holders because of their interest in selling 
their brands in China’s rapidly expanding population of online shoppers. As 
discussed earlier, between 2008 and 2012, the USTR listed Taobao as a 
notorious market based upon recommendations from U.S. rights holders and 
trade associations. Taobao changed its enforcement practices considerably in 
order to be released from the USTR’s Notorious Market List.  The Alibaba 
Group reported that it significantly strengthened Taobao’s notice-and-takedown 
program, increased penalties and reduced the timeframe for removing infringing 
listings (Spelich 2012). Enforcement was streamlined and more rapid. 
 
As part of Taobao’s conditions of release from the USTR blacklist, the 
marketplace worked with rights holders and signed multiple memoranda of 
understanding with trade associations and rights holders. One of those 
agreements, signed in September 2012, is with the International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC). The IACC had long pressured Taobao to 
reform its enforcement practices in the IACC’s submissions to the USTR’s 
Special 301 report.322 The IACC’s agreement with the marketplace is important 
because the IACC is a large, influential trade association that represents 
multiple multinational rights holders, including Nike, Proctor & Gamble and 
Adidas.323 Taobao approached the IACC in the summer of 2012 with an 
“interest in partnering” with the trade association to address the sale of 
counterfeit goods on its platform (IACC 2012). The private agreement is 
intended to strengthen existing enforcement standards, enhance cooperation 
between Taobao and rights holders, and improve efficiency. In the words of the 
IACC, the goal of the agreement is “to leverage available technologies to 
ensure a streamlined and efficient system for the identification and reporting of 
illicit sales through the platform, and to identify the worst offenders” (IACC 
2012). As a result of its agreement with the IACC—and Taobao’s changes to its 
enforcement practices as part of its conditions to be released from the USTR 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'++ The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, for example, regularly submits 
recommendations to the USTR in relation to its Special 301 report that target countries that its 
members consider to have insufficient protection for intellectual property rights. For the IACC’s 
submission, see: http://www.iacc.org/advocacy-and-policy.html.  
'+' These rights holders are all members of the European Commission’s agreement. For a list of 
the IACC’s rights holder members, see: http://www.iacc.org/member-companies.html!!
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list—Taobao’s enforcement practices are more streamlined, coordinated, rapid 
and efficient (Spelich 2012). 
 
IACC president, Bob Barchiesi says rights holders want Taobao to assume 
greater responsibility for online infringement occurring on its platform. "Every 
legitimate business has a shared interest, and a shared responsibility,” 
Barchiesi says, “in making sure that the online marketplace continues to 
develop as a trusted commercial platform" (IACC 2012). In a formal 
announcement of the agreement in August 2013, John Spelich, vice president 
of international corporate affairs with the Alibaba Group, said, “Our goal at 
Taobao is to be synonymous in consumers’ minds with trust and value” (IACC 
2013). In addition to its agreement with the IACC, Taobao also signed 
memoranda of understanding with the Motion Picture Association, which 
represents the film industry, and two U.S.-based rights holders – Samsonite, 
manufacturers of luggage, and Coach, a luxury apparel brand (Spelich 2012).  
 
IV) Analysis of Intermediaries’ Enforcement Measures 
 
The two private agreements examined in this chapter reflect a private regulatory 
regime that is rooted in the United States and the European Union and extends 
both across the European Economic Area and to China. Similar to the findings 
in chapters 4 and 5, coercive state pressure underpins the private agreements 
adopted by eBay and Taobao. In the marketplaces’ agreements, as with the 
regulatory arrangements discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the states involved are 
not neutral arbitrators among competing interests. The cases of eBay and 
Taobao illustrate inter-dependent interests between rights holders and the 
European Commission and with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in 
relation to the protection of intellectual property rights.  
  
Both Taobao and eBay regulate through technology with sophisticated 
monitoring and enforcement programs to detect and remove suspicious listings, 
both in response to complaints and proactively. Taobao significantly 
strengthened its enforcement practices by working with U.S. rights holders and 
trade associations in order to be released from the USTR’s Notorious Market 
List. The Alibaba Group claims that Taobao’s notice-and-takedown program is 
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more streamlined and rapid because of the pressure from the USTR (Spelich 
2012). eBay, in contrast, already had a well established notice-and-takedown 
program through its Verified Rights Owner Program. Intellectual property actors, 
however, wanted eBay to join the European Commission’s agreement to force 
eBay to undertake “a bit of proactive enforcement.”324  
 
Rights holders and brand-protection investigators interviewed for this 
dissertation generally consider eBay’s enforcement practices satisfactory but 
they claim Taobao’s efforts need more work, as is discussed in the following 
section. Criticism of Taobao, however, needs to be understood in the context 
that changes to its enforcement efforts, which occurred in 2011, are relatively 
recent. Those who work with marketplaces observe a correlation between their 
age and responsiveness to the demands of states and rights holders in relation 
to wrongdoing on their platforms. “The larger and more established the platform, 
the easier it is to deal with,” observes Tim Waring, director of Intelligence 
Technologies, a U.K. brand-monitoring firm.325 
 
i) Results of Private Enforcement Agreements 
 
In addition to strengthening its notice-and-takedown practices, Taobao, along 
with eBay, agreed to strengthen proactive enforcement efforts. Both 
marketplaces have software monitoring their platforms for potential violations of 
their policies by users and gather data on sales, products, and user activities 
and behaviour (Erickson 2011). This software extracts information including 
suspicious key words (e.g., knock-off or lookalike) and the seller’s user 
feedback, and information from the seller’s account to identify suspicious 
activities that may result in the removal of listings or penalties against the 
seller.326 
 
Detailed information about marketplaces’ enforcement efforts is not released 
publicly, but there is some indication of the scale of their proactive enforcement 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'+" Interview with Ruth Orchard, Director, Anti-Counterfeiting Group, England, 17 September 
2012, by Skype.  
'+$ Interview with Tim Waring, Director, Intelligence Technologies, England, 3 October 2012, by 
Skype. 
'+# In 2002, eBay launched a system called FADE (Fraud Automated Detection Engine) to 
detect signs of fraudulent activity (Kirsner 2003). 
Page 214 of 307 
!
!
activities. In 2011, for example, Taobao reported removing 53 million listings 
proactively, compared with 9 million listings based upon rights holders’ 
complaints (Spelich 2012). In the first six months of 2012, Taobao said it 
removed 45.2 million listings proactively, in contrast to 2.3 million through rights 
holders’ notifications (Spelich 2012). The European Commission also reports 
that marketplaces’ proactive removal of infringing listings exceeds complaints 
from rights holders. In its report on the agreement’s first eighteen months of 
operation, the Commission cited an unnamed marketplace that said it 
“voluntarily and proactively removes more potentially problematic listings than 
are removed reactively” (European Commission 2013:8). The Commission cited 
another unnamed marketplace that observed a 20% decrease in rights holders’ 
complaints while the marketplace nearly doubled its proactive removal of 
suspicious listings (European Commission 2013:15). 
 
In terms of due-process measures, the most significant problem with these 
private agreements is that there is no threshold of evidence for an infringing 
listing. What “proof is a rights owner giving to third parties like eBay?” asks 
Robert Guthrie, an associate in London with the law firm SJ Berwin. “At what 
level does eBay say that price is suspicious enough for us to pull the listing?”327 
Further, in the agreements, both eBay and Taobao consent to streamline their 
enforcement processes to facilitate the rapid takedown of mass numbers of 
infringing listings. The challenge with technologically facilitated enforcement is 
the wrongful removal of legitimate listings. Marketplaces do not have the 
requisite brand-specific knowledge to distinguish counterfeit goods across 
hundreds or thousands of brands. “They’re not experts,” explains Graham 
Robinson, managing director of the U.K. investigative firm Farncombe 
International. “There are instances where they agree to take down legitimate 
auctions at the request of rights holders. These are legitimate auctions and then 





'+& Interview with Robert Guthrie, Associate, SJ Berwin, 5 October 2012, London. 
'+(! Interview with Graham Robinson, Managing Director, Farncombe International, 28 
September 2012, London.  
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ii) Perspectives on Private Regulation 
 
Given the broad range of rights holders, trade associations, and investigative 
firms that deal with marketplaces in relation to anti-counterfeiting efforts, there 
are diverse perspectives on marketplaces’ enforcement activities. Rights 
holders participating in the European Commission’s agreement report general 
satisfaction with marketplaces’ enforcement efforts (European Commission 
2013). They favourably comment that they “experienced more pro-active 
cooperation” from marketplaces (European Commission 2012). Rights holders 
say that marketplaces seldom reject rights holders’ removal requests (European 
Commission 2013). Marketplaces and rights holders participating in the 
agreement say it “increased a sense of trust and confidence between parties” 
and has been “instrumental in opening avenues to more in-depth dialogues and 
exchanges of information” (European Commission 2012). 
 
Those interviewed for this dissertation offered mixed views on eBay. eBay is 
“very good,” remarks Susie Winter, director general of the Alliance for 
Intellectual Property, a U.K. trade association. “They’ve got their VeRO program 
and were one of the first to the table with some form of program that they could 
do. 329 Winter, however, criticizes the marketplace for allowing those kicked off 
the platform for selling counterfeit goods to register again.330 Several 
interviewees stressed that eBay should assume more responsibility. “eBay has 
certainly tried a bit,” argues Sian Croxon, a partner with the law firm DLA Piper 
in London. “It is just the sheer scale of the criminality that is still going on. It 
seems to me that you have to still question whether it’s enough.”331  
 
Gavin Hyde-Blake, director of research and investigation at the investigative 
firm Eccora, argues that eBay could “be more proactive,” but he acknowledges 
the difficulty of marketplaces being able to distinguish genuine from counterfeit 
goods. Investigators generally have a positive opinion of eBay’s enforcement 
practices. “I think on the whole we’ve had a very good experience with eBay,” 
says Alastair Gray, head of the London branch of Cerberus Investigations. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'+% Interview with Susie Winter, Director General, Alliance for Intellectual Property, 12 
September 2012, London. 
'') Ibid. 
''* Interview with Siân Croxon, Partner, DLA Piper, 14 September 2012, London. 
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“Once you’ve got relationships with people there, it’s a lot easier to deal with 
them and explain the issues behind it.”332 
 
In contrast, Taobao elicits a more negative reaction. “I consider for us the fight 
on eBay pretty much won,” comments Andrew Love, global brand protection 
manager of Specialized, the Utah-based manufacturer of high-end bicycles. “I 
consider the fight on Taobao ongoing.”333 Tim Waring, director of Intelligence 
Technologies, a brand-monitoring firm in the United Kingdom, characterizes 
Taobao as “very fastidious in the request for documentation.”334 Other 
investigative firms, in contrast, work relatively cooperatively with Taobao. Allan 
Watson, director of global operations at Gamble Investigations International in 
London, says that when his company sends complaints to Taobao “they 
comply.”335 For other investigators, establishing a relationship with Taobao was 
more difficult. “There was a learning curve,” recalls Duncan Mee, co-owner of 
Cerberus Investigations.336 Alastair Gray of Cerberus Investigations says his 
company secured cooperation from Taobao by “going to the head of their legal 
department and saying ‘this is a major problem,’” he recalls. If you don’t sort it 
out then we’re going to have to look at other ways of policing it.337 This threat of 
legal action stimulated Taobao to become “a lot more responsive,” says 
Gray.338 
 
V) State Pressure and Actors’ Interests 
 
Like the enforcement programs examined in chapters 4 and 5, the private 
informal agreements with eBay and Taobao are underpinned by the coercive 
power of the state. The European Commission and USTR pressured the 
marketplaces with threats of possible legislation (eBay) and warnings of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
''+ Interview with Alastair Gray, Head of London Cerberus Investigations, 4 September 2012, 
London. 
''' Interview with Andrew Love, Global Brand Protection Manager, Specialized, United States, 
24 August 2012, by Skype, 
''" Interview with Tim Waring, Director, Intelligence Technologies, England, 3 October 2012, by 
Skype. 
''$ Interview with Allan Watson, Director, Global Operations, Gamble Investigations 
International, 12 September 2012, London. 
''# Interview with Duncan Mee, Co-owner, Cerberus Investigations, 4 September 2012, London. 
''& Interview with Alastair Gray, Head of London Cerberus Investigations, 4 September 2012, 
London. 
''( Ibid. 
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potential economic sanctions against China (Taobao). Marketplaces are 
motivated to comply with the agreements to mitigate the risk of legal action by 
states or industry, as well as to serve their financial and reputational interests in 
a safe e-commerce environment. As was the case in the preceding chapters, 
the potential effects of secretive, private enforcement programs on consumers 
are largely overlooked.  
 
i) Role of the State 
 
The U.S. government and the European Commission played central roles in 
facilitating greater regulatory cooperation between rights holders and 
marketplaces. In the case of Taobao, U.S. rights holders and trade associations 
used the USTR’s Notorious Market List to pressure non-U.S. firms or sites, like 
Taobao, with the weight of the U.S. government behind them. The USTR 
demands that these firms institute changes outlined by rights holders before it 
releases them from the list. If the USTR faces recalcitrant actors, it can threaten 
to or impose sanctions on the country in which they are located, thus imposing 
pressure on the country to deal with the notorious market. The USTR’s Special 
301 process is a powerful tool for rights holders because it offers a way to 
pressure companies (and countries) into strengthening their protection of 
intellectual property rights that is backed by the economic leverage of the U.S. 
market (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). 
 
The European Commission had a direct role in bringing rights holders, trade 
associations and marketplaces together. It provided a sufficient threat to 
motivate cooperation among participants—a warning of legislation—and offered 
an incentive to calm the adversarial environment—a moratorium on litigation 
(European Commission 2009; European Commission 2013). The Commission 
also played an active role in coordinating negotiations amongst industry 
stakeholders in closed-door meetings between 2009 and 2010 and in pushing 
marketplaces to exceed their legal responsibilities and adopt beyond-
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ii) State and Corporate Interests in Informal Private Regulation  
 
Private enforcement agreements enable states to create transnational 
regulatory agreements and provide marketplaces a degree of regulatory 
certainty. For the European Commission, creating a private agreement enabled 
it to institute an agreement relatively quickly instead of working for years with all 
European Union member states.339 In addition, by emphasizing non-binding 
measures, the Commission established a coordinated, standardized 
enforcement framework across the European Economic Area.  
 
Legal action can be an effective tool for rights holders with the resources and 
inclination to sue or make credible legal threats; however, rights holders’ have 
varying degrees of capability and interest in doing so. Moreover, as explained 
earlier, litigation is slow, resource intensive and “returns a variety of answers by 
jurisdiction.”'") Litigation is only an effective tool when courts are likely to hold 
intermediaries responsible for infringement. In China, courts have been 
reluctant to do so (Woo 2010),341 making litigation an unhelpful tool for rights 
holders to pressure Taobao to strengthen its enforcement policies.  
 
Marketplaces, particularly eBay with its global operations, operate in an 
uncertain legal climate. This uncertainty is due, in part, to court rulings in the 
United States and Europe that have different interpretations of eBay’s 
regulatory responsibilities and the degree of responsibility it bears for third-party 
infringement on its platform (see Mac Síthigh 2013; Rimmer 2011). The 
European agreement offers rights holders and eBay relief from litigation, as 
signatories agree not to engage in litigation while participating in the agreement. 
In general, however, eBay still faces considerable legal uncertainty. This is 
because there is a lack of clarity on what constitutes an appropriate takedown 
notice and what kinds of Internet intermediaries are entitled to limited liability, 
which makes it difficult to determine compliance (McNamee 2011). In addition, 
in the United States, eBay enjoys no protection from liability under the Digital 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
''% The European Commission’s agreement took approximately two years to complete in closed-
door meetings with industry stakeholders (European Commission 2013). 
'") Interview with Jeremy Newman, Partner, Rouse Legal, 10 September 2012, London. 
'"* A lawyer working in China corroborates this point as he has found the legal system unhelpful 
for protecting his clients’ intellectual property rights. Interview with lawyer at Hong Kong law 
firm, 7 May 2012, Washington.!
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Millennium Copyright Act for its enforcement measures relating to the removal 
of sales listings for counterfeit goods, as the legislation only relates to copyright 
efforts. For eBay, striking partnerships with rights holders may provide a fragile 
but important respite from litigation, at least from rights holders that are 
signatories to the European Commission’s agreement.  
 
For Taobao the main pressure to reform its enforcement practices came 
through the USTR’s Notorious Market List. The case of Taobao nicely illustrates 
the inter-dependencies of large multinational corporations and Internet giants. 
As described earlier, U.S. and European rights holders desire an avenue into 
China’s e-commerce sector and want to ensure that Chinese consumers 
purchase authentic, branded merchandise, and, in turn, the Alibaba Group 
wants access to popular foreign brands (Jackson 2012). The Alibaba Group 
also had a larger strategic goal: it wanted to polish its corporate image to launch 
a lucrative initial public offering in the United States (Jackson 2012). Other sites 
that the USTR designates as notorious markets, such as The Pirate Bay, are 
less susceptible to pressure because they do not have similar interests in 
operating in the legal marketplace.  
 
iii) Consumers’ Interests 
 
Consumers are the missing voices in these private agreements. Similar to the 
agreements examined in chapters 4 and 5, consumers were shut out of the 
drafting and implementation of the European agreement. Although 
marketplaces and rights holders have interests in maintaining consumer trust in 
their services and products, consumers’ interests are assumed to align with 
corporate interests.  
 
The Commission identifies consumers as one of its main stakeholder groups 
(European Commission 2013). However, it is extremely problematic that the 
European agreement was drafted in closed-door, industry-only meetings. It is 
vitally important to involve consumers in regulation that is, ostensibly, carried 
out to protect them. However, seeking consumer representation after all the 
rules and procedures have been drafted significantly constrains the ability of 
such groups to participate fully and represent their members’ interests. 




The European agreement came as a “surprise” to those who study the online 
regulation of intellectual property in Europe, as intellectual property scholar 
Monica Horten noted in her blog post about the agreement (Horten 2011). No 
member of any consumer organization or civil-society group, or the general 
public appears to have been involved or consulted in the drafting of the 
agreement. In its 18-month review of the memorandum, the European 
Commission reported it “will continue to seek the involvement, and preferably 
full participation, of representative consumer organisations and civil rights 
groups” (2013:17). If any of these groups are currently involved in the 
agreement, the Commission does not list them as participants. Although little 
information is publicly available about Taobao’s agreement with the 
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, it does not appear that consumer 
groups or Taobao users were consulted. In addition to the lack of consumer 
representation, consumers can be negatively affected by secretive, 
unaccountable enforcement strategies that constrain their access to a wide 




Marketplaces represent a different dimension of the private anti-counterfeiting 
regime as they regulate legitimate trading platforms through which some 
individuals sell counterfeit goods, rather than infringing sites that may have few, 
if any, legitimate activities. Despite this, there are strong similarities to the 
elements of the regulatory regime described in chapters 4 and 5. State coercion 
was central to the creation of the marketplaces’ private enforcement 
agreements and, following the pattern established in previous chapters, the 
regime has roots in Europe, as well as in the United States. However, as the 
case of Taobao demonstrates, the regime also extends to China. U.S. rights 
holders’ use of the USTR’s Special 301 process illustrates the state-market 
condominium in which states and certain corporate actors’ interests mutually 
shape one another (Underhill 2003). Taobao’s agreement with the U.S.-based 
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, which the USTR facilitated, illustrates 
the degree to which U.S. corporate actors set standards in relation to 
intellectual property, even in China.  
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Under their private agreements, in addition to strengthening their reactive 
notice-and-takedown programs, eBay and Taobao also expanded their 
proactive enforcement efforts. Both marketplaces operate technologically 
sophisticated enforcement programs with the capacity to monitor and 
proactively remove tens of millions of problematic sales listings annually. 
Through the private agreements, states and rights holders directly shaped 
marketplaces’ enforcement practices by pressuring eBay and Taobao to 
formalize their proactive enforcement activities and adapt their technological 
processes to identify counterfeit goods through sales listings. Thus, similar to 
the situation with Google, the USTR and the European Commission, together 
with rights holders, shaped how marketplaces employ technology to regulate 
infringement. Marketplaces’ regulatory practices, which prioritize streamlined, 
proactive mass enforcement, often sacrifice precision for speed. This is a 
particular problem in relation to intellectual property where it is difficult to 
determine the legality of products through marketplaces’ sales listings (or, 
indeed, through images on a standalone infringing website). Further, state and 
industry pressure on marketplaces to shift their enforcement efforts from largely 
reactive to increasingly proactive activities can negatively affect how 
marketplaces operate in terms of the types of goods that their users are 
permitted to buy and sell. Marketplaces that rely upon automated, mass policing 
“make it more difficult for people who genuinely sell second-hand goods or old 
stock” (Horten 2011) as listings for these types of goods may be wrongly 
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Chapter 7: Private Regimes and the Public Interest 
 
To reflect upon the emergence and operation of the private regulatory regime 
discussed in the three previous chapters, it is appropriate to return to the Stop 
Online Piracy Act and the Protect Intellectual Property Act and the massive 
public backlash they generated. The defeat of SOPA and PIPA—an 
unprecedented loss for U.S. intellectual property advocates—remains a high 
point for protests against intellectual property and, more broadly, for online 
grass-roots social movements on the Internet (Sell 2013). The SOPA protests, 
the largest in the Internet’s history, made fully visible the politicisation of the 
online enforcement of intellectual property in the United States. Given the 
strongly bipartisan support in favour of strong intellectual property rights in the 
United States, the defeat of the influential-intellectual property lobby is a 
considerable achievement (Sell 2013). One of the SOPA opponents’ main 
objections was to the bills’ provisions granting corporate actors the right to 
identify and take action voluntarily against certain types of infringing sites. In 
articulating their concern, SOPA protesters tapped into wider societal anxiety 
over state and corporate actors’ power to determine what kinds of content we 
can access, share and use, what we can buy and where, and how we can use 
Internet services, technologies and platforms. The U.S. Congress, overwhelmed 
by the massive public uprising, withdrew the bills. Anti-SOPA protesters 
reasonably believed that the bills’ controversial provisions were dead. They 
were wrong.  
 
Instead, the bills’ proponents—including the U.S. administration—went 
underground. Government officials coordinated negotiations among small 
groups of industry stakeholders in closed-door meetings. The non-binding 
enforcement agreements, which incorporate SOPA-like measures, represent a 
pernicious kind of forum shifting, a shift from public law to private informal 
regulation that is undertaken in the shadows. Forum shifting is commonly used 
to refer to rights holders strategically moving among multilateral, plurilateral and 
bilateral agreements to achieve better outcomes, as well as shifting between 
different international institutions like the World Trade Organisation (Braithwaite 
and Drahos 2000; Sell 2011). Participation in these trade agreements may be 
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limited and proceedings may be secret,342 however, they occur within the public 
realm and among government officials. Although SOPA and PIPA had highly 
problematic measures, elected officials drafted and publicly debated their 
provisions, and stakeholders gave their opinions in testimony before the U.S. 
Congress.343 These bills would have been subject to judicial interpretation. 
SOPA had provisions that would enable the U.S. Congress to review its 
performance and effectiveness two years after its implementation.344  
 
In contrast, the private enforcement agreements assessed in this dissertation 
were created in the absence of judicial and legislative safeguards. Pro-
enforcement actors strategically shifted from the visible public realm to secret 
backroom deals to circumvent legislative processes and side step public 
protests. Unlike other cases of forum shifting where interested parties can 
generally observe the shift from one forum or institution to another, critics of 
SOPA have little idea that some of the bill’s provisions live on in a series of 
informal agreements among powerful U.S.-based corporations. Even now, 
these agreements are relatively unknown. They have attracted little scholarly 
attention or media coverage outside specialised technology and intellectual 
property websites.   
 
The private anti-counterfeiting regime involves a distinct constellation of 
actors—prominent multinational rights holders, macro-intermediaries and 
powerful state actors—in complex, inter-dependent relationships. Despite the 
connotations of the term “voluntary” agreements, this dissertation has 
demonstrated that the state has a paramount role in each of the informal 
agreements. More importantly, while one would expect the state to represent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
342 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, both 
led by the United States, are plurilateral trade deals with the aim of setting tough new standards 
for the protection of intellectual property rights. These agreements have been negotiated in 
secret among participating countries, although there has been extensive consultation with 
prominent corporate actors, particularly from the United States (Flynn et al. 2012).  
343 Testimony before Congress on PIPA and SOPA was largely limited to pro-enforcement 
actors, such as the Motion Picture Association of America and Pfizer, as well as Internet 
intermediaries that supported aspects of the bills, like MasterCard and GoDaddy. Google was 
the only witness invited that opposed the bills.  
344 SOPA Sec. 106 (b)(2) would have required the Register of Copyrights to submit reports to 
the Judiciary Subcommittee of the House of Representatives and the Senate on the 
enforcement resulting from the bill and any suggested amendments. While this report would 
have only covered copyright-related issues, it would have provided an indication of the overall 
progress of and problems with the legislation.!
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the public in these agreements, in practice it has largely represented the 
interests of rights holders. As a result, the public is absent from this regime and 
generally overlooked in the agreements. Proponents of these agreements argue 
that they protect consumers’ interests by ensuring consumers are protected 
from being defrauded or harmed by counterfeit goods. From this perspective, 
intellectual property actors and consumers have common interests in a safe e-
commerce environment in which consumers are not deceived or endangered by 
counterfeit products or those that are legitimate but shoddy. From a broader 
perspective, however, individuals have larger interests that include a growing 
concern over digital privacy because of state and corporate surveillance 
practices. They also have interests in good governance principles of 
transparency and accountability for state and corporate actors that undertake 
regulation in the name of protecting the public interest. These public-oriented 
interests, however, are largely absent from the informal private agreements.   
 
This chapter reflects upon the three preceding chapters to examine the inter-
dependencies and varying interests among corporate and state actors in the 
regulation of online infringement. First, the chapter summarises the private 
regulatory regime and reviews the coercive role of states in compelling macro-
intermediaries’ cooperation and constructing the regime. Then the chapter 
discusses rights holders’ capacity to pressure macro-intermediaries to accept 
their rules (i.e., private authority) and the limitations of that authority. Third, the 
chapter examines corporate interests in informal private regulation and then, in 
the fourth section, turns to examine states’ interests in the regime. Then the 
chapter examines how the regime regulates through technology and the 
attendant challenges associated with techno-regulation. In the sixth section, the 
chapter turns to the overlooked actors—consumers and the general public and 
considers the normative challenges elicited by this type of regulation. In its 
conclusion, the chapter proposes ways to raise public awareness and 
strengthen the protection of the public interest.  
I) Private Anti-Counterfeiting Regime 
 
The private anti-counterfeiting regime extends globally from its roots in the 
United States and the European Union. There are distinct U.S. characteristics 
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as all the macro-intermediaries are headquartered in the United States and it is 
through their internal terms-of-service contracts that macro-intermediaries have 
the authority to remove content or withdraw services. The regime’s regulatory 
practices diffuse outward to Canada and, more importantly, to China. For rights 
holders, China is of particular concern because of its manufacture of counterfeit 
goods that are exported to North America and Europe. China is also important 
because U.S. and European rights holders want to expand sales of their brands 
in China’s burgeoning e-shopping environment.  
 
The regime’s spatial pattern, which reaches globally from distinct U.S. and 
European roots, accords with ideas from regulatory capitalism and the non-state 
governance literature (Graz and Nölke 2008; Levi-Faur 2005). The regime 
follows a global north-south configuration in which rules and standards are set 
in the United States and Europe and then exported worldwide to shape 
standard-setting practices in other countries (Graz and Nölke 2008; Levi-Faur 
2005). Despite the scope of the regime, it is a small group of powerful 
multinational corporate actors and government officials that exert considerable 
authority in making rules and compelling participation from macro-
intermediaries. The regulatory reach of the anti-counterfeiting regime brings to 
mind the creation of TRIPS described in chapter 3, in which twelve executives 
from U.S.-based corporations set international standards to protect intellectual 
property (Sell 2003). In both that case and in relation to this private regime, a 
handful of U.S. and European corporate actors fundamentally reshaped the 
global regulatory environment for the protection of intellectual property rights.  
 
The private anti-counterfeiting regime relies fundamentally on the state for its 
existence. In relation to this regime, state strategically deploys its authority as it 
legitimises rights holders’ demands for a global online regulatory regime and 
uses coercion to bring macro-intermediaries into the regime. This conception of 
the state that governs by deploying authority and facilitating non-state regulation 
echoes ideas from regulatory capitalism discussed in chapter 2 (Braithwaite 
2005; Levi-Faur 2005). The state is a non-neutral arbitrator among competing 
industry interests. The state does not endow all corporate actors with equal 
degrees of authority as there is a distinct orientation toward ever-increasing 
enforcement standards for the protection of intellectual property rights. Despite 
Page 226 of 307 
!
!
its key role in creating and endorsing the regime, the state largely acts from the 
shadows and prefers to emphasise the regime as being driven by voluntary, 
industry-led initiatives. The narrative of “voluntary initiatives,” however, is 
inaccurate as the regime is a product of state coercion, as is discussed in the 
following section.   
 
In terms of its participants, the regime is comprised of rights holders from an 
array of industry sectors that are loosely coordinated through influential trade 
associations, particularly the U.S.-based International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition. Despite the diversity of participants, common enforcement strategies 
bind the regime. Alongside the traditional strategy of targeting infringing content, 
this regime also promotes disabling entire websites by using macro-
intermediaries to withdraw their essential technical and commercial services. 
Proponents of this enforcement approach contend it enacts revenue and access 
chokepoints to throttle unwanted behaviour and deters individuals from seeking 
content or products that infringe intellectual property rights.345 As a result of 
their adoption of the private enforcement agreements, macro-intermediaries’ 
enforcement practices are more streamlined, rapid and proactive than their 
previous efforts. Taobao, for example, reports that its proactive removals of 
infringing sales listings outnumber the listings it removes based on complaints 
from rights holders (Spelich 2012). Enforcement strategies premised upon 
macro-intermediaries’ technology-facilitated regulation, however, are troubled 
by the wrongful targeting of legitimate content and activities, as is explored later 
in this chapter.  
 
i) State Coercion Underlying Private Regulation 
 
State coercion underpins the regime. Three government agencies employed 
varying degrees of coercive pressure to compel participation from macro-
intermediaries. In the United States, Victoria Espinel, head of the Office of the 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), coordinated multiple 
informal agreements among payment, search, advertising and domain name 
macro-intermediaries. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 
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345 Interview with David Wood, Director of Anti-Piracy, British Recorded Music Industry (BPI) 
Ltd., 12 September 2012, London. 
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pressured Taobao to work with U.S. rights holders. In the United Kingdom, Ed 
Vaizey, the Under Secretary of State and Jeremy Hunt, former Secretary of 
State, pushed forward agreements covering search engines and the digital 
advertising industry through industry roundtables at the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport. In Europe, the European Commission facilitated the creation 
of a memorandum of understanding among rights holders, trade associations 
and marketplaces. In Canada, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre created an 
agreement with Visa.346  
 
a) Soft Pressure 
 
Each of the private agreements relies upon direct pressure from governments in 
the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, although the degree of 
coercion varies. At the softer end of the spectrum, government can “open the 
lines of communication” among industry actors.347 Official government support 
can stimulate industry cooperation because the “White House” can be “an 
important endorsement.”348 The European Commission “took on a novel 
function as facilitator” (European Commission 2013:5-6) to coordinate 
discussions among industry stakeholders but also threatened legislation. 
Victoria Espinel, head of IPEC, strongly encouraged payment providers to ramp 
up their regulatory efforts against infringement. Julie Bainbridge, senior brand 
protection manager at PayPal, recalls Espinel saying to PayPal, “We know 
you’re at the table being proactive but you need to do more.”349 Espinel also 
“challenged” (IPEC 2011:2) companies from the payment, search, advertising 
and domain name sectors to come up with best practices to confront 




346 As discussed in chapter 4, the CAFC, as a law enforcement agency, has authority to exert 
pressure on Visa to compel its cooperation in its anti-counterfeiting program and also has moral 
suasion to persuade Visa, particularly as the payment provider is an official partner of the 
CAFC. Visa’s experience of being threatened with criminal charges in the United Kingdom may 
also have motivated the payment provider to cooperate with informal programs in other states.  
'"& Interview with Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator, Executive Office of the President, 18 May 2012, Washington. 
'"( Ibid. 
'"% Interview with Julie Bainbridge, Senior Brand Protection Manager, PayPal, 1 July 2012, by 
telephone.  
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b) Shaming, Threats of Legislation and Legal Action 
 
In addition to softer tactics of encouragement, the states involved in the regime 
publicly criticised macro-intermediaries to force them to amend their regulatory 
practices. Google is a particular target because of its dominance within the 
search sector and because critics argue it facilitates access to infringing sites. 
Politicians in the United Kingdom and United States have repeatedly singled out 
Google for harsh words. The U.K. government’s Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, for example, denounced Google’s enforcement of online 
infringement as “derisorily ineffective” and condemned “the failure of Google, 
notable among technology companies” (House of Commons 2013:3).  
 
Behind the rhetoric of governments facilitating dialogue amongst stakeholders 
was the ever-present threat of legislation. Victoria Espinel’s discussions of 
informal regulations with macro-intermediaries took place against the backdrop 
of the U.S. Congress’ debates over COICA, PIPA and SOPA that would have 
required Internet firms and payment providers to withdraw their services from 
infringing sites. Debates over these bills began in September 2010, 
approximately the time that Espinel first brought together all the macro-
intermediaries. Espinel carried on negotiations after the U.S Congress withdrew 
the Stop Online Piracy Act in January 2012 after massive protests.350 To take 
another example, the European Commission underscored its commitment to 
facilitating voluntary arrangements with a warning that if an agreement were not 
forthcoming it would “need to consider legislative solutions” (European 
Commission 2009:11). In the United Kingdom, Jeremy Hunt at the Department 
of Culture, Media and Sport, made it clear that the government was “willing” to 
legislate search engines but wanted “industry to find a way forward” (Bradwell 
2011).  
Alongside the spectre of legislation, government actors may threaten 
corporations with legal action to motivate their compliance. The City of London 
Police threatened Visa and MasterCard with criminal charges for laundering 
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350 In May 2012, for example, just four months after the SOPA protest, three of the largest 
advertising associations in the United States announced that, after discussions with IPEC, they 
had agreed to non-binding principles to guide their members’ efforts in relation to advertising on 
infringing sites (ANA 2012). 
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proceeds of crime from copyright-infringing music sites unless they voluntarily 
terminated the sites’ merchant accounts.351 A senior office with the agency 
described its role as the “leverage” to secure payment providers’ cooperation 
with rights holders.352 The same pattern is evident in the United States. U.S. 
authorities investigated Google for accepting advertisements from so-called 
illegal online pharmacies and Google settled the case in August 2011 by 
forfeiting a record-breaking $500 million and making changes to its advertising 
practices (DOJ 2011). U.S. Department of Justice officials acknowledged that 
the forfeiture was intended to “get Google’s attention” (DOJ 2011). While 
Google was under investigation, it joined negotiations coordinated by Victoria 
Espinel at IPEC and, in December 2010, co-founded the Centre for Safe 
Internet Pharmacies along with the domain registrar GoDaddy.353  
 
c) Market Leverage 
 
The U.S. government also employs the leverage of its market to threaten 
sanctions against countries that do not implement what the U.S. government 
(and its rights holders) considers sufficient protection for intellectual property 
rights. The U.S. government can also threaten or issue sanctions against 
countries that fail to take action against companies within their borders that 
facilitate infringement of U.S rights holders. As discussed in chapter 3, U.S. 
rights holders and trade associations use the Office of U.S. Trade 
Representative’s (USTR) Notorious Market List to blacklist firms that they 
consider inadequate in their protection of intellectual property. This means that 
rights holders’ complaints have the full weight of the U.S. government behind 
them. Through the USTR’s Special 301 process, the USTR can pressure 
blacklisted firms to amend their enforcement policies and practices in line with 
rights holders’ demands for reform. If there is no action from these firms, the 
USTR has the authority to place the countries in which these firms are located 
on watch lists and apply various coercive measures, from warnings to trade 
sanctions (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002:90).  
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351 Interview with Det./Supt. Bob Wishart, Head of National Operational Delivery, Regional 
Fraud Project, City of London Police, 6 September 2012, London. 
352 Ibid. 
353 This case was not the first of its kind against Google. In 2007, for example, the U.S. 
Department of Justice fined Google, Yahoo and Microsoft a total of $21 million for accepting 
advertisements for Internet gambling, a violation of state and federal law (PR Newswire 2007).!
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The case of Taobao aptly illustrates the utility of the Notorious Market List for 
U.S. rights holders. The USTR blacklisted Taobao in 2008, demanded that the 
marketplace work with rights holders, and then released it from the list in 2012 
after Taobao made considerable amendments to its policies (Spelich 2012). 
The Alibaba Group that owns Taobao campaigned vigourously to release its 
marketplace from the list. It hired a Washington-based lobbying firm to present 
the company’s case for removal from the USTR blacklist to the U.S. 
government and trade associations (Lee 2012). It also approached the 
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition to establish a memorandum of 
understanding with U.S. rights holders (IACC 2012 and 2013). The Alibaba 
Group had an additional incentive to work to remove Taobao from the USTR 
blacklist: it wanted to court the U.S. financial industry and securities regulator to 
access the U.S. financial system so it could hold an initial public offering in the 
United States in 2014.354  
  
In summary, each of the macro-intermediaries examined in this dissertation 
faced direct state pressure through the threat of legislation or legal action. In 
addition, state actors encouraged, demanded, or publicly rebuked the macro-
intermediaries to stimulate their cooperation in relation to online infringement.  
Intellectual property actors, such as the Motion Picture Association of America, 
explicitly acknowledge the coercive nature of these informal “voluntary” 
agreements and observe, “parties are always bargaining in the shadow of the 
law” (Sheffner 2013:2). A macro-intermediary’s choice to participate in informal 
agreements depends “on what it perceives to be the legal consequence (or lack 
thereof) of continuing its current course of action, and not committing to any 
voluntary agreement” (Sheffner 2013:2). Macro-intermediaries have few options 
to decline involvement in informal regulatory regimes when the states involved 
credibly employ threats of legislation and legal action. In part, macro-
intermediaries’ adoption of the private agreements is “defensive” (Lindenbaum 
and Ewen 2012) to reduce the firms’ risk of being targeted by states or rights 
holders.  
 
Macro-intermediaries candidly acknowledge the role of government pressure in 
shaping their enforcement practices. Linda Kirkpatrick, a senior executive with 
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354 The Alibaba Group filed its initial public offering on 7 May 2012 (Owles 2014)!
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MasterCard, recalls that prior to the IPEC-facilitated private agreement, 
payment providers had “different fragmented approach[es] to attacking the 
problem” and “no formal process for addressing inquiries” (Kirkpatrick 2012). 
Advertising actors in the United Kingdom credit “political imperatives from 
government” for the rapid implementation of the Digital Trading Standards 
Group.355 As discussed, Taobao significantly altered its enforcement practices 
according to rights holders’ demands in order to be released from the USTR 
Notorious Market List. As well, the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition 
thanked Espinel for facilitating what IACC president Bob Barchiesi described as 
“unprecedented cooperation from the payment processors,” which enabled the 
creation of the IACC’s merchant-account termination program (IACC 2011). 
 
II) Nature and Limitations of Private Authority 
The nature and limitation of corporate actors’ capacity to persuade others to 
accept their rules goes to the heart of this research. In this context, as chapter 2 
noted, private authority refers to the degree to which corporate actors can 
impose their privately drafted rules and standards on and influence the 
behaviour of other corporate actors (Green 2013). Private authority is a 
relational concept. Actors must be able to convince or compel other private 
parties to accept and abide by their authority. Rights holders’ arsenal of tactics 
includes high-powered pressure, shaming, granting or withholding business 
deals, making credible threats of legal action and, where resources and 
opportunity permit, litigation. These tactics, when employed by wealthy, 
multinational rights holders or trade associations, can be relatively effective in 
compelling other private parties to adapt or adopt regulatory measures. 
 
i) Rights Holders Making Rules  
 
Some actors are easier to convince than others, or may have a lesser capacity 
to resist. Further, some corporate actors have greater resources and capacity to 
lobby the state than others, and their interests may be aligned more closely with 
the state. These interactions reflect a distribution of authority among corporate 
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355 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
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actors but preferences can shift or evolve over time. Context is also important, 
as there may be situations in which actors’ interests temporarily align or 
diverge. Advertising actors, for example, are entirely dependent upon rights 
holders because they “fund the whole industry and everyone has to meet [their] 
demands.”356 As well, what resonates with one community may be unpalatable 
in another, as was evident in the deep divide over SOPA. Some sort of 
recognition or acknowledgement of the actors’ authority by the constituency 
they propose to govern is necessary to grant legitimacy to the regulatory 
activities (Biersteker and Hall 2002; Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010).  
 
Prominent U.S. and European rights holders and trade associations have 
considerable private authority as is evident in their success over several 
decades in shaping the creation of rules and standards domestically and 
internationally (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Sell 2003). They draw upon rich 
stores of structural and discursive authority. In terms of their material resources, 
rights holders emphasise the importance of protecting their popular, multi-
billion-dollar brands and the significant economic revenue they generate. 
Coupled with this is a compelling narrative of the harmfulness of counterfeit 
goods to public safety and economic integrity. They have also successfully 
employed high-powered campaigns to persuade and force intermediaries to 
strengthen their enforcement practices. For example, in response to “years” of 
threats of legal action by rights holders, eBay created its Verified Rights Owner 
program in 1998 (Kolson, McDonald, and Pogoda 2004).  
 
ii) Constraints on Rights Holders’ Authority 
 
Private authority, while expansive for certain corporate actors, has clear 
limitations. Corporate actors have a finite array of sticks and carrots with which 
to convince others. Some actors, particularly large multinational firms, have a 
greater capacity to employ threats, as litigation requires time and resources. 
They can also offer more attractive inducements, such as greater access to 
desirable markets or licenses to sell popular products. They may use strategies 
that combine incentives and threats, or consistently employ strategies over time 
to attempt to wear down reluctant parties. Corporate actors’ authority is limited 
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356 Ibid. 
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when they encounter others with a corresponding capacity to counter their 
efforts and interests in withstanding certain regulatory arrangements or specific 
rules. This resistance may be temporary or may persist over time. Corporate 
actors’ authority may also be limited if their demands exceed their ability to 
apply a corresponding level of threat to persuade others to comply. There is a 
significant difference, for example, in Visa agreeing to process a handful of 
account-terminations voluntarily and its adoption of a private agreement to 
terminate thousands of accounts voluntarily on behalf of rights holders.  
 
In relation to the informal private enforcement agreements, intellectual property 
actors were largely unable to convince macro-intermediaries to make wholesale 
changes to their regulatory efforts. Prior to the payment providers’ enforcement 
agreement, for example, a representative from MasterCard acknowledges that 
the industry’s approach to online infringement was “fragmented” and lacking a 
“formal process for addressing inquiries” (Kirkpatrick 2012).  
 
iii) Calling Upon the State 
 
If actors are loath to expend greater resources in solo campaigns to persuade 
actors or find that their authority is limited in this regard, they can seek 
assistance from the state. This assistance may relate to creating, implementing 
or enforcing particular rules and standards. The degree of direct state 
involvement varies according to whether the topic of regulation is a matter of 
concern to the state or aligns with its interests. By constructing intellectual 
property laws that set out certain responsibilities and liabilities, the state 
arbitrates among (mostly corporate) interests.357 If called upon, the state may 
facilitate regulation. The state may endorse a particular strategy or set of rules. 
It can also act more coercively, by issuing warnings or threats to mandate 
specific action in ways that favour one group over another. 
 
For rights holders, government involvement was necessary to persuade the 
likes of Google, Yahoo, Visa, PayPal and GoDaddy to come together and 
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357 The state’s arbitration among competing industry interests is apparent in its drafting of laws 
that set out responsibilities for Internet intermediaries and conditions under which those 
intermediaries have limited immunity from liability (Haggart 2014).   
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negotiate industry-specific informal agreements. The government agencies 
involved in the regime played key roles in coordinating discussion among 
industry stakeholders. In doing so, they legitimated the concept of non-binding 
private agreements and, more broadly, intellectual property actors’ enforcement 
strategy against online infringement. They also legitimated rights holders’ 
authority to set and enforce rules and standards to protect intellectual property 
on the Internet. Rights holders’ private authority can therefore be understood as 
partly derived from the state, which accords with findings from non-state 
governance scholars (Büthe 2010; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Sassen 2002). 
State and corporate interests shape one another, and both rights holders and 
macro-intermediaries influence the state’s policy preferences and contribute to 
its goals. Rights holders, macro-intermediaries and government actors in the 
United States, United Kingdom and European Union have complex mutual 
interests, which I will explore in the following sections. In relation to the 
protection of intellectual property, corporate and state regulatory goals are 
relatively complementary and “mutually inform” one another (Peters, Förster, 
and Koechlin 2009:504).  
!
 
III) Corporate Interests in Private Informal Regulation  
 
Macro-intermediaries have varying incentives and disincentives to enter into 
informal private enforcement agreements. They face pressures to protect their 
corporate brands and platforms from infringement, and to achieve a measure of 
legal certainty in relation to their regulatory responsibilities. They also encounter 
significant enforcement costs, risk alienating their users through unduly 
aggressive enforcement efforts, and, most importantly, receive no protection 
from liability, which leaves them vulnerable to litigation from rights holders.  
 
i) Reputational and Legal Concerns 
 
Macro-intermediaries have diverse, often conflicting interests about acting as 
gatekeepers for rights holders. Like rights holders, they are concerned with 
maintaining and promoting their valuable brands and fear a loss of reputation—
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and a risk of liability—if their brands are associated with websites selling 
counterfeit goods. They also have economic interests in adopting measures that 
elicit greater consumer trust and confidence in their respective industries. eBay, 
for example, admits that if its business were associated with counterfeit goods, 
even inaccurately, it would “damage our reputation, lower the price our sellers 
receive for their items and damage our business” (eBay 2013:9). Similarly, 
those in the digital advertising community must protect rights holders’ brands as 
they “fund the whole industry.”358 As the digital advertising industry is relatively 
new, it must be particularly vigilant in maintaining rights holders’ trust because 
“one bad story could ruin a brand for a very long time.”359  
 
Internet firms and payment providers may also decide to adopt informal 
regulatory strategies in order to minimise the risk of assuming greater liability for 
infringement. Intellectual property actors recognise their role in pushing eBay 
into strengthening its policies and creating its signature enforcement program, 
the Verified Rights Owner program. For example, panellists at a 2004 
discussion on infringement described efforts to strengthen eBay’s enforcement 
measures: “It took many years to get there, by threatening to sue them under 
the doctrines of contributory and vicarious infringement” (Kolson, McDonald, 
and Pogoda 2004). Macro-intermediaries may also face legal action, fines or 
other penalties if they breach due diligence requirements. Domain registries, 
such as Verisign, can terminate their contracts with registrars, potentially 
stripping them of lucrative domain name contracts (ICANN 2012). Advertising 
actors may be fined for violations, forced to refund rights holders for ads that 
end up on infringing sites, have payment withheld, or lose their industry 
certification. These penalties provide a powerful motivation for firms to 
strengthen their enforcement policies. 
 
ii) Flexibility and Beneficial Terms 
 
Informal regulatory agreements can also offer corporate actors an opportunity to 
adopt rules that benefit their businesses. Transnational private agreements can 
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358 Interview with Amit Kotecha, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising 
Bureau, 8 October 2012, London. 
359 Ibid. 
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minimise regulatory differences among countries, which can make regulation 
simpler. Big, global Internet firms, such as Google and Yahoo “want a global 
initiative,” argues Amit Kotecha, manager with the Internet Advertising Bureau 
in London. “They don’t want to have different laws in different countries.360 
Standardised, global notice-and-takedown policies to remove infringing content 
or withdraw certain services may usefully streamline firms’ enforcement efforts 
across multiple countries. Agreements based upon non-binding best practices 
may also offer corporate actors greater flexibility and less onerous conditions 
than legislation or court-imposed requirements. SOPA, for example, would have 
imposed strict five-day timeframes on payment providers’ to respond to rights 
holders’ complaints.361 Such “artificial deadline[s]” argues Linda Kirkpatrick, 
senior executive at MasterCard, “may present impossible compliance 
challenges in some circumstances” (Kirkpatrick 2011:11).  
 
iii) Disadvantages for Macro-Intermediaries 
 
Even with the above-noted advantages of informal private regulation, there are 
risks for macro-intermediaries that sign onto private enforcement agreements. 
For macro-intermediaries, one of the major downsides of the flexibility and 
informality of informal agreements is a lack of protection from liability. Integral to 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the European Commission,s E-
Commerce Directive are provisions that shield certain intermediaries from 
liability for infringement on their platforms if they respond to rights holders, 
notice-and-takedown requests and remove the specified content.  
 
a) No Immunity from Liability 
 
Proponents for tougher enforcement measures recognise that “a constructive 
dialogue” among industry actors can help mitigate the risk of legislation and 
deliver “mutually satisfactory arrangements,” says Jeremy Newman, a partner 
with Rouse Legal in London.362 “If you’re in a litigious environment, then poor 
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'#* SOPA Sec. 102, (c)(2)(A)(i). !
362 Interview with Jeremy Newman, Partner, Rouse Legal, 10 September 2012, London.  
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old Google would be mad to be saying anything except, ‘It’s not our fault.’”363 
The European Commission recognised the adversarial legal environment 
between rights holders and macro-intermediaries and placed an embargo on 
signatories from engaging in litigation against one another because 
“cooperation is better than litigation” (European Commission 2013:4-5). While 
the European Commission agreement provides some respite from litigation, 
other macro-intermediaries are not so fortunate. In the other private agreements 
discussed in this dissertation, rights holders may sue macro-intermediaries that 
they claim are recalcitrant or negligent. Users may also seek legal action 
against macro-intermediaries that wrongfully removed their content or services.  
 
b) Costs of Enforcement 
 
Macro-intermediaries may incur significant enforcement costs depending on the 
degree to which they amend or augment their regulatory efforts. Enforcement 
programs are costly to operate when they involve the global monitoring of tens 
to hundreds of millions of transactions and users annually. Companies are 
reluctant to disclose the resources they allocate to enforcement. Publicly 
available information indicates that macro-intermediaries devote significant 
resources to enforcement. PayPal, for example, reported in 2012 having a team 
of 90 dedicated to monitoring violations of its intellectual property policies 
(Bainbridge 2012), while Taobao stated it employs 200 individuals responsible 
for intellectual property protection, including handling infringement complaints 
(Spelich 2012). In testimony to the House Judiciary Committee in 2011, 
Google’s senior vice-president Kent Walker said the search giant invested $60 
million in 2010 to prevent violations of its advertising policies (Walker 2011).  
 
Another cost of enforcement is the risk of alienating customers through the 
inaccurate removal of content or services or angering those who find 
enforcement efforts unduly aggressive or unfair. While Internet firms and 
payment providers have an interest in protecting their brands and services from 
wrongdoing, ramping up enforcement efforts against infringement may 
negatively affect aspects of their business models. Marketplaces, for example, 
argue that their businesses rely upon having a large, varied array of offerings to 
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meet consumer demand, including second-hand goods, which can be a source 
of tension with rights holders. eBay argues that some rights holders, particularly 
luxury brands, are attempting to “exact ever greater control over e-commerce,” 
which negatively affects what the marketplace can sell (eBay 2008). Similarly, 
Google has repeatedly expressed discomfort with its role as a regulator for 
rights holders. “It’s not Google’s job to go around the web to declare whether 
sites are legal or illegal,” says Theo Bertram, manager of UK public policy for 
Google, argued in relation to Google’s advertising operations (Bertram 2013).  
 
IV) State Interests In Informal Private Regulation  
 
Non-legally binding private enforcement agreements offer states particular 
benefits. They enable the states involved in the regulatory regime to continue 
their efforts to protect intellectual property. More broadly, these states can 
capitalise upon macro-intermediaries’ regulatory capacity to exert influence 
online in relation to their law enforcement and national security interests. The 
secrecy and flexibility of the agreements, which enables participants to side 
step failed and stalled intellectual property legislation, show that the agreements 
are primarily oriented toward serving certain corporate and state interests. 
   
i) Inter-dependence amongst Corporate and State Interests 
 
Regime theory helps us understand the interactions and inter-dependencies 
between corporate and state actors that construct and shape regulatory 
arrangements (Cutler, Hauffler, and Porter 1999). The private anti-counterfeiting 
regime represents a state-market condominium in which the state and certain 
influential corporate actors mutually constitute interests, policy preferences and 
regulatory strategies (Underhill 2003; see also Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
These corporate interests, however, are integrated asymmetrically into the state 
in relation to corporate actors’ structural and discursive capacity (Underhill 
2000:129 in Sell 2003:19). To those outside the regime, boundaries may appear 
blurred between state and certain corporate interests (Sheptycki 2000:12-13). In 
the case of this private regulatory regime, however, there are distinct 
arrangements of aligned and overlapping interests among rights holders, 
macro-intermediaries and the states involved. The regime’s state actors 
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arbitrate among competing corporate interests, leaving the public largely 
unrepresented. Power dynamics favour large, multinational rights holders, like 
Nike, Pfizer and Louis Vuitton with decades of lobbying successes over 
relatively recent upstarts like Google.  
 
a) Ever-Increasing Protection of Intellectual Property 
 
There are mutually interdependent interests between the state and rights 
holders and, in turn, between the state and macro-intermediaries, as well as 
some overlapping economic and reputational interests between rights holders 
and macro-intermediaries. As discussed in chapters 1 and 3, rights holders and 
states share economic interests in intellectual property, particularly states that 
have the greatest proportion of intellectual property owners. Since the 1970s, 
the United States, along with countries in the European Union, particularly the 
United Kingdom, have conceptually linked intellectual property with international 
trade and economic success (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Halbert 1997). This 
narrative is deeply engrained within these states and reveals the lobbying 
prowess of rights holders. 
 
In the United States, sentiment for the protection of intellectual property rights is 
widespread and deep-seated, as evidenced by high degrees of bipartisan 
support for this position (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). This is particularly 
evident in relation to debate over the four intellectual property bills the U.S. 
Congress considered between 2010 and 2012. Disagreements among U.S. 
legislators over SOPA and its predecessors demonstrate differing views on 
enforcement tactics considered appropriate to protect intellectual property 
rather than a fundamental questioning of the need for ever-increasing protection 
for intellectual property. As noted in chapter 3, Senator Ron Wyden, a 
Democrat, and Representative Darryll Issa, a Republican, staunchly opposed 




364 The OPEN Act has not progressed since the U.S. Congress’ withdrawal of PIPA and SOPA 
in January 2012 
Page 240 of 307 
!
!
The OPEN bill would have addressed some of SOPA,s biggest problems, as it 
removed the private right of action and filtering of the domain name system. 
However, it also affirms some of SOPA’s key provisions. OPEN would have 
retained the practice of using Internet intermediaries to withdraw services from 
infringing sites, although it only includes payment and advertising 
intermediaries.365 It also preserves the problematic provision that grants 
voluntary right of action against sites distributing pharmaceuticals in violation of 
U.S. laws.366 Wyden and Issa intended the OPEN Act as an alternative to 
SOPA. However, measures in OPEN to withdraw critical services from targeted 
sites and retain intermediaries’ voluntary rights of action indicate that these are 
now orthodox enforcement tactics among U.S. legislators. Non-binding private 
enforcement measures are deeply ingrained within the United States as some 
of the largest Internet firms and payment providers, including PayPal, Visa, 
MasterCard, Google, GoDaddy and Yahoo have adopted them. Victoria 
Espinel, as head of IPEC, promoted the benefits of informal private regulation in 
testimony before the U.S. Congress (Espinel 2012). 
 
b) Entrenched Interests and the Rising “Big Tech” Lobbying Force  
 
In the United States and the United Kingdom, interactions among legislators 
and rights holders demonstrate the latters’ capacity to shape policymaking on 
intellectual property (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Underlying rights holders’ 
success in crafting agreements at the global level are close, inter-dependent 
ties between industry and government, particularly the U.S. government. Rights 
holders and their trade associations form an entrenched lobbying force within 
the U.S. political and economic landscape (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). The 
influence of intellectual property actors stems from their efforts in the 1970s and 
1980s to get intellectual property onto the agenda of the U.S. government and 
set standards internationally for the protection of intellectual property (Sell 
2003).  
 
The role of major U.S. corporations as trade policy advisors to the United States 
was institutionalised in the USTR Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
365 OPEN 3(B). 
366 OPEN (k). 
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described in chapter 3 (Sell 2003). U.S. corporations remain involved in shaping 
international trade agreements, such as the controversial and secretly drafted 
U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.367 Further, rights holders and 
trade associations shape U.S. policymaking on intellectual property through the 
USTR Special 301 list, as shown by the case of Taobao in chapter 6. Inter-
relationships between rights holders and state actors are facilitated by the “well-
entrenched politics of money and influence,” in which rights holders generously 
finance political campaigns and, in return, enjoy preferential access in 
policymaking (Sell 2013:16).  
 
Despite intellectual property actors’ institutional advantage, Internet firms, which 
are relatively new to political lobbying, are rapidly developing their lobbying 
capacity and spending considerable funds to shape policymaking in 
Washington. Google, in particular, is fast increasing its lobbying activities and 
acumen. The search giant now ranks among the top five in corporate lobbying 
expenditures in the United States with $15.8 million in 2013, which places it 
behind General Electric at $16.1 million.368 The search giant’s top concern is 
intellectual property—issues relating to copyright, trademarks and patents.369 
Google’s current status as a lobbying giant is a stark contrast from its one-
person lobbying force in 2004 with a rank of 213th place among corporate 
lobbyists (Hamburger and Gold 2013).  
 
Alongside an increase in lobbying efforts, the U.S. technology industry is 
expanding its capacity to lobby through trade associations. As of 2012, there 
were two new, technology industry trade associations in Washington—the 
Internet Association and the Internet Infrastructure Coalition—to act as lobbying 
voices for Internet firms.370 These associations undertake advocacy work in an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
367 Although details of the TPP, which is still ongoing, are secret to the public and elected 
representatives outside the negotiating team, corporate representatives from major, 
multinational companies are involved in the negotiations (see Flynn et al. 2012). 
368 The Centre for Responsive Politics’ project OpenSecrets.org tracks corporate lobbying 
amounts. See: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2013&indexType=s.  
369 According to the Centre for Responsive Politics, Google’s three other top interests are, in 
order of priority, telecommunications, antitrust and labour, and computers and information 
technology.  
370 The Internet Association describes itself on its website as the first trade association in the 
United States for the Internet economy, see: http://internetassociation.org/. The Internet 
Infrastructure Coalition says on its site that it supports those who “build the nuts and bolts of the 
Internet,” see: http://www.i2coalition.com/about-us/. !
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array of policy areas, including data privacy and Internet governance, as well as 
intermediary liability (Internet Association) and facilitating best practices for 
addressing online infringement (Internet Infrastructure Coalition). With the 
growth of Internet firms’ lobbying capacity and the creation of these trade 
associations, it is reasonable to assume that U.S. Internet firms will shape 
policymaking in relation to intellectual property and to the Internet more 
generally, although the ways they may do so are issues for future research. 
 
c) Expanding States’ Regulatory Capacity Online 
 
In addition to the shared interests among rights holders and governments, there 
are important inter-dependencies between macro-intermediaries and the states 
involved in the regulatory regime. Macro-intermediaries enable governments to 
extend their regulatory reach online to target varying types of problems. Since 
the mid-2000s, for example, federal and state authorities in the United States 
have worked with payment macro-intermediaries to withdraw their services 
voluntarily from sites unlawfully distributing tobacco and illegal gambling sites 
(MacCarthy 2010). By working with these payment actors through non-binding 
agreements, the U.S. authorities could target these sites more effectively and 
rapidly than working through court orders. Similarly, the U.S. and U.K. 
governments both have non-governmental programs to tackle child 
pornography sites in which macro-intermediaries—from PayPal, Visa, and 
Google to GoDaddy—agree to withdraw their services voluntarily from sites 
identified as distributing child pornography.371  
 
Macro-intermediaries assist states in the online regulation of national security-
related crimes. The U.K. government, for example, operates a secretive, 
voluntary website-blocking program targeting “violent extremism” sites (Fae 
2014). Under the program, Internet service providers voluntarily block access to 
sites that the U.K. government identifies as hosting content that violates the 
country’s anti-terror laws (Fae 2014; McIntyre 2010). This program, like those 
discussed above, enables the U.K. government to adopt a flexible regulatory 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
371 In the United States, this program is part of the National Centre for Missing and Exploited 
Children and in the United Kingdom it is the Internet Watch Foundation. Internet firms 
participating in the programs terminate their payment services to targeted sites and block 
access to the sites (Laidlaw 2012). 
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approach to deal with the difficult problem of regulating illegal (and sometimes 
simply objectionable) online content. The anti-extremism program, however, 
operates in manner that is non-transparent and unaccountable and raises 
questions of how site content is classified and by whom (Fae 2014; McIntyre 
2010).372 Such challenges, which are inherent to private informal regulatory 
efforts, are explored in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
Macro-intermediaries can also enable states to expand their online surveillance 
capacity to serve states’ national security interests. Bruce Schneier, a well-
known Internet security analyst, argues that surveillance is the business model 
of the Internet (Schneier 2013). Companies like Google, Microsoft, Facebook 
and Twitter track their users, monitor interactions and record transactions 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). Eric Schmidt, Google’s outspoken chief 
executive officer, candidly acknowledges his company’s interest in 
accumulating information on its users:  
 
With your permission you give us more information about you, about your 
friends, and we can improve the quality of our searches. We don't need 
you to type at all. We know where you are. We know where you've been. 
We can more or less know what you're thinking about (Thompson 2010). 
 
Schmidt’s comment, while admittedly a relatively extreme example of corporate 
surveillance, demonstrates the importance that Internet firms place on 
amassing personal data that they can then mine for commercial purposes. 
Macro-intermediaries are valuable to state security programs like the U.S. 
National Security Agency (NSA), because of firms’ vast troves personal and 
commercial information on their users. Revelations from Edward Snowden’s 
leaked files reveal that the NSA heavily depends upon siphoning data from 
companies Google, Yahoo, Facebook and others (Ball, Border, and Greenwald 
2013; Schneier 2014). 
 
Both corporate and state actors have interests in preserving—and expanding—
Internet firms’ corporate surveillance programs, despite public or political 
concerns about privacy. These parties also have shared interests, although 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
372 The U.K. Home Office refuses to release a listing of the industry participants in this program 
or the list of sites that are blocked. In July 2013, the U.K. government confirmed it was blocking 
1,000 sites (Fae 2014; McIntyre 2010).!
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sometimes differing goals, in shaping policies and standards relating to Internet 
infrastructure and services. For example, on the issue of data retention and 
storage, their interests are relatively aligned in favouring broadly conceived 
standards in relation to the collection, retention and use of personal data. The 
situation is somewhat different in the case of encryption. As revealed by the 
Snowden files, the NSA has worked strategically to weaken encryption 
standards to facilitate the agency’s ability to siphon information from all corners 
of the Internet. Firms that offer Internet services and infrastructure, in contrast, 
must protect their systems, users and business partners from risks including 
malware, that may result from using flawed, weakened code.373  
 
In sum, by working with macro-intermediaries, the U.S. government is 
embedding its national security apparatus within Internet firms’ platforms and 
services (Ball, Border, and Greenwald 2013; Schneier 2013). The U.S. 
government is also entrenching itself into the standard-setting architecture of 
the Internet where it can shape policies, like those relating to intellectual 
property, security and data storage, that benefit its strategic economic and 
national security interests.    
 
ii) Flexibility and Secrecy: Plausible Deniability 
 
Informal private regulation offers states particular benefits, such as flexibility to 
side step controversial, stalled or failed legislation. Avoiding the sometimes-
fractious public debates relating to legislation by drafting measures in secret 
can be a valuable feature for scandal-weary states. The U.S. and U.K. 
governments, facing unpopular, flawed legislation and delays in implementing 
legislation intensified their support for non-binding private measures. By working 
with industry stakeholders informally, IPEC avoided the controversy that still 
surrounds the Stop Online Piracy Act. Government officials are wary of “being 
SOPA-ed” (Goldman 2012), which is a neologism that refers to massive, 
unpredictable protests against intellectual property policies. For the U.K. 
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'&' Following details from the Snowden files that the NSA covertly intruded into the systems of 
Google and Yahoo, Internet firms encrypted previously unprotected systems or upgraded their 
encryption systems (Greenwald and MacAskill 2013). 
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government facing the stalled Digital Economy Act,374 private agreements 
offered an opportunity to bypass legislative problems and pressure industry 
actors into taking informal enforcement activities. 
 
Secrecy can be useful to coax reluctant industry actors into negotiations that 
they may otherwise be hesitant to participate in publicly. The U.K. Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport, for example, invited representatives from civil-
advocacy and consumer groups to an industry roundtable meeting following 
public pressure. A civil-society representative who live-tweeted one of the 
meetings reported industry participants were concerned about “too much 
transparency and ‘subjective’ reporting” by civil-advocacy groups (Firth 2011). 
The civil-society groups were not invited to subsequent roundtables.375 
 
States can also use informal regulation to encourage private-sector 
stakeholders to establish an industry consensus, at least among the big players, 
on which legislation could be based. Once industry groups establish informal 
agreements, particularly those with industry-wide consensus, they can be 
difficult to alter. In the United Kingdom, for example, former Secretary of State 
Jeremy Hunt told search engines that the government would prefer that industry 
set rules, but would consider legislation if necessary.376 The European 
Commission expressed a similar sentiment in relation to the regulation of 
counterfeit goods in marketplaces (European Commission 2009).  
 
Governments can employ or rely upon private regulation to bypass traditional 
legal jurisdictional boundaries. Victoria Espinel, head of IPEC, argued that 
voluntary, industry-led regulation enables governments to have an “impact on 
websites that are beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement agencies” (Bason 
2012). Governments can also capitalise upon private enforcement efforts to 
export their preferred regulatory mechanisms globally. The U.S. Food and Drug 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'&" The Digital Economy Act targets copyright-infringing sites by requiring Internet service 
providers (ISPs) to pass on warnings to those making unauthorised downloads and then cut off 
their access to the Internet. Implementation has been delayed until 2015 because of 
disagreements between rights holders and ISPs over who should bear the costs of the system 
(BBC 2013).  
375 The civil-advocacy groups Open Rights Group was invited to the meeting on 7 December 
2011 and then disinvited thereafter.  
'&#!Minutes from the Search Roundtable Discussion with Rights Holders and Search Engines in 
November 2011 (see Bradwell 2012). 
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Administration (FDA), for example, asks domain registrars to withdraw their 
services voluntarily from thousands of sites that the FDA identifies as illegal 
online pharmacies, as the FDA lacks jurisdiction over sites not based in the 
United States (GAO 2013). This strategy enables the FDA to extend its reach to 
govern actors outside its legal jurisdiction and globally impose U.S. policies on 
pharmaceutical distribution and pricing, which favours large U.S. 
pharmaceutical interests (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002).  
 
V) Regulation through Technology 
 
Techno-regulation, the deliberate shaping of human behaviour through 
technology, explains rights holders’ shift toward macro-intermediary-facilitated 
enforcement and the use of technological chokepoints to control online 
infringement. One of the principles of techno-regulation is the mutual shaping of 
technology and politics (Brey 2005; Leenes 2011). Regulators—states, rights 
holders, and macro-intermediaries—shape technology to govern behaviour and, 
in doing so, imbue the technology with certain values, concepts and norms 
(Brey 2005).  
 
Macro-intermediaries, for example, are not “natural” gatekeepers: proponents of 
stronger enforcement conceptualised the firms as well-placed, effective, and 
skilled regulators of online infringement (e.g., Castro, Bennett, and Andes 
2009). Further, intensive pressure from states in the form of threats of 
legislation and legal action, along with years of campaigning from rights holders, 
transformed macro-intermediaries into gatekeepers responsible for policing their 
platforms for third-party infringement. Advocates for greater enforcement also 
shifted the enforcement approach from removing problematic content to 
disabling infringing sites. Thus, intellectual property actors shaped the 
enforcement strategies and techniques that they consider appropriate (e.g., 
withdrawing services from infringing sites). By pushing for streamlined, 
simplified enforcement practices, rights holders also constrained—inadvertently 
or deliberately—macro-intermediaries’ due-process mechanisms, as rapid, 
mass enforcement is generally incompatible with robust oversight and appeal 
measures.  
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i) Politics Shaping Technologies 
 
Macro-intermediaries’ anti-infringement enforcement practices did not simply 
evolve but, as discussed above, were constructed and shaped through ongoing 
interactions with state and non-state actors in a process that demonstrates 
politics shaping the use of technology (Bendrath and Mueller 2011:1156).  
Macro-intermediaries amended and altered their practices in response to 
existing laws, rights holders’ lobbying and litigation, judicial rulings, and 
governments’ threats of legislation and legal action. Intellectual property actors, 
for example, acknowledge their role in shaping companies’ enforcement 
practices and take credit for pushing eBay toward creating its Verified Rights 
Owner program.377 Similarly, macro-intermediaries created enforcement 
programs to ensure their compliance in relation to the European Commission’s 
E-Commerce Directive. Legislators also shaped enforcement efforts by 
demanding specific types of technological regulation. For example, Jeremy 
Hunt, former Secretary of State at the U.K. Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, called upon search engines to demote infringing sites in their search 
indices.378 In this case, the demand was for search engines to re-configure their 
webpage-indexing and ranking processes to de-prioritise infringing sites and 
thereby elevate legitimate sites.  
 
Macro-intermediaries’ technologically facilitated enforcement processes are not 
neutral bits of code. Google, PayPal and others created their enforcement 
programs to protect their platforms and users from various types of wrongdoing, 
such as fraud or malicious attacks. This technology is both real, in that it 
performs specific tasks, and constructed because it is imbued with certain 
norms, ideas and cultural values. These values and norms stem from those who 
created the technology and the companies that operate, as well as intellectual 
property actors. For example, the European Commission’s E-Commerce 
Directive does not impose a general obligation for intermediaries to monitor 
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377 Interview with Siân Croxon, Partner, DLA Piper, 14 September 2012, London. 
'&(!Minutes from the Search Roundtable Discussion with Rights Holders and Search Engines in 
February 2012 (see Bradwell 2012).  
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their platforms for third-party infringement.379 However, states—on behalf of 
rights holders—compelled macro-intermediaries to monitor their platforms 
proactively, thus imposing an obligation to monitor. Intermediaries thus became 
gatekeepers responsible for detecting and determining the legality of content 
and transactions.  
 
Macro-intermediaries expanded their monitoring technologies to scan their 
platforms proactively but, because they do not have the requisite knowledge to 
distinguish genuine products from suspicious ones, they are dependent upon 
rights holders’ indicators of authenticity for thousands of brands. Denise Yee, 
senior trademark counsel at Visa, admits that the company is “not well 
positioned” to identify infringement. Further, “where legality is not clear, we have 
no authority to decide what is lawful. We are then forced into the precarious 
position of either agreeing with the IP owner or the merchant” (Yee 2011:13). 
Rights holders have shaped macro-intermediaries’ proactive measures as they 
determine what constitutes authenticity and compile indicators of suspicious 
activity that they provide to macro-intermediaries to facilitate their enforcement 
activities.380  
 
ii) Drawbacks to Regulating through Technology  
 
Regulation through technology offers considerable benefits for regulators like 
speed and the capability to police mass populations but there are drawbacks. 
Underlying the regime’s proactive enforcement efforts is the assumption that 
counterfeits (physical goods) can be identified and distinguished from legitimate 
goods by scanning the products’ photographs and text descriptions (digital 
information) for anomalies. Some cases are obvious, for instance, if the seller 
labels the goods as “replicas” to indicate their identical appearance to genuine 
branded goods. In other cases, it is extremely difficult to determine whether a 
product is genuine or not.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
379 The E-Commerce Directive Art. 47 prevents member states from imposing a general 
obligation on service providers to monitor their platforms but allows monitoring in a specific 
case.  
380 For example, rights holders and trade associations provide training to intermediaries to 
facilitate their identification and policing of counterfeit goods. They also provide brand-specific 
information so these intermediaries can distinguish between genuine and suspicious goods.  
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Technology is not only a socially constructed tool: it may also cause unintended 
consequences and collateral damage to legitimate users. While automated 
systems speed up the identification and targeting of suspicious activities, these 
systems can also result in the wrongful identification and targeting of legitimate 
content and legally operating sites. As macro-intermediaries process more 
complaints and police more transactions, mistakes—and abuse—inevitably 
occur. Internet actors recognise that inaccurate takedowns are a problem. Theo 
Bertram, Google’s Public Policy Manager in the U.K., told the U.K. 
government’s industry roundtable on intellectual property that search engines’ 
notice-and-takedown program were subject to problems, including competitors 
improperly removing legitimate content.381 Legitimate sites, particularly those 
run by small businesses and individuals, are poorly equipped to defend 
themselves against heavy-handed enforcement practices. Despite the problem 
of wrongful takedowns, few complainants are held liable for bad-faith 
accusations. Further, rights holders have few incentives to be more specific in 
their targeting of wrongdoing or to react to unjustifiable takedowns, as civil-
advocacy groups note (Samuels and Stoltz 2012).382 
 
a) Weak Due-Process Measures 
 
Regulatory programs that rely upon technology-facilitated enforcement have 
relatively weak due-process mechanisms. Rights holders have an interest in 
determining infringement quickly, broadly and at a minimal cost. Testing 
purchases—buying and examining a suspicious product—is generally accepted 
as the most accurate way to determine whether a product is counterfeit or 
genuine. Test purchases, however, can be “tricky if you’ve got a site selling very 
expensive goods,” notes Siân Croxon, a partner in London with the law firm 
DLA Piper.383 As part of their efforts to streamline their enforcement processes, 
some Internet firms and payment providers no longer insist upon test 
purchases. Visa, MasterCard and PayPal do not require rights holders to make 
test purchases as part of the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition’s 
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381 Minutes from the Search Roundtable Discussion with Rights Holders and Search Engines in 
February 2012 (see Bradwell 2012). 
382 Although complainants must attest to Internet firms that their submissions are accurate, few 
complainants are held liable for bad-faith accusations, similar to the case of wrongful takedowns 
in relation to digital-copyright infringement (see Samuels and Stoltz 2012). 
383 Interview with Siân Croxon, Partner, DLA Piper, 14 September 2012, London. 
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merchant-account termination program (Montanaro 2012). The European 
Commission also does not require rights holders to conduct test purchases in its 
agreement (European Commission 2013).  
 
Macro-intermediaries’ appeal mechanisms vary widely in terms of their formality 
and ease of use. Taobao, for example, has a structured online appeals process 
that uses the same system that rights holders use to lodge complaints (Spelich 
2012). Measures among U.S.-based ad networks, in contrast, are much more 
under-developed. The ad networks’ private agreement only stipulates that the 
networks “may consider any credible evidence provided by the accused site in 
defense of the site” in response to a complaint of infringement (Ad Networks 
2013). MasterCard’s appeal system is complex as it operates through acquiring 
banks. Site operators who wish to challenge the termination of the MasterCard 
account must demonstrate to the acquiring bank that issued the merchant 
account that they are in compliance with the payment industry’s rules and prove 
compliance through documentation from a certified forensic examiner 
(MasterCard 2013). While some macro-intermediaries operate relatively robust 
appeals mechanisms, like Taobao, others raise concerns that operators of 
legitimate sites and merchants would have difficulty or lack resources to 
navigate through macro-intermediaries’ systems to launch appeals.  
 
VI) Missing Voices: Consumer Interests in the Private Regime 
 
Consumers and the public more generally are largely absent from corporate 
anti-counterfeiting efforts despite rhetoric from government agencies, 
intellectual property actors and macro-intermediaries about protecting 
consumers’ interests. The mantra of consumer protection underlies anti-
counterfeiting measures, whether public or private, because trademarks are 
intended to serve a public good. Trademarks grant rights holders the ability to 
preserve their brands. They are also intended to prevent the likelihood of 
confusion among consumers by enabling individuals to differentiate among 
goods in the marketplace.384 Consumers rely upon trademarks for information 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'(" The terms “likelihood of confusion” and “confusingly similar” refer to the standards that form 
part the test to determine trademark infringement. For a valuable analysis of the difficulties and 
problems with determining trademark infringement, see Bone (2012).  
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about products and as indicators of a product’s quality or consistency. Rights 
holders and macro-intermediaries have interests in protecting consumers from 
being defrauded or harmed. Rights holders want to ensure that consumers 
retain trust in their brands and keep purchasing their products, while Internet 
firms and payment providers want to maintain users’ confidence in their 
services.  
 
Two of the private agreements underline the importance of consumers. The 
European Commission cites the education and protection of consumers as one 
of its primary reasons for creating an informal private agreement to tackle the 
online sale of counterfeit goods (European Commission 2013). The ad 
networks’ agreement commits participants, including Google and Yahoo, to an 
“ongoing dialogue” with stakeholders including “consumer organizations, and 
free speech advocates” (Ad Networks 2013). Despite the emphasis on 
consumers’ interests, consumers’ representatives are curiously absent from all 
aspects of the private enforcement agreements. There was no participation 
from consumer groups in the creation of any of the agreements. Nor is there 
any indication of consultation with consumer groups in relation to the operation 
of the agreements.  
 
i) Consumers’ Interests in Marketplaces 
 
As discussed throughout this dissertation, the interests of consumers and 
multinational corporations are not always aligned. In terms of online shopping, 
individuals have interests in buying and selling a wide range of products at 
differing prices from online marketplaces. The popularity of consumer-to-
consumer marketplaces, like eBay and Taobao, indicates that consumers want 
a wide variety of products and value being able to act as small-scale merchants.  
 
For those purchasing goods on these marketplaces, anti-counterfeiting 
enforcement activities can unduly and unfairly restrict consumers’ access to 
legitimate goods, particularly those that may be unpopular with rights holders. 
eBay, for example, contends that some rights holders are using the issue of 
counterfeit goods to set rules governing the online distribution of their products, 
particularly in relation to the distribution of luxury brands. eBay claims that these 
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rights holders are unfairly attempting to “exact ever greater control over e-
commerce,” which negatively affects what the marketplace can sell (eBay 
2008). For rights holders, marketplaces’ practice of mass policing is a desirable 
enforcement strategy and consumers benefit from the removal of fraudulent or 
unsafe products from the marketplace. Rights holders and consumers have 
shared interests in a secure, effectively functioning e-commerce environment, 
as well as a healthy, vibrant Internet. However, enforcement practices that 
enable rights holders to determine the legitimacy of products without physical 
evidence and remove genuine products because they object to their online sale 
at particular price points are unduly broad and unfair to consumers.  
 
i) Negative Economic Effects of Informal Private Agreements 
 
Looking beyond consumers, private informal anti-counterfeiting efforts can have 
negative effects on business and the Internet as a whole. With respect to firms, 
given the scale of corporate anti-counterfeiting activities and the reliance upon 
automated tools, legitimate marketplace merchants and website operators are 
undoubtedly being swept up in enforcement dragnets. Analysis of wrongful 
removal of copyright-infringing content (e.g., Urban and Quilter 2006) shows 
that mass policing of intellectual property is neither targeted nor accurate.  
 
Enforcement efforts that target the sale of counterfeit goods through 
marketplaces may inadvertently capture small-scale merchants who legitimately 
sell second-hand or overstock goods, or resell wholesale quantities of goods. 
The sale of such goods can be a point of contention with rights holders who 
wish to control the online distribution of their products or discourage the sale of 
second-hand products because of fears that these sales may damage their 
brand’s reputation or cut into their customer base. Rights holders, for example, 
have ordered multiple eBay sellers to stop offering second-hand Coach purses 
(Masnick 2011).385 As eBay and Taobao increase their proactive enforcement 
capacities, legitimate merchants will likely be mistakenly targeted.  
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385 According to eBay sellers in the class action lawsuit against Coach, the luxury brand claimed 
that their sales listings for second-hand Coach products infringed its trademarks and eBay 
removed the listings (Masnick 2011).  
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Macro-intermediaries that enact technological chokepoints can inadvertently 
throttle legitimate activities alongside unwanted behaviour. Proponents of this 
strategy say it can “shrink the universe” of Internet firms that provide services to 
infringing sites (Johnson 2013). The goal is to push infringing sites away from 
mainstream, legitimate service providers toward less-reputable firms. Legitimate 
merchants, however, may be negatively affected by the loss of payment or 
domain name services. These individuals can be understood as “stranded 
citizens” (Brown and Marsden 2013:183) that typically do not have the 
resources or knowledge to challenge allegations of infringement, particularly 
when accused by large, multinational rights holders. Appeal mechanisms are 
often complex and merchants may be unsure of their legal rights and unable to 
afford legal representation. 
 
a) Anti-Competitive Behaviour 
 
Anti-competition effects are another potential problem. The eight private 
enforcement agreements studied in this dissertation involve global firms that 
dominate the provision of key Internet services in relation to search, advertising, 
payment, domain names and marketplaces. Intellectual property actors and 
macro-intermediaries recognise the challenge of avoiding anti-competitive 
behaviour—or the perception of such behaviour—in relation to their private 
agreements. Linda Kirkpatrick, a senior executive with MasterCard, referred to 
the issue when she spoke alongside colleagues from PayPal and Visa on a 
panel at a conference hosted in 2012 by the International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition in Washington. “Some of us are competitors in our space,” Kirkpatrick 
notes. “It’s not often that you get MasterCard, PayPal and Visa on the same 
panel. Our lawyers don’t let us” (Kirkpatrick 2012). Kirkpatrick’s comments 
indicate that these big payment providers are sensitive to the perception that 
coordinated standard setting and enforcement efforts could be construed as 
anti-competitive actions.  
 
Payment providers—of all the macro-intermediaries studies—have the 
strongest regulatory capacity because they can commercially cripple targeted 
sites by withdrawing payment-processing facilities. Site operators that lose their 
payment services can institute alternative payment methods but these methods 
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have to be trusted, popular and effective to attract consumers. Through their 
private enforcement agreements, PayPal, Visa, MasterCard and American 
Express have significant discretion (and, more importantly, state support) to 
take action against sites that they reasonably believe are involved in 
infringement. As discussed in chapter 4, PayPal takes a particularly aggressive 
approach to determining infringement and has withdrawn payment processing 
from companies that offer services PayPal that contends are a high risk for 
facilitating infringement (Enigmax 2013; Ernesto 2012). The companies PayPal 
targets include those offering virtual private networks, BitTorrent file sharing 
protocol, and file storage services, all of which arer legal, valuable technologies 
with legitimate uses. PayPal can set the conditions under which companies and 
individuals use its services but the firms’ targeting of legal technologies and 
services is unduly broad and unfair to legitimate companies and their users.  
 
Similar problems are evident in relation to domain name and search/advertising 
macro-intermediaries. Returning to the Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies 
discussed in chapter 5, consumers have interests in accessing safe, affordable 
medicine and benefit from enforcement activities that remove pharmacies 
selling dangerous, misbranded or adulterated medication. However, it is 
problematic when corporate actors with financial ties to the pharmaceutical 
industry (for example, the pharmacy-verification firm, LegitScript) have the 
authority to designate online pharmacies as “illegal” and then request macro-
intermediaries to withdraw their services. Proper safeguards and oversight 
mechanisms are not readily apparent in this area, which raises the troubling 
possibility that legitimate pharmacies may be targeted and lose critical services. 
Through the Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies, rights holders and macro-
intermediaries have the capacity—and the support of the U.S. government—to 
shape the online distribution of medication in ways that can benefit the 
pharmaceutical industry over consumers. 
  
Similarly, Google is wrongly removing legitimate search results, sometimes 
because of abusive complaints, (Urban and Quilter 2006).386 This problem will 
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386 Urban and Quilter (2006) observe that some of the wrongful removals they study are from 
corporate actors who target their competitors’ websites and send erroneous takedown 
complaints to Google.  
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only grow as Google removes ever-increasing numbers of allegedly infringing 
search results. In terms of advertising, as discussed in chapter 4, industry-
generated blacklists to prevent the placement of ads on infringing sites have the 
potential to censor sites mistakenly labelled as infringing and stifle businesses 
that may pose a threat (e.g., the next “YouTube”) to the established corporate 
interests and business models. Industry-generated blacklists have a troubled 
history of wrongly designating legitimate sites as infringing (Ernesto 2011), a 
problem that is compounded when the blacklists are compiled secretly and 
implemented without effective oversight and auditing processes.  
 
In summary, macro-intermediaries—particularly payment providers—can act as 
private arbiters in relation to the legality of specific firms, and, more broadly, in 
relation to Internet services, technologies and applications. This sledgehammer 
approach to enforcement can retard innovation and constrain the development 
of new services and technologies that rights holders may argue facilitate 




As the preceding discussion shows, the states involved in the private anti-
counterfeiting regime play a central, if hidden, role. The European Commission, 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and the Office of the Intellectual 
Property Enforcement Coordinator cajoled and coerced macro-intermediaries 
into negotiations with rights holders and endorsed the resulting private, non-
binding enforcement agreements. These state actors largely operate from the 
shadows and through closed-door meetings that are off-limits to consumer or 
civil-advocacy groups. Instead of operating openly, the states involved in the 
regime strategically under-play their role as architects of the regime and 
emphasise the voluntary nature of the agreements.  
 
A responsibility of government is to promote and protect important public policy 
initiatives, such as competition, freedom of expression, and due process. The 
states involved in the private regime have the capacity to reshape the regulatory 
efforts to represent public interests. These state actors, however, stress, but do 
not demand that corporate actors follow established principles of good 
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governance. By offloading responsibility for good governance principles to the 
regime’s corporate actors, the government agencies involved in the regime are 
abdicating their duty to represent the public interest. Given the secrecy of the 
regime’s creation and activities, there has been little public awareness of the 
regime or its activities.387  
 
i) Locating the Public Interest in Private Regulatory Regimes 
 
In July 2013, following the announcement of the ad networks’ best practices, 
Victoria Espinel praised the agreement and said all enforcement must be 
consistent with “the Administration’s broader Internet policy principles 
emphasizing privacy, free speech, fair process, and competition” (Espinel 
2013). These principles are laudable, however, the private agreements fall far 
short. These agreements have weak procedural measures and serious 
normative challenges, in part, because they were created in secret to side step 
the difficulties of drafting and implementing legislation, as well as the 
controversy that accompanied SOPA in the United States and the Digital 
Economy Act in the United Kingdom. Industry and government actors designed 
the agreements to give corporate actors significant latitude to target and control 
online infringement and the ability to do so in relative secrecy. Some rights 
holders and macro-intermediaries are reluctant to disclose their enforcement 
efforts publicly because of fears of angering or alienating their customers, or 
damaging their brand by admitting problems with infringement.388  
 
For these reasons, these agreements are deeply problematic and seriously 
flawed. Given the interest of these governments in facilitating secretive private 
regulation on the Internet, they do not represent consumers’ interests or those 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
387 Traditionally, however, states have been very poor at protecting consumers’ interests, which 
is why many consumers’ rights campaigns are grass-roots efforts that pressured states to act, 
often against entrenched economic interests. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000:609-611) examine 
the gap between what citizens want (often better, higher standards of regulatory protection) and 
what citizens get (often lower standards of regulatory protection) and conclude that this is 
largely because of regulatory capture of states by business, similar to the case of intellectual 
property protection on the Internet.   
388 A senior policy advisor with the Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator 
told me that, “in a post-PIPA and post-SOPA world,” private-sector companies are “reluctant to 
identify publicly the measures they are taking online to address infringements of intellectual 
property.” Interview with Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator, Executive Office of the President, 18 May 2012, Washington. 
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of the general public. Further, in their push to expand corporate regulation that 
is based upon mass online surveillance and policing, the states involved in the 
private anti-counterfeiting regime are actively undermining fundamental digital 
rights, particularly privacy.  
 
ii) Toward a Digital Bill of Rights  
 
Given these significant challenges, how can we begin to address the problems 
inherent in this case of private regulation and, in particular, bring the public (and 
public interests) back into the picture? It is not practical to look to the corporate 
actors participating in the private anti-counterfeiting regime. While these actors 
are powerful multinational companies with varying degrees of influence with the 
state, they have stronger interests in facilitating informal private regulation than 
resisting this type of regulation. More importantly, it is not possible to rely upon 
the government agencies involved in the regulatory regime from the United 
States, United Kingdom and European Union. These agencies have abdicated 
their duty to represent the public interest and protect fundamental due-process 
measures. In part, these states are unwilling to address consumers’ interests 
because there is a lack of public pressure. However, as is discussed below, 
public pressure on the regime can come through a push for greater 
transparency.   
 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to propose a framework to guide 
transnational activism on this subject. However, it is important to outline 
possible first steps toward this goal based on this dissertation’s analysis and 
findings. Two key themes that emerge from my analysis of the private 
enforcement agreements are the necessity of transparency and the vital 
importance of protecting Internet users’ digital privacy and, more broadly, digital 
rights. Transparency is sorely lacking in these agreements, particularly in those 
coordinated by the U.S. and U.K. governments. Neither government, moreover, 
is especially enthusiastic about disclosing information in relation to the 
agreements.389 State transparency is deficient, thus, a push for industry 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
389 The U.K. Department for Culture, Media and Sport first only released information on its 
industry roundtables through freedom of information requests but later published minutes from a 
May 2013 meeting on its departmental website. In contrast, the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, which hosts the Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, denied a 
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transparency is a possible interim step to begin to raise public awareness of 
informal private regulation on the Internet and to stimulate a much-needed 
critical discussion of regulatory accountability and legitimacy in this area of 
governance.  
 
a) A Call for Transparency 
 
As will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter, companies use 
industry transparency reports to disclose their enforcement activities on behalf 
of governments and rights holders. These reports, if undertaken in a manner 
similar to Google’s Transparency Report, would provide valuable data on the 
scale of corporate anti-counterfeiting efforts, trends in enforcement, and details 
of complainant (rights holders) and enforcement actors (macro-intermediaries). 
Regular disclosures could enable researchers and practitioners to track and 
suggest correctives in relation to errors, unfair or unduly harsh enforcement 
practices, and systematic problems in relation to weak due-process measures.  
 
Persuading macro-intermediaries to adopt transparency reports in relation to 
their informal regulatory efforts against online infringement will be challenging. 
However, many U.S.-based Internet firms are now mindful of the value of 
transparency reports, as will be discussed in chapter 8. Their interest in 
disclosing their regulatory efforts on behalf of states came because of a public 
backlash, as a result of Edward Snowden’s leaked files, against firms that 
supply information to the U.S. National Security Agency.  
 
b) Marco Civil – a Useful Roadmap 
 
In terms of working towards a framework for digital rights, a useful example can 
be found in Brazil. On April 23, 2014, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff 
passed a trailblazing bill, the Marco Civil da Internet, which translates as the 
“Internet Bill of Rights” into law.390 It is the first of its kind in the world. For the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
freedom of information request pertaining to payment providers’ informal agreements citing 
confidential trade information (Masnick 2014).   
'%) An English-language version of the Marco Civil law is available here from InfoJustice.org, a 
civil-advocacy group: http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Marco-Civil-English-
Translation-November-2013.pdf  
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purposes of this dissertation, the Marco Civil provides a useful roadmap both in 
terms of the way it was created and its content.391 After policymakers drafted 
the first iteration of the bill in 2009, there was an 18-month public consultation 
period through an open-access online platform. Access, a transnational digital 
rights group that campaigned for Marco Civil, describes the consultative 
process:   
 
It was truly a hybrid and transparent forum: users, civil society 
organizations, telcos, governmental agencies, all provided comments side-
by-side. Each contributor could see the others’ contributions, and all cards 
on the table had to be considered (Access 2014). 
 
Nearly 2,000 people provided comments on the bill and the government then 
incorporated these amendments into the next version of the bill (Biddle 2014). 
This open process facilitated debate among all interested parties, not just 
powerful corporate stakeholders, and allowed a diversity of opinions. Further, it 
put into practice the oft-lauded but rarely exercised principle of multi-
stakeholder consultation.392 
 
Marco Civil covers a wide range of issues, from intermediary liability and net 
neutrality to privacy. Importantly, it establishes a set of rights and principles that, 
among other provisions include the protection of privacy and personal data.393 
Supporters of Marco Civil hail it as expressing “strong commitment to an 
Internet that is an open, collaborative, democratic, space for individual and 
collective expression” (Moncau and Mizukami 2014). The law is, of course, not 
perfect. In relation to the corporate collection of personal data, it allows Internet 
firms to do so if the collection can be justified, is not forbidden, and is specified 
in Internet firms’ terms-of-use agreements.394 The Marco Civil is useful because 
it provides a framework for other countries to model, both in terms of its open-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'%*!The Green Party in New Zealand proposed a similar bill—the Internet Rights and Freedom 
Bill—in April 2014. It is the first bill that crowdsources comments and amendments from the 
public through an open digital platform. The bill includes proposals for an Internet Rights 
Commissioner and a set of ten rights, including the right to encryption technology and the right 
to privacy, see: http://www.internetrightsbill.org.nz/.!
392 The Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN), which was proposed as 
an alternative to SOPA, also solicited comments from the public. Darryl Issa, a California 
Republican and one of the bill’s co-sponsors, called for public comments on his site. As of 
January 19, 2012—one day after the anti-SOPA Internet Blackout—the site had 101 
“community suggestions” and 72 comments. See: www.Keepthewebopen.com. 
393 Marco Civil da Internet, Art. 3 II and III. 
394 Marco Civil da Internet, Chapter II, Art. 8(a)(b)(c).!
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consultative process and in its provisions that codify principles of human rights 
on the Internet. The real test, however, will come in its implementation and 
enforcement, particularly when individuals’ rights are set against corporations’ 
economic interests and the state’s security interests.  
 
c) A Path to Digital Rights 
 
The big lesson in relation to Marco Civil is that it is possible to craft a law that 
codifies principles of digital rights, including privacy, freedom of expression, 
data protection, and net neutrality, even when they are vehemently opposed by   
entrenched corporate interests. Marco Civil was, for example, delayed for over 
two years in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies as Internet firms lobbied to 
water down provisions in relation to privacy, among other issues (Moncau and 
Mizukami 2014). Despite these challenges, the law is a considerable 
achievement for digital-rights activists. In the words of the Australian civil-
advocacy group Global Voices, Marco Civil is a “victory” that “can bring hope to 
those working to improve user protections worldwide” (Biddle 2014). In the 
wake of the Snowden files, which stimulated President Rousseff to push 
forward the Marco Civil and propose privacy provisions,395 there is a surge of 
interest in digital privacy and digital rights.  
 
Following the SOPA protests and ongoing outcry against the NSA’s surveillance 
programs revealed in the Snowden files, Internet users are increasingly aware 
of and concerned about corporate and state surveillance on and regulation of 
the Internet. The SOPA protests and the introduction of Marco Civil show that it 
is possible to mobilise individuals over time and to push forward ideas that 
preserve and enhance individual freedoms. As will be seen in the final chapter, 
the SOPA protests, the ongoing public criticism of the U.S. National Security 
Agency’s surveillance programs, and Marco Civil can provide us with ideas on 
how to strengthen transparency and digital rights in relation to the private 
regulation of the Internet. The introduction of an Internet constitution in Brazil—
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'%$! The Snowden files revealed that Rousseff and some of her key aides had their digital 
communications monitored by the NSA. In response, Rousseff proposed that all Internet firms’ 
data on Brazilians should be held within the country. After an outcry from technologists, civil-
advocacy group and Internet firms that it would balkanise the Internet, the government relented 
(Reuters 2014).!
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a victory for digital-rights activists and the public, as well as the Brazilian 
government—shows that the state can be brought back in to regulate on behalf 
of public interests. This even holds true in relation to governance on the Internet 
where corporations and state security agencies have strong preferences for 
minimal safeguards for the collection and retention of personal data that 
facilitate mass online surveillance and enforcement. 
Chapter 8: Locating the Public Interest in Private 
Regulation 
 
This dissertation began by asking why a small group of U.S. Internet firms and 
payment providers, which dominate their respective industry sectors, would 
agree to increase their regulatory responsibilities voluntarily on behalf of rights 
holders. It questioned why states, particularly the United States and the 
European Union, would intervene and compel macro-intermediaries to act as 
voluntary gatekeepers in the regulation of counterfeit goods on the Internet. The 
eight private, non-legally binding enforcement agreements examined in this 
dissertation involve some of the largest Internet firms and payment providers, 
from Google, PayPal and eBay to MasterCard, Visa and GoDaddy. Through an 
analysis of these private agreements, which were created between 2010 and 
2013, this dissertation finds that the private regulatory regime created as a 
result of those agreements is highly reliant upon state actors in the United 
States and the European Union and is a product of state coercion. In addition to 
its coercive underpinnings, there are overlapping interests among the regime’s 
corporate and state actors in protecting intellectual property and, more broadly, 
shared interests in expanding macro-intermediaries’ regulatory capacity on the 
Internet. For the states involved in the regime, working with (and through) 
macro-intermediaries enables them to further exert control online to control 
undesirable or criminal activities, such as child pornography websites, as well 
as serve their national security interests by expanding their online surveillance 
capabilities. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it gives an overview of the dissertation 
and draws together its principal empirical findings and theoretical insights. 
Second, the chapter considers the policy implications raised by this type of 
state-created private regulatory regime. Reflecting on the regime’s transparency 
deficit discussed in chapter 7, it proposes ways that corporate and state actors 
can be persuaded to bring transparency into the regime. The chapter concludes 
by calling for greater political engagement from the public to begin to address 
the problems inherent in this type of private regulatory regime and, more 
generally, unaccountable corporate-state online surveillance practices.  
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I) Overview and Key Findings  
Chapter 1 established the secretive, undemocratic manner in which government 
agencies in the United States, United Kingdom and European Union created the 
private enforcement agreements in closed-door, industry-only meetings. It laid 
out the varying interests rights holders, macro-intermediaries, and the above-
noted states have in creating a private regulatory regime to govern online 
infringement. These states are non-neutral arbitrators among competing 
corporate interests as their interests largely align with strengthening the 
protection of intellectual property on the Internet.     
Chapter 2 set out a three-part theoretical framework that weaves together 
concepts of regulatory regimes, private authority, and techno-regulation from 
the non-state governance and law and technology literatures. Through this 
framework, the dissertation examined the actors, rules, and interests comprising 
the regulatory regime, as well as the nature and limitations of rights holders’ 
private authority, which is understood in this project as the capacity to make 
rules that others adopt (Green 2013). The third component, techno-regulation, 
focuses analysis on the ways macro-intermediaries employ technology to 
control infringing sites, along with the complexities and challenges of policing 
through technology. 
Chapter 3 established the historical, legal, and technological contexts in which 
the private enforcement agreements were formed. Politically, the United States 
and European Union accord great importance to the protection of intellectual 
property, a socially constructed perspective that rights holders have shaped by 
conceptually linking intellectual property to trade (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). 
Legally, macro-intermediaries face a fragmented, uncertain landscape: there is 
little clarity on the nature and scale of macro-intermediaries’ regulatory 
responsibilities, or their degree of liability in relation to third-party infringement 
on their platforms.396 In terms of technology, the online environment is 
conducive to mass surveillance and policing, particularly by macro-
intermediaries. Macro-intermediaries have a global regulatory capacity and the 
capability to withdraw essential Internet services, a form of techno-regulation, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
396 This point draws from McNamee (2011) and Mac Síthigh (2013) and their analysis of the 
legal uncertainty facing Internet intermediaries.   
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which makes them indispensable gatekeepers for both corporations and states. 
These inter-related factors explain both the development of macro-intermediary-
facilitated regulation and states’ interest in using coercive means to compel their 
regulation of online infringement through private agreements.  
Chapters 4 through 6 analysed eight private enforcement agreements to 
examine how and why macro-intermediaries adopted informal regulatory 
measures to address online infringement. These macro-intermediaries, which 
offer a range of important Internet services, can remove infringing content (e.g., 
eBay sales listings). They can also withdraw their services from infringing sites 
in an enforcement strategy intended to “choke” sites’ access to key Internet 
services (e.g., payment). Chapter 4 examined payment and advertising macro-
intermediaries’ regulation of infringing sites through private enforcement 
agreements, while chapter 5 did the same for search and domain name macro-
intermediaries. Chapter 6 analysed online marketplaces’ implementation of 
private agreements to control the sale of counterfeit goods through their 
platforms.  
These three chapters depicted and critically examined the global private 
regulatory regime that is based upon the non-binding private enforcement 
agreements. The regime is comprised of a distinct constellation of actors—
prominent multinational rights holders, macro-intermediaries and powerful state 
actors from the United States and European Union—and has distinct roots in 
the United States and the European Union. Macro-intermediaries, which have 
vast platforms and command dominant market shares in their respective 
industry sectors, are a special type of Internet intermediary with considerable 
regulatory capabilities. With their global scope and technologically sophisticated 
surveillance and enforcement programs, these companies have capabilities that 
outstrip traditional physical-world gatekeepers, like banks. As gatekeepers for 
online infringement, however, their regulatory effectiveness varies widely. Only 
payment macro-intermediaries have the regulatory capacity to cripple infringing 
sites as they withdraw essential commercial services. In contrast, website 
operators can easily replace services withdrawn by domain397 and advertising 
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397 As discussed in chapter 5, in addition to cancelling domain names, domain registrars can 
also suspend DNS resolution. This means that the site may not be found or, instead of 
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macro-intermediaries,398 and search engines and marketplaces only remove 
content but do not impair services.399  
Technology—and its use as an enforcement tool—is an important part of the 
regime as automated enforcement processes enable the regime to regulate 
globally, rapidly and over a mass population. Automation fundamentally 
changes how regulation can occur. Regulators, whether public or private, can 
detect and target problems globally in a way that was previously unaffordable or 
technological unfeasible. In relation to private anti-counterfeiting enforcement, 
macro-intermediaries’ efforts are generally more coordinated, streamlined, and 
rapid than their previous efforts, and have a lower evidential burden. Precision, 
however, is often sacrificed for speed and scale. As the actors within the regime 
undertake policing on a mass scale, the scope for mistakes is considerable, 
potentially affecting large numbers of legitimate transactions, search results, 
sites, or individuals. These challenges speak to the complexities and attendant 
challenges of policing using technology as a regulatory instrument, particularly 
in the online realm. 
Chapter 7 drew together the dissertation’s empirical and analytical findings and 
reflected upon its themes of the role of the state in private regulation, state-
corporate inter-dependencies, and the rapidly evolving relationship between 
regulation and technology. Underlying each of the private enforcement 
agreements studied in this dissertation, state actors played a central role in 
constructing and legitimising the regime by applying coercive pressure on 
macro-intermediaries. State intervention was necessary because rights holders 
and their trade associations were unable alone to persuade macro-
intermediaries to make wholesale changes to their enforcement practices. 
Rights holders’ authority, while significant in shaping states’ intellectual property 
policymaking, is limited in relation to private actors to threatening legal action, 
shaming, and granting or withholding business deals. Rights holders have an 
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displaying the proper site, the user may be redirected to a warning banner. However, site 
operators may simply shift to another domain registrar and register another domain name. 
398 Advertising actors can withdraw ads from infringing sites but such sites tend not to reply 
upon mainstream advertising. If they use ads, they tend to be in less-reputable sectors like the 
sex industry (see Watters 2014). 
399 Search engines remove search results’ hyperlinks to infringing webpages but do not affect 
the content of those webpages, which may be found using other search engines. Marketplaces 
remove infringing sales listings but individuals can re-list items under another name or move to 
another trading platform.!
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institutional advantage over macro-intermediaries, particularly in relation to the 
U.S. government, which is the global proponent of stronger intellectual property 
rights. In the United States, rights holders’ interests are politically entrenched 
following their successful, decades-long campaign that has strengthened the 
protection of intellectual property in the United States and internationally. 
Private enforcement agreements offer benefits for all actors within the 
regulatory regime as they allow for more flexible, rapid, and streamlined 
enforcement than is generally possible through legislation or litigation. Further, 
participants can also take advantage of the secrecy of private agreements to 
avoid public scrutiny. More broadly, the regulatory regime is coupled together 
by overlapping interests. Rights holders and macro-intermediaries have shared 
interests in protecting intellectual property, although there are disagreements in 
relation to enforcement tactics and the degree of regulatory burden each party 
can (and should) assume.  
Macro-intermediaries, particularly Google, have interests in furthering their 
surveillance-oriented business models that are premised upon accumulating 
and mining vast troves of users’ personal and commercial data (see Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Schneier 2013). The regime’s state actors, in 
turn, have interests in capitalising upon macro-intermediaries’ regulatory 
capacity so that the states can further exert their influence in the online 
environment over illegal content, such as child pornography and terrorist-
extremism websites. In addition, macro-intermediaries’ global networks and vast 
troves of data facilitate states’ national security interests, particularly those of 
the U.S. government, and enable states to intensify their online surveillance 
programs.  
Consumers—and the public in general—are largely overlooked by the private 
online anti-counterfeiting regime. The regime’s actors created the enforcement 
agreements in closed-door meetings and implemented them quietly, without 
civil-society involvement. State and corporate actors alike emphasize the 
importance of protecting consumers from counterfeit goods. Consumers, 
however, have broad interests in accessing a wide range of products at varying 
prices, both new and second-hand, that can conflict with rights holders’ desire 
to control the distribution and pricing of their products. More seriously, state 
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actors’ encouragement of macro-intermediaries to set rules amongst 
themselves to govern infringement raises concerns of anti-competitive 
behaviour. In addition, the secretive, unaccountable nature of the regime is 
antithetical to democracy and the public interest. The states involved in the 
regime—government agencies in the U.S. and U.K., and the European 
Commission—are unwilling to serve consumers’ interests in this area, in part 
because there is no public pressure on states in relation to this issue.  
Beyond online regulation, this dissertation’s findings raise several areas for 
future investigation. U.S.-based Internet firms, particularly Google, are rapidly 
expanding their political-lobbying capabilities in the United States, as 
demonstrated by their increased expenditure on lobbying.400 The rise of Internet 
firms’ lobbying power will affect policymaking in the United States and, given the 
scale of firms like Google, influence Internet-related policies worldwide. The 
ways in which this shift in political influence to Internet firms will shape 
policymaking in relation to intellectual property, digital privacy and corporate 
online surveillance practices, and regulation on the Internet more generally, are 
critical areas for future research. Further, my analysis of the private anti-
counterfeiting regime points to a need for further research into rapidly evolving 
practices of regulation through technology and the attendant complexities and 
challenges. To what degree do my findings translate to other areas in which 
Internet firms, particularly macro-intermediaries, act as gatekeepers on behalf of 
states or other corporate actors, such as the control of child pornography 
websites? How are macro-intermediaries’ gatekeeping efforts and, in particular, 
their latitude in setting and enforcing rules governing the use of their platforms, 
shaping how Internet users access and employ certain technologies, such as 
file-sharing software or virtual private networks?  
II) Challenging Private Regulation on the Internet 
This dissertation’s analysis of a relatively secretive global private regulatory 
regime underscores the procedural challenges and normative complexities of 
not only corporate online regulation but also policing through technology in 
ways that facilitate mass online surveillance and enforcement. The private 
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400 As discussed in chapter 3, Google is now among the top five lobbying corporations in 
Washington, D.C., alongside companies like AT&T.  
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regime ostensibly targets online infringement; however, the regulatory strategy 
of mass policing and enacting chokepoints has the potential to sweep millions of 
legitimate users into enforcement dragnets. Moreover, when corporate interests 
align with those of the state in relation to the provision of enforcement, lines of 
accountability are murky and boundaries between “‘general’ and ‘specific’ 
interests are hopelessly blurred” (Sheptycki 2001:13). There are also serious 
practical concerns of how this type of state-facilitated corporate regulation 
affects how individuals access and use Internet services and technologies. At a 
broader level, macro-intermediaries have the capacity act as private arbiters of 
the legality of products offered for sale as they have considerable latitude in 
determining and targeting infringement. This means that macro-intermediaries, 
particularly payment providers, can shape the development of new technologies 
and services on the Internet as they can withdraw their services from 
companies that they contend facilitate the distribution of counterfeit goods.  
As these previously shadowy regulatory efforts come to light, it is timely and 
important to examine critically the implications of corporate online regulation 
through technology. Unearthing and examining these challenges requires an 
inter-disciplinary approach—drawing upon, in particular, socio-legal studies, 
sociology, computer science, criminology and political science. This scholarship 
must be accompanied by practical outreach to engage the public and educate 
key stakeholders who can affect change in this area. While such efforts are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, this chapter sets out preliminary steps to 
improve the regime’s transparency and then engage the public. A focus on 
transparency is a necessary first step as there is little public awareness of this 
private regulatory regime or its global enforcement efforts. Before doing so, 
however, the next section briefly outlines the regime’s principal challenges.  
i) Procedural and Normative Problems 
The regulation of online infringement through private informal agreements 
raises significant procedural and normative challenges. Government officials 
who coordinated the agreements stressed that they should adhere to principles 
of accountability and due process (European Commission 2013). There is little 
evidence, however, of these principles in practice in any of the agreements 
studied for this project. The creation of these agreements suggests that this 
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regime’s accountability and oversight mechanisms are problematic. Small 
groups of industry and state actors drafted the agreements in closed-door 
meetings and the texts therefore represent relatively narrow interests. There 
was no involvement from consumer or civil-society organizations, despite 
rhetoric of working with and on behalf of consumers. There is no mechanism for 
public or judicial review, or for oversight of the agreements. Further, the 
government agencies involved provide no indication of any governmental 
oversight. In fact, representatives from the Office of the Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator frankly admitted that the office did not want to 
stipulate oversight provisions that may “add layers of difficulty that might drive 
participants away” from informal private agreements.401 Those involved in the 
agreements differ in their desire for the agreements to remain below the public 
radar. For example, the European Commission published its informal 
agreement with marketplaces on its website (European Commission 2011). In 
contrast, IPEC and the U.K. Department for Culture, Media and Sport were 
reluctant to release publicly the private agreements they negotiated. A senior 
policy official from IPEC argued that publicity may deter some companies from 
participating in the arrangements and the office did not want disclosure of 
signatories “to be a bar for the participants.”402 
All of the private agreements studied here have weak due-process 
mechanisms. Enforcement is based on rights holders’ allegations, not proof of 
infringement. This is because macro-intermediaries generally do not require 
complainants to make test purchases of suspect products to demonstrate that 
they are counterfeit.403 Furthermore, while macro-intermediaries are increasing 
their proactive targeting of infringing content, they acknowledge that they are 
not well suited to differentiating genuine from infringing goods (for Visa, see Yee 
2011). It is particularly difficult to determine authenticity on the basis of 
keywords and photographs supplied by sellers. There “are many criteria that 
help you assess whether it’s likely to be a counterfeit,” explains Jeremy 
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401 Interview with Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the IP Enforcement Coordinator, Executive 
Office of the President, 18 May 2012, Washington. 
402 Ibid. 
403 For example, test purchases are not required for the International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition’s merchant-account termination program (Montanaro 2012). Nor are they required for 
the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre’s merchant-account termination program. Interview with Barry 
Elliott, Criminal Intelligence Analytical Unit, Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, 27 June 2012, by 
telephone. 
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Newman, a partner with Rouse Legal in London.404 “You’ll never be sure until 
you see that physical sample.”  
Overall, then, the private agreements studied in this dissertation are 
fundamentally problematic because stakeholders—both industry and 
government—designed them to streamline, simplify and accelerate enforcement 
processes. Principles of due process and accountability are generally 
incompatible with the shift toward rapid mass enforcement. Automated 
processes exacerbate these problems as they enable rights holders to submit 
enormous numbers of complaints to macro-intermediaries like eBay or Google. 
These firms use automated programs to address the problem, generally within a 
few hours. Given the volume of complaints and the timeframes for processing, 
there is not adequate time to review or investigate the allegations. The 
emphasis on rapid, mass policing exacerbates the problem of wrongful 
takedowns of non-infringing content and wrongful termination of services to 
legitimate sites.  
ii) Preliminary Steps for Greater Transparency 
The private anti-counterfeiting regime’s efforts are antithetical to fundamental, 
commonly agreed upon principles of good governance, which emphasise 
transparency of governance efforts, accountability of regulatory actors, fairness, 
and robust due-process mechanisms. Regulation through private enforcement 
agreements is also contrary to internationally accepted tenets of Internet 
policymaking, which emphasize the importance of consulting all relevant 
stakeholders. As Peter Bradwell from the U.K. Open Rights Group argues, 
private online regulation “should not be an excuse for invitation-only policy 
making” (Bradwell 2011). In 2011, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) introduced a set of principles for policymaking on the 
Internet. Chief among these is a recommendation that processes of rule 
production, implementation, and enforcement should involve multi-stakeholder 
collaboration in which all interested parties participate. This includes 
representatives from consumer and civil-society organisations (OECD 2011). 
The OECD’s guidelines also echo good governance principles in their emphasis 
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404 Interview with Jeremy Newman, Partner, Rouse Legal, 10 September 2012, London.  
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on the importance of transparency and accountability. The private enforcement 
agreements, as discussed above, have multiple procedural and normative 
challenges. The principle of transparency, however, provides a good starting 
point to consider preliminary steps to address the significant problems with the 
agreements. In addition, greater transparency about these agreements is 
necessary to examine their effects in greater detail and track their evolution. As 
these agreements are global, cover essential Internet services and can police 
hundreds of millions of transactions and interactions across the Internet, there is 
a strong argument to cultivate public awareness in this area.  
Transparency is the most promising area to begin reform because macro-
intermediaries can strengthen this aspect of their enforcement efforts without 
involvement from the state or rights holders. There are several concrete steps 
that macro-intermediaries can take to improve the transparency of their 
enforcement efforts. They should publicly disclose the full text of their private 
enforcement agreements and publish their enforcement policies and processes 
relating to these agreements.405 These policies should be written in clear, easy-
to-understand language. Macro-intermediaries should clearly set out their 
procedures for receiving and investigating complaints of infringement and for 
issuing sanctions. This must include how individuals can appeal allegations of 
infringement by rights holders and provide contact information to facilitate 
appeals.  
a) Industry Transparency Reports 
Industry transparency reports are particularly useful tools to facilitate greater 
transparency of corporate and state regulation on the Internet. Companies use 
transparency reports to disclose and track requests for data received from the 
state or complaints of infringement from rights holders. Google provides a good 
model in this regard because of its years working with rights holders in the 
removal of infringing search results. The search giant also provides data to 
government in relation to requests from law enforcement and to the U.S. 
National Security Agency (NSA) in regards to national security (Google 
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405 Where these policies are incorporated within broader terms-of-use contractual agreements, 
which can run to hundreds of pages, they should also publish the policies separately on their 
websites in an area that is easy to locate. 
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Transparency Report). The concept of industry transparency reports in relation 
to disclosure of users’ data became a topic of considerable interest to Internet 
companies and their users when files leaked by Edward Snowden revealed that 
the U.S. and U.K. national security agencies rely heavily upon data from 
Internet firms (Ball, Border, and Greenwald 2013). These revelations elicited 
significant concern and protests from users of the targeted companies, 
particularly Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and Facebook. Further, the targeted 
companies complain that since the spying revelations they have lost business 
from firms outside the United States that want to ensure their data is not 
targeted by the NSA (Miller 2014). Estimates of these losses by think tanks and 
research firms vary greatly.406 In response, multiple U.S. firms adopted 
transparency reports to reassure their wary users and business partners. These 
companies include Microsoft, Yahoo, Twitter, Facebook, Dropbox, Apple and 
LinkedIn, as well as the telecommunications companies Verizon and AT&T.407     
Google, the first firm to track its enforcement efforts, discloses most of the 
requests it receives from governments and rights holders. It discloses the 
reporting organization (or individual) that submitted the request and the URL of 
the search result linking to the infringing webpage. Google also tracks the 
requests it complies with and those it rejects. There is room for improvement in 
Google’s reports. It does not capture all of its services as, for example, it 
excludes takedown requests for YouTube. Nor does Google indicate the 
reasons that specific requests are denied, which would help researchers track 
the number of wrongful or abusive complaints. Transparency reports adopted 
by Facebook, Twitter and others are similar to Google’s report.408 Most of them, 
however, focus solely on disclosing law enforcement requests for data and 
those related to national security requests. 
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406 For example, the Washington-based think tank, the Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation, calculates that the scandal could cost the U.S. cloud computing industry $35 billion 
by 2016, while Forrester Research, a technology firm, estimates the losses could range as high 
as $180 billion (Miller 2014). 
407 Links to U.S. firms’ transparency reports are available on Google’s Transparency Report site, 
see: www.google.com/transparencyreport/.  
408 Facebook, for example, describes what constitutes lawful requests from governments, how it 
responds and what kinds of information it releases. Facebook also tracks the numbers of 
requests received over time, the types of request (e.g., search warrants or subpoena), and the 
number or percentage of requests in which the company discloses some data. 
See: https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20States/2013-H2/.   
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The creation of industry transparency reports demonstrates that Internet firms 
will respond to pressure from their customers and business clients if they 
perceive risks to their reputation or the loss of clients (Miller 2014; Schneier 
2013). This is particularly true in cases where the firms have interests in 
emphasising their good management of users’ data and, consequently, 
distancing themselves from controversial or unpopular regulatory efforts. 
Companies that publish these reports, such as Twitter and LinkedIn, tend to 
stress their commitment to the principle of transparency on behalf of their users 
and can use these reports to demonstrate their adherence to good governance 
practices.409 Public pressure could be applied to companies with a transparency 
reporting process in place, like Facebook and Yahoo, to persuade them to 
expand their transparency processes to track corporate requests for data. 
Twitter, for example, has followed Google’s lead and tracks requests from 
governments and also rights holders in relation to the removal of copyright-
infringing content.410 This reporting needs to be expanded to all corporate 
requests for enforcement, including online anti-counterfeiting efforts. Internet 
users and digital-rights groups could pressure other companies, like PayPal or 
GoDaddy, to adopt similar reporting practices by pointing to companies with 
transparency reports as industry leaders in data management practices.  
Aside from informing users how their data is accessed and disclosed, and by 
whom, corporate transparency reports are valuable to researchers and activists 
interested in examining state and corporate actors’ online surveillance and 
enforcement activities. Individuals studying digital-copyright enforcement, for 
example, use Google’s transparency report to track trends in the scale and 
nature of takedown notices, as well as identify problematic and abusive 
reporting practices (e.g., Seng 2014; Urban and Quilter 2006). Civil-society 
groups, like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, have used Google’s 
Transparency Report and the Chilling Effects411 site to identify actors who 
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409 The professional networking site LinkedIn, for example, states in its transparency report that 
it discloses government requests for data so that its users and the public better understand the 
kinds of requests it receives and how it deals with them. See: 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/transparency.  
410 For Twitter’s tracking of the copyright notices it receives, see: 
https://transparency.twitter.com/copyright-notices/2013/jul-dec!!
411 The Chilling Effects site is a joint project of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and clinics at 
law schools in the United States, including Harvard University and Stanford University. It is 
intended to help individuals understand their legal rights in relation to freedom of expression 
and intellectual property. See: http://www.chillingeffects.org/index.cgi  
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deliberately submit requests to remove lawful content or seek to censor 
information.412 Similar levels of data on corporate anti-counterfeiting efforts 
using macro-intermediaries would be of significant value to researchers and 
consumer organisations. Research could track trends in enforcement strategies 
and techniques, as well as regulatory activities by industry sector, trade 
associations, and individual rights holders. Moreover, such data would help 
develop a much-needed picture of the rapidly expanding brand-protection 
industry that undertakes monitoring and enforcement activities on behalf of 
rights holders. 
iii) Transparency and the State 
Demands for transparency should not fall solely on macro-intermediaries as 
government departments in the United States and the European Union played a 
central role in facilitating the creation of informal private agreements, as did the 
European Commission. These state actors, however, generally have not been 
forthcoming in providing information about the informal anti-counterfeiting 
measures. The U.K. Department for Culture, Media and Sport, for example, has 
both invited civil-society representatives to its industry roundtables and then dis-
invited them.413 The Office of Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator 
(IPEC) released some information about its agreements in press releases and 
in reports to the U.S. Congress but refused to release the payment providers’ 
informal agreement.414 In contrast, the European Commission, which created its 
agreements among industry stakeholders, published the text publicly (European 
Commission 2011).  
Given the central role of these states in constructing the private regime, they 
should bear some responsibility for ensuring that the agreements meet basic 
standards of good governance and that the public is aware of these private 
regulatory arrangements. Both IPEC and the DCMS should disclose the full 
texts of all private enforcement agreements that they have coordinated in this 
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412 The Electronic Frontier Foundation collects the worst examples of abusive takedowns and 
showcases them in its “Takedown Hall of Shame.” See: https://www.eff.org/takedowns  
413 The department published minutes of its May 2013 roundtable minutes on its website but 
only released minutes from early meetings after repeated freedom of information requests by 
the Open Rights Group.  
414 A U.S. lawyer requested the release of these best practices through freedom of information 
laws and was denied.  
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area. In addition, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, which has an arrangement 
with Visa, should publicly disclose the details of its arrangement.  
These government agencies should also clearly and publicly lay out guidelines 
to ensure that corporate signatories have appropriate due-process 
mechanisms. In their endorsement of the agreements, government actors 
stressed the importance of respecting fundamental values, particularly freedom 
of expression and privacy (see Espinel 2013). However, they provide no 
guidance as to how corporate actors should uphold these values and no 
oversight to ensure that they do so. At the very least, if each agency publicly 
disclosed the text of the agreements and drafted a set of clear guidelines 
explaining how measures should be implemented, the public would have a 
basic understanding of these private agreements. Individuals who wished to 
obtain more information on, complain about, or challenge the regulatory 
activities could contact the government agency responsible for coordinating the 
agreements. They could also file freedom of information requests to attempt to 
access or petition for further information. 
These preliminary steps to provide a small degree of transparency in relation to 
private anti-counterfeiting efforts are vitally important to establish a baseline of 
publicly available information. To date, these agreements have attracted little 
attention from scholars or the mainstream press because the agreements are 
relatively new and there is little publicly available information on them, with the 
exception of the European Commission’s reports. By pressing macro-
intermediaries and the government agencies involved in this regime to disclose 
its policies and practices, along with enforcement results, we could begin 
cultivating public awareness of the existence of this global private regulatory 
regime.  
III) Conclusion: A Future with Digital Rights 
Steps to establish transparency measures in relation to the private anti-
counterfeiting regime are critical in the short term in order to begin to build 
public awareness. However, improved transparency alone cannot address the 
considerable procedural and normative problems inherent in corporate online 
anti-counterfeiting efforts. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the states 
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involved in this regime are not representing the interests of consumers or, more 
broadly, the general public. Given these states’ abdication of public interest in 
this area, greater political engagement by the public is needed. It is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to set out how this political engagement should best 
occur. However, political action targeting the U.S. government is necessary 
given its influential role in shaping enforcement standards for the protection of 
intellectual property. Further, the U.S. government, particularly the Office of the 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, was a key driver of the private 
enforcement agreements and all the macro-intermediaries are headquartered in 
the United States.  
Two recent events—opposition to the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the 
introduction of Brazil’s Internet bill of rights (Marco Civil da Internet)—
demonstrate that it is possible to challenge entrenched interests in relation to 
state-corporate governance on the Internet. In the United States, the protests 
that culminated in January 2012 with the massive Internet Blackout began in 
September 2010 with the Combatting Online Infringement Counterfeiting Act 
and grew with the introduction of the Protect Intellectual Property Act and 
SOPA. Over approximately sixteen months, a broad-based coalition against 
these bills raised awareness through social media, launched petitions and 
explained to average Internet users how they would be negatively affected by 
the bills (Moon, Ruffini, and Segal 2013; Sell 2013). These protests 
demonstrate that there is considerable public interest in the topic of regulation 
on (and of) the Internet. The protests also show that even with relatively 
technical issues like intellectual property it is possible to raise public awareness 
and encourage political engagement. Similarly, ongoing protests against the 
U.S. National Security Agency in relation to the secretive surveillance programs 
revealed by Edward Snowden demonstrate significant public interest in issues 
of digital privacy and concern over corporate-state surveillance alliances on the 
Internet (Levy 2014).   
Engaging the states responsible for the private regulatory regime will be difficult 
as they have varying interests in facilitating online regulation through macro-
intermediaries. Brazil’s Marco Civil can provide ideas to guide engagement with 
states and shape legislation that protects digital rights. As chapter 7 discussed, 
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Marco Civil, introduced in April 2014, is the world’s first Internet bill of rights. It 
offers a useful roadmap for activists in other countries to consider how to raise 
public awareness of digital-rights issues and interact with governments in a 
practical, meaningful way. The Brazilian government published a first draft of 
the bill on an open-access online platform for an 18-month public review 
(Moncau and Mizukami 2014). The government then invited interested parties, 
including businesses, individuals, and non-governmental organizations, to 
comment on and suggest amendments to the bill. Importantly, all comments 
were publicly available and the Brazilian government incorporated these 
publicly derived amendments into the next version of the bill (Access 2014). An 
open-access platform for the public to engage with legislation and other 
government-created rules ensures that all interested parties are aware of 
different policy positions or suggestions and can respond accordingly. Actors 
could still lobby the government privately but this open-access process would 
ensure that the public has a forum in which to suggest amendments that 
governments would then consider.  
Drawing together ideas from the SOPA protest and Marco Civil, civil-society 
efforts to challenge corporate-state surveillance on the Internet should bring 
together consumer groups with digital-rights organisations and other parties 
interested in strengthening digital rights. One important line of activity would be 
to press macro-intermediaries to adopt or amend industry transparency reports 
in order to track their enforcement activities on behalf of corporations and 
states. Alongside this work, citizens must pressure the states responsible for 
the private regulatory regime to re-assume their public regulatory duties of 
representing the public interest. This could involve enrolling relevant or 
sympathetic elements within these states, such as competition watchdogs, 
privacy and human rights commissioners, and agencies responsible for 
promoting openness on the Internet and net neutrality. Pressure on states could 
begin with demands for the disclosure of details of non-binding enforcement 
agreements and government requirements for macro-intermediaries to publish 
and track their enforcement activities on behalf of states and corporations. 
These preliminary steps are necessary to begin to build public awareness and 
to establish a broad-based multi-stakeholder approach to governance on the 
Internet.  
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The private, state-backed agreements discussed in this dissertation raise 
fundamental questions of who owns our data, and what rights we have to 
control how states and corporations use our digital footprints. As daunting as 
the challenges are to reform this private regulatory regime—and they are 
considerable—there is hope. An important consequence of Edward Snowden’s 
revelations of surveillance programs by the U.S. government (and its allies) is 
an increased sensitivity among the public toward digital privacy and digital rights 
in general.415 These debates concern the shifting nature of privacy in an era of 
mass online surveillance by both states and corporations. Members of the 
public are clearly interested in and concerned about surveillance and 
enforcement practices on the Internet and are engaging in vibrant global 
debates over the nature and limits of digital privacy.416 Bringing the private 
regulatory regime out of the shadows is the first step toward democratising the 
online enforcement of trademark infringement and the Internet as a whole. 
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415 In January 2014, for example, the non-partisan U.S. PEW Research Centre conducted a 
survey in which 70% of Americans said that they should not have to give up privacy to be safe 
from terrorism.  http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/poll-nsa-
surveillance/4638551/  
416 For example, tens of thousands of people protested against NSA surveillance on the Internet 
on 12 February 2014, which was called “the day we fight back.” People protested in 15 
countries and in the United States individuals directed 18,000 calls and 50,000 emails to the 
U.S. Congress (Gabbatt 2014).  
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Brand-protection manager, U.S. apparel company (rights holder), 31 May 2012, interview 
by Skype. 
 
Brenner, Brett, Electrical Safety Foundation International (trade association), Arlington, 
VA, 24 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Brokate, Brian, Partner, Gibney Anthony & Flaherty (law firm), New York City, 30 March 
2012, in-person interview. 
 
Courtney, Kurt, Director, Government Relations, American Apparel and Footwear 
Association (trade association), Washington, DC, 30 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Elings, Roxanne, Co-Chair, Global Trademarks/Brand Management Practice, Greenberg 
Traurig LLP (law firm), New York City. 20 March, 2012, in-person interview.  
 
Evert-Burks, Leah, Director of Brand Protection, Deckers Outdoor Corporation (rights 
holder), 12 June 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Faulconer, David, Consultant, TeleSolv Consulting, LLC (investigative firm), Washington, 
DC, 27 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Feinberg, Eric, Owner, Fans Against Kounterfeit Enterprise (brand-monitoring firm), 2 
August 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Flynn, Sean, Associate Director, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property 
(non-governmental organisation), Washington, DC, 14 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Forgione, Joseph, Director of Trademark Enforcement, Gioconda Law Group (law firm), 
New York City, 3 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Gaines, Rudy Manager, Marksmen (investigative firm), 19 April 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Garner, Tracy, Anti-Counterfeiting & Unauthorised Distribution, Schneider Electric (rights 
holder), 9 May 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Gioconda, Joseph, Founder, Gioconda Law Group & Founder, RogueFinder LLC (law 
firm), New York City, 22 August 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Global Head of Security, Pharmaceutical company (rights holder), 27 March 2012, 
interview by Skype. 
 
Government official, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator, Washington, DC, 18 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Government official, National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Centre, Arlington, 
VA, 16 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Holmes, Rob, Owner and CEO, IPCybercrime (investigative firm), Texas, 2 May 2012, in-
person interview (in Washington, DC). 
 
Investigative firm, California, 19 April 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Investigative firm, Georgia, 23 April 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Jamar, Steven D., Associate Director, Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice 
(non-governmental organisation), Washington, DC, 26 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Karaganis, Joe, Vice-President, The American Assembly (non-governmental organisation), 
New York City, 28 March 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Kubic, Tom, CEO, Pharmaceutical Security Institute (trade association), Arlington, VA, 10 
May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Lawyer, Hong Kong Law Firm, Washington, DC, 7 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Li, Candice, External Relations Manager, Anti-counterfeiting, International Trademark 
Association (trade association), New York City. 3 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Loaiza, Mario, Owner, Mario Loaiza & Associates Inc. (investigative firm), 16 July 2012, 
interview by Skype. 
 
Love, Andrew, Brand Security, Global Investigations, Legal Enforcement, Specialised 
Bicycles (rights holder), US, 24 August 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Montanaro, Kristina, Associate Counsel, Director Special Programs, International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition (trade association), 24 April 2012, Washington, D.C., in-person 
interview. 
 
Rogan, Lisa, Director of Trademarks & Brand Protection, Acushnet and coordinator of U.S. 
Golf Manufacturers’ Anti-Counterfeiting Working Group (rights holder), Washington, DC, 2 
May 2012, in-person interview.  
 
Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, 
Executive Office of the President, Washington, DC, 18 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Silcox, Clark, Counsel, National Electrical Manufacturers’ Association (trade association), 
Arlington, VA, 13 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Siy, Sherwin, Deputy Legal Director, Public Knowledge (non-governmental organisation), 
Washington, DC, 11 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Sohn, David, General Counsel, Centre for Democracy and Technology (non-governmental 
organisation), Washington, DC, 15 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Smith, Te, Vice President, Communications, MarkMonitor (brand-monitoring firm), 6 April 
2012, interview by Skype.  
 
Tarbutton, Tamara, Investigator, Vaudra Ltd. (investigative firm), Washington, DC, 2 May 
2012, in-person interview. 
 
Thomson, Tom, Executive Director, Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights (trade 
association), Washington, DC, 10 May 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Trainer, Timothy, President, Global Intellectual Property Strategy Centre (trade 
association), Washington, DC, 11 April 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Volpi, Vincent CEO, PICA Corporation (investigative firm), 25 June 2012, interview by 
Skype. 
 
Walling, Daniel, Founder, LevelPlay (brand-monitoring firm), 14 August 2012, interview by 
Skype. 
 
Weinstein, Maxim, President & Executive Director, StopBadware (non-governmental 
association), Cambridge, MA, 1 August 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Westerfield, Allen, President, Imaging Supplies Coalition for International Intellectual 
Property Protection Inc. (trade association), 10 July 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Zewers, Kirsten, Government Relations, Counsel, Intellectual Property Owners 




Arnold, Phill, Director, Counterfeiting Intelligence Services, Brisbane, 2 May 2012, in-
person interview (in Washington, DC). 
 
Australian Customs, Canberra, 23 February 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Australian Federal Police, Canberra, 23 January 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Bosland, Jason, Senior Lecturer, Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (non-
governmental organisation), Melbourne, 31 January 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Douglas, Craig, Owner, Nationwide Research Group, Melbourne (investigative firm), 1 
February 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Gamble, Ken, CEO, Gamble Investigations International (investigative firm), Sydney, 5 
December 2011, in-person interview. 
 
Hutley, Vanessa, Music Industry Piracy Investigations (trade association), Sydney, 16 
December 2011, by email. 
 
Kitschke, Brad, Executive Director, Australian Sporting Goods Association (trade 
association), Melbourne, 2 February 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Managing Director, Investigative firm, Australia, 8 November 2011, in-person interview.  
 
Manders, Karl CEO, Continental Enterprises Inc. (investigative firm), 9 May 2012, 
interview by Skype. 
Robson, Julie, Investigator, Victorian Detective Service, Melbourne, 6 February 2012, in-
person interview. 
 
Rumore, Michael, Owner, Rumore Investigations, Sydney, (investigative firm), 30 
November 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Stern, Stephen, Partner, Corrs, Chambers and Westgarth (law firm), Sydney, 1 February 




Baker, Steve, Co-Owner, Intellectual Property Management Services (investigative firm), 
UK, 9 September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Croker, Damian, CEO, BrandStrike Limited (brand-monitoring firm), London, UK, 25 
September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Croxon, Siân Partner, DLA Piper (law firm), London, UK, 14 September 2012, in-person 
interview.  
 
Cumming, Robert, Solicitor, Walker Morris (law firm), UK, 21 September 2012, interview 
by Skype.  
 
Government official, National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Centre, 16 May 
2012, Arlington, VA, in-person interview. 
 
Government official, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Embassy, London, UK, 4 
October 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Gray, Alastair, Head of London Cerberus Investigations (investigative firm), London, UK, 4 
September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Guthrie, Robert, Associate, SJ Berwin (law firm), 5 October 2012, London, UK, in-person 
interview. 
 
Harrison, Clive, Export Sales & Brand Protection Manager, Acushnet Europe (rights 
holder), 2 October 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Hyde-Blake, Gavin, Director of Research and Investigation (investigative firm), Eccora, 
London, UK, 19 September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Investigations manager, computer technology firm (rights holder), 9 October 2012, 
interview by Skype. 
 
Investigative firm, UK, 14 May 2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Kotecha, Amit, Senior Mobile & Networks Manager, Internet Advertising Bureau (trade 
association), London, UK, 8 October 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Mee, Duncan, Co-owner, Cerberus Investigations (investigative firm), London, UK, 4 
September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Newman, Jeremy, Partner, Rouse Legal (law firm), London, UK, 10 September 2012, in-
person interview.  
 
Orchard, Ruth, Director, Anti-Counterfeiting Group (trade association), England, 17 
September 2012, by Skype. 
 
Ramm, James, Director, Commercial Security International (investigative firm), London, 
UK, 10 October 2012, in-person interview.  
 
Robinson, Graham, Managing Director, Farncombe International (investigative firm), 
London, UK, 28 September 2012, in-person interview.  
 
Sharp, Kieron, Director General, Federation Against Copyright Theft (trade association), 
UK, 9 October 2012, by Skype. 
 
Simmons, Adrian, Managing Director, Total Brand Security (brand-monitoring firm), 
London, UK, 21September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Smith, Keith, Deputy Director, British Electrotechnical Allied Manufacturing Association 
(trade association), London, UK, 3 September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Starr, Ian, Partner, D Young & Co. (law firm), London, UK, 7 September 2012, in-person 
interview. 
 
Waring, Tim, Director, Intelligence Technologies (brand-monitoring firm), UK, 3 October 
2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Watson, Allan, Director, Global Operations, Gamble Investigations International 
(investigative firm), London, UK, 12 September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Whitelaw, Valerie, President, Imaging Consumables Coalition Europe, 17 September 
2012, interview by Skype.  
 
Winter, Susie, Director General, Alliance for Intellectual Property (trade association), 
London, UK, 12 September 2012, in-person interview.  
 
Wishart, Det./Supt. Bob, Head of National Operational Delivery, Regional Fraud Project, 
City of London Police, London, UK, 6 September 2012, in-person interview. 
 
Wood, David, Director of Anti-Piracy, British Recorded Music Industry (BPI) Ltd. (trade 




Elliott, Barry, Criminal Intelligence Analytical Unit, Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, North Bay, 
Ontario, 27 June 2012, interview by telephone. 
 
Hunter, Beau, President, Global Intellectual Property Securities (investigative firm), 4 April 
2012, interview by Skype. 
 
Lipkus, Lorne, Partner, Kestenberg, Siegal, Lipkus LLP Toronto, (law firm) 1 May 2012, in-
person interview (in Washington, DC). 
 
Lipkus, David, Associate, Kestenberg, Siegal, Lipkus LLP Toronto, (law firm) 10 August 
2012, in-person interview. 
 
Representative from Nipissing University, North Bay, Ontario, 12 July 2012, interview by 
telephone. 
 
Spreekmeester, Kevin, Vice President, Global Marketing, Canada Goose (rights holder), 9 
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Best Practices for Rights-holders with Payment Processors  
 
Good Faith.  Any claim put forward by a rights-holders, their agents or 
associations will be made with a good faith belief in the accuracy and 
completeness of the details contained in the claim. 
Notice Consolidation and Designated Points of Contact.  Rights-holders who 
are active members of a participating association KHUHLQDIWHU³FKDQQHOLQJ
associations), will channel all complaints through such association, unless not 
reasonably practicable, for example, if  the activity complained of is not 
reasonably related to the competency of the trade association, if the rights-holder 
has a good-faith belief that direct notification is necessary due to the urgency of 
the circumstances, if there is a conflict of interest, or a prohibitive contractual 
obligation exists. Each channeling association shall endeavor to consolidate such 
claims made by its members prior to submission to the payment processors.  
Rights-holders and any channeling association engaged by one or more rights-
holder shall also furnish a designated point of contact charged with responding 
expeditiously to inquiries from such channeling associations and/ or the payment 
possessors.   
Additional information requested by the payment processor.  Channeling 
associations and/or rights-holders will respond expeditiously to reasonable 
requests for additional information that are made by a payment processor in 
connection with a claim or, within five business days of receiving the request, will 
explain the delay in providing the additional information. If in a particular case a 
payment processor identifies a specific need for additional information not 
appearing in the mutually agreed-upon standardized form described below, the 
channeling association or rights-holder will respond within a reasonable time 
period, either with the requested information or an explanation as to why the 
information requested is not reasonable. 
  
Standardized Form. Channeling associations will develop and utilize a common 
form or system for notifying a payment processor about the use of its financial 
network to process transactions for activities that violate US intellectual property 
laws, including without limitation unauthorized sales, access to performances of, 
or distributions oILWV¶ULJKWV-KROGHUV¶LQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\. Channeling 
associations will consult with rights-holders and payment processors as needed 
in developing such form or system. 
 
Standardized Coding of Infringement Types. Active channeling associations 
will collaborate to develop a standardized coding for various infringement types 
(e.g., unauthorized copyright download, unauthorized copyright streaming, 
counterfeit goods, circumvention devices, etc.) to aid in categorization and 
response by payment processors.  Channeling associations shall consult with the 
payment processors to develop such coding.   
 




Concurrent Notification. Where a site accepts payment from multiple payment 
services, channeling  associations  will endeavor to provide notice of the request 
for investigation to multiple payment processors simultaneously so that each 
payment processor is aware of the pending investigation by a sister payment 
processor.  
 
Training.  Upon request from payment processors, channeling associations shall 
provide baseline training to payment processors on detecting counterfeit 
products or infringing works, or other related topics. 
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4  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/business/13search.html?_r=1 These, and other aspects search 
ranking, were investigated by Congress at the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property, Competition and the Internet Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate 
Sites v. Parasites, Part II 6 April 2011. 
5 http://www.samaritans.org/media_centre/latest_press_releases/google_one_box.aspx  
6 http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2011/09/making-copyright-work-better-online.html  
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7 $VUHIOHFWHGLQ*RRJOH¶VSROLF\VWDWHPHQWRI1RYHPEHUsee 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/12/making-copyright-work-better-online.html  
8 One example of such a certification programme is the Music Matters scheme 
http://www.whymusicmatters.org. This scheme, which is open to any website to join at zero or nominal cost, 
awards Music Matters certification to sites making available recorded music that satisfy objective criteria, in 
terms of having appropriate procedures in place to ensure that the content they make available is properly 
licensed.  















C""8-&# (*%# *55"$50&3# %"+&# 4&0&5'# 2&-0"+&# /+,4"=&+&5'%# '"# /'%# ,4"0&%%&%# ."4# 4&0&/=/58# *53#
*0'/58#"5#DEFG#5"'/0&%#%$6+/''&3#67#4/8('%("-3&4%A# @5#"$4#&),&4/&50&1#*=&4*8&# '*9&3"25#'/+&%#
(*=&# /+,4"=&3# *53# '(&# ,4"0&%%# ".# %$6+/''/58# 5"'/0&%# (*%# 6&&5# +*3&# &*%/&4A# C""8-&# (*%# *-%"#








*$'("4/%&3# *8&5'A# N50&# 4&+"=&31# '(&4&# %("$-3# 6&# &..&0'/=&# +&*%$4&%# '"# ,4&=&5'# 4&O
*,,&*4*50&#".#/5.4/58/58#-/59%#*53#".#,/4*'&#%/'&%#*53#6-"8#%,"'%J##
#
x /.# *# 2&6%/'&# /%# %$6P&0'# '"# *# 6-"09/58# "43&4# "4# (*%# 6&&5# *3P$3/0*'&3# 67# *# 0"$4'# '"# 6&# *#








x G$'"0"+,-&'&# "4# ;%$88&%'&3# %&*40(&%;# %("$-3# 5"'# /5# *57# /5%'*50&# 3/4&0'# 0"5%$+&4%#




                                                 
9 http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2011/09/making-copyright-work-better-online.html  
10 Google currently limits the number of de-listing submissions that a rights holder can make to 10k per day. 
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UK search: the way ahead 
 
The UK internet economy: 
 
The UK internet economy now accounts for over 7.2 per cent of UK GDP and is forecast to 
grow to over 10 per cent by 2015. The UK leads the world at e-commerce: online, the UK 
now exports three times more than it imports. We have become a nation of digital 
shopkeepers, with small businesses online growing over four times faster than those offline. 
This rapid growth in the digital economy continues to create jobs – with some estimates 
suggesting 350,000 jobs over the next five years. 
 
The Coalition Government has made clear that it both recognises the value of the UK 
economy and is committed to nurturing its growth. 
 
"I am committed to making the UK the best place in the world to start, run and grow a 
hi-tech company.” Prime Minister, 29 September 2011 
 
In his September 2011 speech to the Royal Television Society, the Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport echoed the Government's commitment to hi-tech growth and 
described how, with the right conditions, this could create huge opportunities for the creative 
content industries in the UK: 
 
“The first priority must be to capitalise on the extraordinary opportunity presented by our 
digital and creative industries. It is an opportunity that is probably bigger for this country 
than any in the world except the United States. That is because we are the second 
largest producer of digital content in the world and the internet makes it possible to 
distribute that content worldwide at close to zero cost.” 
 
However just as the internet creates fantastic opportunities to distribute UK creative content 
worldwide, it also brings with it new and disruptive challenges, and the Secretary of State is 
seeking to help strengthen copyright enforcement in order to support those who create 
content. 
 
Supporting the Secretary of State’s multi-stakeholder approach: 
 
UK internet users are world leaders in their use of innovative digital content and online 
e-commerce services. At the same time, the UK creative industries are world leaders in 
innovative, commercially successful content of all kinds. 
 
The UK can continue holding both of these leadership positions if the right solutions to online 
copyright infringement can be agreed, which truly focus on the root causes of piracy, and 
target enforcement in a proportionate way. Disproportionate measures would deter inward 
investment, stifle legitimate innovation, and make it harder for new artists to break through. 
We therefore support the Secretary of State’s efforts to facilitate cross-industry dialogue to 
address industrial-scale piracy. In addition, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! will continue to 
help audiences find high-quality content online. 
 
According to the latest figures from the BPI, digital revenues grew by 24.7 per cent in 2011 
to account for 35.4 per cent of overall sales – in particular, digital albums were up 43.2 per 
cent year-on-year. “It is highly encouraging for the long-term prospects of the industry that 
the pace of digital growth continues to accelerate,” says chief executive Geoff Taylor. More 
needs to be done but we are confident that we are on the right track with respect to the 




Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! continue to explore and conclude innovative partnerships with 
the creative industries – built around providing access to more content for more users. 
 
 
Tackling copyright infringement on the internet: 
 
As search engines, we put our users first. Our policies are built around that principle. It is 
vital that as we seek to work with the Secretary of State and the rightsholders to tackle 
online copyright infringement that this principle of putting users first is not overturned. 
 
Search engines play a vital role in free speech, creativity, expression, and innovation by 
organising billions of web pages in a way that they can be more easily discovered by internet 
users. Search engines benefit creators and rightsholders by helping connect users to artists 
and content producers. 
 
Search engines are not the source of infringing content. Removing links from a search 
engine does not remove illicit content from the internet. 
 
Rightsholders have the primary responsibility for protecting their intellectual property, and 
are in the best position to identify their intellectual property and evaluate potential 
infringement. 
 
The violation of intellectual property rights is an issue search engines take seriously and 
have policies and practices in place to address. However, without specific, reliable notices 
from rightsholders, search engines lack the knowledge and capability to identify and address 
infringement without inadvertently disrupting the free flow of information on the internet. 
 
Search engines aid rightsholders in their efforts to enforce their rights by providing robust 
and effective copyright notice and takedown systems which allow for the expeditious 
removal of problematic links and advertisements from the search engine’s database. 
Rightsholders must participate fully in the notice and takedown system for it to be maximally 
effective and expeditious in addressing the shared goal of reducing infringement. 
 
To that end, this document sets out general principles rightsholders and search engines 





1. Principles for ensuring effective and expeditious copyright notice and takedown – 
search engines: 
 
• Search engines should have a method to allow rightsholders to provide notice regarding 
links to infringing materials indexed by the search engine; 
 
• Search engines should have procedures for expeditiously processing valid takedown 
notices from rightsholders; 
 
• To further free speech, creativity, expression, and innovation online, it is appropriate for 
search engines to consider counter-notices from those affected by takedown requests 
and who seek to challenge the basis of those requests; 
 
• Search engines will continue to work with rightsholders to improve notice and takedown 
practices and systems to eliminate inefficiencies in the processing of takedown notices. 
 
 
2. Principles for ensuring effective and expeditious copyright notice and takedown – 
rightsholders: 
 
• Rightsholders should seek removal of infringing content directly from the infringing actor 
or from the online hosting service before seeking remedies from search engines; 
 
• Rightsholders should limit their removal request to links actually offered by a search 
engine in its results or advertisements; 
 
• Rightsholders should substantiate their ownership of allegedly infringing IP and their 
claims of infringement of their IP; 
 
• Rightsholders should narrowly and specifically identify infringing content in their 
takedown notices and must issue such notices only after assessing their impact on any 
non-infringing uses and concluding that the takedown would not have an adverse effect 
on such non-infringing uses; 
 
• Rightsholders should agree to a reasonable procedure for sites or advertisers to file 
counter-notices that contest the takedown demand, allow for restoration of the content 
under appropriate circumstances, and eliminate liability of search engines for restoring 
content in response to counter-notices; 
 
• Rightsholders should be accountable for improper notices, e.g. through the failure to 
properly identify infringing material or limit the negative effect on non-infringing uses; 
 
• Rightsholder should support transparency in the takedown process, by ensuring that 
notices be made publicly available with only minimal redactions to protect privacy 
interests; 
 
• Rightsholders should not pursue legal action against search engines for content that they 
link to unless they have first submitted takedown notices meeting the standards 




3. Leading industry efforts to protect advertisers from association with infringing 
content: 
 
• Our businesses are also damaged by misplacement of advertising against inappropriate 
content. The advertising networks and exchanges we own operate in highly competitive 
spaces, and rely on building and maintaining the trust of our advertiser clients. We 
already have strong commercial incentives to avoid placing advertising against copyright 
infringing material, so where instances do occur, they are rectified swiftly. 
 
• Along with our own efforts, all three companies are active members of the Internet 
Advertising Bureau, and are involved in the evolving system for online self-regulation. 
Our advertising networks are all IASH signatories, and we take our responsibilities in this 
respect very seriously. We are constantly vigilant to the dangers of misplacement of 
advertising online, as this fundamentally affects our ability as businesses to maintain the 
trust of our valued advertiser clients. 
 
• The online advertising world is constantly changing, and now involves a bewildering 
array of different players and technologies. The self-regulatory system must, and will, 
evolve to encompass these changes. 
 
 
Ongoing, multi-stakeholder engagement: 
 
We appreciate the role the Secretary of State has played in engaging all stakeholders in 
meaningful dialogue. 
 
The interconnected nature of the internet means that a well-intended but narrowly focused 
effort to address problems can have serious unintended consequences on the integrity of the 
internet and the rights of its users. Crafting effective action requires a holistic approach that 
includes the engagement of diverse stakeholders, especially those with deep understanding 
of both technical and human rights considerations. 
 
Over the last few years in the UK, there has been steady and welcome growth in 
understanding between the creative industries and internet companies. 
 
This document is written to play a part in furthering that understanding and providing a 
foundation for a progressive partnership with the creative industries that will reduce rates of 
copyright infringement. 
 
We therefore commit to ongoing dialogue in the UK – in parallel with global efforts – with 
copyright owners and other stakeholders. In our view, this dialogue should focus on: 
 
• Assessing and sharing insights into the changing nature of piracy and its technologies; 
 
• Gathering intelligence about the effectiveness of all of the current interventions 
(injunctions, notice and takedown procedures etc.) and providing a forum to discuss their 
evolution. 
 
This dialogue would inform, and be informed by, other dialogue at European level and 
beyond. The aim would be a steady progression of our commercial and policy responses to 
piracy in the UK, which takes due account of global developments. 
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